Opinion
BANKRUPTCY CASE NO. 02-37307-HDH-7, CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:04-CV-0494-G, CONSOLIDATED WITH 3:04-CV-1013-G 3:04-CV-1469-G 3:04-CV-1585-G.
October 14, 2004
MEMORANDUM ORDER
Before the court is the motion of appellant Melvin Ray Hassell ("Hassell" or "appellant") to recuse the undersigned on the basis of 28 U.S.C. § 455. For the reasons set forth below, Hassell's motion is denied.
I. BACKGROUND
Appellant, proceeding pro se, filed this motion on June 24, 2004, purportedly under the authority of 28 U.S.C. § 455 and the Code of Judicial Conduct Canon 3. Docket Sheet, No 3:04-CV-1013-G. This case is a consolidation of several appeals from decisions of the bankruptcy court.
The following cases have all been consolidated into this action, No. 3:04-CV-494-G, No. 3:04-CV-1013-G, No. 3:04-CV-1021-G (dismissed August 19, 2004), No. 3:04-CV-1469-G, and No. 3:04-CV-1585-G.
On September 4, 2002, this court entered a default judgment against Hassell and his wife in a previous case for approximately $800,000.00 as a result of unpaid federal income taxes, interest, and penalties. United States v. Hassell, No. 3:02-CV-0112-G (N.D. Tex. Sept. 4, 2002) (default judgment), appeal dismissed, 82 Fed. Appx. 372 (5th Cir. 2003). Before entry of default judgment in that case, Hassell filed a demand for a jury trial but his demand was denied. United States v. Hassell, No. 3:02-CV-0112-G, 2002 WL 1359718 (N.D. Tex. June 18, 2002).
During the course of litigation related to Hassell's tax liability, Hassell has, on at least two occasions, filed with various courts an affidavit of criminal complaint, in which he alleges that several public figures, including myself, have committed extortion. See In re Hassell, No. 02-37307 HDH-7, 2004 WL 790227, at *1 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. Feb. 20, 2004) (striking such an affidavit filed with the bankruptcy court). Most recently, on August 31, 2004, Hassell filed a civil complaint in which he named, among others, myself and all other judges in the Northern District of Texas as defendants. Hassell v. IRS Bonus Partners, et al., No. 3:04-CV-1907-D (Complaint filed August 31, 2004).
II. ANALYSIS A. Legal Standards
"Any justice, judge, or magistrate judge of the United States shall disqualify himself in any proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned." 28 U.S.C. § 455(a).Furthermore, Canon 3 C(1)(c) of the Code of Conduct for United States Judges provides, in pertinent part:
C. Disqualification
(1) A judge shall disqualify himself or herself in a proceeding in which the judge's impartiality might reasonably be questioned, including but not limited to instances in which . . .
* * *
(c) the judge knows that the judge, individually or as a fiduciary, or the judge's spouse or minor child residing in the judge's household, has a financial interest in the subject matter in controversy or in a party to the proceeding, or any other interest that could be affected substantially by the outcome of the proceeding.
Code of Conduct for United States Judges, Canon 3 C(1)(c).
B. Hassell's Argument
Hassell contends that I must be disqualified from these proceedings because my impartiality is in question due to the fact that he has "filed criminal charges against" me. Motion to Recuse at 4. Hassell asserts "[c]learly, because I . . . have filed criminal charges against Chief Judge Fish with both the F.B.I. and the Congress of the United States of America, Chief Judge Fish does have a substantial personal interest in the outcome of my case, and therefore the impartiality of Chief Judge Fish can be reasonably questioned." Id. at 11 (emphasis in original). These "criminal charges" stem from Hassell's allegations of a conspiracy of public officials who — he argues — employ extortion as a means of collecting an amount from him greater than the debt originally determined by the United States Tax Court. Id. at 4. My role in the alleged conspiracy was apparently consummated when the September 4, 2002 default judgment was entered against Hassell. See United States v. Hassell, No. 3:02-CV-0112-G (default judgment dated Sept. 4, 2002).
Hassell's next argument in support of recusal is grounded on the denial of his demand for a jury trial in the above action. See United States v. Hassell, No. 3:02-CV-0112-G, 2002 WL 1359718 (N.D. Tex. June 18, 2002). In the motion to recuse, Hassell asserts that his Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial was violated by the denial of his demand, and further states "[t]his violation of my constitutionally-secured right to a trial by jury is evidence that Chief Judge Fish is either ignorant of, or disrespects, the supreme Law of the Land." Motion to Recuse at 14 (citing U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2). Hassell concludes his arguments by stating: "Judge Fish, now named in criminal complaint and petitions filed by appellant Hassell, may appear to minimize or avoid his own personal liabilities if appellant Hassell is found guilty in Chief Judge Fish's court." Motion to Recuse at 17.
The Fifth Circuit has held that allegations of bias must be based on an extrajudicial foundation. Henderson v. Department of Public Safety and Corrections, 901 F.2d 1288, 1296 (5th Cir. 1990); United States v. Clark, 605 F.2d 939, 942 (5th Cir. 1979). Additionally, a judge should not recuse himself merely because the party seeking recusal has sued, or threatened to sue, the judge. United States v. Grismore, 564 F.2d 929, 933 (10th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 954 (1978). Moreover, the Fifth Circuit has observed that "adverse rulings in a case are not an adequate basis for demanding recusal." United States v. MMR Corporation, 954 F.2d 1040, 1045 (5th Cir. 1992) (citing Berger v. United States, 255 U.S. 22 (1921), and United States v. Phillips, 664 F.2d 971, 1002-03 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied sub nom. Meinster v. United States, 457 U.S. 1136 (1982)).
A party should not be allowed to abuse the recusal process in efforts to "judge shop," delay his case, vent his frustration at an unfavorable ruling, or otherwise attempt to gain some perceived strategic advantage. Here, the motion to recuse is based on two prior rulings I made in a case involving Hassell. Hassell has attempted to inject frivolous grounds for recusal into these consolidated bankruptcy appeals by naming me as a party in civil litigation and by making criminal allegations against me. As stated above, however, recusal is not proper when it is based upon the judge's rulings against the movant, nor is it proper when based on the existence of litigation between the movant and the judge. Grismore, 564 F.2d at 933; MMR Corporation, 954 F.2d at 1045. Hassell has not submitted any extrajudicial foundation for his motion to recuse. Furthermore, Hassell has not shown that I have any personal interest in the outcome of his case because no such interest exists. Thus, there are no factual or legal grounds for recusal.
III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, Hassell's motion to recuse is DENIED.