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In re H.W.

California Court of Appeals, Second District, First Division
Jul 14, 2008
No. B201614 (Cal. Ct. App. Jul. 14, 2008)

Opinion

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County No. CK67627, Jan Levine, Judge.

Christopher R. Booth, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

Raymond G. Fortner, Jr., County Counsel, James M. Owens, Assistant County Counsel, and Timothy M. O’Crowley, Senior Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.


VOGEL, Acting P.J.

This is a father’s appeal from jurisdictional and dispositional orders declaring his children dependents of the juvenile court. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 300.) We affirm.

All section references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.

FACTS

Y. and C.W. have two daughters, O.W. (born in December 1994) and H.W. (1996). The family came to the attention of the Department of Children and Family Services in March 2007 based on a report from H.’s therapist of “possible child abuse.” C. and the girls told the police that Y. had become violent when C. objected to his proposal that the family return to Israel (where they had lived before they came to California), and that there had been prior incidents of violence. A petition was filed alleging a history of domestic violence by the father, the mother’s failure to protect the children, and the threat of further violence. On April 3, the dependency court ordered the children released to C. with monitored visits for Y.

An amended petition was filed in June with the added allegations that Y. had on numerous occasions sexually abused his daughters. Following a contested jurisdiction hearing held over a period of several weeks, the dependency court sustained the petition, finding true the allegations of domestic violence and sexual abuse of H. (but not O.) and describing its findings in detail in a statement of decision. In short, the court found the mother and daughters credible, noting that they had separately related the same events, and rejected the father’s testimony on the ground it was not credible.

Y. appeals from the dependency court’s jurisdictional findings and dispositional orders.

DISCUSSION

I.

Y. contends his due process right of confrontation was violated because the dependency court “repeatedly prevent[ed him] from challenging the credibility of witnesses.” More specifically, he claims the court erred in (1) denying his request for a “continuance to obtain, and perhaps introduce as evidence, documents intended to challenge” C.’s credibility; (2) in excluding evidence on relevance grounds when he tried to ask H. about whether C. had told H. she wanted a divorce; and (3) in imposing a “blanket exclusion” of all evidence relating to the parents’ Jewish divorce proceedings. None of these claims have merit.

A.

Parents involved in dependency proceedings have the right to confront and effectively cross-examine witnesses who testify at a contested hearing (In re Malinda S. (1990) 51 Cal.3d 368, 382-385; Denny H. v. Superior Court (2005) 131 Cal.App.4th 1501, 1513; In re Vanessa M. (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 1121, 1129-1132; cf. Delaware v. Fensterer (1985) 474 U.S. 15, 20), but the court may impose reasonable limitations that do not leave the trier of fact with a view of a witness’s credibility that would have been altered had further cross-examination been permitted (Delaware v. Van Arsdall (1986) 475 U.S. 673, 680). Subject to these due process considerations, the dependency court has broad discretion to control the proceedings before it and such rulings will be reversed only upon a showing of abused discretion. (Ingrid E. v. Superior Court (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 751, 758; In re Cindy L. (1997) 17 Cal.4th 15, 35.)

B.

1. At a May 3 pretrial conference, Y. asked for a continuance to allow him time to obtain documents related to a “child abduction case in Israel” involving the family. The request was denied, and Y. now claims it should have been granted because, “perhaps,” he could have found and introduced documents challenging C.’s credibility. The contention fails because Y. has not explained whether he could have obtained these documents or how they would have impeached C.’s credibility.

2. Y.’s assertion that, during his cross-examination of C., the court “repeatedly excluded evidence on relevance grounds” fails because Y. has not explained the relevance of his questions or how C.’s answers would have affected the dependency court’s assessment of C.’s credibility.

3. When C. was asked on cross-examination, “When you were in Israel, were you still married to [Y.],” C.’s lawyer objected on the ground of relevancy. The court responded thus: “All right. Now . . . I haven’t really interrupted the questions previously, but counsel [has] made reference to times spent in Israel. There’s been no objection [as] to vagueness as to time . . . . No objection as to foundation. So I haven’t interrupted the questions, but I am going to say that based on my duty to control the smoothness of this trial, those questions about time in Israel, I am going to just exclude [them] as not relevant to the events that are outlined in the petition today.”

Shortly thereafter, Y.’s lawyer asked C. whether her daughters’ claims of sexual abuse arose after C. learned that Y. had talked to a rabbi about a “Jewish divorce.” C. answered affirmatively. Y.’s lawyer then asked, “Were you shocked that [Y.] had filed the Jewish divorce?” C. (joined by the Department) objected on relevance grounds and the objection was sustained. Y. then asked a series of questions apparently designed to show that C. was not truly afraid that Y. was violent (“Did you ever beg him to take you back into the home?” and that sort of thing). Objections were sustained, but not to Y.’s subsequent specific questions about whether C. had lied to Y.

Considered in context and in its entirety, Y.’s cross-examination of C. was extensive and it does not appear that any relevant line of questioning was foreclosed by the court’s rulings. More to the point, Y. has again failed to tell us what answers he sought to elicit or how those answers could have affected the dependency court’s assessment of C.’s credibility.

C.

For similar reasons, we reject Y.’s claim that the dependency court impermissibly limited the scope of his evidence while allowing C. to pursue other matters.

1.

Y. called Debra Mindlin, the Department’s investigator, who testified on direct about differences between the information C. provided to the police and the information C. and her daughters provided to Mindlin. On cross-examination, C. asked Mindlin whether she had any reason to doubt anything H. or O. had said. Y. objected, claiming the questions called for inadmissible opinions. The objection was overruled and Mindlin answered “No.” Y.’s lawyer then asked the court whether he could “cross-examine” Mindlin “regarding the questions . . . just asked.” The court denied the request, commenting that “the questions weren’t particularly relevant but that wasn’t the objection that you made. So there’s really no point in cross-examining. It will go to the weight of the testimony.” Y.’s claim of error fails because he has not explained how he was prejudiced by the court’s ruling.

2.

When Y. testified on direct, his lawyer asked whether his daughters ever asked him to kiss them goodnight, but C.’s objection was sustained. Later, Y.’s lawyer asked him whether he thought the allegations about inappropriate touching might be “made up.” Again, the court sustained C.’s objection. Y.’s challenge to these evidentiary rulings fails because he ignores the fact that he testified at great length without objection, and because he once again has failed to explain how the result might have been different had he been allowed to answer the questions.

II.

We summarily reject Y.’s contention that the court erred in failing to exclude H. from the courtroom during O.’s testimony (and vice versa). Section 349 expressly provides that a minor who is the subject of a dependency proceeding is entitled to be present at all hearings. (See also Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.530.) Y.’s point -- that he was entitled to show that his wife and daughters “were colluding to present distorted or false testimony against [him]” -- ignores the fact that he made this point repeatedly in the dependency court, and ignores the fact that his wife and daughters had separately given their statements to the police. We see no due process violation.

DISPOSITION

The orders are affirmed.

We concur: ROTHSCHILD, J., NEIDORF, J.

Retired Judge of the Los Angeles Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.


Summaries of

In re H.W.

California Court of Appeals, Second District, First Division
Jul 14, 2008
No. B201614 (Cal. Ct. App. Jul. 14, 2008)
Case details for

In re H.W.

Case Details

Full title:In re H.W. et al., Persons Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. LOS…

Court:California Court of Appeals, Second District, First Division

Date published: Jul 14, 2008

Citations

No. B201614 (Cal. Ct. App. Jul. 14, 2008)