Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Kern County. H.A. Staley, Judge, Nos. JD116919 & JD116920
Shaylah Padgett-Weibel, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
B.C. Barmann, Sr., County Counsel, and Susan M. Gill, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
OPINION
Gomes, J.
M.A. (father) appeals from the juvenile court’s dispositional order declaring his then 13-year-old daughter A. and 16-year-old son J. (collectively the children) dependents, temporarily removing them from his physical custody and ordering reunification services. Father challenges only the removal order, asserting it was not supported by evidence that removal was necessary to avoid a substantial danger to the children’s physical health or emotional well-being (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 361, subd. (c)(1)) and there were alternatives available short of removal. We disagree and will affirm the order.
Mother, who was a non-offending, non-custodial parent, also was given reunification services. She is not a party to this appeal.
All further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The children first came to the attention of Kern County Child Protective Services (CPS) in April 1997, when it was reported that a protective custody petition had been filed in Las Vegas, Nevada, on behalf of the children and their older brother, N., alleging mother’s improper supervision, alcoholism and emotional instability. Investigation revealed all three children were living with father and mother in Boron; the house had very little furniture, the family slept on mattresses on the floor, and there was not enough food or clothing for the children. Pursuant to instructions from Las Vegas Child Protective Services, CPS took the three children into protective custody and transported them to Las Vegas. On April 23, 1997, the court released the three children to father’s care in California.
In May 1997, CPS received another referral reporting that Las Vegas Child Protective Services had given father, who was living in Boron, custody of the three children; that mother had “alcohol and mental problems” and was at Kern Medical Center threatening suicide; and the children were not to reside with mother. CPS received a referral in February 1998 alleging the house was “‘filthy dirty.’” Father admitted the home was in “pretty bad condition,” but the social worker noted he had cleaned it up before her arrival and the children appeared clean and healthy. A June 1998 referral alleging general neglect was substantiated, as the home was found to be “‘trashed and filthy’” and a November 1998 referral alleging general neglect was inconclusive as it appeared the family had moved.
Father and the three children eventually moved to Dallas, Texas. In 1999, the Texas Department of Family and Protective Services received four referrals over a nine- month period alleging father was neglecting the children and keeping a filthy home. After an investigation in December 1999 into a referral alleging father left N. alone to care for his sick sister, father agreed to voluntary services, but the case was closed because father failed to keep appointments and no new referrals were received. In 2002, two more referrals were received alleging father left J. and A. alone overnight unsupervised, but the second referral, in November 2002, could not be investigated as the family had moved. Another referral, received in June 2003, alleging father left the children home unsupervised, could not be investigated because the family had moved.
In May 2006, the Kern County Department of Human Services (Department) received a referral alleging general neglect, stating the children were being sent to school “filthy, with holes ripped in pants, shirt and shoes,” and the school had attempted to notify father for a change of clothes, but the telephone had been disconnected. The allegations were deemed inconclusive because the Department was unable to investigate as father and the children were in Florida visiting a grandmother.
The instant dependency case had its genesis in December 2007, when J. reported to Kern County Sheriff’s Deputy Norris that father had threatened to kill him over a lost cell phone and had a rifle which he was afraid father would use to hurt him. Sheriff’s deputies responded to the home, which was in a trailer park, and found “an inhabited recreational vehicle” (RV) heated with a propane heater that had several electrical cords in use around its base. The deputies found an unsecured firearm in the vehicle and “garbage and general debris scattered about the yard.” Deputy Norris believed the situation presented a safety hazard to the residents of the RV. A trailer was also on the property. There were two entrances to the trailer, neither of which was clear. One entrance was a sliding glass door that was visible but blocked by debris; the deck used to access the sliding door “had no steps and appeared to be unstable.” A large amount of debris nearly blocked the other entrance and the door was no longer attached, leaving an open walkway into the trailer. Deputy Norris did not go into the trailer because a large dog was inside it, but he did look inside and noted the trailer “was in a state of disrepair and appeared to be dirty.” The hot water heater was exposed and several wall panels had been removed exposing the inner wall. Deputy Norris spoke to father, who said J. had left after an argument they had over J. helping to clean the residence. Deputy Norris also spoke to A., who said father and J. had been arguing over a phone and after the argument, J. left.
Kern County Sheriff’s Deputy Bowman re-contacted father at the trailer park. Father told Deputy Bowman he was recently injured at work and had been unable to move until a week before. Father claimed he had been cleaning the trailer and RV since that time, but admitted it still needed a lot of work. Father was reluctant to allow Deputy Bowman to look inside the RV and trailer, but eventually allowed him to do so. The interiors of both the RV and trailer were nearly uninhabitable. The floors and any flat counter or surface was covered in trash and clutter; dirt and dust covered everything. Aside from the open propane heater, there did not appear to be a working furnace or electricity. Deputy Bowman concluded neither the RV nor trailer was a safe place for children to live. Father called a cousin in southern California, who agreed to take the children until he was able to arrange for more appropriate living conditions. Deputy Bowman confirmed that father transported the children there and spoke with the cousin. Deputy Bowman decided not to take the children into protective custody because father was willing to relocate the children until the situation could be resolved, and referred father to the Department for assistance and services.
On December 27, 2007, the Department received a referral alleging that father had retrieved the children from his cousin’s house on December 23, 2007, though neither child wanted to go with him. Detective Bowman told the social worker the children would be taken into protective custody because the trailer they were living in was not suitable for children. A social worker attempted to contact the family “at their home on several occasions to no avail,” and tried to contact the children at school, but they were no longer enrolled. The social worker finally made contact with father on February 1, 2008, while he was driving away from the residence. Father agreed to speak with the social worker on February 5. On February 4, father called the social worker and asked if they could reschedule the meeting for the following week. The social worker explained she needed to speak with the children. Father told the social worker he was going to re-enroll A. at a middle school and J. attended a home study school. Deputy Bowman told the social worker he allowed the children to reside with the relative because of the holidays and explained they were not supposed to return home until the trailer was cleaned up and the utilities working properly.
The social worker interviewed A. at the middle school on February 5. A. reported her grades had suffered because she had not been in school for five weeks. A. claimed the utilities at the home worked and they had food. She said she had been sleeping in the RV at night and they have portable heaters. She felt safe with father. A. said father and J. had only gotten into verbal arguments and she had never seen them get physical. A. reported an incident in which J. hit father during an argument, but father did not hit back. A. said things had been going well in her home since that incident. She told the social worker she was responsible for cleaning the home, mainly the dishes. The social worker described A. as “well dressed, groomed, [and] . . . healthy and happy.” On February 6, the social worker told father she would be coming to his home the following day to see the residence.
The social worker interviewed J. at school on February 7. J. reported he is sometimes frightened by his father’s behavior, which he described as “erratic” and “psychotic,” and said his father has “a really bad temper.” J. explained he is in a home-school program which requires him to attend school one day a week, but he does not always attend and he doesn’t do his homework because father always has him working around the house. J. said his family has “been working on cleaning up the trailer,” and he was responsible for mopping, taking out the trash and cleaning the kitchen. The heater in the trailer is broken and it is so cold without heat that their dog froze to death, so the family sleeps in the RV. J. said he is afraid that his father’s anger is going to result in either he or his sister being hurt. The social worker noted that J. was not well groomed: “J. looked like he just got out of bed; he looked tired, was not dressed well, his shoe[’]s soles were falling off, but he did appear to be healthy.”
The social worker, an aide, a sheriff’s deputy and Deputy Bowman went to the home and found deplorable conditions. Father told them there was electricity, water and some food, the landlord refused to fix the broken heater, he had been boarding up the broken windows, and for the last three weeks he had been staying at hotels when he could afford it, and only staying at the trailer two to three nights per week.
Piles of trash and debris were in the front yard, as well as inside the trailer and RV. Exposed wires were going from the RV to the trailer. At the trailer’s entryway, the social worker noted the smell “of urine, old stale food and feces.” To get inside the trailer, the social worker had to tiptoe around “a tool box, empty dog food bags, magazines, empty soda bottles, tools, a computer, boxes, a table, canned food, old newspapers, blankets, and a laundry basket among other piles of trash.” A.’s bedroom had a stained mattress with no sheets and was littered with the same type of debris. The bathroom countertop was not visible because it was covered with debris; the floor was full of trash, food wrappers and magazines. The toilet did not have working mechanisms and there was a bucket used for the shower, which was clogged and did not work properly. The kitchen sink was not operable; there was debris, as well as spoiled and stale food, throughout the room. The “kitchen reeked of mold and feces.” The social worker noticed a light fixture full of mold coming out of the ceiling and another light with a wire wrapped around it holding it up. On the ground were fast food wrappers, pots, bags, trash, exposed wires, towels and empty soda bottles. The living room was also full of debris; the social worker was able to walk only halfway into the room because there was so much laundry and trash on the ground in the other half of the living room.
The RV was also full of debris and “smelled of urine, spoiled rotten food and feces.” In the bedroom were three mattresses piled high with “clothes, bags, papers, empty juice containers, wires, and an electronic device.” A lamp had caused the RV’s ceiling to turn black, indicating a safety hazard. The room had a shelf piled high and stuffed full with magazines, boxes, empty food containers, helmets, a chair, and baskets with papers and books, and the floor was littered with empty cereal boxes, compact discs, clothes, papers, and towels. A heat lamp was lying on the clothes in the bedroom.
Father told the social worker he thinks J. needs psychiatric help. A. cried and told the social worker she did not want to leave father. The social worker explained she could not leave the children in the home because the conditions were unsafe. Deputy Bowman and the social worker agreed the house was not suitable because of the safety hazards of exposed wires, old stale food, piles of clothes and trash, and utilities not properly working that put the children at risk of being injured. The social worker provided father with an application for an apartment complex that had proper housing and placed the children in protective custody.
In interviews with the social worker, both children stated they had no relationship with their mother, who lived in Las Vegas, where their older brother, N., also lived. A. appeared very bonded to father and wanted to return to him. A. said that father had hurt his back and the home became “‘beyond repair.’” She did not appear bothered by the home’s condition and stated everything in the home was working.
J., however, seemed “very depressed and frustrated about his living situation,” and told the social worker he had been living in dirty homes his entire life and was not happy about that. J. said there is no heat in the home and the water doesn’t work well. J. explained the water in the kitchen and bathroom sinks does not work and while the water in the shower works, the drain is clogged so when taking a shower the water needs to be “‘bailed out.’” To flush the toilet, the chain inside the tank has to be pulled. The trailer is so cold at night that they sleep in the RV, where they use a space heater for warmth. J. has to take a shower at a friend’s house or sometimes father rents a motel room; he recently had to boil hot water on the stove to take a bath. Since leaving father’s cousin’s house, he has only been able to bathe about once a week and he wanted to be able to bathe every day. J. said father sleeps and sits in front of the computer all day. J. also uses the computer, explaining “I try to disconnect from my life.” J. did not want to visit father and he wanted to live with father’s cousin.
On February 8, father told the social worker his home was in such poor condition because the landlord needed to fix a few things. Father said he did not let the children remain at his cousin’s because she wouldn’t let him see the children. He also said J. was “‘bad-mouthing me behind my back.’” Father said he was looking for a new place to live, but he had financial problems. Father stated he was trying to find a job and thought his mother might be able to help him with money to obtain a new residence.
That same day, mother called the social worker and reported that father had been hiding the children from her. She said she went through rehabilitation in 1998, but suffered “a brief relapse a few years ago.” She claimed she had been clean and sober for three years. Mother said she was diagnosed with “Situational Depression” when her children were taken from her. She confirmed her oldest son, N., lives in Las Vegas with her mother. Mother told the social worker she was not in a position to care for the children, but she would like them to be placed with her sister in Las Vegas.
Dependency petitions were filed on the children on February 11, 2008. The petitions alleged J. and A. were children described by section 300, subdivision (b), in that they had suffered or there was a substantial risk they would suffer serious physical harm or illness because of their father’s willful or negligent failure to provide them with adequate food, clothing, shelter, or medical treatment. The petitions described in detail the condition of the trailer and RV on December 15, 2007 and February 7, 2008.
At the detention hearing, the court declared father the presumed father and ordered the children detained. The court, however, gave the Department discretion to return the children to father upon verification of appropriate housing, with five days’ notice to all counsel prior to placement. The court ordered weekly one-hour supervised visits for both parents. When the social worker reviewed the initial case plan with father, he asked about the court’s order allowing return of the children. The social worker explained the court gave the Department discretion to release the children to him if he obtained a suitable residence, and said that if he did so, the Department would consider returning A. to his care but not J., since he refused to return to father’s care. Sometime after the detention hearing, J. expressed a desire to live with mother, while A. wanted to be returned to father.
On February 27, father called the social worker and said he was registered at the homeless shelter and wanted his children returned to him there. The social worker explained the children would not be returned to him at the homeless shelter, as “the living conditions at his home appeared to be a lifestyle for him, according to his children’s statements and past referrals,” and living at the homeless shelter would prevent the social worker from assessing whether father was capable of maintaining a suitable residence for the children. Father became angry and insisted the social worker had told him the children would be returned if he moved to the homeless shelter. The social worker denied telling him that, but father kept insisting she did and said she was lying to him. On March 17, father told a social worker he was still staying at the trailer park.
At first there was difficulty arranging visits between father and the children, as father initially did not agree to allow the foster parent to supervise visits, J. refused to visit with father, and father tried to schedule Saturday visits, when there was a limited number of aides available to supervise. Their first visit was on February 21. Father told A. he was looking for a house in Boron. A. responded she dislikes Boron and refused to live there. When father said they may have to go live in Boron because he might be able to get a good home there, A. began to cry. A. asked father to look for a house in Bakersfield; he agreed to do so. The interaction between father and J. was extremely limited and occurred only when father addressed a specific question to him. J. asked to leave the visit early and father agreed he could. Father also visited with the children on March 1, 8 and 19; A. interacted with father during these visits, but J. refused to do so. The last documented visits between father and the children occurred on April 4.
After father failed to appear in court on April 2 for the scheduled jurisdictional hearing, the court continued the hearing to April 16 at his attorney’s request. Father again failed to appear for the April 16 jurisdictional hearing. The court denied father’s attorney’s request for continuance and found the petition’s allegations true. The dispositional hearing was continued and the court ordered the Department to initiate an ICPC investigation into placement of the children with their maternal aunt in Nevada.
A contested dispositional hearing was held on May 5, with father present in the courtroom and mother appearing by telephone. A. testified she felt safe with father and she never lived in conditions where she didn’t have food or shelter. A. understood father was currently living at a homeless center in Bakersfield and she preferred to live with him there rather than in court custody. J.’s attorney made an offer of proof, which counsel and the court accepted, that if called to testify he would indicate he does not feel safe living with father and does not wish to live with him, but he wishes to live with his mother or aunt in Las Vegas. Father’s attorney provided the court with an April 30 letter from a homeless shelter in Bakersfield, which stated that as of April 30, the homeless shelter had “available space” for father and the children, which was entered into evidence.
Father’s attorney stated father was willing to have both children with him, but understood J. did not wish to come home, and therefore asked that A. be placed with him under terms of family maintenance. A.’s attorney noted that while A. wanted to live with her father, because the family had what seemed to be a “long-term problem” and a history of leaving, the attorney was submitting on the report.
The court adjudicated the children dependents pursuant to section 300, subdivision (b). The court removed the children from father’s custody after finding clear and convincing evidence of a substantial danger to the children’s well-being in their father’s care, and no reasonable means to protect their physical health without removal from father’s custody. The court ordered reunification services to both parents. Father was ordered to participate in counseling for parenting and child neglect, and to complete a mental health evaluation and comply with any treatment recommendations. Visits were ordered to continue and the court restated its order for an ICPC evaluation of mother and the maternal aunt in Las Vegas. The court gave the Department discretion for J. to have an extended visit with mother.
DISCUSSION
Father contends the court abused its discretion in removing the children from his custody because (1) there was insufficient evidence of a substantial danger to the children’s physical health, safety, or well-being if returned home; and (2) the evidence does not show that less drastic measures would not sufficiently protect the children. (§ 361, subd. (c)(1).) We find no ground for reversal.
When a parent challenges a dispositional finding, the question is whether substantial evidence supports the finding. (Kimberly R. v. Superior Court (2002) 96 Cal.App.4th 1067, 1078; In re Mark L. (2001) 94 Cal.App.4th 573, 580-581 [although trial court makes findings by the elevated standard of clear and convincing evidence, substantial evidence test remains the standard of review on appeal].) In resolving this question, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court’s determination, drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the determination and affirm the order even if there is other evidence supporting a contrary conclusion. (In re Baby Boy L. (1994) 24 Cal.App.4th 596, 610; In re Misako R. (1991) 2 Cal.App.4th 538, 545.) The appellant has the burden of showing there is no evidence of a sufficiently substantial nature to support the order. (In re L.Y.L. (2002) 101 Cal.App.4th 942, 947.)
As relevant here, before the court may order a child physically removed from his or her parent, it must find by clear and convincing evidence that the child would be at substantial risk of harm if returned home and there are no reasonable means by which the child can be protected without removal. (§ 361, subd. (c)(1).) A removal order is proper if it is based on proof of parental inability to provide proper care for the child and proof of a potential detriment to the child if he or she remains with the parent. (In re Diamond H. (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 1127, 1136 (Diamond H.), disapproved on another ground in Renee J. v. Superior Court (2001) 26 Cal.4th 735, 748, fn. 6.) The parent’s level of denial is an appropriate factor to consider when determining the risk to the child if placed with that parent. (In re Esmeralda B. (1992) 11 Cal.App.4th 1036, 1044 [denial is a factor often relevant to determining whether persons are likely to modify their behavior in the future without court supervision].) The parent need not be dangerous and the child need not actually have been harmed before removal is appropriate. The focus of the statute is on averting harm to the child. (Diamond H., supra, 82 Cal.App.4th at p. 1136; In re Jamie M. (1982) 134 Cal.App.3d 530, 536, citing In re B.G. (1974) 11 Cal.3d 679, 699.)
We conclude that application of the appropriate standard of review requires that we affirm the court’s dispositional order because it is supported by substantial evidence. The evidence showed the RV and trailer were unsafe for the children to live in, placing them in danger of physical harm. There was not a clear entrance into the trailer. The trailer presented a fire hazard, as it was full of trash and a light fixture that hung from the ceiling had another light with a wire wrapped around it holding the light fixture up. The conditions were unsanitary – the toilet flushed only by pulling on the chain inside the tank, the shower did not drain, there was no hot water, the kitchen sink was inoperable, there was mold in the ceiling and the trailer smelled of urine, stale food and feces. The RV also presented a fire hazard, as it was also full of trash and debris and there was a lamp inside it that was turning the ceiling black, as well as a heat lamp lying on the clothes in the bedroom. Exposed wires running from the RV to the trailer presented a fire hazard. While father minimizes the condition of the RV and trailer, asserting that excessive trash and foul odors don’t place teenage children at risk of physical harm, he ignores the fire hazards that were present, as well as the unsanitary conditions of the RV and trailer in not having hot water, a kitchen sink, an operable shower, and mold. The fire hazards and unsanitary conditions certainly place even teenage children at risk of physical harm.
Father relies on In re Paul E. (1995) 39 Cal.App.4th 996 (Paul E.) in support of his argument that removal is not supported by the record. In that case, jurisdiction was declared over a four-year-old, possibly autistic, child due to the dirty and unsanitary conditions of the home, although he was not removed from his parents’ custody. While the parents improved the living conditions, the caseworker remained concerned about their ability to function as parents. The house was still messy and dirty, but the unsanitary conditions had been remedied. The caseworker identified trivial hazards, which the parents immediately fixed. The caseworker nonetheless took the child into custody because the parents’ failure to “‘progress in recognizing the dirty conditions of the house demonstrate[d] that they were limited by their own ability.’” (Id. at p. 1000.) The appellate court reversed the dispositional order removing the child from the parents’ custody, finding that chronic messiness by itself and apart from any unsanitary conditions or resulting illness or accident is not clear and convincing evidence of a substantial risk of harm. (Id. at p. 1005.)
The facts in Paul E. are not comparable to the facts presented here, as that case involved simply a messy house, with a few trivial hazards, kept by parents who otherwise doted on their only child. Here, the RV and trailer were not simply messy; they presented fire and safety hazards, and were unsanitary. That the children here are teenagers does not mitigate the risk posed to them from an unsanitary home lacking hot water, heat in winter, beds with linens on them, and posing a fire hazard from the use of space and propane heaters, exposed wires, and a lamp blackening the ceiling in areas where there was an inordinate amount of debris and trash. Father asserts the hazards easily could have been remedied without removing the children. Father, however, was given an opportunity to remedy the situation, yet failed to do so, both after he took the children to live with his cousin in December 2007, and after the children were detained in February 2008. Father’s failure to rectify the situation demonstrates the difficulty in fixing the hazardous conditions.
We also reject father’s claim that there was no risk of physical harm because the children were not adversely affected by the home’s condition. While the children appeared healthy, there was evidence that J. suffered emotionally from the unsanitary conditions and was unable to do his homework, and both of the children missed a significant amount of school. Moreover, as stated above, a child need not have suffered actual harm before removal is appropriate. (Diamond H., supra, 82 Cal.App.4th at p. 1136.) Although the court in Paul E. took “special note” that the child there had not actually suffered ill effects from his home, and explained that was a way of distinguishing “a loving-but-dirty-home case from a case of real neglect” (Paul E., supra, 39 Cal.App.4th at p. 1005 & fn. 8), this case involves more than a dirty home – it involves a home that is unsafe and unsanitary. Based on the evidence, the juvenile court reasonably could conclude that there was clear and convincing evidence of a risk of physical harm to the children if they remained in father’s custody.
Father contends the court had other options short of removal, either (1) the conditions in the home that posed actual physical danger to the children could have been remedied “in the matter of a few minutes,” the children returned to the home, and father provided services there, or (2) the children could have been placed with father at the homeless shelter with services. With respect to the first alternative, the children could not have been returned to the trailer park because the dangers in the home were substantial and could not have been corrected within a matter of minutes. The RV and trailer were full of trash and debris, which presented a fire hazard due to the exposed wiring, lamps, and the space and propane heaters. The family had reportedly been trying to clean up the home, but were unable to do so. Father complains there was no discussion of voluntary placement of the children outside the home long enough for him to bring the home up to acceptable standards. Father, however, was given the opportunity to regain custody of the children before the dispositional hearing if he remedied the dangers in the home, yet he failed to do so. Based on this evidence, the juvenile court reasonably could conclude that supervised in-home placement would have been insufficient to protect the children and removal was necessary to provide time for father to secure adequate housing.
This case is distinguishable from the one father relies on, In re Jeannette S. (1979) 94 Cal.App.3d 52 (Jeannette S.), which involved a five-year-old removed from the filthy home of a possibly schizoid mother, who was of above average intelligence and had herself contacted child protective services for assistance. The mother’s repeated requests for assistance triggered dependency proceedings. Other than being very dirty, the child was well nourished, in good health, doing well in school, and had a close and loving relationship with her mother. (Id. at pp. 56-58.) This court found substantial evidence to support the jurisdictional finding because the home was filthy and smelled of feces and urine, the child had no adequate place to sleep because of the clutter, and the filthy condition was not an isolated incident. (Id. at pp. 58-59.) This court, however, found insufficient evidence to support the dispositional order removing the child from the custody of both the mother and father, as the juvenile court failed to consider less drastic alternatives, and noted two viable alternatives to the removal order: (1) return the child to the mother under stringent conditions of supervision and appropriate services to clean the home, given the mother’s previous and repeated attempts to maintain the house and obtain the requisite assistance from social agencies; or (2) place the child in the non-offending father’s custody, who was willing to assume custody and living in appropriate conditions, while the court exercised its broad power of supervision and monitored her progress while in the father’s care. (Id. at pp. 60-61.)
Unlike the mother’s apartment in Jeannette S., which was cluttered and smelly but apparently did not present a safety hazard, the trailer and RV here are not only cluttered and smelly, they are uninhabitable. Father asserts that like the mother in Jeannette S., he should have been offered homemaking assistance. Nothing in the record, however, suggests that such assistance would have been effective. First, father needed more than homemaking assistance to make the trailer and RV habitable – significant repairs needed to be done to enable the trailer to have hot water, heat, a working kitchen sink, a sanitary toilet, and to remove the mold on the ceiling. Moreover, father had a long history of inadequate supervision of his children, living in filthy homes and evading child protective services. While there were some periods of time when child protective services did not receive referrals about the family, the juvenile court reasonably could conclude from the referrals that were received, as well as J.’s statement that he had lived in filthy homes his entire life, that father had a long-standing problem in these areas. While father was given an opportunity to clean up the home or find alternative housing in December 2007, as well as after dependency proceedings were initiated in February 2008, he failed to do so. Given father’s indifference to remedying the problem, it is not likely he would do so if the children were returned to him, even with assistance.
The juvenile court also reasonably could find the second option – placing the children with him in the homeless shelter – was insufficient to protect the children. While father asserts he was no longer living in the trailer park at the time of the dispositional hearing, the evidence does not establish this. The only evidence of father’s residence was A.’s testimony that she understood he was living at the homeless shelter. The letter from the homeless shelter also does not establish that he was living there or that the family could actually live there as of the date of the dispositional hearing, as it states only that as of April 30, 2008, the homeless shelter had available space for the family. Even if there was space at the homeless shelter for the family, the juvenile court reasonably could conclude it would not be safe to return the children to father there, given the lack of evidence of father’s future plans for housing, and his past history of transience and maintaining filthy homes.
In sum, we find substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s removal order. As a result, we uphold the order temporarily removing the children from father’s custody.
DISPOSITION
The juvenile court’s dispositional order is affirmed.
WE CONCUR: Vartabedian, Acting P.J., Kane, J.