Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Super. Ct. Nos. JD225461, JD225462, JD225534
RAYE, J.
C.R. (appellant), father of S.R. and G.R. (the minors), appeals from the judgment of disposition denying him visitation. (Welf. & Inst. Code, §§ 358, 361, 395.) He contends insufficient evidence supports the juvenile court’s finding that visitation would be detrimental to the minors. We disagree and shall affirm.
All further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On February 9, 2007, five-year-old S.R. and four-year-old G.R. were placed into protective custody after a medical report indicated “sexual abuse was suspected” and it was determined that appellant “had a substantiated history of sexual abuse.” Before being placed into protective custody, the minors lived with appellant and their stepmother; their sister, J.R., was born a week later and subsequently detained. Appellant had sole physical custody of the minors.
While the notice of appeal reflects that it pertains to J.R. as well as the minors, in his opening brief appellant challenges only the denial of visitation as to S.R. and G.R. He makes no claim of error concerning J.R., with whom he was granted “third party supervised visitation.” Accordingly, we dismiss as abandoned appellant’s appeal as it pertains to J.R. (See In re Sade C. (1996) 13 Cal.4th 952, 994.)
On February 14, 2007, the Sacramento County Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) filed section 300 petitions on behalf of the minors, which as later amended alleged: (1) appellant failed to protect the minors, (2) the minors had been sexually abused, and (3) the minors were at substantial risk of abuse or neglect because a sibling had been abused or neglected. (§ 300, subds. (b), (d), (j).)
The detention report reflects that on February 2, 2007, following a report from the minors’ former care provider that she observed blood in G.R.’s underwear, the minors were examined for sexual abuse at the University of California, Davis, Child and Adolescent Abuse Resource and Evaluation Diagnostic and Treatment Center (CAARE Center). While the results of those examinations were “indeterminate,” a social worker at the CAARE Center said that “sexual abuse was highly suspected.”
On February 9, 2007, the minors were examined a second time at the CAARE Center. Both had “concerning genital examinations, which [were] indicative of possible sexual abuse.” A nurse practitioner at the CAARE Center said, “At the very least, the examinations were concerning for sexual abuse, if not for healed trauma.” She explained that “[i]t’s possible the injury was caused by a penetrating injury to the hymen” but noted that the “full cause for the injury” would not be known until a photo review was completed. She “reiterated the examinations were highly concerning for sexual abuse.”
The detention report further disclosed that in 1999 a section 300 petition alleging defendant sexually abused P.R., an older daughter from a previous marriage, was sustained. P.R. said the abuse began when she was 10; she was almost 12 when the petition was sustained.
At the detention hearing on February 20, 2007, the minors’ counsel advised the juvenile court that she had “asked [the minors] specifically if they wanted visits with [appellant] and they said no . . . .” The juvenile court ordered the minors be detained, ordered there be “no contact” between appellant and the minors pending further order of the court, and set the matter for a jurisdiction/disposition hearing.
According to the jurisdiction/disposition report, on March 5, 2007, the colposcopic photographs taken of the minors at the CAARE Center were reviewed and found to be “Classification IV: Concerning for generalized narrowing” of the hymen. Such a finding indicates “there is a concern that there was vaginal penetration.” The nurse practitioner who examined the minors explained that the narrowing of the minors’ hymens is “consistent with the physical findings of children that were known to be sexually abused.”
The minors’ former care provider told the social worker that in addition to seeing blood in G.R.’s underwear, she observed the minors “rubbing each other on their privates” and heard them refer to it as a “mommy game.” She ceased providing care for the minors in March 2006 but failed to report her concerns until approximately January 2007, explaining she did not “want to get involved in somebody else’s business.”
An addendum to the jurisdiction/disposition report indicated the minors did not want to visit with appellant or reunify with him. Although the minors had not disclosed any sexual abuse, S.R. stated that her stepmother had beaten her on her feet with a belt and hit her on the back of her shoulder with a back scratcher. G.R. did not want to reunify with appellant because he “hit her and hurt her.” According to the social worker, G.R. “said that even if he did not hurt her anymore she still would not want to reunify with him because she does not like him . . . because she does not live with him.”
At the contested jurisdiction/disposition hearing in May and June 2007, the court investigator assigned to the case testified the family social worker had recently informed him that G.R. wanted to visit appellant and that S.R. did not want to visit. He also confirmed that the minors had never claimed appellant touched them inappropriately.
During closing arguments, appellant’s counsel argued the petitions should be dismissed. In the event the minors were adjudged dependents of the juvenile court and continued to be placed outside the home, he requested that appellant be permitted to visit with them. He noted that appellant “really wants to work on the relationship with the girls and visit with them. The whole -- every time he comes into court he asks for visitation. And . . . we think it’s going to be assessed now. We know that [G.R.] wants to visit with him, but not [S.R.] So he would be hopeful at least as to [G.R.] that [DHHS] can set up visits between he [sic] [and G.R.]”
The juvenile court issued its ruling on June 11, 2007. It found by a preponderance of the evidence that the minors were persons described by section 300, subdivisions (b), (d), and (j); adjudged the minors dependents of the juvenile court; provided appellant with reunification services; and ordered that “visitation remain suspended.” The court found that “visitation between [appellant] and the [minors] would be detrimental given the Court’s finding regarding the uncontroverted medical evidence and the classification and scan results of the [minors], the fact that visitation has not occurred in a substantial period of time, and that it appears there has been no progress in therapy by either [appellant] or the [minors].” The court also ordered appellant and the minors to participate in counseling and set the matter for a progress report (§ 365) on August 13, 2007, “to address . . . the status of [appellant’s] progress in counseling and assess the desires of the [minors] as to visitation with [appellant].”
DISCUSSION
Appellant appeals from the juvenile court’s June 11, 2007, order “denying him visitation with [the minors], while granting him reunification services.” He contends there is insufficient evidence to support the court’s determination that visitation would be detrimental because (1) the minors “never said that [he] had molested them”; (2) the minors “merely did not want to reunify with him, because they did not live with him”; and (3) “the medical evidence did not establish sexual molestation per se but only a suspicion of molestation.”
As a preliminary matter, we reject DHHS’s assertion that appellant forfeited his claim by failing to object to the juvenile court’s order denying him visitation with the minors. During his closing argument, appellant’s counsel specifically requested that appellant be granted visitation with the minors. Nothing more was required to preserve the issue on appeal. Having raised the issue in his closing argument, appellant was not required to object when the court rendered its ruling.
We now turn to the merits. “In order to maintain ties between the parent . . . and the child, and to provide information relevant to deciding if, and when, to return a child to the custody of his or her parent,” an order placing a child in foster care and ordering reunification services must include an order regarding visitation. (§ 362.1, subd. (a)(1)(A); see also In re Christopher H. (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 1001, 1008 (Christopher H.).) Such visitation must be “as frequent as possible, consistent with the well-being of the child.” (§ 362.1, subd. (a)(1)(A).) However, the court may deny a parent visitation or otherwise craft appropriate orders for limited parent-child contact if visitation would be harmful to the child’s well-being since “[n]o visitation order shall jeopardize the safety of the child.” (§ 362.1, subd. (a)(1)(B).) “It is ordinarily improper to deny visitation absent a showing of detriment.” (In re Mark L. (2001) 94 Cal.App.4th 573, 580 (Mark L.).)
We review the juvenile court’s finding that any visitation with appellant would be detrimental to the minors under the substantial evidence test (Mark L., supra, 94 Cal.App.4th at p. 580; In re Daniel C. H. (1990) 220 Cal.App.3d 814, 837), “which requires us to determine whether there is reasonable, credible evidence of solid value such that a reasonable trier of fact could make the findings challenged” (In re Brian M. (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 1398, 1401). In applying the substantial evidence test, we construe all reasonable inferences in favor of the juvenile court’s finding. (Francisco G. v. Superior Court (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 586, 600; see also Mark L., supra, 94 Cal.App.4th at pp. 580-581.)
Here, in finding the minors were persons described by section 300, subdivision (d) [sexual abuse], the court found that defendant had sexually abused the minors. That finding is supported by the medical evidence and the finding in the prior dependency proceeding that appellant sexually abused the minors’ older half-sibling. Appellant does not directly challenge the court’s jurisdictional findings on appeal, which, combined with the minors’ expressed ambivalence about having contact with appellant, support the court’s conclusion that visitation would be detrimental. This is particularly true where, as here, neither appellant nor the minors had begun counseling. The court could reasonably infer that until the minors were given time to heal and see that appellant was committed to making changes in the way he parented them, any contact with appellant would be harmful to their emotional well-being. (Cf. Mark L., supra, 94 Cal.App.4th at p. 581; Christopher H., supra, 50 Cal.App.4th at p. 1008.)
Contrary to appellant’s assertion, the minors’ failure to state they had been molested by him or did not want to reunify with him because of such abuse does not irrefutably dispel the court’s finding that visitation would be detrimental. There are many reasons why victims of familial child abuse do not disclose the abuse. On this record, the court reasonably could conclude that the minors’ failure to do so was attributable to some factor other than that the abuse did not occur.
Appellant’s claim that substantial evidence was lacking because “the medical evidence did not establish sexual molestation per se but only a suspicion of molestation” goes to the weight of the evidence supporting the jurisdictional findings, which appellant does not directly challenge on appeal.
Appellant cites In re Brittany S. (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 1399, 1407 for the proposition that “[l]ack of visitation may ‘virtually assure[] the erosion (and termination) of any meaningful relationship’ between parent and child.” In that case, the court held that it was error not to provide visitation for an incarcerated parent where the parent was incarcerated in facilities located less than 40 miles from where the child lived. (Ibid.) Unlike here, there was no finding that visitation with the parent would be detrimental to the child. Indeed, section 361.5, subdivision (e)(1), upon which the court relied in that case, provides that reasonable reunification services must be offered to an incarcerated parent “unless the court determines . . . those services would be detrimental to the child.” (Italics added.) Accordingly, In re Brittany S. does not undercut the denial of visitation in this case.
In closing, we note that the juvenile court retains the power to modify its visitation order (§ 385), and should the circumstances change or new evidence become available, appellant may petition the court to modify it (§ 388).
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed as to S.R. and G.R. The appeal as to J.R. is dismissed.
We concur: SIMS, Acting P.J., DAVIS, J.