Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Super. Ct. No. JD225268
BUTZ, J.Ronald W. (father) and Theresa W. (mother), the parents of G.W. (the minor), appeal from an order of the juvenile court terminating their parental rights. (Welf. & Inst. Code, §§ 366.26, 395.) Father and mother make four claims of alleged prejudicial error in the proceedings, including a claim that Sacramento County Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) and the juvenile court violated the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 (the ICWA). (25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.) Disagreeing with each of those claims, we shall affirm.
Undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On December 28, 2006, DHHS filed an original juvenile dependency petition pursuant to section 300 on behalf of the 23-month-old minor. That petition alleged the minor’s home was unsafe, and that A.W., the minor’s sibling, had been sexually molested by a stepsibling. Thereafter, two amended petitions alleged father and mother had a history of domestic violence, mother and father had a history of mental illness, and mother had a substance abuse problem. The juvenile court sustained the second amended petition, adjudged the minor a dependent child of the court, ordered the minor removed from parental custody, and denied father and mother reunification services.
Psychologist Jayson Wilkenfield conducted a bonding assessment of the minor, the minor’s sibling, A.W., and father and mother. According to Wilkenfield, the minor did not have “a particularly strong emotional attachment� to mother. As for father, Wilkenfield observed the minor and his sibling “appeared much more animated in their interactions with him� than with mother. Both minors were “happy and comfortable� being with father, and both displayed an “emotional attachment� to him. However, on separating from father, neither child “exhibited any overt signs of anxiety, sadness or distress. . . .� In conclusion, the psychologist opined that the minor would not suffer “any significant emotional detriment� if he failed to reunify with mother. As for father, Wilkenfield believed it was likely the minor would suffer “at least some mild emotional detriment� if his relationship with father were severed, but that the benefits of permanency would outweigh any harm.
Visits between mother and father and the minor went well, but father had missed some initial scheduled visits. The minor was placed with a nonrelative extended family member, who had adopted three cousins of the minor. That caregiver indicated a willingness to adopt the minor and A.W., his sibling, who also had been placed with the caregiver. Except for a period of two to three months when they were in separate placements, the minor and A.W. remained together.
The report prepared by DHHS for the section 366.26 hearing recommended adoption as the permanent plan for both the minor and his sibling. However, as to the minor’s sibling, DHHS urged the juvenile court to continue the matter. Although the caregiver had made a commitment to keep the minor and the minor’s sibling together, recently the sibling had displayed some behavioral problems. Accordingly, the caregiver and DHHS sought more time in order to assess further the sibling’s situation. DHHS noted that the minor was generally adoptable, as he was “an active, healthy and bright young boy.�
In an addendum report, DHHS noted the minor and A.W., the minor’s sibling, were bonded to each other. A.W. reportedly showed “a lot of affection� toward the minor. A.W. would be receiving more therapy, and was showing some improvement. The caregiver indicated her continuing commitment to maintenance of the sibling relationship. DHHS was not yet certain whether A.W. was adoptable. However, the social worker believed the minor remained adoptable generally and that any delay “would delay the [minor’s] permanency.�
At the December 2007 section 366.26 hearing, the social worker’s testimony was consistent with the section 366.26 report. Father and mother testified their visits with the minor and A.W. went well, and that the minor and A.W. were bonded to each other. Counsel for father and mother argued that two statutory exceptions to adoption applied, and suggested guardianship or long-term foster care as the appropriate disposition for the minor. Counsel for mother suggested the minor was not likely to be adopted, or was at most only specifically adoptable based on the minor’s relationship with A.W.
At the conclusion of the section 366.26 hearing, the juvenile court found it likely the minor would be adopted and terminated the parental rights of father and mother as to the minor. In doing so, the court stated in part: “The Court also finds that termination of parental rights would not be detrimental to the child as defined in Section 366.26[, former subdivision] (c)(1) of the Welfare and Institutions Code. [¶] Much has been made about whether the exception under [section 366.26, former subdivisions] (c)(1)(A) or (c)(1)(E) applies. The Court will start with the issue of the [former subdivision] (c)(1)(E) exception concerning the sibling. [¶] The Court would note that the issue is whether or not it would be detrimental to the [minor]. The Court would note that the children remain placed together. They continue to have their relationship with one another. The Court is not aware of any information at this point in time that would lead to the removal of the [minor’s sibling] from the relative caretaker’s home. The information that the Court has is that ultimately both children may go to permanence in that home and that the caretaker is not seeking the removal and would foster the relationship even if [the minor’s sibling] did not reside in the home. [¶] [The minor] is a very young child for whom permanency is the first priority when he cannot be returned to the home of a parent. [¶] Furthermore, when there is an exception under [section] 366.26[, former subdivision] (c)(1)(A) based on the strength of the bond between the child and the parent--certainly there remains a relationship between the child with his parents, but they would have to be acting in the role of a parent in order for the Court to decline termination of parental rights. And neither is serving in that capacity at this time.â€�
Effective January 1, 2008, those provisions of section 366.26, subdivisions (c)(1)(A) and (E) have been renumbered as subdivisions (c)(1)(B)(i) and (v), respectively.
DISCUSSION
I
Mother and father contend the juvenile court and DHHS failed in their duties to ensure adequate information was provided to various tribal entities, as required by the ICWA.
Father joins in the argument made by mother on this and all other issues.
Based on father’s statement that he had Cherokee Indian tribal heritage, DHHS sent notices of the dependency proceedings to three relevant tribes and to the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA). Two of the tribes replied the minor was not eligible for membership. One tribe, Cherokee Nation, told DHHS it needed additional information about family members before reaching a decision on the minor’s eligibility for membership. Thereafter, the juvenile court ordered father to provide the requested information to DHHS.
At an April 23, 2007 hearing, the social worker advised the juvenile court that father had failed to provide DHHS with the information required by Cherokee Nation. Counsel for father did not dispute that statement. The court ruled that, unless father provided the required information, DHHS was not obliged to send new notices to the tribes. Thereafter, on June 1, 2007, the court ruled the minor was not an Indian child pursuant to the ICWA. According to the court, unless additional information was provided, no further notices to the tribes were necessary.
Mother and father claim the juvenile court’s reliance on the representation by DHHS that father had failed to provide the requested information was insufficient. Instead, they assert the juvenile court had the duty to inquire of DHHS what steps it had taken to ensure that father had followed through with the court’s direction to provide the information sought by Cherokee Nation. The result, they say, was a failure to ensure compliance with the ICWA’s notice requirements.
We disagree. As the record shows, the juvenile court ordered father to provide the requested information, asked DHHS if it had received it, and left open the possibility that new notices to tribes would be necessary if DHHS received additional information. DHHS had stated previously father had not provided DHHS with a completed questionnaire, and that DHHS lacked contact information on some family members. Thereafter, DHHS advised the court that it had not received anything further.
The ICWA protects the interests of Indian children and promotes the stability and security of Indian children and Indian tribes by establishing minimum standards for, and permitting tribal participation in, dependency actions. (25 U.S.C. §§ 1901, 1902, 1903(1), 1911(c), 1912.) The juvenile court and DHHS have an affirmative and continuing duty to inquire whether a child who is subject to the proceedings is, or may be, an Indian child. (Cal. Rules of Court, former rule 5.664(d).) If, after the petition is filed, the court knows or has “reason to know that an Indian child is involvedâ€� (25 U.S.C. § 1912(a)), notice of the pending proceeding and the right to intervene must be sent to the tribe or to the BIA if the tribal affiliation is not known (former rule 5.664(f)).
Further rule references are to the California Rules of Court.
“The burden is on [DHHS] to obtain all possible information about the minor’s potential Indian background and provide that information to the relevant tribe or, if the tribe is unknown, to the BIA.� (In re Louis S. (2004) 117 Cal.App.4th 622, 630.) Failure to comply with the notice provisions and determine whether the ICWA applies is prejudicial error. (In re Desiree F. (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 460, 472; In re Kahlen W. (1991) 233 Cal.App.3d 1414, 1424.)
Former rule 5.664(d)(3) states: “At the first appearance by a parent or guardian in any dependency case, . . . the parent or guardian must be ordered to complete Parental Notification of Indian Status (Juvenile Court) ([former] form JV-130).� In this case, mother completed that form. The court directed father to complete the Indian ancestry questionnaire (former form JV-135). Thereafter, DHHS stated it had contacted father by telephone to inquire about his Indian heritage.
Effective January 1, 2008, the form numbers have changed: Former form JV-130 now is form ICWA-020 (rule 5.481(a)(2)), and former form JV-135 now is form ICWA-030 (rule 5.481(a)(4)(A)).
The obligation of DHHS and the juvenile court pertaining to a minor’s Indian ancestry “is only one of inquiry and not an absolute duty to ascertain or refute Native American ancestry.â€� (In re Antoinette S. (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 1401, 1413.) Here, the juvenile court concluded the ICWA was inapplicable. On this record, we presume DHHS made necessary inquiries and obtained information sufficient to support the court’s conclusion that the ICWA did not apply. (Evid. Code, § 664; In re E.H. (2006) 141 Cal.App.4th 1330, 1334.)
In sum, we conclude the juvenile court discharged its duty properly to ascertain whether the minor might be an Indian child under the ICWA, and that the court’s finding the ICWA did not apply is supported by the record. (In re E.H., supra, 141 Cal.App.4th at p. 1335; cf. In re Levi U. (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 191, 199.)
II
Claiming the minor is part of a bonded sibling group that should not be separated and the minor’s sibling is not adoptable, mother and father contend the finding by the juvenile court that it was likely the minor would be adopted was not supported by substantial evidence. They argue that, if the minor and his sibling’s current placement fails, then the minor and his sibling are unlikely candidates for adoption. According to mother and father, unless the behavioral issues of the sibling are resolved, it is premature to find it likely the minor would be adopted.
“In order for the court to select and implement adoption as the permanent plan, it must find, by clear and convincing evidence, the minor will likely be adopted if parental rights are terminated.â€� (In re Tabatha G. (1996) 45 Cal.App.4th 1159, 1164; see also § 366.26, subd. (c)(1).) Usually, the issue of adoptability focuses on the minor, “e.g., whether the minor’s age, physical condition, and emotional state make it difficult to find a person willing to adopt the minor.â€� (In re Sarah M. (1994) 22 Cal.App.4th 1642, 1649.) However, “in some cases a minor who ordinarily might be considered unadoptable due to age, poor physical health, physical disability, or emotional instability is nonetheless likely to be adopted because a prospective adoptive family has been identified as willing to adopt the child.â€� (Id. at p. 1650.)
Here, mother and father do not challenge the juvenile court’s finding of the minor’s likely adoptability based on any of his personal characteristics or possible difficulties with the eligibility of the prospective adoptive parent. Instead, they urge that, because the minor is part of a bonded sibling group with his sister, who may not be adoptable, the minor cannot be found likely to be adopted.
We disagree. Mother and father cite no authority for their proposition that the issue of the minor’s likely adoptability must be “inextricably tiedâ€� to the minor’s sibling’s adoptability. As both parties recognize, the juvenile court could have deferred termination of parental rights if it had found the minor difficult to place due to his membership in a sibling group. (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(3).) But the court made no such finding, nor could it have done so reasonably, for the minor was not difficult to place; he was placed with a prospective adoptive parent, along with his sibling. Moreover, the social worker concluded that, despite the minor’s bond with his sibling, the minor’s adoption should not be delayed pending a decision pertaining to the status of the sibling.
Substantial evidence supports that conclusion. Cases cited by mother and father do not compel a different result. In re Asia L. (2003) 107 Cal.App.4th 498, 510-511, involved siblings, five and seven years old, who exhibited significant emotional and behavioral problems and who needed specialized placement. Although the social worker reported that her agency was “confident� an adoptive home could be located, the minors’ current foster parents were not committed to adoption and there was no evidence of other approved families willing to adopt children with the problems faced by the siblings. (Id. at pp. 510-512.) Under those circumstances, the appellate court reversed the juvenile court’s finding of adoptability. (Id. at pp. 512, 515.)
Here, there was no evidence of any special needs of the minor that would necessitate a specialized placement or that the sibling issue was so significant as to pose an obstacle to adoption. Moreover, unlike in In re Asia L., supra, 107 Cal.App.4that pages 511-512, where only a willingness to consider adoption was present, here the record reflects the prospective adoptive mother had expressed her commitment to adopt the minor. Nor was there anything else about “the minor’s age, physical condition, and emotional state [that would] make it difficult to find a person willing to adopt the minor.� (In re Sarah M., supra,22 Cal.App.4th at p. 1649.)
In In re Brian P. (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 616, 624, also cited by mother and father, the social worker’s opinion that a child was adoptable was held insufficient to sustain a finding of adoptability where the social worker provided no facts to support her opinion. In contrast to the characteristics of the four-and-one-half-year-old child in that case--he had only recently begun to speak, had problems with his “gait,� was still learning to dress himself and was only recently toilet trained--the record here does not reflect that any possible developmental delays would create difficulties for purposes of placing the minor for adoption. (Id. at p. 619.)
In In re Amelia S. (1991) 229 Cal.App.3d 1060, cited by mother and father, a finding of adoptability was reversed where 10 siblings had “various developmental, emotional and physical problems, some of a serious nature� (id. at pp. 1062-1063) and only two of the siblings’ five foster families were even “considering� adopting the large sibling group (id. at pp. 1065-1066). The minor’s circumstances here are readily distinguishable--he is not a member of a large sibling group for purposes of locating an adoptive placement, nor does the record reflect any potential delays preventing placement or making more problematical the potential success of the prospective adoptive placement.
Mother and father also cite In re Jerome D. (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 1200, 1203, 1205, in which the prospective adoptive parent of a nearly nine-year-old child was the mother’s former boyfriend, who had various potential legal impediments to adoption. As there was insufficient evidence of the child’s “general adoptability,� the appellate court reversed the finding of adoptability. (Id. at pp. 1205-1206.) The reasoning in that case does not apply to a child such as the minor here, whose appealing characteristics and placement with an experienced and committed caretaker support the juvenile court’s finding of likely adoptability.
In In re Tamneisha S. (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 798, cited by mother and father, the social services agency was unable, after a 10-month search, to find an adoptive home for the child. (Id. at pp. 802-803.) Ultimately, the juvenile court granted a guardianship after finding the agency had failed to show the minor was likely to be adopted. (Id. at p. 803.) The Court of Appeal affirmed the order of guardianship. (Id. at p. 808.)
This case is different from the circumstances found in In re Tamneisha S., supra, 58 Cal.App.4th 798. Here, the minor had developed a close relationship with his prospective adoptive parent. Moreover, he was in a placement with a caregiver committed to his adoption and also dedicated to maintaining her commitment to the minor’s relationship with his sibling.
Analogizing the situation of the minor to that of circumstances involving a “special needs� child, it is true that sometimes special needs children are more difficult to place than those without such needs. For example, in In re Michael G. (1983) 147 Cal.App.3d 56, the minor was developmentally disabled and suffered from serious emotional problems. According to the record in that case, the seven-year-old minor functioned below his age level, was not completely toilet trained, and possessed limited language abilities. On that record, the court noted all parties had conceded adoptive placement would be difficult. (Id. at pp. 58-59.)
The circumstances here are different. Although the minor arguably is in a “special situation� with his sibling, the record makes clear it is the intention of the caregiver to adopt the minor’s sibling or continue to have the sibling live with her under an alternative permanent plan. Adopting the minor does not necessarily mean the sibling relationship will be affected adversely. The evidence before the juvenile court provides ample support for its determination that the minor was likely to be adopted within a reasonable time. (Cf. In re Scott M. (1993) 13 Cal.App.4th 839, 843-844.)
III
Mother and father also claim the juvenile court committed reversible error in failing to apply the sibling relationship exception to adoption to the proceedings. According to mother and father, the record contains evidence the minor and his sibling had a significant bond with each other, as seen by their past joint residence together. Noting evidence of enjoyment by the minor of contact with his sibling, and reliance on her, mother and father suggest the minor’s sibling relationship was of great importance to the minor. Mother and father also assert the benefits obtained by the minor from maintenance of that relationship outweigh the benefits of adoption to the minor, and that adoption might interfere substantially with that relationship.
As alternatives to adoption, mother and father suggest the juvenile court should have continued the matter, or chosen long-term foster care or guardianship as the appropriate permanent plan for the minor.
The claim by mother and father is premised on the statutory exception to adoption contained in section 366.26, former subdivision (c)(1)(E). Under that provision, the juvenile court may find a compelling reason for determining that termination of parental rights would be detrimental to the minor where “[t]here would be substantial interference with a child’s sibling relationship, taking into consideration the nature and extent of the relationship, including, but not limited to, whether the child was raised with a sibling in the same home, whether the child shared significant common experiences or has existing close and strong bonds with a sibling, and whether ongoing contact is in the child’s best interests, including the child’s long-term emotional interest, as compared to the benefit of legal permanence through adoption.â€� (§ 366.26, former subd. (c)(1)(E).)
Pursuant to former subdivision (c)(1)(E) of section 366.26, the juvenile court is given the discretion to determine that termination of parental rights would be detrimental under certain circumstances. To make such a determination, the court must find a “compelling reason.â€� (§ 366.26, former subd. (c)(1).) Moreover, the statute contains a number of criteria that the court may consider. But the court is not required by the statute even to consider the applicability of the statutory exception. (Cf. In re Melvin A. (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 1243, 1252.)
In this case, the juvenile court determined that termination of parental rights would not be detrimental to the minor based on the sibling relationship existing in this case. The court noted the minor and his sibling lived together, and that their caregiver was committed to maintaining the relationship whether or not the sibling remained there. Accordingly, its ruling suggested, there was no “compelling reasonâ€� to apply the former subdivision (c)(1)(E) exception. (See § 366.26, former subd. (c)(1).)
The record supports the determination by the juvenile court that termination of parental rights would not be detrimental to the minor based on substantial interference with his sibling relationship. It is true, as mother and father argue, that there is no guarantee the minor and his sibling will remain together. However, as the juvenile court noted, there was no evidence before the court to suggest that the minor’s sibling might be removed from her placement with the minor. Accordingly, the court impliedly found no evidence to support a finding that termination of parental rights would result in a substantial interference with a sibling relationship.
On the record before us, we cannot say the juvenile court’s determination was an abuse of its discretion. Under the circumstances presented, although, as we have said, there is no guarantee, it is likely the minor and his sibling will remain together, as they have for some time, and continue to enjoy the emotional benefits of their relationship. Moreover, even the testimony by mother and father did not indicate the minor would suffer detriment if the minor and his sibling were separated. We conclude there was no error in the court’s ruling that termination of parental rights was not detrimental to the minor.
The California Supreme Court has held the juvenile court may reject adoption under the sibling relationship exception only if it determines adoption would be detrimental to the minor whose welfare is being considered. (In re Celine R. (2003) 31 Cal.4th 45, 49-50.) Here, it is indisputable that a strong sibling relationship existed between the minor and his sibling. But, before adoption can be rejected, the statute requires something more: the showing of a substantial interference with a sibling relationship if adoption is chosen as the permanent plan. (§ 366.26, former subd. (c)(1)(E).)
The record in this case does not demonstrate substantial interference with a significant sibling relationship due to adoption of the minor. Moreover, considering their history together, the fact their caregiver had adopted three cousins of the minor, and the expressed commitment of the caregiver to maintain the sibling relationship, there is little reason to expect that adoption necessarily will mean the prospect of interference with the relationship between the minor and his sibling in the future. Finally, as the court found and the record reflects, the minor would benefit greatly from adoption.
In this case, in considering the statutory exception, the record reflects the juvenile court had before it all of the facts and circumstances pertaining to the minor’s sibling relationship. After evaluating them, the court did not find a “compelling reason� under former subdivision (c)(1)(E) of section 366.26 to apply the exception. The explanation for that is, as the record suggests and the court found, there would be no substantial interference with sibling relationships, and no detriment to the minor. On this record, the court concluded that the minor’s need for permanency outweighed the benefits a continued relationship with his sibling would afford.
Here, as we have seen, the record suggests the benefits of adoption for the minor outweigh the benefits of continuing his sibling relationship, even assuming there was some interference with that relationship. (In re L.Y.L. (2002) 101 Cal.App.4th 942, 951-953.) In any event, the record reflects the juvenile court did consider the possibility the minor’s sibling could be removed from the joint placement. Considering all pertinent factors, the record supports the court’s finding that adoption would not be detrimental to the minor. Accordingly, we reject the claim.
IV
Father and mother claim the failure by the juvenile court to apply the statutory exception to termination of parental rights based on their relationship to the minor requires reversal of the order terminating their parental rights. According to father and mother, the record contains substantial evidence they satisfied both elements of the exception. Moreover, they argue, the minor will be harmed by a lack of contact with them.
Mother joins in the argument made by father on this and all other issues.
“‘At the selection and implementation hearing held pursuant to section 366.26, a juvenile court must make one of four possible alternative permanent plans for a minor child. . . . The permanent plan preferred by the Legislature is adoption. [Citation.]’ [Citations.] If the court finds the child is adoptable, it must terminate parental rights absent circumstances under which it would be detrimental to the child.� (In re Ronell A. (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 1352, 1368.)
One of the circumstances under which termination of parental rights would be detrimental to the minor is: “The parents . . . have maintained regular visitation and contact with the child and the child would benefit from continuing the relationship.â€� (§ 366.26, former subd. (c)(1)(A).) The benefit to the child must promote “the well-being the child would gain in a permanent home with new, adoptive parents. In other words, the court balances the strength and quality of the natural parent/child relationship in a tenuous placement against the security and the sense of belonging a new family would confer. If severing the natural parent/child relationship would deprive the child of a substantial, positive emotional attachment such that the child would be greatly harmed, the preference for adoption is overcome and the natural parent’s rights are not terminated.â€� (In re Autumn H. (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 567, 575.)
The parent has the burden of establishing the existence of any circumstances that constitute an exception to termination of parental rights. (In re Cristella C. (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 1363, 1372-1373.) The juvenile court is not required to find that termination of parental rights will not be detrimental due to specified circumstances. (Id. at p. 1373.) Even “‘frequent and loving’ contact� is not sufficient to establish the benefit exception absent significant, positive emotional attachment between parent and child. (In re Teneka W. (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 721, 728-729; In re Beatrice M. (1994) 29 Cal.App.4th 1411, 1418-1419.)
In this case, it is true father and mother visited the minor regularly, and that those visits went well. But the record also reflects the minor’s attachment to mother was not a strong one. The bonding report found the absence of “a particularly strong emotional attachment� to mother. As to father, it is true the report found evidence of “a positive emotional attachment� between the minor and father. As a result, the examining psychologist believed it was likely the minor would experience “at least some mild emotional detriment� if his relationship with father were severed. However, the report also suggested the attachment that existed was based more on father as a source of “familiarity and entertainment� rather than of stability and comfort. In any event, the report concluded that the advantages of permanency “would almost certainly outweigh any harm� the minor would suffer as a result of severance.
Section 366.26 requires both a showing of regular contact and a separate showing that the child actually would benefit from continuing the relationship. In re Autumn H., supra, 27 Cal.App.4th 567, interprets the statutory exception to involve a balancing test, and both In re Autumn H. and In re Beatrice M., supra, 29 Cal.App.4th 1411, posit a high level of parental involvement and attachment. Even assuming those decisions overemphasized the importance of the parental role, the record here does not support the suggestion of father and mother that simply because the minor had lived with them and because of their history of visits, the minor would benefit from continuing his relationship with them. (Cf. In re Amanda D. (1997) 55 Cal.App.4th 813, 821-822.)
Here, the issue was: In light of the minor’s adoptability, would a continued relationship with father and mother benefit the minor to such a degree that it would outweigh the benefits the minor would gain in a permanent adoptive home? Substantial evidence in the record supports the juvenile court’s implied answer that it would not. On the record before it, the juvenile court could conclude, as it did impliedly, that only adoption, which is the preferred disposition (In re Ronell A., supra, 44 Cal.App.4th at p. 1368), would promote the best interests of the minor.
After it became apparent that father and mother would not reunify with the minor, the juvenile court had to find an “exceptional situation existed to forego adoption.� (In re Autumn H., supra, 27 Cal.App.4th at p. 576.) In this case, the court determined the minor would not benefit from continuing his relationship with father and mother to such a degree that termination of parental rights would be detrimental. Father and mother had the burden to demonstrate the statutory exception applied. They failed to make such a showing. Therefore, the court did not err in terminating parental rights based on its refusal to apply the section 366.26, former subdivision (c)(1)(A) exception. (In re Amanda D., supra, 55 Cal.App.4th at pp. 821-822.)
DISPOSITION
The order terminating the parental rights of father and mother is affirmed.
We concur: SCOTLAND, P.J., SIMS, J.