Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
Solano County Super. Ct. No. J37879
Judge of the Superior Court of Contra Costa County, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.
I.
Introduction
G.P., a minor, appeals from the juvenile court’s orders sustaining certain allegations of a petition under Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 and adjudging him a ward of the court. He maintains that the court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence found in a search of his residence. We affirm.
II.
Procedural Background
In August 2007, the Solano County District Attorney filed a juvenile delinquency petition alleging three counts against G.P.: receiving stolen property (Pen. Code, § 496, subd. (a)); possessing a controlled substance, MDMA, in violation of Health and Safety Code section 11377, subdivision (a); and possessing psilocybin mushrooms on June 13, 2006, in violation of the same section. The court denied G.P.’s motion to suppress evidence found in a search of his home. The court dismissed the possession of psilocybin count, which was in regard to a previous offense for which G.P. received diversion, at the prosecutor’s request. Following a contested jurisdictional hearing, the court found true the allegation that G.P. possessed MDMA, but did not sustain the allegation of receiving stolen property. The court adjudged G.P. a ward of the court, imposed probation with specified conditions, and found the maximum period of confinement was three years. This timely appeal followed.
MDMA is an acronym for “3, 4-methylenedioxymethamphetamine, also known . . . by its street name, Ecstasy.” (People v. Nazem (1996) 51 Cal.App.4th 1225, 1228.)
III.
Factual Background
On August 24, 2007, someone stole approximately $800 in cash from Raymond Gordon in Vacaville. Gordon identified the individual later that evening, and police apprehended R.L. R.L. told police he left some of the money at G.P.’s home.
At about 1:00 a.m. on August 25, Vacaville police officers Stuart Tan and Waldrop went to G.P.’s home. As they approached the home, Officer Waldrop told Officer Tan he had been to the residence before to execute a search warrant. He knew that narcotics were found, and believed G.P. was on probation. The officers knocked on the door of the residence, and G.P. answered the door. Officer Waldrop asked G.P, “Are you on probation with search and seizure?” Officer Tan testified that G.P. replied, “ ‘Yeah,’ he believed he was.” The officers entered the house and began searching for the cash taken by R.L. G.P. directed them to the basement, but the officers found nothing “of evidentiary value” there. Officer Tan went upstairs to search G.P.’s bedroom, where he found $400 in cash and 11 pills identified as Ecstasy in the pocket of one of G.P.’s sweatshirts.
Officer Waldrop’s first name is not reflected in the record.
The parties stipulated that the 11 pills were tested by the Contra Costa crime lab and “found to be methamphetamine,” an apparent misstatement.
At the hearing on the motion to suppress, G.P. testified that he was in bed asleep at about 1:00 a.m. on August 25. He heard loud banging, and answered the door to find Officers Waldrop and Tan. Officer Waldrop told him that R.L. “stashed . . . money or something” with him. The officers told him “[he was] on search and seizure probation, and they could come in if they wanted to.” G.P. told them he was on diversion, but “never said anything about search and seizure.” G.P. told the officers the money “might be in the basement.” The officers “walked [G.P.] down to the basement, handcuffed.” After about five minutes of searching, Officer Tan went upstairs to G.P.’s bedroom, where he found “money and Ecstasy.”
G.P. was not on probation. He had received diversion for the prior offense of possession of psilocybin mushrooms.
IV.
Discussion
G.P. asserts that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence found in the search of his residence. He argues that the warrantless search of his home at 1:00 a.m. was presumptively unreasonable. “The standard of review of a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress is well established and is equally applicable to juvenile court proceedings. ‘ “On appeal from the denial of a suppression motion, the court reviews the evidence in a light favorable to the trial court’s ruling. [Citation.] We must uphold those express or implied findings of fact by the trial court that are supported by substantial evidence and independently determine whether the facts support the court’s legal conclusions.” [Citation].’ ” (In re Lennies H. (2005) 126 Cal.App.4th 1232, 1236, quoting In re William V. (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 1464, 1468.)
Respondent maintains that the trial court properly denied the motion to suppress, relying on In re Jeremy G. (1998) 65 Cal.App.4th 553 (Jeremy G.). In that case, police received information from a confidential informant that a “male Mexican juvenile wearing a home detention bracelet on his ankle” was selling marijuana from a specified address. (Id. at p. 555.) An officer went to that address and knocked on the door, which was answered by a young girl. The officer asked if an adult was present, and the juvenile came to the door with his mother. The officer asked the juvenile if he was “searchable,” to which he replied, “Yes. For weapons.” (Ibid.) The officer searched the residence and found contraband. (Ibid.) On appeal, the court reversed the order granting the motion to suppress, holding that “[t]here was no prior improper act by the government which led to the search. . . . [The information that] the minor was subject to search for weapons . . . came directly from the minor. The fact the minor was in error was immaterial. . . . [¶] [The officer’s] reliance on the minor’s statement . . . was reasonable. The minor was 16 years old, and nothing in the record shows he exhibited signs of immaturity or lack of normal intelligence. . . . [The officer] could reasonably believe the minor was aware of his legal circumstances and would not make a statement against his interest unless it was true.” (Id. at p. 556.)
G.P. claims the factual circumstances here were distinguishable, asserting that his reply to the officer’s question of whether he was “on probation with search and seizure” was “ambiguous.” The test here is whether it was reasonable for the officer to rely on G.P.’s response of “yeah” to his question of whether he was on “probation with search and seizure.” (Jeremy G., supra, 65 Cal.App.4th at p. 556.) Though it is not clear from the record whether G.P. also stated he “believed he was” on probation with search and seizure, or whether that was Officer Tan’s interpretation of G.P.’s response of “yeah,” the response was not so ambiguous that the officers could not reasonably rely on it. The court properly made a credibility determination, and specifically found that Officer Tan’s testimony was “more credible.” Substantial evidence supports the court’s factual findings.
Though not claiming that the officers were required to confirm his probation status before conducting the search, G.P. argues their failure to do so, or to “clarify what the precise search terms might have been,” rendered their reliance on his statement unreasonable. As in Jeremy G., nothing in the record suggested that G.P. did not understand Officer Waldrop’s question or his response to it. (Jeremy G., supra, 65 Cal.App.4th at p. 556.) The record does not reflect that G.P. “exhibited signs of immaturity or lack of normal intelligence.” (Ibid.) He was 17 years old at the time of the search, was described as an “exemplary employee,” and was on the honor roll at his high school. The officers in this case, as in Jeremy G.,“could reasonably believe the minor was aware of his legal circumstances and would not make a statement against his interest unless it was true.” (Ibid.) The facts demonstrated in the record support the trial court’s legal conclusions in denying the motion to suppress.
IV.
Disposition
The order adjudging the minor a ward of the court is affirmed.
We concur: MARCHIANO, P. J., MARGULIES, J.