Summary
affirming judgment denying writ of habeas corpus based on claimed violation of right to speedy trial under R.C. 2945.71 through 2945.73 and the United States and Ohio Constitutions
Summary of this case from Boles v. KnabOpinion
No. 87-2147
Decided April 27, 1988.
Habeas corpus — Delay in ruling on motion to suppress not unreasonable, when — Appeal is proper remedy for alleged violations of speedy trial right.
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Montgomery County.
Appellant, Rolen Jackson, Jr., has been incarcerated in the Montgomery County Jail since his arrest on July 28, 1987. He is charged with aggravated murder and felonious assault and has been unable to post bond of $15,000.
Appellant states that he filed a motion to suppress in the trial court on October 7, 1987. On November 20, 1987, he filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the court of appeals. On November 30, 1987, that court issued a "Decision and Entry" denying the writ. Appellant states that only then, on December 1, 1987, did the trial court rule on his motion to suppress. Trial was set to commence on January 4, 1988.
The cause is now before this court upon an appeal as of right from the denial of the writ.
Robert E. Renshaw, for appellant.
Lee C. Falke, prosecuting attorney, and Ted E. Millspaugh, for appellee.
Appellant argues that the delay involved in bringing him to trial denies his right to a speedy trial secured by the United States and Ohio Constitutions and R.C. 2945.71 through 2945.73, and entitles him to discharge pursuant to a writ of habeas corpus. We disagree.
R.C. 2945.71 provides in part:
"(C) A person against whom a charge of felony is pending:
"* * *
"(2) Shall be brought to trial within two hundred seventy days after his arrest.
"* * *
"(E) For purposes of computing time under * * * [division] (C)(2) * * * of this section, each day during which the accused is held in jail in lieu of bail on the pending charge shall be counted as three days. * * *"
R.C. 2945.72 provides in part:
"The time within which an accused must be brought to trial, or, in the case of felony, to preliminary hearing and trial, may be extended only by the following:
"* * *
"(E) Any period of delay necessitated by reason of a plea in bar or abatement, motion, proceeding, or action made or instituted by the accused."
The court of appeals held that appellant did not demonstrate that the trial court had taken more time than was reasonably necessary to rule on his motion to suppress. In arriving at this decision, it relied on an additional fact, developed at the hearing on the petition, that appellant was one of three co-defendants, each of whom filed motions to suppress, necessitating three separate hearings to accommodate the schedules of their counsel. Under these circumstances, we cannot say the delay was unreasonable.
An appeal rather than a writ of habeas corpus is the proper remedy to challenge alleged violations of the right to a speedy trial. In re Singer (1976), 45 Ohio St.2d 130, 74 O.O.2d 253, 341 N.E.2d 849. The judgment of the court of appeals is therefore affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.
MOYER, C.J., SWEENEY, LOCHER, HOLMES, DOUGLAS, WRIGHT and H. BROWN, JJ., concur.