Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County. No. CK12324, Daniel Zeke Zeidler, Judge.
Lori A. Fields, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Andrea Sheridan Ordin, County Counsel, James M. Owens, Assistant County Counsel, and Sarah Vesecky, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
MALLANO, P. J.
Maria C. (Mother) appeals from the May 27, 2010 juvenile court order denying her second petition filed pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 388 (second petition) requesting the juvenile court to grant her reunification services and/or order minor Giselle C. returned to her care. Mother requests that the matter be remanded with directions to the juvenile court to hold a full evidentiary hearing on the second petition prior to conducting any further permanency planning proceedings for Giselle. We conclude that the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in denying her second petition ex parte because the only new information attached to the second petition was available at the time the juvenile court conducted a full evidentiary hearing on Mother’s first section 388 petition (first petition), did not allege changed circumstances, and failed to demonstrate that the proposed change may promote Giselle’s best interests. We affirm the order of the juvenile court.
Unless otherwise designated, statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
BACKGROUND
Prior appellate proceedings
Mother has a lengthy child welfare history and has lost custody of her four other children as a result of substance abuse. The procedural and factual background leading up to the placement of Rosenda C., born in 1990, and the adoptions of Michelle C., born in 2000, Hector C., born in 2003, and Stephanie C., born in 2004, has been well documented in the four previous opinions issued by us. Rosenda was placed into long term foster care in 2003. Mother’s parental rights were terminated with respect to Michelle in 2002, Hector in 2005, and Stephanie in 2007.
We have issued four opinions regarding Mother’s child welfare history (In re Michelle C. (Feb. 28, 2003, B160811) [nonpub. opn.]; Maria C. v. Superior Court (Mar. 30, 2004, B172280) [nonpub. opn.]; Maria C. v. Superior Court (Aug. 29, 2005, B184229) [nonpub. opn.]; and In re Hector C. (Feb. 27, 2006, B183228) [nonpub. opn.]). The background is derived from our most recent opinion, In re Hector C., supra, B183228.
We take judicial notice of the record filed in In re Stephanie C., B200384. (Evid. Code, §§ 452, 459.)
On March 2, 2000, Rosenda and Michelle were declared dependents of the juvenile court after Michelle was born with cocaine in her system. The Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) provided family reunification services to Mother as ordered by the juvenile court, and the minors were ordered returned to her custody on August 31, 2000. On October 11, 2000, Mother was arrested for disturbing the peace and being under the influence of alcohol. DCFS filed a supplemental petition, which was sustained by the juvenile court. The juvenile court returned the minors to Mother’s custody at the permanency hearing on August 23, 2001, after she completed various parenting and drug programs. On September 5, 2001, less than two weeks later, Mother was arrested for spousal battery and disturbing the peace. At the time of her arrest, Mother was under the influence of alcohol. The juvenile court sustained the supplemental petition filed by DCFS, denied Mother further reunification services, and ordered permanent placement services.
Although DCFS reported the minors were very bonded to Mother, who was affectionate and loving toward them during visitation, it recommended legal guardianship for Rosenda and adoption for Michelle. At the selection and implementation hearing on August 14, 2002, the juvenile court ordered legal guardianship for Rosenda and terminated Mother’s parental rights as to Michelle. On Mother’s appeal from the juvenile court’s order terminating her parental rights with respect to Michelle, we affirmed the juvenile court’s order. (See In re Hector C., supra, B183228 at p. 8.) Michelle was adopted and Rosenda was ordered placed in long-term foster care.
Hector, born in October 2003, was detained after Mother tested positive for cocaine at his birth. Mother enrolled in a drug treatment program, but missed a drug test and stopped testing altogether after six weeks. DCFS recommended against providing reunification services to Mother. The juvenile court sustained a petition filed under section 300, subdivision (b) (serious physical harm) and subdivision (j) (abuse of sibling), denied reunification services, and set a selection and implementation hearing. We denied Mother’s subsequent writ petition challenging the juvenile court’s jurisdictional findings and denial of reunification services. (See In re Hector C., supra, B183228 at p. 11.)
Stephanie was born in October 2004, while Mother resided at Los Angeles Restoration Church, an unlicensed drug rehabilitation facility. DCFS received a referral after Stephanie was hospitalized with pneumonia and other infections on February 1, 2005. On February 4, 2005, the juvenile court granted Mother’s section 388 petition in part, permitting her to have liberalized contact with Hector and Rosenda. On February 10, 2005, DCFS reported that Mother had been leaving Stephanie alone for extended periods, sometimes overnight, in violation of the drug rehabilitation facility’s rules. On February 17, 2005, Mother signed a voluntary maintenance contract and agreed to participate in various counseling and education programs. Stephanie remained hospitalized until March 4, 2005, after which she was placed in foster care. On March 31, 2005, Mother tested positive for cocaine. DCFS reported that Mother had not enrolled in a drug program and was resistant to providing the counselor with information necessary for enrollment. The juvenile court denied Mother’s second section 388 petition seeking extended visitation with Rosenda and Hector.
In May 2005, the juvenile court sustained an amended section 300 petition with respect to Stephanie, denied family reunification services, and set a selection and implementation hearing. We denied Mother’s subsequent writ petition challenging the juvenile court’s order. (See In re Hector C., supra, B183228 at p. 15.) The juvenile court also terminated Mother’s parental rights over Hector and freed him for adoption in May 2005. On Mother’s appeal from the juvenile court’s order terminating her parental rights over Hector, we affirmed the juvenile court’s order. (In re Hector C., supra, B183228 at p. 22.) Mother’s parental rights over Stephanie were terminated in 2007 and Mother abandoned her subsequent appeal.
Detention of Giselle
Giselle was born in March 2008. On April 9, 2009, DCFS filed a petition pursuant to section 300, subdivision (b) (failure to protect) and subdivision (j) (abuse of sibling), alleging that on March 30, 2009, Mother had placed Giselle at risk by driving under the influence of alcohol while Giselle was a passenger in the vehicle. The petition alleged that on March 30, 2009, Mother was arrested for driving under the influence of alcohol and child endangerment and that she had a nine-year history of drug and alcohol abuse and was a current abuser of alcohol. The petition alleged that Giselle’s siblings Stephanie, Hector, Rosenda, and Michelle had received permanent placement services due to Mother’s “illicit drug use.”
Mother was not present at the detention hearing on April 9, 2009, because she was in custody. According to the detention report, on March 30, 2009, Mother was drunk when she picked up Giselle from the home of her friend Carolina V. Although Carolina advised Mother not to take Giselle because Mother was intoxicated, Mother drove off with Giselle and hit the car of Mother’s cousin, Lucio Q., who was living with Carolina. Lucio and Mother’s aunt, Martiriana C., who also lived with Carolina, stated that Mother was drunk when she hit Lucio’s car. The juvenile court ordered Giselle detained. The juvenile court also ordered monitored visitation for the parents and investigation of relatives, including Rosenda, for possible placement. At a later proceeding, Mother submitted a declaration indicating that the identity of Giselle’s father was unknown.
The jurisdiction/disposition report stated that on April 15, 2009, Mother was convicted of willful cruelty to a child, driving under the influence of alcohol and drugs, and driving without a license. According to the report, Mother stated that she drank four beers at a liquor store prior to driving to Carolina’s house. Carolina put Giselle in the back seat. Mother said her car was parked and she did not move the car before she was arrested. She said that the police came in response to a telephone call by a neighbor who accused her of hitting her car. She claimed she was arrested by the police under a warrant for failing to do community service rather than for driving under the influence of alcohol and drugs while Giselle was in the car. Mother also claimed that she stopped using cocaine in 2004 or 2005 and the last time she drank alcohol was three or four years earlier. She denied being under the influence of alcohol on March 30, 2009, while Giselle was in her care. The juvenile court ordered Giselle to be detained with Rosenda conditioned on approval of her home study.
At the jurisdiction and disposition hearing on June 4, 2009, the juvenile court sustained the section 300 petition. The juvenile court took judicial notice of the previously sustained petitions, minute orders, and disposition case plans regarding Giselle and her siblings. Noting that Mother had been in the system for nine years and had been unable to reunify with her other four children, the juvenile court stated: “It’s been time and again that the mother for periods of time getting her act together, getting the kids back and having them removed again, with the first two and the third and fourth children, the mother was not even successful in getting to that stage....” The juvenile court declared Giselle a dependent of the court and denied Mother reunification services under section 361.5, subdivision (b)(10) and (11). The juvenile court found that reunification services had been terminated for a sibling or half sibling because Mother failed to reunify with the child, Mother’s parental rights over a sibling or half sibling had been terminated, Mother had not subsequently made a reasonable effort to treat the problems leading to the removal of the sibling or half siblings, and it was not in the best interests of Giselle for Mother to be granted reunification services. The juvenile court ordered monitored visits for Mother.
Section 361.5, subdivision (b) provides in pertinent part: “Reunification services need not be provided to a parent or guardian described in this subdivision when the court finds, by clear and convincing evidence, any of the following: [¶]... (10) That the court ordered termination of reunification services for any siblings or half siblings of the child because the parent or guardian failed to reunify with the sibling or half sibling after the sibling or half sibling had been removed from that parent or guardian pursuant to Section 361 and that parent or guardian is the same parent or guardian described in subdivision (a) and that, according to the findings of the court, this parent or guardian has not subsequently made a reasonable effort to treat the problems that led to removal of the sibling or half sibling of that child from that parent or guardian. [¶] (11) That the parental rights of a parent over any sibling or half sibling of the child had been permanently severed, and this parent is the same parent described in subdivision (a), and that, according to the findings of the court, this parent has not subsequently made a reasonable effort to treat the problems that led to removal of the sibling or half sibling of that child from the parent.”
On October 1, 2009, the juvenile court held a selection and implementation hearing. DCFS prepared a report for the hearing which indicated that Giselle was healthy and developmentally on target. DCFS reported that Giselle was very close to Mother and cried at times when the visit was over. DCFS reported that Giselle was strongly bonded to Rosenda, but that Rosenda had asked that Giselle be re-placed because Rosenda had broken up with her fiancé and was temporarily residing with an uncle. DCFS recommended that the adoption home study for Rosenda not be completed because of her unstable circumstances. It recommended that an adoption home study be commenced for Adriana M., who had adopted Giselle’s brother Hector, had cared for Giselle for four days while Rosenda moved to her uncle’s residence, and had expressed a desire to adopt Giselle. The juvenile court set the matter for a contested section 366.26 hearing on January 4, 2010, and ordered DCFS to prepare a report on the adoption home study for Adriana.
At the hearing on January 4, 2010, DCFS reported that Giselle had been placed in Adriana’s home since October 7, 2009, and appeared to be doing well, but the adoption home study had not been completed. The interim report stated that Giselle was closely bonded to Adriana. DCFS reported, “At this time mother failed to provide verifiable proof to DCFS that she is living a drug free lifestyle.... Although Giselle had a negative toxicology test at birth mother failed to take the necessary steps toward a sober lifestyle.” Mother’s counsel informed the court that Mother was in a program and her visits with Giselle “are going beautifully.” The juvenile court continued the contested hearing to March 30, 2010.
Mother’s first petition
On March 8, 2010, Mother filed the first petition requesting reunification services “and or home of mother order, and or unmonitored visits, and or extended visit[s] in the home of the mother.” The petition stated that the following change in circumstances had occurred. Mother was attending Avalon-Carver Community Center (Avalon-Carver) and an “ab1353” program which she expected to complete in May 2010. The petition also stated that Mother’s visits with Giselle went well and that Giselle would cry when she left.
Attached to the petition were a progress report from Avalon-Carver dated December 16, 2009, stating that Mother was currently enrolled in the program, that her estimated date of completion was July 29, 2010, and that Mother “continue[d] to attend and actively participated in group process”; a notification of reenrollment letter from Shields Place of Family (Shields) dated December 1, 2009, stating that Mother had reenrolled in the nine-month program on December 1, 2009, with an expected completion date of May 30, 2010; and a criminal court order dated November 19, 2009, ordering Mother to “re-enroll” in an alcohol program in an “SB1353” program. Mother also attached proof of a negative drug test from November 2009 and a document showing a request by “Sunrise Counseling” for a random drug test on December 12, 2009, and the collection of a sample on that date.
Mother used several aliases, including “Cinthya” C. The name “Maria” was written above the name “Cinthia” C. on the Avalon-Carver progress report.
DCFS submitted a last minute information for the court recommending that Mother’s section 388 petition be denied. The information stated that Mother had failed to take the necessary steps toward a sober lifestyle, that Mother was arrested for being under the influence of drugs and alcohol which resulted in the detention of Giselle, and that she had left Giselle with an unrelated caregiver who was also under the influence of drugs or alcohol. The information noted that although she had received reunification services in the past, Mother had never complied with court orders and that she was unable to provide Giselle with the basic necessities of life. Nor had Mother provided verifiable proof that she was living a drug free lifestyle or was participating in a drug abuse program.
DCFS also submitted a second last minute information stating that Adriana had expressed doubts about going forward with the adoption of Giselle because of Adriana’s commitments to the teenage children currently in her home. DCFS reported that it was currently completing an adoption home study for Mr. and Mrs. P., who had adopted Michelle and Stephanie and were interested in adopting Giselle.
DCFS submitted a status review report that noted that Mother had not missed any of her weekly two-hour monitored visits with Giselle. The report indicated that Giselle was closely bonded to Adriana and her family and recommended that Mother’s parental rights be severed and DCFS proceed with adoptive placement.
After a hearing, the juvenile court denied Mother’s first petition on March 30, 2010, and continued the contested section 366.26 hearing.
The record does not contain a transcript of the hearing. The clerk’s transcript contains a minute order that shows the juvenile court denied the section 388 petition because “[t]he best interest of the child(ren) would not be promoted by proposed change of order.”
Mother’s second petition
Less than two months later, on May 27, 2010, the day the matter was scheduled for a contested section 366.26 hearing, Mother filed the second petition. The second petition appeared to be, in large part, a duplicate of the first petition. It cited the same changed circumstances of attendance at Avalon-Carver and attendance at the “ab1353 program.”
In addition, the second petition referred to, and attached a letter from, Sunrise Community Counseling Center (Sunrise) dated May 20, 2010. The letter from Sunrise stated that Mother had enrolled in an outpatient program on October 22, 2009, and had completed “(42) groups out of (48) on chemical dependency and relapse prevention.” The letter reported that although the program permitted only six absences, Mother was allowed 12 absences due to her work schedule. But Mother had been warned that she would be discharged from the program if she had another absence. The letter reported that on April 1, 2010, and April 15, 2010, Mother had two negative random drug tests, which were attached to her petition. The letter recommended “allowing [Mother] to complete her courts orders. Continue to attend the 12-steps groups, and to seek a sponsor. She now appears to have a better understanding of her problems with her addiction to substance abuse, due to her history of drug[] abuse. She appears to [accept] the consequence... her drug usage has brought to herself, and especially her children.”
The juvenile court denied the second petition ex parte, noting that “the 388 [petition] showed changing, not changed circumstances, even the therapist’s letter, recommendation, quote allowing her to complete court orders, unquote. [¶] This case has a 10 year history of court involvement. There was not a showing in the 388 [petition] that it was in the best interest of the child to grant the 388.”
DCFS reported that Adriana decided she was not able to continue with the adoption. Mr. and Mrs. P., who had adopted two of Giselle’s siblings, were identified as prospective adoptive parents. Their adoption home study had been approved on May 19, 2010. Mr. and Mrs. P. agreed to allow Rosenda to maintain contact with Giselle. DCFS reported that Giselle could not be placed in Mr. and Mrs. P.’s home until Mother’s parental rights were terminated. Mr. and Mrs. P. were only interested in adoption and did not have a foster care license. The juvenile court continued the hearing on the contested section 366.26 at Giselle’s counsel’s request to reevaluate Rosenda as a possible placement option. The juvenile court also ordered DCFS to evaluate a maternal uncle who had expressed interest in adopting Giselle. The juvenile court continued the matter to July 26, 2010.
DISCUSSION
Mother argues that she established a prima facie showing in her second petition that she had undergone a significant change of circumstance and that the requested change of order was in Giselle’s best interests. Mother urges that the juvenile court’s order denying her second petition must be reversed and the matter remanded for a full evidentiary hearing on her petition. We are not persuaded by Mother’s arguments.
A parent may petition the court to change an order pursuant to section 388, which provides: “(a) Any parent or other person having an interest in a child who is a dependent child of the juvenile court... may, upon grounds of change of circumstance or new evidence, petition the court in the same action in which the child was found to be a dependent child of the juvenile court... for a hearing to change, modify, or set aside any order of court previously made or to terminate the jurisdiction of the court. The petition... shall set forth in concise language any change of circumstance or new evidence which are alleged to require the change of order or termination of jurisdiction. [¶]... [¶] (d) If it appears that the best interests of the child may be promoted by the proposed change of order, ... the court shall order that a hearing be held and shall give prior notice....”
Under section 388, the petitioning party has the burden of showing by a preponderance of the evidence that there is a change of circumstances or new evidence and that the proposed change and the juvenile court’s previous order is in the child’s best interests. (In re Jasmon O. (1994) 8 Cal.4th 398, 415.) “The [section 388] petition must be liberally construed in favor of its sufficiency. [Citations.] As one court has explained, ‘if the petition presents any evidence that a hearing would promote the best interests of the child, the court will order the hearing.’ [Citation.]” (Ibid.) “If the liberally construed allegations of the petition do not show changed circumstances or new evidence that the child’s best interests will be promoted by the proposed change of order, the court need not hold a hearing.” (In re Carl R. (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 1051, 1071.) To be entitled to a hearing, the parent need only show probable cause and not a probability of prevailing on the petition. (In re Aljamie D. (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 424, 432.)
“The petition is addressed to the sound discretion of the juvenile court and its decision will not be disturbed on appeal in the absence of a clear abuse of discretion.” (In re Jasmon O., supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 415.)
A. Mother’s second petition failed to show changed circumstances
Mother contends that her second petition established a prima facie showing that she had undergone a significant change of circumstances which triggered her right to a full evidentiary hearing on the petition. As we explain, the second petition and the documents attached to it did not establish a change in circumstances.
The documents attached to her second petition filed on May 27, 2010, were almost identical to the documents attached to the first petition and did not provide current information as to Mother’s progress. Mother attached the same letter from Shields that she attached to her first petition. That letter, dated December 1, 2009, states that Mother “re-enrolled in [Shields’s] AB1353 (9 months) program on December 1, 2009.” No explanation was given in the second petition why Mother was required to “re-enroll” in the program. Mother also attached the criminal court order, which required her to “re-enroll” in an “SB1353” “alcohol program, ” and set a date of February 26, 2010, for a progress report. Yet the second petition did not provide any information about the February 26, 2010 progress report. And the attached December 16, 2009 Avalon-Carver progress report stated that Mother enrolled in a parenting program on June 28, 2009, and had attended 21 out of 52 parenting sessions. But the report was over five months old and Mother did not attach any documentation indicating whether she was currently enrolled and participating in the program.
The only new information provided in the second petition was the letter from Sunrise dated May 20, 2010, which stated that Mother enrolled in the outpatient drug-free program on October 22, 2009. We note that Mother did not provide this information for the full evidentiary hearing on her first petition on March 30, 2010, although apparently she had been enrolled in the program for five months. She does not explain why the information was not presented at that time to the juvenile court, and we do not see why she should be allowed a second full evidentiary hearing on evidence that had been available to her at the first hearing. And although Mother points to the letter’s statement that she had completed 42 out of 48 groups on chemical dependency and relapse prevention, the letter also warned that Mother was at risk of being discharged from the program if she had any more absences. The letter also noted that two random drug tests conducted on April 1, 2010, and April 15, 2010, were negative, but a document attached to the first petition shows that Sunrise had required Mother to submit to drug testing on December 12, 2009. Yet no results from that test were attached to the first or the second petition. Our review of Sunrise’s letter shows that Mother was, at best, in the process of attempting change. We conclude that the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in denying her petition ex parte. (In re Baby Boy L. (1994) 24 Cal.App.4th 596, 610 [mere prima facie showing of “changing” circumstances not enough to require a section 388 hearing].)
Nonetheless, Mother contends that although she had never been given a case plan for Giselle, she “completed a variety of counseling programs on her own, which was a significant factor establishing she was serious about her rehabilitation.” But Mother did not attach proof of completion of any programs; nor did she show she had gone through “dramatic changes” in circumstances as the mothers did in the cases she cites. (In re Aljamie D., supra, 84 Cal.App.4th at p. 428 [full evidentiary hearing should have been granted on section 388 petition which alleged that mother “fully complied with the case plan, and attached completion certificates for parenting classes, a domestic violence program, [a residential program], a job readiness workshop, a perinatal health education program, and a ‘behavior change & skills building prevention’ program, ” that the minors wished to return to her, and that she had visited the minors consistently]; In re Eileen A. (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 1248, 1252, 1260 [the mother, “whose only sin was ignorance and lack of vigilance, ” made dramatic changes after juvenile court denied reunification services by paying for and attending counseling, parenting classes, Al-Anon, and consulting an attorney to complete the divorce of incarcerated husband; also, mother’s bond to the minor was stronger than the current caretakers, who did not want to adopt the minor], disapproved on other grounds in In re Zeth S. (2003) 31 Cal.4th 396, 413–414.)
Mother also contends Sunrise’s letter indicates that she had gone through a significant change in attitude regarding her addiction problem. She urges that a full evidentiary hearing is necessary so the counselor can elaborate on her statement that Mother “now appears to have a better understanding of her problems with her addiction to substance abuse, due to her history of drug[] abuse. She appears to [accept] the consequence... her drug usage has brought to herself, and especially her children.” As previously stated, Mother had enrolled in the Sunrise program five months before she filed the first petition, for which she had a full evidentiary hearing. On appeal, she does not explain what more the counselor would have said, other than in general terms. At most, the letter describes Mother as coming to a better understanding of the consequences of her substance addiction. But it does not state that Mother had made any meaningful progress in resolving her long-standing substance abuse issues or describe a dramatic change in circumstance that would trigger a full evidentiary hearing under section 388.
We reject Mother’s further argument that the juvenile court “mis-analyzed” her second petition and “implied that mother was not prepared to take custody of [Giselle] on May 27, 2010 and she needed more time.” Mother contends that because she requested reunification services, the completion of her counseling was irrelevant to the question of whether she should have been given a full evidentiary hearing. We disagree. Nothing in the record indicates that the trial court did not understand that Mother requested reunification services if custody were denied. Instead, the juvenile court noted that Mother merely showed “changing” circumstances, taking into account the counselor’s letter recommending that Mother be allowed “to complete court orders, ” which may have been a reference to reunification programs.
We conclude that Mother’s second petition did not make a prima facie showing of changed circumstances.
B. Mother’s second petition failed to show the proposed change would promote Giselle’s best interests
Mother argues the proposed change was in Giselle’s best interests because Giselle remained closely bonded to Mother. She also urges that a full hearing on the second petition would not have substantially delayed permanency for Giselle because it was unclear which family would ultimately be determined to be prospective adoptive parents. We disagree on both points.
“In order to be entitled to a hearing on a petition for modification, a parent must show changed circumstances and it must appear that the best interests of the child may be served by a change in the order. (§ 388; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 1432(c).)” (In re Aljamie D., supra, 84 Cal.App.4th at p. 432.) “Although the specific factors a court must consider vary with each case, each child’s best interests would necessarily involve eliminating the specific factors that required placement outside the parent’s home [citation], here, Mother’s drug addiction.” (In re Angel B. (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 454, 463–464.) Additionally, the goal of assuring stability and continuity is taken into consideration when determining the child’s best interest. (Id. at p. 464.)
Mother has a long history of persistent substance abuse, failed to maintain sobriety and reunify with her four other children after being offered and participating in reunification services, and exposed Giselle to risk by driving with her while under the influence of alcohol. In the current matter, she attempted some drug treatment on her own, but by no means demonstrated a change in circumstances. Yet Mother argues that the best interests of Giselle would be promoted by the requested change of order because, unlike her previous children, Giselle was born with a negative toxicology screen, was in Mother’s care for the first 13 months of her life, remained closely bonded to Mother, who did not miss any visits with her, and cried when her visits with Mother ended.
We are not persuaded that Mother’s relationship with Giselle “stands in sharp contrast to her actions with her other children, ” as she argues. Like Giselle, Rosenda, Hector, and Stephanie were not detained at birth with drugs in their system. Rosenda had lived with Mother for the first nine or ten years of her life and was closely bonded to her. Stephanie lived with Mother for the first four months of her life until she was hospitalized with pneumonia. Mother had in the past received reunification services, visited consistently with her other children, had at times received liberalized contact with Hector and Rosenda pursuant to her section 388 petition, and even had custody of Rosenda and Michelle for a time after they had been detained. And she was reported to be affectionate and loving toward her children during visitation. Yet she failed to reunify with any of her children. Thus, we are not convinced by Mother’s argument that the dissimilarities between Giselle’s situation and that of her other children add up to a prima facie showing that a change in the order would be in Giselle’s best interests.
Mother also argues that the goal of assuring stability and continuity for Giselle would be served by giving Mother a full hearing on the second petition. She argues that because Giselle’s prospective adoptive placement had fallen through, and Giselle’s attorney had expressed concern about Mr. and Mrs. P.’s willingness to allow sibling contact between Rosenda and Giselle, a period of reunification services would not have delayed Giselle’s permanency planning. We disagree. Mr. and Mrs. P., who had adopted two of Giselle’s siblings and were identified as prospective adoptive parents, had stated to DCFS that they were willing to allow contact between Giselle and Rosenda. And Mr. and Mrs. P. were interested in adoption but not foster care. Therefore, they had their home study approved but did not have a foster care license. Granting Mother reunification services would have delayed the section 366.26 hearing and could have delayed Giselle’s placement in the appropriate home.
The cases cited by Mother for the proposition that she showed probable cause entitling her to a hearing on her second petition are distinguishable. In those cases, unlike here, the parent made a prima facie showing of changed circumstance and that the order might be in the best interests of the child. (In re Hashem H. (1996) 45 Cal.App.4th 1791, 1797 [mother continuously participated in individual therapy for 18 months, had consistent visitation with minor for more than a year, participated in conjoint counseling with minor, had stable employment and religious affiliation, had ability to provide a home for minor on a full-time basis, and therapist recommended return of minor to mother’s custody]; In re Aljamie D., supra, 84 Cal.App.4th at pp. 432–433 [discussed ante].)
Instead, Mother’s case is more like In re Angel B., supra, 97 Cal.App.4th 454, which she seeks to distinguish. In that case, the appellate court pointed out that the burden of showing changed circumstances that may mean a change of placement is in the best interests of the child is a difficult burden when reunification services have never been ordered or have been terminated. (Id. at p. 464.) The court stated, “After the termination of reunification services, a parent’s interest in the care, custody and companionship of the child is no longer paramount. [Citation.] Rather, at this point, the focus shifts to the needs of the child for permanency and stability. [Citation.] In fact, there is a rebuttable presumption that continued foster care is in the best interest of the child [citation]; such presumption obviously applies with even greater strength when the permanent plan is adoption rather than foster care.” (Ibid.) There, the court affirmed the juvenile court’s summary denial of the mother’s section 388 petition, concluding there was no evidence the mother was ready to assume custody of the minor or provide suitable care or even that she had completed a drug program. (In re Angel B., supra, 97 Cal.App.4th at p. 463.) Like here, the mother in that case had been unable to remain sober in the past, resulting in the placement of another child. Also, while it is true that the minor in In re Angel B. never lived with her mother and the plan was for her to be adopted by her long-term caregiver, here, Giselle was quite adoptable as evidenced by the fact that family members and adoptive parents of her siblings wanted to adopt her.
We conclude that Mother’s second petition did not make a prima facie showing that the proposed change may be in Giselle’s best interests. Accordingly, we conclude that the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in denying Mother’s second petition ex parte.
DISPOSITION
The juvenile court’s jurisdiction and disposition order is affirmed.
We concur: ROTHSCHILD, J., CHANEY, J.