Opinion
Docket No. DRB 13-028 Docket No. DRB 13-062
07-29-2013
IN THE MATTERS OF EDWARD HARRINGTON HEYBURN AN ATTORNEY AT LAW
Disciplinary Review Board District Docket Nos. XIV-2010-0695E (CAA 38-2009) and VII-2012-0027E Decision
To the Honorable Chief Justice and Associate Justices of the Supreme Court of New Jersey.
These matters were before us on two certified records: one filed by the Committee on Attorney Advertising (CAA) (DRB 13-028) and the other filed by the District VII Ethics Committee (DEC) (DRB 13-062). The complaint in DRB 13-028 charged respondent with violating RPC 7.1(a)(1) (a lawyer shall not make false or misleading communications about the lawyer's services), RPC 7.4(d) (a lawyer may communicate that the lawyer has been certified as a specialist or certified in a field of practice only when the communication is not false or misleading, states the name of the certifying organization, and states that the certification has been granted by the Supreme Court of New Jersey), and R. 1:39-6(c) ("no use may be made of the designations set forth in the Regulations of the Board [on Attorney Certification] except as therein provided, nor may other words or combinations of words be used by a certified attorney in place of such designation").
The complaint in DRB 13-062 charged respondent with violating RPC 1.3 (lack of diligence), RPC 1.4(b) and (c) (failure to comply with a client's reasonable requests for information and failure to explain a matter to the extent necessary for the client to make informed decisions about the representation), RPC 1.15 (failure to safeguard property; no subsection was cited), RPC 8.1(b) (failure to cooperate with disciplinary authorities), RPC 8.4(c) (conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation), and R. 1:20-3(g)(3) (duty to cooperate in disciplinary investigations).
Respondent filed a motion to vacate the defaults, essentially arguing that he had not received copies of the complaints, which had been sent to a former office address. For the reasons discussed more fully below, we deny his motion and impose a single censure for both matters.
Respondent was admitted to the New Jersey bar in 1997. He has no history of discipline. There are no cases pending against him.
As noted previously, respondent filed a motion to vacate the default. He contended essentially that he did not receive the complaints filed in these matters, which were sent to his former office. Specifically, respondent stated that, in January 2011, he moved his office to Regus, 103 Carnegie Center Drive, Princeton, New Jersey, 08540 (Regus), where he had his own office in a shared office facility. Respondent explained that while at Regus, his mail was being misdirected.
Respondent's office remained at Regus until approximately June 2012. He requested that the post office forward his mail to his home address. The post office continued to sporadically send his mail to Regus. According to respondent, he changed his mailing address with the clerk of the Superior Court to his home address and was assured that all future correspondence would be directed there.
In the summer of 2012, respondent "was no longer able to fund running a private office," and began working as an associate at a law firm. Respondent did not identify the firm in his affidavit and did not provide the firm's address to the New Jersey Lawyers' Fund for Client Protection (CPF).
Presumably, this is the June 2012 departure from Regus, to which respondent referred earlier in his affidavit.
In June 2013, respondent received a letter from the Office of Board Counsel (OBC), which had been sent by certified and regular mail to his Regus address. That letter gave respondent notice of the two default proceedings currently before us. As to the certified mail, the forwarding address (respondent's home address) was hand-written, rather than on a printed label. In his motion to vacate the default, respondent claimed that he did not receive the regular mail.
The written address says Hightstown, which is not where respondent lives. The street address was correct.
Respondent noted that the OBC's letter referred to two ethics complaints. He was aware of only one, stemming from his use of the designation "certified trial attorney." Respondent explained that he had been designated as a certified trial attorney, failed to pay the annual fee, and was no longer permitted to use the designation. He "immediately ceased using the designation" (presumably, following his receipt of the ethics complaint), and answered the ethics complaint explaining the circumstances. Respondent "certified" his answer to the complaint. The OAE objected, however, because he did not "verify" it. Respondent recalled "receiving a response [presumably, from the OAE], indicating that [he] was to receive a formal reprimand and [he] accepted that result." Respondent assumed that the 2010 docket number referred to that matter, but claimed that he was unaware of the subject matter of the 2012 docket number (the DEC matter).
According to respondent, it appears that the OBC "is sending mail to an old address and did not check with the Superior Court for a correct address." It also appears that the OBC "did not check with the Post Office for a current address." Respondent stated that he has lived at his current address for twelve years and reported it on his attorney registration form, but it does not appear that the OBC made any attempt to notify him there.
Respondent concluded by stating that, if he made a mistake and we conclude that he should be "punished," he can accept the result, but he should be given an opportunity to know the nature of the allegations against him. Thus, he requested that we vacate the default and send "all documentation" to his correct address so that he can address the complaint.
We use a two-prong test to determine whether a default should be vacated. First, did the attorney present a valid reason for the failure to file an answer? The conclusion here is no. As will be explained more fully, below, in DRB 13-028, respondent filed an answer that was not verified. He was given the opportunity to verify his answer and prevent the default. He chose not to do so. He should not be given a second bite at the apple. As to the second prong, meritorious defenses to the allegations, respondent presented no defenses to the charges against him in his motion.
As previously explained, respondent's answer was certified, rather than verified. Ordinarily, we would be lenient and accept the answer. However, in light of the balance of respondent's conduct with regard to his interaction with the Office of Attorney Ethics (OAE), the CAA, and the DEC, we cannot do so here.
In DRB 13-062, respondent set out no defense to the underlying allegations, claiming to not know the basis for the complaint, which the DEC sent to his address of record with the CPF. The OBC contacted the CPF to ascertain what address(es) respondent has on file with that office. Respondent's Regus address, where, according to his affidavit, he has not practiced for over a year, is still listed on the attorney registration records as his office address. His home address is correctly listed. However, the CPF uses the office address provided, unless instructed otherwise by the attorney. Respondent did not designate that correspondence should be addressed to his home address. Thus, it was sent to his office address of record. The onus is on respondent to update his information with the CPF.
Moreover, respondent's contention that he does not know the subject matter under the 2012 docket number is specious. As will be seen below, he communicated with the DEC. At his request, a copy of the grievance was faxed to him. He chose to ignore it. He has had more than his share of opportunities to address these two matters. He failed to avail himself of those opportunities. His motion to vacate the defaults is, thus, denied. DRB 13-028 (District Docket No. XIV-2010-0695E; CAA 38-2009)
On January 4, 2012, an agreement in lieu of discipline (ALD) was sent to respondent, presumably by the OAE, at his last known business address, 103 Carnegie Drive, Suite 300, Princeton, New Jersey. Respondent was advised that, if he did not sign and return the ALD within two weeks, a formal ethics complaint would be filed against him. Respondent did not reply.
Although the OAE forwarded the ALD to respondent, the case originated with the CAA. Specifically, the CAA sent two letters to respondent, in January 2010 and September 2010, following that office's receipt of three communications about respondent. After respondent did not "timely" reply to the CAA's inquiries, the CAA referred the matter to the OAE for the filing of a complaint. The record does not reveal what occurred between December 2010, when the CAA referred the matter to the OAE, and January 2012, when the ALD was sent to respondent.
On January 20, 2012, HoeChin Kim, OAE Deputy Ethics Counsel, telephoned respondent's office. Respondent advised Kim that he had left the ALD in his car, but would sign it and mail it that day. On February 1, 2012, after receiving no reply from respondent, Kim again telephoned him, at which time respondent stated that he had misplaced the ALD. Accordingly, on that date, the OAE sent another copy of the ALD to respondent's office, with instructions that he sign and return the ALD within five days of receipt. Respondent failed to comply with the OAE's instruction.
On February 14, 2012, Kim left a voicemail message on respondent's business phone, advising him that, unless the signed ALD was returned to the OAE by no later than February 17, 2012, a formal ethics complaint would be filed against him. Respondent failed to sign and forward the ALD. On February 28, 2012, a complaint was filed against him.
Service of process was proper in this matter. By letter dated March 1, 2012, the secretary to the CAA sent a copy of the complaint to respondent, by certified and regular mail, at 103 Carnegie Center Drive, Suite 300, Princeton, New Jersey 08540. Neither letter was returned, although the certified mail receipt was not returned either. Respondent was instructed to file his verified answer within twenty-one days.
By letter dated April 16, 2012, the CAA secretary advised respondent that, if he did not file an answer to the complaint within five days, the allegations of the complaint would be deemed admitted and the record would be certified to us for the imposition of discipline. The letter further served to amend the complaint to charge respondent with violating RPC 8.1(b) for failing to file an answer. The letter was sent by certified and regular mail to the Princeton address. The certified mail receipt indicates delivery on April 19, 2012. The signature is not respondent's. The CAA certification does not state if the regular mail was returned. Respondent did not file an answer.
According to the record, "while preparing to forward the complaint on a certification of the record, it was discovered" that respondent had been placed on the IOLTA ineligible list in October 2011. Thus, on May 10, 2012, the CAA secretary sent another copy of the complaint to respondent, by certified and regular mail, to his home address. The certified mail was returned to sender, marked "Unclaimed." The regular mail was not returned.
Respondent was removed from the ineligible list in June 2012.
We recall that respondent claimed difficulties with his mail delivery to his former office, yet certified mail to his home address went unclaimed.
On May 31, 2012, the CAA received an answer from respondent, which was not verified. On June 5, 2012, Kim telephoned respondent at his office to advise him that he had failed to include the verification with his answer and that he should re-file his answer with the required language. Respondent stated that he would do so "right away." He did not do so.
By letter dated June 11, 2012, the OAE advised respondent that, if he failed to file a verified answer by June 20, 2012, the allegations of the complaint would be deemed admitted and the record would be certified to us for the imposition of discipline. The letter was sent to respondent's business address, by certified and regular mail. The certified mail receipt and the United States Postal Service database indicate delivery of the certified mail on June 14, 2012. The signature on the receipt is not respondent's. The regular mail was not returned. Respondent did not verify his answer.
The CAA filed a report in this matter, recommending an admonition. The court rule governing discipline for advertising infractions, R. 1:19A-4(c), provides that, after a complaint has been filed, an attorney must file a verified answer. The rule has no provision governing defaults or directing the CAA to proceed in accordance with R. 1:20-4(f), the rule governing defaults. Thus, in the absence of procedural guidance, the CAA adopted what it called "a hybrid approach,"
inviting the Board to consider this matter a default (on the ground that the lack of reference to Rule 1:20-4(f) in Rule 1:19A-4 is a mere oversight) but also providing its findings and recommendation for discipline as if the matter were considered one for which no material facts are in dispute
pursuant to Rule 1:19A-4(d) (but not providing for oral argument since respondent did not file a verified answer). Given the procedural uncertainty, the Committee hearing panel considered respondent Heyburn's unverified answer in the course of its review.
(CAAC¶4).
CAAC refers to the CAA secretary's certification.
In fact, the CAA erred in considering respondent's answer in its review of this matter. The answer respondent filed with the CAA was unverified. Despite respondent's assurance to the OAE that he would provide the verification of his answer "right away," he failed to do so. We, thus, disregard respondent's answer and look only to the four corners of the complaint in our review, treating this matter as a default, as if no answer had been filed.
The facts that gave rise to this matter are as follows:
In March 2005, respondent was certified as a civil trial attorney by the Board on Attorney Certification (BAC). Respondent failed to pay his annual fee for 2007. In September 2007, the BAC revoked respondent's certification. He continued, however, to use the designation, specifically, the Supreme Court seal with the words "Certified Attorney" on his letterhead and on his attorney website, until early 2011.
The complaint charged respondent with violating RPC 7.1(a)(1), RPC 7.4(d), and R. 1:39-6(c). DRB 13-062 (District Docket No. VII-2012-0027E)
Service of process was proper in this matter. In October 2012, the DEC secretary sent a copy of the complaint to respondent, by certified and regular mail, at his last known office address listed with the CPF, 103 Carnegie Center Drive, Suite 300, Princeton, New Jersey 08540. The certified mail receipt indicates delivery on November 8, 2012. The signature is not legible, but it appears to be respondent's initials. The regular mail was not returned.
The DEC secretary's certification states that, at the time that he sent the complaint to respondent, respondent was "suspended" from practice. As noted previously, respondent was on the IOLTA ineligible to practice list for failure to comply with R. 1:28A, but was removed from the ineligible list in June 2012.
By letter dated November 30, 2012, the DEC secretary advised respondent that, if he did not file a verified answer to the complaint within five days, the allegations of the complaint would be deemed admitted and the record would be certified to us for the imposition of discipline. The letter further served to amend the complaint to charge respondent with an additional violation of RPC 8.1(b) for failing to file an answer. The letter was sent by certified and regular mail to the Princeton address. The certified mail was unclaimed. The regular mail was not returned. Respondent did not file an answer.
The facts that gave rise to this matter are as follows: Count One
In approximately July 2010, Mary Ann Dilapo retained respondent to pursue a medical malpractice action against Capital Health System Hospital (Capital Health). She provided respondent with her medical records. In August 2010, respondent filed a lawsuit against Capital Health and "various medical professionals" not specified in the ethics complaint. The civil complaint requested responses to uniform interrogatories and demanded $10,000,000 in damages.
In December 2010, Capital Health filed a motion to dismiss the complaint for the plaintiff's failure to file an affidavit of merit within sixty days of the defendant's answer. Respondent also failed to appear for an affidavit of merit conference, earlier that month.
In early January 2011, respondent called Dilapo to cancel a meeting that had been scheduled for January 12, 2011. Thereafter, on January 21, 2011 and April 29, 2011, the court entered orders dismissing Dilapo's case, with prejudice, against Capital Health and one doctor. Respondent did not oppose Capital Health's motion to dismiss.
The language in paragraph 9 of the complaint indicates that there was more than one motion filed. The complaint does not state if respondent opposed the other motion(s). The record also does not disclose what happened to any other defendants in the case.
At some point thereafter, also in early 2011, respondent told Dilapo and her son that her case had been dismissed. He did not disclose to Dilapo that the case had been dismissed for failure to file an affidavit of merit. Respondent also told Dilapo that it would not be wise to try to reinstate the case and that she would need approximately $10,000 for the attempt.
The record does not explain Dilapo's son's involvement.
Also in 2011, Dilapo and her son advised respondent that she no longer wanted respondent to represent her. They requested that he turn over her medical records and her file.
Over the course of several months, Dilapo and her son left numerous voice messages for respondent, requesting Dilapo's records and file. Respondent did not return their messages or turn over the requested documents.
By letter dated April 23, 2012, Dilapo demanded copies of her file and medical records. Her letter stated that she would file an ethics grievance against respondent, if he failed to turn over her documents. Respondent did not reply to that letter.
The complaint charged respondent with violating RPC 1.3, RPC 1.4(b) and (c), RPC 8.4(c), and RPC 1.15 based on his refusal to provide Dilapo with correct information about the dismissal of her lawsuit and his refusal to turn over her medical records and legal file. The complaint considered respondent's failure to "properly respond" to the defense motions to dismiss and his failure to attend the affidavit of merit conference to be a violation of RPC 1.3 as well. Count Two
On May 22, 2012, the DEC secretary sent a copy of Dilapo's grievance to respondent and requested that he provide a written reply. Respondent did not reply. By letter dated June 25, 2012, the secretary requested that respondent reply to the grievance within ten days of the letter. Again, respondent failed to reply. By letter dated July 17, 2012, the secretary forwarded Dilapo's grievance to the DEC investigator, noting that respondent had failed to reply to his letters. Respondent was copied on the secretary's letter.
By letter to the DEC, dated July 22, 2012, respondent claimed that the previous letters to him had not contained a copy of Dilapo's grievance. Respondent requested that the DEC fax him a copy of the grievance. His letter stated that he would reply "immediately." On July 24, 2012, the DEC secretary faxed a copy of Dilapo's grievance to respondent. Respondent did not reply.
Presumably, the DEC was using respondent's Princeton address. We note that respondent did not contend that he did not receive the letters, but only that they did not contain the grievance, thereby admitting his receipt of the letters. --------
On August 8, 2012, the DEC investigator sent a letter to respondent by regular mail and fax, requesting that he provide a written reply to Dilapo's grievance and a copy of her file. Respondent did not comply with the investigator's request. The investigator also left two voice messages at respondent's office. Respondent did not reply to the messages.
The complaint charged respondent with violating R. 1:20-3(g)(3) and RPC 8.1(b), based on his refusal to comply with the DEC's multiple requests for a written reply to the grievance and for Dilapo's file.
The facts recited in the complaints support the charges of unethical conduct. Respondent's failure to file answers is deemed an admission that the allegations of the complaints are true and that they provide a sufficient basis for the imposition of discipline. R. 1:20-4(f)(1).
As to the allegations in DRB 13-028, respondent continued to use the designation "Certified Trial Attorney" on his letterhead and website, after his designation had been revoked for non-payment of the annual fee. We analogize this situation to an attorney's practicing law while ineligible for failure to pay the annual assessment to the CPF.
Practicing law while ineligible, without more, is generally met with an admonition if the attorney is either unaware of the ineligibility or advances compelling mitigating factors. See, e.g., In the Matter of Robert B. Blackman, DRB 10-137 (June 18, 2010) (attorney practiced law while ineligible for failure to file the IOLTA registration statement for three years; the attorney did not know that he was ineligible); In the Matter of Matthew George Connolly, DRB 08-419 (March 31, 2009) (attorney ineligible to practice law rendered legal services; the attorney's conduct was unintentional); In the Matter of Frank D. DeVito, DRB 06-116 (July 21, 2006) (attorney practiced law while ineligible, failed to cooperate with the OAE, and committed recordkeeping violations; compelling mitigating factors justified only an admonition, including the attorney's lack of knowledge of his ineligibility); In the Matter of William C. Brummel, DRB 06-031 (March 28, 2006) (attorney practiced law during a four-month period of ineligibility; the attorney was unaware of his ineligible status); In the Matter of Queen Esther Payton, DRB 05-250 (November 3, 2005) (attorney practiced law while ineligible between September 2003 and August 2004 and failed initially to cooperate with disciplinary authorities; family illnesses and lack of prior discipline considered in mitigation); In the Matter of Richard J. Cohen, DRB 04-209 (July 16, 2004) (attorney practiced law during nineteen-month ineligibility; the attorney did not know that he was ineligible); and In the Matter of Douglas F. Ortelere, DRB 03-377 (February 11, 2004) (attorney practiced law while ineligible during periods ranging from one day to eleven months; the attorney also failed to communicate with the client and delayed the payment of the client's medical expenses as well as the disbursement of the client's share of settlement proceeds; in mitigation, the attorney was suffering from depression at the time of the misdeeds and had no disciplinary history since his admission to the bar in 1983).
A reprimand is usually imposed when the attorney has an extensive ethics history, has been disciplined for conduct of the same sort, has also committed other ethics improprieties, or is aware of the ineligibility and practices law nevertheless. See, e.g., In re Jay, 210 N.J. 214 (2012) (attorney was aware of ineligibility and practiced law nevertheless; prior three-month suspension for possession of cocaine and marijuana); In re (Queen) Payton, 207 N.J. 31 (2011) (attorney who practiced law while ineligible was aware of her ineligibility and had received an admonition for the same violation); In re Goodwin, 203 N.J. 583 (2010) (attorney practiced law while ineligible, commingled personal and trust funds by depositing the proceeds from the refinance of his residence into his trust account, and was guilty of recordkeeping violations; there was no evidence that the attorney was aware of his ineligibility); In re Austin, 198 N.J. 599 (2009) (during one-year period of ineligibility attorney made three court appearances on behalf of an attorney- friend who was not admitted in New Jersey, receiving a $500 fee for each of the three matters; the attorney knew that he was ineligible; also, the attorney did not keep a trust and a business account in New Jersey and misrepresented, on his annual registration form, that he did so; several mitigating factors considered, including the attorney's unblemished disciplinary record); In re Marzano, 195 N.J. 9 (2008) (motion for reciprocal discipline, following attorney's nine-month suspension in Pennsylvania; the attorney represented three clients after she was placed on inactive status in Pennsylvania; she was aware of her ineligibility); In re Davis, 194 N.J. 555 (2007) (motion for reciprocal discipline; attorney represented a client in Pennsylvania when the attorney was ineligible to practice law in that jurisdiction as a non-resident active attorney and later as an inactive attorney; the attorney also misrepresented his status to the court, to his adversary, and to disciplinary authorities; extensive mitigation considered; the attorney was suspended for one year and a day in Pennsylvania); In re Kaniper, 192 N.J. 40 (2007) (attorney practiced law during two periods of ineligibility; although the attorney's employer gave her a check for the annual attorney assessment, she negotiated the check instead of mailing it to the CPF; later, her personal check to the CPF was returned for insufficient funds; the attorney's excuses that she had not received the CPF's letters about her ineligibility were deemed improbable and viewed as an aggravating factor); In re Coleman, 185 N.J. 336 (2005) (motion for reciprocal discipline after attorney's two-year suspension in Pennsylvania; while on inactive status in Pennsylvania, the attorney practiced law for nine years, signing hundreds of pleadings and receiving in excess of $7,000 for those services); In re Perrella, 179 N.J. 499 (2004) (attorney advised his client that he was on the inactive list and then practiced law; the attorney filed pleadings, engaged in discovery, appeared in court, and used letterhead indicating that he was a member in good standing of the Pennsylvania bar); In re Forman, 178 N.J. 5 (2003) (for a period of twelve years, the attorney practiced law in Pennsylvania while on the inactive list; he was suspended for one year and a day in Pennsylvania; compelling mitigating factors considered); and In re Ellis, 165 N.J. 493 (2000) (one month after being reinstated from an earlier period of ineligibility, the attorney was notified of his 1999 annual assessment obligation, failed to make timely payment, was again declared ineligible to practice law, and continued to perform legal work for two clients; he had received a prior reprimand for unrelated violations). But see In re Lynch, 186 N.J. 246) (2006) (attorney censured for practicing law while knowing that he was ineligible; attorney had been previously admonished and reprimanded).
There is nothing in the record to indicate that respondent was aware that his designation as a certified trial attorney had been revoked. No other misconduct was alleged in the complaint. Thus, an admonition would be the appropriate measure of discipline, if DRB 13-028 stood alone.
Respondent, however, is guilty of an additional violation that mandates the imposition of a least a reprimand. He is guilty of misrepresentation, based on his failure to disclose to Dilapo the basis for the dismissal of her malpractice claim. He did not advise her that the case had been dismissed, following his failure to file an affidavit of merit. "In some situations, silence can be no less a misrepresentation than words." Crispen v. Volkswagenwerk, A.G., 96 N.J. 336, 347 (1984).
Misrepresentation to clients requires the imposition of a reprimand. In re Kasdan, 115 N.J. 472, 488 (1989). Thus, at this point in our analysis, a reprimand would be the appropriate measure of discipline for respondent's infractions, even when the misconduct in these two matters is combined. See, e.g., In re McNamara, 179 N.J. 342 (2004) (reprimand for an attorney who represented the Kearny Planning Board at a time when she was ineligible to practice. She grossly neglected the matter, made a misrepresentation about the status to the Planning Board, and failed to withdraw from representation when she knew that her physical or medical condition impaired her ability to represent the Board).
That is, however, not the end of our analysis. Respondent allowed both of these matters to proceed as defaults. His contentions about the problems with his mail delivery are without merit. He communicated with the OAE and was offered diversion. Yet, he failed to sign the agreement. Thereafter, he filed an answer and, again, failed to sign the verification that the OAE provided to him. Respondent may well have had difficulties with his mail delivery, but, even when he receives communications, he obviously fails to consider their full import. Rather than sign documents, he allowed these matters to proceed on certified records.
In a default matter, the appropriate discipline for the found ethics violations is enhanced to reflect the attorney's failure to cooperate with disciplinary authorities as an aggravating factor. In the Matter of Robert J. Nemshick, DRB 03- 364, 03-365, and 03-366 (March 11, 2004) (slip op. at 6). Thus, the otherwise appropriate reprimand must be enhanced to a censure for the sum of the infractions in these two matters.
Members Gallipoli and Zmirich would impose a three-month suspension.
We further determine to require respondent to reimburse the Disciplinary Oversight Committee for administrative costs and actual expenses incurred in the prosecution of this matter, as provided in R. 1:20-17.
Disciplinary Review Board
Bonnie Frost, Chair
By:/s/_________
Julianne K. DeCore
Chief Counsel
VOTING RECORD
Disposition: Censure
| MEMBERS | Disbar | Three-monthSuspension | Censure | Dismiss | Disqualified | Did notparticipate |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Frost | X | |||||
| Baugh | X | |||||
| Clark | X | |||||
| Doremus | X | |||||
| Gallipoli | X | |||||
| Yamner | X | |||||
| Zmirich | X | |||||
| Total: | 2 | 5 |
/s/_________
Julianne K. DeCore
Chief Counsel