Opinion
A22-0643
09-06-2022
In the Matter of the Civil Commitment of: Chester Lee Grauberger.
Lincoln County District Court File No. 41-PR-17-117
Considered and decided by Ross, Presiding Judge; Connolly, Judge; and Frisch, Judge.
ORDER OPINION
Kevin G. Ross Judge
BASED ON THE FILE, RECORD, AND PROCEEDINGS, AND BECAUSE:
1. In 1997 Chester Grauberger was convicted and incarcerated on multiple counts of criminal sexual conduct. Near the end of Grauberger's prison term, the state petitioned to civilly commit him to the Minnesota Sex Offender Program (MSOP) as a sexually dangerous person. The district court granted the state's petition and we affirmed on appeal. In re Commitment of Grauberger, No. A18-1790, 2019 WL 1758483, at *2, *6 (Minn.App. Apr. 22, 2019).
2. This appeal arises from Grauberger's latest posttrial motion seeking relief from his commitment order under Minnesota Rule of Civil Procedure 60.02. He identified 14 issues in his motion, which we summarize into two primary reasons that the order should be vacated. He argued first that the state committed fraud upon the court at his commitment trial because it knew that he did not suffer from mental illness and that MSOP does not treat mental illness. He argued second that, because he does not currently suffer from mental illness, the circumstances of his commitment have changed, and the order must be vacated.
3. The district court denied the motion, concluding it was untimely as to all but one issue, that nine of the issues were outside the scope of rule 60.02, and that five of the issues were barred by collateral estoppel. It determined that all issues bearing on his fraud-on-the-court theory and his change-in-circumstances theory were untimely.
4. Grauberger challenges the district court's order denying his rule 60.02 motion. We review rule 60.02 decisions for an abuse of discretion. Gams v. Houghton, 884 N.W.2d 611, 620 (Minn. 2016). He primarily contends that the district court abused its discretion by holding his rule 60.02 motion was untimely because he alleged fraud on the court, which, unlike ordinary fraud, is not time-barred under the rule.
5. He correctly states the law. Although rule 60.02 bars motions seeking relief from "[f]raud" brought "more than one year after the judgment, order, or proceeding," it also expressly "does not limit the power of a court to . . . set aside a judgment for fraud upon the court." The supreme court has interpreted this to mean that a district court finding of fraud upon the court "eliminates the time restriction for bringing a motion to vacate judgment" under the rule. Maranda v. Maranda, 449 N.W.2d 158, 165 (Minn. 1989).
6. But Grauberger identifies no evidence suggesting a fraud upon the court. Fraud upon the court involves "an unconscionable plan or scheme [that] is designed to improperly influence the court." Id. (quotation omitted). Grauberger in essence argues, unconvincingly, that the state's attempt to prove by clear and convincing evidence that he is a sexually dangerous person, as required by Minnesota Statutes section 253D.07 (2020), constitutes fraud upon the court. Because the argument lacks merit, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion by implicitly rejecting his theory and rejecting his motion as untimely.
7. We likewise reject Grauberger's contention that the district court abused its discretion by determining his change-in-circumstances theory did not fall within the scope of rule 60.02. The district court concluded this challenge was untimely, and Grauberger does not contest that decision on appeal. The uncontested rationale therefore stands.
8. We finally reject his argument that the district court abused its discretion by failing to address the factors laid out in Finden v. Klaas, 128 N.W.2d 748, 750 (Minn. 1964). A district court must address the Finden factors only before granting relief under rule 60.02. Gams, 884 N.W.2d at 619. The district court did not abuse its discretion by failing to discuss those factors here, where it denied relief.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:
1. The district court's order is affirmed.
2. Pursuant to Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c), this order opinion is nonprecedential, except as law of the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel.