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In re I.G.

California Court of Appeals, First District, Second Division
Sep 22, 2008
No. A119762 (Cal. Ct. App. Sep. 22, 2008)

Opinion


In re I.G., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. SAN MATEO COUNTY HUMAN SERVICES AGENCY, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. ALICIA G., Defendant and Appellant. A119762 California Court of Appeal, First District, Second Division September 22, 2008

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

Defendant Alicia G. appeals from the juvenile court’s dispositional order of a reunification plan that requires her to undergo a substance abuse assessment and comply with drug treatment as a part of her case plan. We affirm the court’s order.

San Mateo County Super. Ct. No. 77129

Lambden, J.

BACKGROUND

On June 4, 2007, a juvenile dependency petition pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 300 was filed by San Mateo County Human Services Agency (Agency) on behalf of 11-year-old I.G. It alleged that I.G.’s mother, Alicia, had failed to comply with a voluntary services contract to address issues of chronic homelessness, had no permanent residence despite being provided services in locating and maintaining housing, and had been asked to leave homeless shelters due to destructive and belligerent behavior.

The petition contained allegations that Alicia’s “previous live in boyfriend,” Charles, had inappropriately exposed himself to the child by placing his bare buttocks on the child’s chest, and that Alicia, who witnessed this incident, later recanted her story and continued to allow Charles access to I.G., placing the child at substantial risk of harm. It was further alleged that Alicia and Charles had a “volatile relationship,” and that the child had witnessed incidents of domestic violence between Alicia and both Charles and his roommate. It was also alleged that Alicia had a history of fainting spells, continued to drive with I.G. despite being ordered by a doctor not to do so, and that she fell asleep at one point while driving with him on the freeway, waking up after hitting her face on the steering wheel.

Alicia contends on appeal that there was insufficient evidence to support the portion of the juvenile court’s disposition order that ordered her to undergo a substance abuse assessment and comply with drug treatment as a part of her case plan. As we discuss herein, we find the juvenile court’s order is supported by substantial evidence. We have reviewed the entire record and all of Alicia’s factual contentions. However, our discussion herein is largely limited to this substantial evidence because it is dispositive of her appeal.

Alicia was in a serious car accident in 2006, resulting in injuries for which she was taking certain prescription medication for chronic pain. She reported that the prescription medication had at times affected her driving, such as in a May 2007 incident when she hit a parked car while driving with I.G. Furthermore, Alicia experienced fainting spells, the cause of which was not determined. As is discussed herein, Agency was concerned that, Alicia was inappropriately consuming alcohol along with these prescription drugs, and was becoming dependent on these drugs without making a sufficient effort to explore alternatives. The Agency, based on its social worker’s observations, police and other reports it received, and the evaluations and opinions expressed by medical professionals, was concerned that Alicia was placing I.G. at considerable risk in part because of her substance abuse.

At the end of May 2007, I.G. was removed from Alicia’s physical custody and placed in protective custody pending a detention hearing, which occurred the following month.

The Detention Report and Hearing

The detention report indicated Alicia was having serious difficulties, which included her abuse of prescription drugs and alcohol. For example, it referred to an October 2006 incident as follows: “ A report was received by the Agency that Alicia was placed on a 5150 Psychiatric Hold due to a suicide attempt, which consisted of an overdose of 15 Valium tablets mixed with vodka. After taking the aforementioned substances, Alicia reportedly called a friend and told them, ‘someone needs to take care of my son.’ The friend called the San Mateo Police Department, which did a welfare check, Alicia telling the reporting officer, ‘I don’t want to live anymore.’ When Alicia was brought to the hospital, she changed her story, and said that she was only drinking some vodka. Alicia later said she was despondent back in September 2006, when she had been on the verge of housing eviction. Alicia admitted that they were evicted and that was the reason why she and the children stayed with her friend.”

The detention report also stated that in January 2007, the Agency “received a referral stating that Alicia reported that her live in boyfriend . . . had pulled down his pants and sat on her child’s chest. The Agency interviewed Alicia who confirmed the reports and later retracted her statements.”

The detention report also indicated that Alicia’s therapist “expressed that she had growing concerns about Alicia’s prescription drug use and her level of depression. [The therapist] . . . recommends that admission into an inpatient treatment facility would be the most helpful to Alicia [The therapist] also stated that on several occasions Alicia has mentioned suicide,” and she had discussed committing a double suicide with Charles.

The report further indicated that in May 2007, “the child reported that he was sitting in his mother’s vehicle with her when she stated that she had to rest. The child stated that the mother became unconscious and the child stated that he could not wake his mother up.” Alicia was taken to a hospital, where she remained overnight. Alicia “reported to have had ‘some sips’ of beer and fainted in her parked vehicle with her son in the passenger seat.”

At the conclusion of the detention hearing, the court ordered I.G. be detained pending the jurisdiction and disposition hearings because of the substantial danger to his physical health.

The Jurisdiction Report and Hearing

The jurisdiction report, filed on June 27, 2007, repeated much of the information contained in the detention report. The report stated that one of Charles’s roommates told a detective that he had witnessed Charles’s January 2007 abuse of I.G. The roommate told the detective “that [I.G.] should not ‘be allowed to stay with his mother or be around anyone in the residence because Charles and Alicia have been drunk all year.’ ”

An addendum report, filed on June 28, 2007, contained as an attachment, a report by a San Mateo Police Department detective, dated January 4, 2007. The attachment included the roommate’s comment to the detective, Alicia’s and I.G.’s reporting of the incident, and a handwritten retraction of I.G.’s report of abuse, although a social worker testified at the jurisdiction hearing that I.G. denied it was his handwriting.

The jurisdiction report also contained statements by Alicia which minimized or denied a number of the incidents and concerns discussed in the report. She denied that she ever misused prescription drugs, and stated that “[t]he story about the suicide pact [which she reportedly had discussed with Charles] and misuse of drugs is a fabrication.” She denied taking 15 Valium in the October 2006 incident, instead contending that she had consumed “ ‘some alcohol several hours prior to my taking Valium that evening. I took at least three Valiums,’ ” and stating that she was prescribed four 10 milligram Valiums a day. She denied being told by any doctors that she should not be driving, stated that she had some faintings since the accident, but did not have a history of fainting spells, denied any unresolved mental health issues, and denied that Charles had ever pulled his pants down in front of her son. It was reported that I.G. had been exposed to troubling behavior and activities by Charles and others at Charles’s residence, and that I.G. appeared very sad.

Alicia’s therapist testified at the jurisdiction hearing that she had advised Alicia that her relationship with Charles, whom Alicia had reported was an alcoholic, was harmful because of his drinking and prescription drug use. She also testified that Alicia had previously agreed to keep I.G. away from Charles, but had failed to do so. The therapist expressed concern about the amount and variety of prescription drugs Alicia was taking and how this might be intensifying her depression, possibly causing her fainting spells and affecting her driving. The therapist expressed further concern that Alicia had mixed alcohol with these prescription drugs, which was of concern even in small amounts. The therapist recommended to Alicia that she get a case manager because her care and medications had not been coordinated, and recommended that Alicia go to a pain clinic to try to move away from narcotic dependency and give her an alternative means to deal with pain. However, Alicia refused to go to a pain clinic or otherwise take steps to reduce her admitted dependence on narcotics, although she agreed it sounded like a good idea. The therapist had also recommended that Alicia see a psychiatrist for treatment of her depression, as well as drug rehabilitation, but Alicia had refused to do so. When the therapist and the social worker discussed drug rehabilitation programs with Alicia, she threatened to take off with her son if the recommendation was pressed upon her, even when the recommendation was changed from inpatient to outpatient care so that Alicia could continue to care for her son. The therapist testified that she was concerned about Alicia’s ability to exercise good judgment and care for her son, especially if she were under the influence of narcotics.

Alicia’s social worker testified that Alicia had not followed the voluntary case plan by failing to attend a pain clinic because of her use of multiple pain medications. The social worker attended a meeting between Alicia and a neurologist, in which the neurologist instructed Alicia not to drive because of her fainting spells. Alicia had admitted to the social worker that she once passed out while driving with I.G. and only woke up when her head hit the steering wheel. There was also testimony that Alicia had been involved in traffic accidents in 2006 and 2007.

The court sustained the amended petition. It ordered Alicia to undergo a psychological evaluation and drug and alcohol evaluation.

Disposition Report and Hearing

The disposition report, filed on August 22, 2007, reported that on August 6, 2007, Charles was struck and killed by a train on tracks in San Mateo. An officer reported arriving on the scene and speaking with one of Charles’s friends. The officer was told that the friend, Charles, and Alicia “were all parked in [Alicia’s] vehicle. Alicia was in the driver’s seat. Charles was in the passenger seat and [the friend] was in the middle. They were all drinking and Charles was arguing with Alicia about wanting to kill himself. Charles said, ‘Let me out of the vehicle so I can go commit suicide.’ Charles was struck and killed by the train shortly thereafter.”

It was stated in the report that “ the mother does not believe that she needs medical case management for her pain medication, and she is attempting to ‘cut back on meds.’ ” It was reported that Alicia had participated in an alcohol and drug assessment in July 2007. The assessor stated in his report that during their session, he discussed with Alicia his conclusion at the time that there seemed to be no required need for treatment services. However, he subsequently received copies of psychiatric reports regarding Alicia’s two prior hospitalizations pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 5150, and a copy of the police report of Charles’s death. The assessor then wrote, “ ‘Following the assessment session with [Alicia], this assessor received a, seemingly, substantial amount of written documentation regarding the client’s past and current [Child Protective Services]-related cases that point to a number of discrepancies between what the client reported, during the assessment, and what was indicated in written police department-generated and CPS-generated reports and, as such, have resulted in a revision of this assessor’s recommendations for alcohol and other drug treatment services.’ ” His report, which was attached to an addendum to the disposition report, specifically referred to “numerous discrepancies in regard to: the client’s history of consuming alcohol and prescription medication” and “the client’s alleged use of alcohol to cope with anxiety.” His recommendations included intensive day treatment services for a minimum period of nine months, a psychiatric evaluation to determine the appropriateness of prescribed psychotropic medication, parenting classes for at least six months, random screens, individual and group therapy to address abuse–related issues, and weekly 12-step meetings for at least one year. The disposition report essentially adopted the assessor’s treatment recommendations into its own disposition recommendations to the court.

It was also recounted in the report that a friend of Alicia, apparently Charles, had reported that in October 2006, when she was hospitalized, Alicia took 10 Valium tablets and was calling godparents and relatives in Spain and Italy to see if they could take care of I.G.

An addendum report to the disposition report, filed with the court on October 11, 2007, contained further evidence suggesting substance abuse. It stated that Alicia’s therapist overheard the mother demanding prescription medication from a pharmacist who refused her request, resulting in the mother “slandering the pharmacist, calling him a quack.” The therapist “expressed concern about the mother’s ongoing use of such large quantities of opioid and observed that the mother has a remarkably high tolerance for these medications. When further questioned about the mother’s tolerance, [the therapist] stated that, given the amount of Valium, Percocet, and Darvocet she ingests, that it is unlikely that she only began taking these medications relatively recently. The addendum report also stated that Alicia told her “that she was addicted or dependent on her pain medication.”

The social worker who prepared the disposition report and addendum testified at the disposition hearing that Alicia had “a pattern of mixing alcohol and prescription medication.” His recommendations regarding Alicia’s drinking and drug use were made because he felt she should not be taking pain medication at all, but that he wanted confirmation that she was taking her medications, and not using alcohol.

A public health nurse testified that, according to records from late 2006, Alicia carried with her several medications, including Percocet, Darvocet, Valium, naprosyn, codeine, and mecilizine. The Darvocet and Percocet in particular were strong and potentially addictive. It was unclear who had prescribed all of these medications because Alicia’s primary physician’s hearing testimony about her medication regimen did not mention all of them.

At the conclusion of the disposition hearing, the court stated that it had considered the testimony given at the jurisdiction and disposition hearings, and read and considered each of the reports submitted by the agency. The court found that Alicia “has significant physical and mental health issues that need to be addressed,” and that the Agency had met its burden of proof by clear and convincing evidence that there was a substantial risk of harm to I.G. in his mother’s care. The court declared I.G. to be a dependent child and removed him from Alicia’s custody. It ordered reunification services for Alicia, approving the proposed case plan, which included counseling and substance abuse treatment. Specifically, the plan included as service objectives that Alicia stay sober and show the ability to live free of alcohol dependency. Her responsibilities included participating in substance abuse outpatient services, substance abuse testing, a 12-step program, and a psychiatric assessment to determine the appropriateness of psychiatric medication.

Alicia filed a timely notice of appeal.

DISCUSSION

According to Alicia, “the evidence was insufficient to support an order requiring Aliciato undergo substance and alcohol abuse testing and treatment in order for her to reunify with I.G. This was not a typical substance abuse case but a case of someone who was reliant on pain medication to relieve her of chronic pain.” We strongly disagree.

A juvenile court has “ ‘broad discretion to determine what would best serve and protect the child’s interest and to fashion a dispositional order in accordance with that discretion.’ ” (In re Neil D. (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 219, 225.) The juvenile court’s dispositional findings regarding a case plan are subject to review for substantial evidence. (In re Jasmin C. (2003) 106 Cal.App.4th 177, 180.) “ ‘In juvenile cases, as in other areas of the law, the power of an appellate court asked to assess the sufficiency of the evidence begins and ends with a determination as to whether or not there is any substantial evidence, whether or not contradicted, which will support the conclusion of the trier of fact. All conflicts must be resolved in favor of the respondent and all legitimate references indulged in to uphold the verdict, if possible.’ ” (In re Rocco M. (1991) 1 Cal.App.4th 814, 820.) “Substantial evidence” must be “ ‘ “reasonable in nature, credible, and of solid value; it must actually be ‘substantial’ proof of the essentials which the law requires in a particular case.” ’ ” (Ortega v. Pajaro Valley Unified School Dist. (1998) 64 Cal.App.4th 1023, 1043.)

Alicia’s argument centers on her severe injuries from a 2006 car accident, the pain she has endured, her 13 surgeries for back injuries, and the pain medication she has received. She is dismissive of the evidence of her inappropriate alcohol and prescription drug use. Regarding the evidence discussed in the police report prepared after Charles’s death, Alicia contends that it merely indicated that there was alcohol in the trunk of the car, and that the social worker who testified that she had a pattern of alcohol and prescription drug dependency could not prove that she had over the legal limit of alcohol in her system, or that she misused drugs. She also selectively argues the evidence presented at hearing, including evidence that some service providers and health professionals did not find evidence of substance abuse in their dealings with Alicia. She contends that “the people who had the most contact with Alicia, her treating providers, were not concerned about alcohol abuse.” She argues that “it does not appear the [Agency] was concerned with alcohol use,” and that at the hearing, the Agency’s counsel only opined that Alicia had unresolved mental health and drug issues related to prescription medication. In counsel’s opinion, the issue that presented the greatest risk was that Alicia was unsafe to drive.” She concludes, “[f]or all these reasons, the evidence was insufficient that Alicia had a substance abuse or alcohol abuse problem to justify” the portions of the court’s order that are the subject of her appeal.

Alicia’s arguments and contentions ignore, or mischaracterize, the substantial evidence that supports the court’s order. For example, it can be reasonably inferred from the substantial evidence of the August 2007 episode that resulted in Charles’s death that Alicia was inappropriately drinking vodka in the time that led up to this tragedy. The police report indicated that the vehicle involved was Alicia’s, that she was sitting in the driver’s seat, and that, according to a friend in the car, they were “all drinking.” The officer who prepared the police report also stated that “paramedics pointed out that Alicia and Charles had possibly been drinking because there were two bottles of vodka on the front seat. I looked inside the cab of [Alicia’s] vehicle and laying in the middle of the front seat I saw two bottles of an unknown alcoholic beverage. One bottle appeared to be empty and the other bottle was missing about a third of its contents.” This is substantial evidence that Alicia, within weeks of the court sustaining the petition at the jurisdiction hearing, was inappropriately drinking vodka while she was still taking a substantial amount of prescription drugs, a mixture that had previously led to her hospitalization, and that she showed a lack of self-control and bad judgment in doing so. It can reasonably be inferred from these circumstances that, as the social worker who authored the disposition report stated in his disposition hearing testimony, “ we’re not talking about social drinking.” At a minimum, it is substantial evidence which supports the social worker’s expressed concern about Alicia’s “pattern of mixing alcohol and prescription medication,” and provides sufficient support for the court’s orders.

Furthermore, substantial evidence indicates that Alicia’s October 2006 hospitalization after drinking vodka and taking Valium, was a suicide attempt, given her initial report that she took 15 Valium, her statement that she did not want to live, and the reports that she sought help from others to look after her son.

In addition, the court could reasonably infer from the circumstances of Alicia’s May 2007 hospitalization, when I.G. notified police that she was unconscious in her car, that she had used alcohol inappropriately. Alicia acknowledged at the time that she had had some “sips of beer,” before she became unconscious.

There is other substantial evidence that Alicia drank inappropriately. This included the recounting of Charles’s roommate’s statement to police in January 2007 that she had been “drunk all year,” and her own statement that she used alcohol to deal with her anxiety.

There is also substantial evidence that Alicia was abusing prescription drugs. She had, by her own admission, become “addicted or dependent” on her pain medication. She was evasive about her mixing of prescription drugs and alcohol, as seen by her changing story about her October 2006 consumption of vodka and Valium. The assessor was concerned about discrepancies between her accounts of her consumption of drugs and alcohol and what he found in the records he reviewed. Alicia was resistant to obtaining a case manager to manage her medications or coordinate her care, despite the recommendation of her therapist, although her therapist was concerned that the medications were exacerbating her depression and emotional instability. The therapist, reviewing her tolerance for consuming prescription drugs, opined to the Agency that it was unlikely that Alicia had been taking them only recently. Although the cause of Alicia’s fainting spells was unknown, it was reasonable to infer from the record that substance abuse contributed to them, given her passing out in her car after taking “sips of beer” in May 2007.

Indeed, the evidence supporting the portion of the juvenile court’s order appealed from is ample. Moreover, Alicia’s arguments are based on characterizations that ask us to reweigh the evidence, which is unacceptable under a substantial evidence standard of review. In short, her arguments are without merit.

In light of our conclusion, we need not address the Agency’s argument that Alicia forfeited her challenge to the case plan by her purported failure to properly object in the juvenile court. We also do not address any jurisdictional finding regarding “count b-3” of the original petition, a matter Alicia suggests the Agency has raised in its opposition brief, as the Agency has not properly requested any such review, nor does it appear from their papers that they are requesting one at this time.

DISPOSITION

The findings and orders of the juvenile court are affirmed.

We concur:

Kline, P.J. Haerle, J.


Summaries of

In re I.G.

California Court of Appeals, First District, Second Division
Sep 22, 2008
No. A119762 (Cal. Ct. App. Sep. 22, 2008)
Case details for

In re I.G.

Case Details

Full title:SAN MATEO COUNTY HUMAN SERVICES AGENCY, Plaintiff and Respondent, v…

Court:California Court of Appeals, First District, Second Division

Date published: Sep 22, 2008

Citations

No. A119762 (Cal. Ct. App. Sep. 22, 2008)