Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Super. Ct. No. PDP060031
RAYE, P.J.D.S. (appellant), the father of G.S. (the minor), appeals from orders of the juvenile court adjudging the minor a dependent child of the court and removing the minor from parental custody. (Welf. & Inst. Code, §§ 360, subd. (d), 395.) Appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support the court’s jurisdictional finding. For the reasons that follow, we shall affirm.
All further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On July 17, 2006, the El Dorado County Department of Social Services (DSS) filed an amended juvenile dependency petition pursuant to section 300 on behalf of the five-year-old minor. The petition alleged in part that appellant had a history of substance abuse rendering him incapable of providing adequate care for the minor. The petition also alleged that appellant and the mother of the minor, B.S., who is not a party to this appeal, have a history of domestic violence in that appellant had assaulted the minor’s mother twice in the past. Finally, the petition averred the mother had substance abuse and mental illness difficulties, and despite appellant’s knowledge of those difficulties, he had left the minor in the care of the mother.
According to the June 2006 report prepared by DSS for the jurisdiction hearing, in January 2005 the juvenile court had declared the minor a dependent child after an August 2004 assertion of jurisdiction by the court. Jurisdiction in that proceeding was based on a finding of serious emotional damage because of ongoing domestic violence perpetrated by appellant on the minor’s mother. Appellant had agreed to participate in counseling and submit to random drug testing. In August 2005, after reunification was accomplished, the court dismissed the proceeding. The record also contains reports in 2000 of substantiated emotional abuse of other children and in May 2004 of a substantiated lack of supervision with allegations of substance abuse.
At the jurisdiction hearing, the minor’s classroom assistant, who later served as her preschool teacher, testified that before the minor was placed into foster care, she frequently smelled of urine, her hair was “knotted and tangled,” and she was “very pale, thin.” Moreover, the minor had tantrums. She appeared to be “[v]ery quiet, not happy, [and] very rarely smiled . . . .” However, the minor appeared to have a good relationship with appellant.
The minor’s Head Start program teacher testified that during the second half of 2006, the minor came to school with dirty clothing and uncombed, matted hair. The minor also had tantrums during that period of time. When the minor began the program in August 2005, there were no hygiene issues. Sometimes the minor asked for appellant during her tantrums.
The mother of the minor had reported to several social workers that she was the victim of domestic violence by appellant. One social worker also learned that the minor’s mother had stated appellant was using controlled substances. At the jurisdiction hearing, the mother testified that at one time appellant was using methamphetamine on a daily basis. From October 2005 until May 2006, the mother observed dramatic changes in appellant’s behavior: he destroyed property, assaulted her, and stayed up all night. During that period, according to the mother, appellant was using methamphetamine on a weekly basis. The minor was in the home during some of the violent episodes.
Appellant testified he began using methamphetamine in mid-September 2005, approximately one month after termination of the previous dependency proceeding. Thereafter, from March 2006 to May 2006, appellant used methamphetamine on a daily basis. He also used marijuana on a limited basis from December 2005 to May 2006. Although he had gone to treatment-related meetings in the past, by March 2006 appellant had stopped attending them. As of August 2006, appellant was participating in a substance abuse program. He was not using illegal drugs.
Appellant denied he had been physically violent to the minor’s mother. However, he admitted engaging in arguments with the mother in which they yelled and screamed at each other. The minor was home at those times. Appellant also admitted calling the mother derogatory names but denied bullying her. Appellant testified he could tell from the minor’s demeanor that she did not like it when he and the mother fought.
Appellant acknowledged being under the influence of methamphetamine while he was caring for the minor. Appellant also admitted picking up the minor from daycare when he was under the influence of methamphetamine. However, he did not use methamphetamine in the presence of the minor. Appellant did not believe his drug abuse affected his ability to care for the minor or placed the minor at risk. Appellant also asserted it was safe for him to drive the minor while he was under the influence of methamphetamine. According to appellant, the last time he used methamphetamine was May 5, 2006. Appellant believed he could safely parent the minor.
At the conclusion of the jurisdiction hearing, the juvenile court sustained the amended petition as amended further. In doing so, the court stated in part as follows: “The issue here is that we have a situation where [appellant] has struggled with drug dependency for significant portions of his adult life. It is undisputed testimony that he has found it necessary to smoke methamphetamine in the home when the child is there, that he has -- had found it necessary to operate a motor vehicle with a child after smoking methamphetamine, that he has found it necessary to leave the child in the care of his wife, whom he believes at least on several, from zero to three occasions a month is incapable of providing adequate parental care. The issue that I’m trying to raise here is that this is a case where [appellant] is battling a serious issue of drug dependency and this Court is not required to operate in a vacuum. Counsel would have me address this drug dependency issue on the basis that [appellant] has undertaken some voluntary treatment for his own care. And he is to be commended for that. As the attorneys in this courtroom know, as well as the social workers, the methamphetamine polysubstance abuse issues represent 50 to 65 percent of the cases in this court or more, that methamphetamine is one of the most difficult types of addictions to treat and that usually and oftentimes even professional treatment and in-patient treatment is unsuccessful. The chances of future relapse without professional managed treatment and court supervision, I believe, is [sic] substantially likely. And I believe that if the Court does not assert jurisdiction that the opportunity to help this family with this issue is going to be lost. [Appellant] himself indicated that he wasn’t sure if he had the resources to adequately address the addiction issues if the Court did not assert jurisdiction.”
The court also stated that “this Court is not allowed to base its decision on speculation and conjecture. That’s why I’ve gone into [sic] great length to show all the pieces that go together in the puzzle to show that this is not speculation and conjecture. This is a family that is very much in need of the Court’s assistance and very much in need of addressing these issues. [¶] The statutory elements for jurisdiction in this case we need to show neglectful conduct, causation and substantial risk of harm, those are your statutory elements. And, in fact, those are the elements that David M. points outs [sic] and, quite frankly, I believe that based upon my findings raising this child at a home where there is very, very clear domestic violence and drug addiction and failing to take steps to protect this child from that environment is neglectful conduct as defined in Welfare and Institutions. [¶] As to causation, I believe there is sufficient evidence to show that this conduct has created emotional harm to this child and is likely to continue to cause this child emotional harm as based on the evidence I previously alluded to and won’t reiterate again. [¶] The issue of substantial risk of serious harm is not only past harm, is there going to be substantial risk of serious harm in the future. Again, this Court is not required to operate in a vacuum. Domestic violence if untreated most -- there’s a substantial likelihood it will continue and continue, become worse and worse and worse. This is the simple nature of domestic violence. [¶] As to drugs, methamphetamine is the most dangerous affliction that people who have created drugs have made. If it is untreated, it becomes a nightmare. I don’t need to elaborate any further to any of the professionals in this room. This case is even more difficult because [appellant] is -- not only has meth as a drug of choice, he’s an episodic. In other words, you go in and out of use. And, thirdly, you’re a polysubstance abusive, switching back and forth and also evidence that you have doctors who are willing to give you drugs, even though I’m not sure why they are giving you the type of drugs they are giving you knowing that you have addictive problems. That’s a bridge way too far from me. That’s not my issue. My issue today is whether or not this Court should supervise what’s going on to make sure that your child is safe. As I indicate, I believe that if this Court does not assert jurisdiction and set up a case plan for this family, this situation is likely to get continue to get worse. There is a very strong likelihood of foreseeable harm to this child in the future and that’s why the Court is asserting jurisdiction.”
At the October 6, 2006, disposition hearing, the juvenile court adjudged the minor a dependent child and ordered the minor removed from parental custody.
DISCUSSION
Appellant contends the juvenile court’s jurisdictional finding pursuant to subdivision (b) of section 300 is not supported by substantial evidence. According to appellant, “[t]here was no showing that substance abuse, mental illness or domestic violence occurred in such fashion as to cause serious harm to the child or that the child at the time of the jurisdictional hearing was at any risk of such harm occurring.” Characterizing a portion of the court’s ruling as “pure speculation,” appellant argues no evidence was adduced that his drug usage “impaired his ability to parent other than poor judgment in driving the child home from school on occasion.”
Subdivision (b) of section 300 provides for jurisdiction where “[t]he child has suffered, or there is a substantial risk that the child will suffer, serious physical harm or illness, as a result of the failure or inability of his or her parent . . . to adequately supervise or protect the child, . . . or by the willful or negligent failure of the parent . . . to provide the child with adequate food, clothing, shelter, or medical treatment . . . .”
Jurisdiction may be upheld if the evidence supports one of several grounds on which the juvenile court relied, even though the evidence may be insufficient to support all of the grounds relied on by the court. (In re Jonathan B. (1992) 5 Cal.App.4th 873, 875.)
We review the juvenile court’s determination regarding removal under the substantial evidence test, drawing all reasonable inferences to support the findings and recognizing that issues of credibility are matters for the juvenile court. (Sheila S. v. Superior Court (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 872, 880-881; In re Basilio T. (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 155, 170.) Appellant has the burden of demonstrating the evidence was insufficient to sustain the juvenile court’s findings. (In re Geoffrey G. (1979) 98 Cal.App.3d 412, 420.)
Viewed in the light most favorable to the judgment (In re Terry D. (1978) 83 Cal.App.3d 890, 899), the record supports the juvenile court’s jurisdictional finding under section 300, subdivision (b).
Appellant reported he first used cocaine at the age of 16. He told the juvenile court he first realized he was a drug addict in 1993. Appellant has had periods of remission, extending from sometime in 1993 until 1995, and again from 1998 until early 2005. But he told a psychologist in November 2006 that he had tested positive for cocaine the month before, during these dependency proceedings.
Appellant argues that without more, parental substance abuse is not itself a sufficient basis for dependency jurisdiction. But here we have more, much more. The record contains evidence that appellant drove the minor in a motor vehicle while under the influence of methamphetamine. Moreover, appellant asserted that he did not believe such conduct posed a risk to the minor.
In his opening brief, appellant states the obvious in describing his conduct as “poor judgment.” It was more than a simple lapse in judgment. Operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of methamphetamine creates an extreme danger to the driver, passenger, and the public. Subdivision (a) of section 300 requires a showing only of a substantial risk the minor will suffer serious physical harm. Here, by his own testimony, appellant has shown an abject failure on his part to appreciate the danger in which he has placed the minor.
It is true that appellant was participating in a substance abuse program, for which he is to be commended. However, his fitful efforts at rehabilitation do not alter the reality that his conduct posed a substantial risk to the minor’s safety. The fact that appellant was recently involved in a treatment program, yet began to use methamphetamine only a month or so after the conclusion of the previous dependency proceeding, does not serve to mitigate the risk. Moreover, appellant had missed recent scheduled drug tests. Finally, appellant stated his belief that his substance abuse did not adversely affect his parenting ability, which suggests he just “does not get it.”
Relying in part on cases such as In re David M. (2005) 134 Cal.App.4th 822, appellant argues the record contains no evidence that his substance abuse created a substantial risk of serious physical harm to the minor. We disagree. As we have suggested, the record contains ample evidence that appellant is a lifelong substance abuser who had recently used methamphetamine and other illegal drugs. Unlike In re David M., which involved drug use three years before the proceedings began (id. at pp. 825, 831), here the juvenile court had before it evidence of recent substance abuse. On this record, it is reasonable to infer that appellant’s drug lifestyle and history of poor decision-making interfered with his ability to provide proper care for the minor and placed the minor at a substantial risk of suffering serious physical harm.
Contrary to appellant’s assertion that the juvenile court “focused” on domestic violence on which to predicate jurisdiction, the transcript of the court’s lengthy comments indicates the court emphasized appellant’s substance abuse in the household and his operation of a motor vehicle while under the influence of methamphetamine. Noting appellant’s history of relapse, the court properly expressed its concern that appellant’s conduct likely would pose a substantial risk of serious harm to the minor in the future.
In sum, we conclude that substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s exercise of jurisdiction in this case. (Cf. In re Basilio T., supra, 4 Cal.App.4th at p. 169.)
In light of our disposition, we need not consider appellant’s argument that there was insufficient evidence to support the juvenile court’s exercise of jurisdiction over the minor on grounds of domestic violence and the alleged mental health difficulties of the minor’s mother.
DISPOSITION
The orders of the juvenile court are affirmed.
We concur: DAVIS, Acting P.J., BUTZ , J.