Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of San Diego County, No. J516482A-B, George W. Clarke, Judge. Affirmed.
AARON, J.
D.C., mother of dependent minors Francisco C. and Anthony C. (together, the minors) appeals a juvenile court order terminating reunification services at a 12-month permanency hearing. D.C. contends that the evidence showed there was a substantial probability that the minors would be returned to her custody by the 18-month date, and thus, that the court erroneously terminated reunification services. We affirm the order.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In December 2006, the San Diego County Health and Human Services Agency (Agency) filed petitions in the juvenile court under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivision (b) alleging that 10-year-old Francisco and seven-year-old Anthony were at risk of harm because D.C. was mentally ill, she had been involved with child protective services in two other states, and she had exposed the minors to domestic violence. The petition also alleged that the minors needed mental health treatment, which D.C. was unable to provide. (§ 300, subd. (c).) The court detained the minors in a group home.
Statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
At a jurisdiction and disposition hearing, the court sustained the allegations of the petitions, declared the minors dependents, and placed them in foster care. The court ordered reunification services for D.C. and set a six-month review hearing. Three months later, Agency filed supplemental petitions under section 387, alleging that the minors needed a higher level of care and requesting that they be moved to a group home. Francisco suffered from major depressive disorder and posttraumatic stress disorder. Anthony had severe language deficits and also suffered from posttraumatic stress disorder. The minors had been exposed to abuse, neglect, and criminal activity for a lengthy period of time. Francisco acknowledged that his parents had a history of domestic violence. He said he had been physically abused by paternal relatives, and that he frequently witnessed his father drink alcohol and shoot guns. D.C. did not recognize the protective issues or understand the severity of the physical violence to which she had exposed the minors. The court sustained the allegations of the supplemental petitions and placed the minors in a group home.
The minors' father is not a party to the appeal.
Agency reported that D.C. was living in Tijuana, Mexico and commuting to San Diego for services and visits. She had been inconsistent in visiting the children, missing a number of scheduled visits. Psychological evaluations showed that the minors required a secure and stable living environment. Francisco's group home placement was necessary in order to monitor his suicidal ideation. D.C.'s psychological evaluation included a diagnosis of delusional disorder. In view of D.C.'s mental problems, the evaluator doubted that D.C. would be able to make informed decisions about the minors' educational and health needs. The evaluator concluded that the severity of D.C.'s delusional disorder prevented her from competently parenting the minors, and that her mental disability rendered her incapable of utilizing reunification services.
At a six-month review hearing, the court found that returning the minors to D.C. would be detrimental to them, and continued their placement in a group home.
The minors' Court Appointed Special Advocate (CASA) reported that the minors had ongoing special needs. D.C. completed a parenting class, but had failed to participate in therapy with a court-approved therapist, to take a domestic violence class, or to submit to a medication evaluation. The CASA recommended that the minors remain in their group home placement.
According to Agency's 12-month report, D.C. had recently begun attending domestic violence classes, but her delusional behavior required individual, rather than group treatment. D.C.'s mental illness remained untreated. She failed to appear for an appointment with a psychiatrist for a medication assessment. Her therapist reported that D.C. would require at least one year of intense therapy before progress could occur. Given D.C.'s poor compliance with services, her mental instability and her sporadic visits with the minors, the social worker recommended that the court terminate services. The social worker noted that if services were terminated, D.C. could still continue to participate in services through Medi-Cal, which had been funding her treatment during the dependency proceedings.
D.C. told the social worker that she had been buried alive, that she had missing organs, and that her husband had poisoned her. These and other bizarre statements made it difficult for the social worker to communicate with D.C.
At a contested 12-month hearing, Francisco testified that he lived in a group home with Anthony, and that D.C. visited them once a week. Sometimes D.C. did not visit because she lost her telephone. When she did not visit, Francisco would wait for her; he knew that if she did not come, he would see her the next time.
Social worker Neice Brown testified that the protective issues in the case were D.C.'s inadequate supervision of the minors, D.C.'s mental illness, her history of physical abuse and domestic violence, and her failure to meet the minors' basic needs. Although D.C. had completed a parenting class, she had made only minimal progress in individual therapy and domestic violence treatment and had not cooperated with efforts to obtain psychiatric treatment for her. Her visits with the minors had been sporadic. In Brown's opinion, it would be detrimental to the minors to be returned to D.C.'s custody, particularly in light of the minors' need for proper mental health care. Brown recommended that the court terminate services and order a permanent plan for the minors.
D.C. testified that she had completed a parenting class and had been attending therapy. She had not participated in domestic violence treatment, as required, because she was having financial problems. D.C. said that she visited the minors every Wednesday unless she had a conflict in her schedule. She wanted custody of the minors if she would be allowed to return to Mexico, but if she was going to have to remain in the United States, she wanted the minors only on weekends, because she lived in a bad neighborhood. D.C. acknowledged that she had previously been involved with child protective services in Georgia and Texas. She claimed that she had been misdiagnosed as delusional.
After considering the evidence and hearing argument of counsel, the court found that D.C.'s services had been reasonable and that returning the minors to D.C.'s custody would be detrimental to them. Finding no substantial probability of returning the minors to D.C. by the 18-month date, the court terminated reunification services and ordered another planned permanent living arrangement as the minors' permanent plans.
DISCUSSION
There is Substantial Evidence to Support the Court's Order Terminating Services
D.C. contends that the court erred by terminating reunification services. She asserts that there was a substantial probability that the minors would be returned to her custody by the 18-month date because she had completed a significant portion of her case plan and was now consistently visiting the minors, who enjoyed the visits and wanted to live with her.
A
Standard of Review
We review the court's order terminating reunification services to determine whether there is substantial evidence to support it. (See In re Andrea G. (1990) 221 Cal.App.3d 547, 552; In re James Q. (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 255, 261.) In this regard, we draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the court's findings, consider the record favorably to the court's order, and affirm the order even if other evidence supports a contrary finding. (In re Casey D. (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 38, 52-53.) The appellant has the burden of showing that there is no evidence of a sufficiently substantial nature to support the finding or order. (In re L. Y. L. (2002) 101 Cal.App.4th 942, 947.)
B
There Was No Substantial Probability That the Minors Could be Returned to D.C.'s Custody by the 18-Month Date
If a child is not returned to parental custody at the 12-month permanency hearing, the court is to continue the case for up to six months, but no longer than 18 months from the date the child was taken into protective custody, only if there is a substantial probability that the child will be returned to parental custody within the extended period of time. (§ 366.21, subd. (g)(1).) In determining whether there is a substantial probability of return within the extended period, the court must find all of the following:
The court may also continue the case if it finds that reasonable services have not been provided. (§ 366.21, subd. (g)(1).) D.C. does not challenge the reasonableness of services.
"(A) That the parent . . . has consistently and regularly contacted and visited with the child.
"(B) That the parent . . . has made significant progress in resolving problems that led to the child's removal from the home.
"(C) That the parent . . . has demonstrated the capacity and ability both to complete the objectives of his or her treatment plan and to provide for the child's safety, protection, physical and emotional well-being, and special needs." (§ 366.21, subd. (g)(1)(A) - (C).)
Here, the evidence showed that D.C. did not consistently and regularly visit the minors throughout the dependency proceedings. At times, she visited weekly and other times three weeks would pass without a visit. Even if she had been consistent in her visitation, she did not show that she made significant progress in resolving the protective issues, or that she was able to complete the objectives of her treatment plan and provide for the minors' safety, protection, physical and emotional well-being, and special needs.
D.C. had been the victim of repeated domestic violence, but made only minimal progress with domestic violence counseling. She has serious mental health issues that prevented her from utilizing reunification services. According to the psychological evaluation, D.C. could not even begin to achieve the objectives of her treatment plan without at least one year of intensive therapy.
Further, D.C.'s delusional thinking prevented her from competently parenting the minors and from making informed decisions on their behalf. She did not have the capacity or the ability to provide for the minors' many special needs. There is substantial evidence to support the court's finding that there was no substantial probability that the minors could be returned to D.C.'s custody by the 18-month date.
The minors were detained in out-of-home care on December 18, 2006. The 18-month date was June 18, 2008, just two months after the hearing at which the court terminated services.
DISPOSITION
The order is affirmed.
WE CONCUR: McCONNELL, P. J., HUFFMAN, J.