Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Super. Ct. No. JD224019
CANTIL-SAKAUYE, J.
Christina H., mother of the minor, appeals from orders of the juvenile court terminating her parental rights. (Welf. & Inst. Code, §§ 366.26, 395.) Appellant contends, based upon events occurring subsequent to entry of the order from which this appeal is taken, that reversal is required because the juvenile court erred in failing to terminate the parental rights of both parents in the same proceeding. This issue cannot be raised in the instant appeal. The order terminating parental rights is affirmed.
Hereafter, undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
FACTS
The Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) filed a non-detaining petition in March 2006 alleging the minor was at risk due to domestic violence perpetrated by appellant’s boyfriend, D.B. and appellant’s failure to comply with a voluntary service plan. At the initial hearing, appellant identified the minor’s father as Christopher W., but suspected he was deceased because “‘the Welfare Department cannot find him.’” Appellant failed to comply with the terms of the minor’s placement with her and DHHS filed an amended petition to detain the minor.
Appellant again identified Christopher W. as the minor’s father but had no information about him. The court sustained the petition and adopted a reunification plan for appellant.
The report for the six-month review hearing listed the father as unknown. However at the hearing, Christopher W. was once again identified as the minor’s father and the court ordered DHHS to make a due diligence search for him. An addendum report in November 2006, gave details of a due diligence search for Christopher W. which produced no information on his whereabouts. A parentage inquiry directed to the local child support agency was also fruitless. The court terminated services and set a section 366.26 hearing.
In January 2007, the court ordered service by publication “be made on Christopher W[.] or any person claiming to be the father of the minor . . . .” (Italics added.) The declaration of due diligence had a last known address for him but no successful service had been made despite several attempts. Publication was to be completed February 2, 2007. Substituted service on Christopher W. was actually made while service by publication was occurring and proof of service was filed with the court.
At a later hearing, the court noted that the affidavit in support of the request for service by publication stated that Christopher W. had been excluded as the father. County counsel clarified the matter by confirming Christopher W. had never come forward to submit to a test and the declaration was in error. However, the minute order for the hearing incorrectly stated that Christopher W. was excluded as the father.
On June 14, 2007, the court terminated parental rights as to appellant; the alleged father, Christopher W.; and all unknown fathers.
July 9, 2007, on its own motion, the court stayed the termination order and recalendared the matter on a notice issue. Apparently a person on the clerical staff, based upon her review of the record, erroneously concluded that Christopher W. had been excluded as a father and questioned whether separate service on unknown fathers should have been done. When the matter was heard in August 2007, appellant identified a new possible father and the court ordered a separate section 366.26 hearing for him.
DISCUSSION
I.
Appellant contends reversal is required because termination of parental rights for both the minor’s parents did not occur in the same proceeding as required by California Rules of Court, rule 5.725(h). Appellant’s argument is based upon events occurring after the order terminating parental rights which are not properly before this court on appeal. (In re Zeth S. (2003) 31 Cal.4th 396, 405.) The record supports the conclusion that there was no error in making the orders terminating parental rights on June 14, 2007.
During the period of the dependency and up to the termination of her parental rights, appellant consistently identified Christopher W. as the father of the minor. Christopher W. never appeared and, as a result, he and any other person claiming to be the minor’s father were served notice of the termination hearing by publication. Additionally, Christopher W. was served by substituted service when his whereabouts were discovered. The notice given was adequate both for Christopher W. and all unknown fathers. (§ 294 [provides detailed requirements for notice of a § 366.26 hearing].) Thus, at the section 366.26 hearing, the court terminated the parental rights of appellant, Christopher W. and all unknown fathers. Appellant’s parental rights were terminated in the same proceeding as the alleged and unknown fathers and no violation of rule 5.725(h) occurred.
II.
As to the matters which took place after the section 366.26 hearing, the orders were ineffective as attempts to stay, vacate or modify the orders terminating parental rights. (§ 366.26, subd. (i).) The court lacked the power to enter such orders since, by statute, the orders were final as to the juvenile court and could only be challenged on appeal or, in certain circumstances not present here, on equitable grounds. (David B. v. Superior Court (1994) 21 Cal.App.4th 1010, 1017-1020; see also In re Jacob E. (2004) 121 Cal.App.4th 909, 925; In re Jerred H. (2004) 121 Cal.App.4th 793, 797-798; In re Heather B. (2002) 98 Cal.App.4th 11, 15; In re Meranda P. (1997) 56 Cal.App.4th 1143, 1161; In re David H. (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 368, 378; In re Ronald V. (1993) 13 Cal.App.4th 1803, 1806.)
The Supreme Court has emphasized the strong interests which support finality of dependency and adoption proceedings and has accepted that error in a dependency may become irremediable. (In re Sade C. (1996) 13 Cal.4th 952, 990; In re Zeth S., supra, 31 Cal.4th at pp. 412-413.) Even a clear violation of due process resulting from a lack of timely notice does not overcome the explicit limitation of section 366.26, subdivision (i)(1). (David B. v. Superior Court, supra, 21 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1016-1017.)
The juvenile court’s actions compounded the error by the clerk and created confusion and uncertainty in the child’s status. The court lacked jurisdiction to make further orders regarding termination of parental rights and thus, could not enter a valid, separate order terminating any unknown father’s parental rights.
DISPOSITION
The orders of the juvenile court are affirmed.
We concur: RAYE, Acting P.J., MORRISON, J.