Opinion
No. 5-590 / 05-0042
Filed October 26, 2005
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Lee (South) County, R. David Fahey, Judge.
Plaintiffs appeal the district court's judgment and decree concluding the will of decedent, Marvin E. Cecil, and certain inter vivos transfers between Marvin and Joan Cecil, defendant, were not the product of undue influence. AFFIRMED.
Thomas D. Marion of Marion Law Office, Keokuk, for appellants.
James Dennis, Keokuk, for appellee.
Heard by Mahan, P.J., Hecht, J., and Schechtman, S.J.
Senior judge assigned by order pursuant to Iowa Code section 602.9206 (2005).
Richard Calfee, Debra Calfee, and Martin Cecil, plaintiffs, appeal the district court's judgment and decree concluding the will of decedent, Marvin E. Cecil, and certain inter vivos transfers between Marvin and Joan Cecil, defendant, were not the product of undue influence. We affirm.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings
Marvin E. Cecil, the decedent, and his first wife Noreta were married for about forty years and had five children. Noreta died in December 1999; one of the children predeceased her. The four surviving children were Garland (Gene) Cecil, Debra Cecil Calfee, Martin Cecil, and Diane Cecil Coop.
Within weeks after Noreta's death, Marvin executed a new will, disinheriting his daughter Diane. Marvin blamed Diane for her husband's harassment of Noreta during her final illness.
In April 2000, Marvin asked Vera Gray, a friend of more than forty years, to arrange a date between him and Joan Phillips, Vera's aunt. Joan moved in with Marvin a few months later, and the two were married in June 2001.
When Marvin and Joan started dating, Joan was working at Wal-Mart. She quit a few months after the marriage, at Marvin's insistence. Marvin worked as a farmer and truck driver. He took Joan on some of his over-the-road trucking trips until he acquired a tanker truck and could no longer have passengers.
In the early 1990s, Marvin and his son Martin formed M M Traders, a farming and rental properties partnership. They jointly acquired farm equipment and other items of personal property. Martin also assisted his father by driving trucks for Marvin's trucking business.
During his marriage to Noreta, Marvin and Noreta acquired numerous pieces of real estate in and around Montrose, Iowa, and a farm in Missouri. Marvin retained title to these properties as surviving joint tenant after Noreta's death. Prior to his marriage to Joan, Marvin purchased a home for the couple in Donnellson, Iowa.
Martin lived on one of the Montrose properties. Around the time of his marriage to Joan, Marvin sold the property to Martin's wife's parents. The sale agreement included certain items of personal property. A dispute ensued between Martin and Marvin over the ownership of these items, and Marvin filed a replevin lawsuit against Martin in January 2002. The relationship between father and son deteriorated rapidly, and there was no further contact between the two. The lawsuit was dismissed only after Marvin's death.
As the district court summarized in its findings of fact:
Thus, as of mid-January 2002, Marvin had disinherited Diane and had filed suit against and stopped communicating with Martin. This left only two children who might be in Marvin's good graces. The elder, Garland (or Gene), lived and continues to live in Florida. The record is essentially silent concerning what communication or contact Garland and Marvin maintained. The remaining child, Debra, was asked early in her testimony whether she was close to her father. She paused to consider the matter for several seconds and answered hesitantly, "Yeah." When she was asked about particulars of her father's work, health and life over the several years preceding his death, Debra's words and demeanor were noticeably vague.
In late February 2002, while driving his truck in Colorado, Marvin called Joan to tell her he had summoned emergency medical personnel, was in a Denver hospital and was about to have emergency surgery to remove a portion of his colon. Joan immediately left for Colorado, where she remained throughout Marvin's hospitalization. Joan's son and wife came from Wyoming to stay with her. Joan's son-in-law unloaded Marvin's truck and drove it back to Missouri. None of Marvin's children traveled to Colorado to visit him during his stay in the hospital. Joan called them to report on Marvin's condition. Marvin had a tracheotomy that prevented him from talking, but was able to write notes.
In mid-March, Marvin was air lifted to the University of Iowa Hospitals and Clinics (UIHC) in Iowa City, where he remained for approximately one month. Joan's son drove her from Colorado to Iowa City. Joan drove back and forth between Iowa City and Donnellson every day (approximately 150 miles round trip) to see Marvin.
Marvin's condition improved, and in mid-April 2002 he was transferred to the skilled care unit at Great River Medical Center (GRMC) in Burlington. Joan traveled to Burlington daily to see Marvin.
The day he was transferred to GRMC, a nurse practitioner at UIHC examined Marvin and noted he was alert and oriented as to who he was, where he was, what day it was, and what was going on around him. He made "significant improvement" at GRMC and was discharged home on May 11, 2002. His condition quickly deteriorated, however, and Marvin was in and out of the hospital on various occasions until his death on June 13, 2002.
From the time Marvin returned to Iowa in March until his death in June, Debra and her husband, Richard, visited Marvin approximately five times. None of Marvin's other children visited him during this period.
Before his illness, Marvin talked to Joan about changing his will. During his hospitalization, Marvin raised the subject again with Joan, instructing her to have a new will drawn up leaving everything to her. Joan contacted attorney Curtis Dial and asked him to draft the will. She chose not to have Marvin's long-time attorney, Michael Phelan, draft the will because Phelan refused to complete the sale of real estate owned by Marvin but used by Martin once he learned Marvin was hospitalized. Joan told attorney Dial what Marvin wanted in the will; Dial never met with or spoke to Marvin about the will. Joan took the will to Marvin at the hospital in Burlington and read it to him. Marvin told Joan it was what he wanted and signed it on April 18, 2002, in the presence of two witnesses.
While in the hospital in Burlington, Marvin instructed Joan to have three quitclaim deeds prepared to transfer property from his name into his name and hers as joint tenants. Joan had attorney Dial prepare the deeds. She took the deeds to the hospital, where Marvin read and signed them on April 25, 2002. Three other properties were not transferred from Marvin's name into joint tenancy with Joan, including the house in Donnellson.
In May 2002, Marvin signed a power of attorney to Joan. She used the power of attorney to complete the sale of one of Marvin's trucks. This was the only time Joan used the power of attorney.
Joan filed a petition for probate of Marvin's will shortly after his death. Debra Calfee, Richard Calfee and Martin Cecil (plaintiffs) filed a petition to set aside the will and the real estate transfers made by Marvin prior to his death, alleging undue influence by Joan. Following a bench trial, the court ruled the will and inter vivos transfers were not the result of undue influence. Plaintiffs appeal.
II. Standard of Review
An action to set aside a will is triable in probate as a law action. Iowa Code § 633.33 (2001). Our review on appeal is for correction of error of law. Iowa R. App. 6.4; In re Estate of Bayer, 574 N.W.2d 667, 670 (Iowa 1998). In a law action, the district court's findings of fact are binding on appeal if supported by substantial evidence. In re Estate of Lachmich, 541 N.W.2d 543, 545 (Iowa Ct.App. 1995).
By contrast, "all other matters triable in probate shall be tried by the probate court as a proceeding in equity." Iowa Code § 633.33. Therefore, our review of the district court's decision regarding the inter vivos transfers is de novo. In re Estate of Todd, 585 N.W.2d 273, 275 (Iowa 1998). We give weight to the district court's factual findings, but are not bound by them. Jackson v. Schrader, 676 N.W.2d 599, 603 (Iowa 2003).
III. Confidential Relationship
Plaintiffs argue the quitclaim deeds transferring property from Marvin's name into his name and Joan's as joint tenants were the result of undue influence stemming from the confidential relationship between Joan and Marvin. They assert Marvin's infirm condition and reliance on Joan resulted in Joan exerting undue influence over Marvin, which benefited Joan.
Persons seeking to set aside inter vivos transfers must prove their cause of action "by clear, satisfactory and convincing evidence." Todd, 585 N.W.2d at 277. Evidence is clear, satisfactory and convincing "when there is no serious or substantial uncertainty about the conclusion to be drawn from it." Mendenhall v. Judy, 671 N.W.2d 452, 454 (Iowa 2003).
Transactions between persons in a confidential relationship raise a presumption of undue influence. Id. The presumption of undue influence arising from a confidential relationship is rebutted if the grantee of the transaction proves by clear, satisfactory, and convincing evidence "that the grantee acted in good faith throughout the transaction and the grantor acted freely, intelligently, and voluntarily." Jackson, 676 N.W.2d at 605.
A "confidential relationship" is "any relation existing between parties to a transaction wherein one of the parties is duty bound to act with the utmost good faith for the benefit of the other party." In re Herm's Estate, 284 N.W.2d 191, 199 (Iowa 1979) (quoting Dibel v. Meredith, 233 Iowa 545, 549, 10 N.W.2d 28, 30 (1943)). It arises when one person "`has gained the confidence of another and purports to act or advise with the other's interest in mind.'" Coffman v. Adkins, 338 N.W.2d 540, 543-44 (Iowa Ct.App. 1983) (quoting Oehler v. Hoffman, 253 Iowa 631, 635, 113 N.W.2d 254, 256 (1962)). "The gist of the doctrine of confidential relationship is the presence of a dominant influence under which the act is presumed to have been done." Estate of Clark, 357 N.W.2d 34, 37 (Iowa Ct.App. 1984). A confidential relationship does not exist solely from blood relationship or marriage. Coffman, 338 N.W.2d at 544.
Plaintiffs have failed to show by clear, satisfactory and convincing evidence that a confidential relationship existed between Joan and Marvin in which Joan was the dominant person. Nothing in the record supports a finding that Joan had a dominant influence over Marvin. To the contrary, numerous witnesses testified Marvin was "strong-willed," "stubborn," and "had a mind of his own." Marvin continued to display these character traits during his illness.
Even if a confidential relationship existed between Joan and Marvin, Joan rebutted the presumption by presenting clear, satisfactory, and convincing evidence that she acted in good faith and that Marvin acted freely, intelligently, and voluntarily. The record reveals that Joan was simply following Marvin's directions in carrying out certain transactions for him, including the preparation and execution of the quitclaim deeds. Medical records admitted into evidence and testimony from numerous witnesses support a finding that Marvin was alert and oriented at all times relevant to the transactions at issue.
IV. Undue Influence
Four elements are necessary to establish undue influence to set aside an inter vivos transfer or a will: (1) the grantor/testator must be susceptible to undue influence; (2) defendant had an opportunity to exercise undue influence and effect the wrongful purpose; (3) defendant had a disposition to influence unduly for the purpose of procuring an improper favor; and (4) the result clearly appears to be the effect of undue influence. Mendenhall, 671 N.W.2d at 454 (inter vivos transfer); Bayer, 574 N.W.2d at 671 (will).
Parties seeking to set aside a will based on undue influence must prove the essential elements of the action by a preponderance of the evidence. Todd, 585 N.W.2d at 277. To set aside an inter vivos transfer, the evidence must be clear, satisfactory and convincing. Id.
"For influence to be considered undue, it must be the `equivalent to moral coercion.'" Bayer, 574 N.W.2d at 671 (quoting In re Hollis' Estate, 234 Iowa 761, 769, 12 N.W.2d 576, 581 (1944)). Direct proof of undue influence is not required; circumstantial evidence may be sufficient. Id. However, there must be more than a "scintilla" of evidence. Id. There must be "`a solid foundation of established facts upon which to rest an inference of'" undue influence. Id. (quoting In re Will of Pritchard, 443 N.W.2d 95, 98 (Iowa Ct.App. 1989)). "Mental strength of the person dominated has a direct bearing on the issue of undue influence." Herm's Estate, 284 N.W.2d at 200.
Plaintiffs have failed to prove that either the inter vivos transfers or the will were the result of undue influence.
None of Marvin's children came to visit him in Colorado, despite his grave condition. The district court found Debra's explanation that a snowstorm prevented her from traveling to Colorado "less than believable" based on her demeanor. Even upon his return to Iowa, the only child to visit Marvin was Debra; she and her husband visited only on a few occasions over the last four months of Marvin's life. The other children did not visit or telephone. None of the children visited their father in the month after he left GRMC in Burlington.
According to Joan and Marvin's long-time friend Vera Gray, the lack of attention by his children bothered Marvin. He had demonstrated on previous occasions that he was capable of cutting ties with his children if they upset him. He removed Diane from his will shortly after Noreta's death and filed a replevin suit against Martin over the return of certain personal property. His actions in executing a new will and the three quitclaim deeds are but one more example. Moreover, the district court's conclusion that Marvin was "entirely competent" when he executed the will and the deeds is supported by substantial evidence.
Joan's actions in carrying out Marvin's wishes provide the clearest evidence that she did not exert undue influence over Marvin. Joan only took action at Marvin's request. She sought out an attorney to draft a new will only after Marvin requested it. When provided with a power of attorney from Marvin, she used it only to the extent he had instructed, to clear the debt on a truck. Only three of Marvin's seven properties were transferred into joint tenancy with Joan, pursuant to his instructions. Significantly, the most valuable piece of property in Marvin's estate, the house in Donnellson, remained in his name only at his death. The value of the house and the other properties Marvin held in his own name at his death nearly equaled the value of the property held in joint tenancy with Joan.
Marvin was described as "stubborn," a man with "a mind of his own," "cantankerous," and someone "not easily influenced by others, especially when it came to money." Marvin's character and Joan's actions in carrying out Marvin's instructions clearly demonstrate Joan did not exert undue influence over Marvin in the execution of his will or the three quitclaim deeds.
We affirm the district court.