Opinion
B304588
06-28-2021
In re IZABELLA B., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. LOS ANGELES COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. ILIANA B., Defendant and Appellant.
Sherman & Fung and Kenneth P. Sherman for Defendant and Appellant. Rodrigo A. Castro-Silva, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy, Assistant County Counsel, and Tracey Dodds, Principal Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County No. 19CCJP00923A, Jean M. Nelson, Judge. Dismissed.
Sherman & Fung and Kenneth P. Sherman for Defendant and Appellant.
Rodrigo A. Castro-Silva, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy, Assistant County Counsel, and Tracey Dodds, Principal Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
SEGAL, J.
INTRODUCTION
Iliana B. appeals from the juvenile court's disposition order declaring her daughter, Izabella B., a dependent of the court, removing Izabella from her custody, and finding the Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services made reasonable efforts to prevent Izabella's removal and to return her to Iliana's home. Iliana argues the Department did not make reasonable efforts to provide (predisposition) reunification services-specifically, the Department “failed to implement the court's visitation orders and failed to look for a qualified therapist” for Izabella.
We cannot provide Iliana any effective relief. The juvenile court's reasonable efforts findings related to the Department's efforts to prevent Izabella's removal and to return her to Iliana's home. Iliana, however, does not challenge Izabella's removal or placement. Moreover, after the juvenile court at disposition ordered family reunification services for Iliana, the court made orders at three subsequent review hearings that included findings the Department made reasonable efforts to reunify Izabella with Iliana, and Iliana did not appeal from any of those orders. Thus, even if we reversed the juvenile court's reasonable services findings at disposition, there would still be three such unchallenged findings. Therefore, we dismiss the appeal.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. The Juvenile Court Detains Izabella and Orders Monitored Visitation for Iliana
Izabella is now 12 years old. She lived with her legal guardian-her maternal grandmother-from ages three to nine, when the probate court terminated the guardianship and reunited Izabella with Iliana. In February 2019, seven months after Izabella returned to Iliana's home, the Department filed a petition under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivision (b), alleging Iliana was “unable to care for [Izabella] due to intoxication, ” after Izabella sent a text message to a friend saying she was scared because her mother “was drunk and passed out.” During an interview with a Department social worker, Izabella said she was afraid of Iliana and did not want to live with her. Izabella also told the social worker Iliana drank alcohol while driving with Izabella. Iliana submitted to Izabella's detention, and the court placed Izabella with her maternal grandmother and ordered monitored visitation for Iliana. The court also ordered a mental health assessment for Izabella.
Undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
B. Izabella Refuses To Visit with Iliana
By April 2019 Izabella and Iliana had not had any visits. The Department filed a report for a hearing later that month that stated there had been no visits because Izabella was “extremely resistant to it” and “continues to have fears and flashbacks.” At the hearing the Department asked the court to suspend visitation, and counsel for Izabella joined the Department's request. The court stated it could not make a finding whether visits would be detrimental without the results of Izabella's mental health assessment and ordered the Department in the meantime to “encourage” Izabella to have visits with Iliana. The court ordered Izabella to begin therapy with a licensed therapist and ordered the Department to assess certain therapists Iliana had suggested and offered to pay for.
The social worker continued to encourage Izabella to visit with Iliana, explained the visits would be monitored, and told her Iliana could not be under the influence of alcohol during visits. The social worker also told Izabella she could end the visits at any time if she felt uncomfortable. Izabella repeatedly refused to visit with her mother. In early May 2019 the Department filed an amended petition under section 300, subdivisions (a) and (b), and reported Izabella was on a waitlist for a therapist.
At a progress hearing on May 14, 2019 the Department stated that it had considered the therapists Iliana had suggested, but that the therapists were 20 miles from Izabella's placement and might be biased. The Department stated that Elizabeth Madrigal would provide therapy for Izabella and that, although she was not licensed, she would be supervised by a licensed therapist. Counsel for Iliana objected, arguing Madrigal was not qualified and lacked experience. The court ordered Izabella to begin therapy with Madrigal.
Izabella began therapy with Madrigal on May 16, 2019. Two weeks later the court ordered the Department to report on Izabella's progress and to ask Madrigal “whether [Izabella] can have visits with mother” and whether Madrigal “would be willing to provide the therapeutic setting [for visits] and/or conjoint counseling.”
Prior to the jurisdiction hearing in July 2019, the Department reported that the social worker asked Izabella each week if she wanted to visit her mother and that Izabella continued to refuse. At the hearing, the juvenile court sustained the amended petition, and set a disposition hearing.
C. Izabella Continues To Refuse Visits with Iliana
In early August 2019 Madrigal told the social worker Izabella was making progress in her “trauma focus[ed] therapy” but still did not want to visit with Iliana. The social worker met with Izabella and reported that she seemed “less anxious” when discussing Iliana. Yet, Izabella told the social worker there was nothing the social worker could do to “change her mind” about visiting with Iliana. Throughout September and October 2019 Izabella continued to refuse to speak with Iliana.
The court continued the disposition hearing to November 21, 2019 and ordered the Department to provide a report on whether conjoint therapy could begin. The Department reported Izabella “continue[d] to decline” contact with Iliana, despite the social worker's attempts “to encourage Izabella to have telephone calls and or visits” and the social worker's assurances of “different safety precautions that can be put in place to help her feel safe in visits.” The Department stated it “can encourage visits, however [it] cannot physically force the child to attend a visit with [her] mother.”
The Department also reported it appeared Iliana “had a relapse” because she sounded “under the influence” and spoke in a “slurry, repetitive, scattered, incoherent” manner. The Department stated that “[b]ased on [Iliana's] recent relapse it is evident that the services the mother participated in have not remediated the risk factors and the reasons as to why [the Department] is involved with the family.”
Iliana voluntarily enrolled in programs, including substance abuse treatment and a parenting course, prior to disposition.
D. The Juvenile Court Makes Disposition Orders
The social worker testified at the November 21, 2019 disposition hearing that she asked Izabella each month if she would see or speak to Iliana, but that Izabella always said no. The social worker said she told Madrigal that the goals of Izabella's therapy were “to decrease anxiety” and “reunify with mother” and that she discussed with Madrigal “the obstacles for reunification”-namely, that Izabella was not “ready to speak [to] or see mother.”
The Department filed a last minute information report for the continued disposition hearing on January 13, 2020. The Department stated that the social worker continued “to inquire with Izabella and encourage her” to have visits with Iliana, but that Izabella was “not interested.” Izabella said that her decision was “influence[d]” by Iliana's “‘drinking problem'” and that Iliana “‘left a voicemail and you can tell she was drunk.'”
Madrigal testified she ended Izabella's therapy because the goal was to “address trauma” and Izabella had “met her therapy goals.” On the issue of visitation, Madrigal stated that the social worker asked her whether she could “provide the reunification” and that Madrigal told the social worker, “We don't provide reunification services.”
Counsel for Iliana argued the Department did not make reasonable efforts “to reunify” Izabella with her mother because it “took [the Department] three months to get her into therapy” and the Department “did not do anything to enforce visitation.” Counsel argued Izabella's therapy was not appropriate because Madrigal was not a licensed therapist and did not focus “on re-establishing a relationship between Izabella and her mother.” Despite his argument the Department did not make reasonable efforts to reunify Izabella with Iliana, counsel for Iliana stated, “[W]e're not sitting here saying Izabella needs to go back to the mom, what we're saying here is we need to make a good faith effort to try and reestablish a relationship.” Counsel for Iliana said, “We're not contesting the recommendation for a suitable placement.”
The court found the Department made reasonable efforts regarding Izabella's therapy. The court observed that, although there was some initial delay in finding a therapist and Madrigal was not licensed, Izabella completed her treatment with Madrigal, who the court said was “a suitable therapist” and “understood her duty.” The court found “the services she provided were useful to deal with [Izabella's] anxiety which would naturally involve issues of talking about her mother and how she deals with her mother.” The court also found the Department “continued to assess the therapy and continued to assess whether conjoint [counseling] could begin.”
The court also found the Department made reasonable efforts regarding visitation. The court stated the Department “routinely ask[ed] Izabella if she was ready to visit, and encouraged her to visit, and that is what the social worker should have done. To go beyond that and be more coercive is not appropriate.” The court said that, although the Department should try to enforce visitation orders, it would be “emotionally damaging” to “drag a child to visits.”
Finally, the court ruled, “[W]hether or not there [were] reasonable efforts... [t]he mother has had a relapse.... And that relapse is not new to anything having to do with the visits with the child. There is no cause and effect-I'm finding there were reasonable services, but even if... there was a problem with the visits, that is not the reason why mother is failing to reunify.... I couldn't even order reunification today-that the child go back-because the mother has had a relapse.”
The juvenile court declared Izabella a dependent under section 300 and found there were no reasonable means to protect her without removing her from Iliana. The court found the Department made reasonable efforts to prevent removal and to return Izabella to Iliana's home. The juvenile court ordered for Iliana, among other things, family reunification services and monitored visits with Izabella in a therapeutic setting. The court ordered Izabella to resume therapy with a new therapist and ordered the Department to assess the therapists Iliana had previously suggested, notwithstanding the distance from Izabella's placement. The court stated it would not order conjoint therapy without a recommendation from a therapist. Iliana timely appealed from the juvenile court's disposition order, challenging only the court's findings the Department made reasonable efforts regarding visitation and therapy for Izabella.
E. The Juvenile Court Holds Review Hearings and Terminates Reunification Services
After Iliana appealed from the disposition order, the juvenile court on October 19, 2020 held a review hearing under section 366.21, subdivision (e), and found Iliana had made partial progress in her reunification case plan. The court found the Department “complied with the case plan by providing, offering, or making reasonable and/or active efforts to provide or offer reasonable services to enable [Izabella's] safe return home” and continued reunification services for Iliana. The court made these same findings at the January 19, 2021 review hearing under section 366.21, subdivision (f), and again continued reunification services. Iliana did not appeal from either order.
At the March 19, 2021 permanency review hearing under section 366.22, the court again found that Iliana had made partial progress in her case plan and that the Department had made reasonable efforts to enable Izabella to return to Iliana's home safely. The court, however, terminated reunification services and set a permanency planning hearing under section 366.26 for July 16, 2021. Iliana did not seek review of that order.
We take judicial notice of the juvenile court's October 19, 2020, January 19, 2021, and March 19, 2021 minute orders. (See Evid. Code, §§ 452, subd. (d), 459.)
DISCUSSION
Iliana challenges the juvenile court's findings at disposition that the Department made reasonable efforts, arguing the Department “utterly failed to implement the court's visitation orders and failed to look for a qualified therapist who could provide conjoint therapy.” The Department argues the juvenile court's reasonable efforts findings are not appealable. But even if the findings are appealable (see In re T.G. (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 687, 694 [a “‘review of findings is normally obtained by appeal from the ensuing judgment or order'”]), we must dismiss Iliana's appeal because we cannot provide her any effective relief. (See In re S.P. (2020) 53 Cal.App.5th 13, 16 [“[c]ourts do not decide issues that can provide no effective relief for the parties”]; In re J.A. (2020) 47 Cal.App.5th 1036, 1050 1051 [“‘“[w]hen no effective relief can be granted, an appeal... will be dismissed”'”].)
We asked the parties to submit supplemental briefs on this issue. Neither side responded to our request.
Iliana does not challenge the court's orders removing Izabella from her custody and placing her with her maternal grandmother. To the contrary, counsel for Iliana made it clear at the disposition hearing that Iliana was not asking for Izabella “to go back” to her and that Iliana did “not dispute” placement. Iliana argues only that the juvenile court's findings of reasonable efforts were unsupported and “will have negative consequences for [her] at the subsequent judicial review hearings.”
But the Department's efforts that Iliana argues were not reasonable were efforts to prevent Izabella's removal from, and placement outside of, Iliana's home at disposition. (See § 361, subd. (e) [after declaring a child a dependent of the juvenile court, “[t]he court shall make a determination as to whether reasonable efforts were made to prevent or to eliminate the need for removal of the minor from his or her home”]; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.695(d) [at the disposition hearing “[t]he court must consider whether reasonable efforts to prevent or eliminate the need for removal have been made” and must find either that “[r]easonable efforts have been made to prevent removal” or that “[r]easonable efforts have not been made to prevent removal”]; see also id., rule 5.502(33) [“[r]easonable efforts” means “those efforts... offered or provided by the county welfare agency... to prevent or eliminate the need for removing the child, or to resolve the issues that led to the child's removal in order for the child to be returned home”].) Therefore, even if we were to conclude substantial evidence did not support the juvenile court's findings of reasonable efforts regarding visitation or Izabella's therapy, such a conclusion would have no effect on the uncontested removal and placement disposition orders.
And even if Iliana had challenged the juvenile court's removal and suitable placement orders based on the Department's lack of reasonable efforts to reunify the family, Iliana has not challenged the other bases for the disposition orders. For example, the court found that, even if the Department failed to make reasonable efforts, the court would not order “that the child go back, because the mother has had a relapse.” Reversing the reasonable efforts findings would have no effect on the juvenile court's disposition orders based on that finding.
Although Iliana asserts the juvenile court's reasonable efforts findings at disposition will affect whether Izabella “could be returned to [her] care within the statutorily allowable time, ” Iliana does not argue that vacating the findings would entitle her to any additional time for reunification. (See In re A.G. (2017) 12 Cal.App.5th 994, 1005 [“[t]he remedy for the failure to provide court-ordered reunification services to a parent is to provide an additional period of reunification services to that parent and to make a finding on the record that reasonable services were not offered or provided to that parent”].) Nor could she. The reasonable efforts findings the court made at the disposition hearing related to efforts to provide services during the predisposition period, which does not count against Iliana for purposes of the statutory time limits on reunification. (See § 361.5, subd. (a)(1)(A) [for a child over the age of three, “court-ordered services shall be provided beginning with the dispositional hearing and ending 12 months after the date the child entered foster care”]; In re T.W. (2013) 214 Cal.App.4th 1154, 1169 [“‘[s]ection 361.5 time limits for reunification services start to run when a child is removed from all parental custody at the disposition hearing'”].)
Finally, contrary to Iliana's contention, the reasonable efforts findings the juvenile court made at disposition will not have negative consequences for her at the permanency planning hearing, currently scheduled for July 16, 2021. Under section 366.26, subdivision (c)(2)(A), the court may not terminate parental rights if, “[a]t each hearing at which the court was required to consider reasonable efforts or services, the court has found that reasonable efforts were not made or that reasonable services were not offered or provided.” Here, the juvenile court made orders at the review hearings under section 366.21, subdivisions (e) and (f), that included findings the Department made reasonable efforts to provide services and to return Izabella to Iliana's home. Iliana did not appeal from either order. (See In re Rashad D. (2021) 63 Cal.App.5th 156, 164 [mother's appeal from jurisdiction findings was mooted by her failure to appeal from subsequent orders terminating jurisdiction and awarding custody]; In re N.S. (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 53, 61 [appellate court could not provide effective relief where the order from which the parent appealed was not the basis of any current order adverse to her].) Nor did Iliana seek review of the court's orders at the hearing under section 366.22, where the court made similar findings, terminated reunification services, and set the hearing under section 366.26.
DISPOSITION
The appeal is dismissed.
We concur: PERLUSS, P., J., FEUER, J.