Opinion
No. 04-16-00503-CV
03-07-2018
IN RE ESTATE OF Ramiro AGUILAR Jr., Deceased
MEMORANDUM OPINION
From the Probate Court No. 2, Bexar County, Texas
Trial Court No. 2012-PC-2800
Honorable Tom Rickhoff, Judge Presiding Opinion by: Marialyn Barnard, Justice Sitting: Marialyn Barnard, Justice Rebeca C. Martinez, Justice Irene Rios, Justice DISMISSED FOR LACK OF JURISDICTION IN PART; AFFIRMED IN PART
This appeal arises from two probate court orders entered by Bexar County Probate Court No. 2 on July 7, 2016 and July 13, 2016. On appeal, appellants, Anthony C. Aguilar and Michael A. Aguilar, challenge whether the probate court had subject matter jurisdiction to enter the orders. The Aguilars further argue that assuming the probate court had subject matter jurisdiction, the probate court erred in entering the July 7, 2016 order because the order violated their due process rights. The Aguilars also argue that the probate court erred in entering the July 13, 2016 order because the probate court erred in finding Anthony to be a vexatious litigant. We hold the probate court had jurisdiction to enter both orders. However, because the July 7, 2016 order is not a final, appealable order, this court does not have jurisdiction to consider an appeal of that order. We affirm the July 13, 2016 order.
We note that many of these same issues have been raised by appellant, Anthony C. Aguilar, in a companion appeal, Cause No. 04-16-00504-CV, In the Estate of Alvilda Mae Aguilar, Deceased.
BACKGROUND
This dispute originates from a probate matter that has come before our court multiple times. The following sets forth the factual and procedural history of the case necessary to place the orders being appealed in context.
See In re Estate of Aguilar, No. 04-16-00381-CV, 2017 WL 4158092 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Sept. 20, 2017, pet. denied) (mem. op.); In re Estate of Aguilar, No. 04-16-00249-CV, 2016 WL 3796953 (Tex. App.—San Antonio July 13, 2016, no pet.) (mem. op.) (per curiam); In re Estate of Aguilar, No. 04-16-00655-CV, 2017 WL 603632 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Feb. 15, 2017, no pet.) (mem. op.) (per curiam); In re Estate of Aguilar, 492 S.W.3d 807 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2016, pet. denied); In re Aguilar, No. 04-16-00027-CV, 2016 WL 402292 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Feb. 3, 2016, orig. proceeding) (per curiam); In re Estate of Aguilar, No. 04-13-00367-CV, 2014 WL 2443865 (Tex. App.—San Antonio May 28, 2014) (mem. op.); In re Estate of Aguilar, No. 04-13-00038-CV, 2014 WL 667516 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Feb. 19, 2014) (mem. op.); In re Aguilar, No. 04-13-00589-CV, 2013 WL 5297243 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Sept. 18, 2013, orig. proceeding) (per curiam); In re Aguilar, No. 04-13-00425-CV, 2013 WL 4501435 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Aug. 21, 2013, orig. proceeding) (mem. op.).
Siblings — appellants and their sister, Margaret Morales — have been involved in ongoing litigation since the death of their father, Ramiro Aguilar, Jr., in the summer of 2012. On August 31, 2012, Anthony Aguilar, an attorney, filed an application to probate Ramiro's will in Bexar County Probate Court No. 2. Anthony filed the application on behalf of Morales, who was seeking to be appointed independent executrix of Ramiro's estate. On September 15, 2012, Morales retained new counsel. Thereafter, on September 17, 2012, the will was admitted to probate, and Morales was appointed independent executrix of Ramiro's estate.
On December 9, 2015, Morales filed an Account for Final Settlement and a Petition for Declaratory Judgment. In her petition, Morales sought to be discharged from any liability involving matters relating to the administration of the estate. On January 27, 2016, following a hearing on the final accounting, the probate court entered an Order Approving Final Account.
In 2016, the Aguilars began filing a series of lawsuits in both Bexar County and El Paso County against Morales and her attorneys as well as other individuals involved in the administration of the estate. First, on February 22, 2016, the Aguilars filed a Counterclaim and Third-Party Claim in Bexar County Probate Court No. 2, naming Morales and her attorneys, William Leighner and Arthur Bayern, as defendants. In that pleading, the Aguilars alleged Morales hid estate assets, and they sought a constructive trust on the attorney's fees paid to Leighner and Bayern. Shortly thereafter, on March 5, 2016, the Aguilars filed litigation in the 384th District Court of El Paso County, again naming Morales and her attorneys, Leighner and Bayern, as defendants. In the El Paso lawsuit, the Aguilars also named Morales's accountant — Rene Pena — and Lillian Eller as defendants. In their petition, the Aguilars alleged causes of action for fraud and breach of fiduciary duty.
Subsequently, Leighner and Bayern filed a joint motion to dismiss the Aguilars' claims against them as baseless pursuant to Rule 91a of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 91a. The joint motion was filed in the 384th District Court of El Paso County; however, on June 7, 2016, Bexar County Probate Court No. 2 entered an order transferring the El Paso lawsuit to the probate court for further proceedings. That same day, the Bexar County probate court entered an order declaring Anthony a vexatious litigant. Two days later, on June 9, 2016, the probate court granted Leighner and Bayern's joint motion, dismissing the Aguilars' claims against them with prejudice. The Aguilars attempted to appeal the probate court's order granting Leighner and Bayern's joint motion to dismiss, and we ultimately dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. See In the Estate of Aguilar, No. 04-16-00381-CV, 2017 WL 4158092, at *6 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Sept. 20, 2017, no pet.) (mem. op.).
After the El Paso lawsuit was transferred to the Bexar county probate court, Morales also filed motions to dismiss, seeking to dismiss all of the claims asserted against her. Specifically, Morales sought to dismiss the claims asserted against her in the El Paso lawsuit as baseless pursuant to Rule 91a of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 91a. As to the claims asserted against her in the counterclaim filed in the Bexar County probate court, Morales filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to section 11.056 of Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code, arguing the claims against her should be dismissed because Anthony failed to furnish security as ordered by the probate court in its June 7, 2016 order declaring Anthony a vexatious litigant. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 11.056 (West 2017). Thereafter, the probate court granted the Rule 91a motion by order dated July 7, 2016 and granted the section 11.056 motion by order dated July 13, 2016. This appeal followed.
ANALYSIS
On appeal, the Aguilars raise ten separate issues challenging the probate court's July 7, 2016 and July 13, 2016 orders. For the purposes of clarity, we have restated the Aguilars' complaints as follows: (1) whether the probate court had subject matter jurisdiction to enter the orders; (2) assuming the probate court had subject matter jurisdiction, whether it erred in entering the July 7, 2016 order because the order violated their due process rights; and (3) assuming the probate court had subject matter jurisdiction, whether it erred in entering the July 13, 2016 order because it failed to find Anthony to be a vexatious litigant.
Probate Court's Jurisdiction (Issues 1-7)
In their first seven issues on appeal, the Aguilars contend the probate court did not have subject matter jurisdiction to enter the July 7, 2016 and July 13, 2016 orders dismissing their claims against Morales. Specifically, the Aguilars contend the probate court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the estate was closed at the time the orders were entered.
Standard of Review and Applicable Law
"Probate courts are courts of limited jurisdiction." Stauffer v. Nicholson, 438 S.W.3d 205, 213 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2014, no pet.). It is well-established that "[s]ubject matter jurisdiction is essential to a court's authority to decide a case." Id. at 213-14 (citing Bland Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Blue, 34 S.W.3d 547, 553-54 (Tex. 2000) and Tex. Ass'n of Bus. v. Tex. Air Control Bd., 852 S.W.2d 440,443 (Tex. 1993)). "Whether a court has subject matter jurisdiction is a question of law[,]" and we review questions of law de novo. Id. at 214; see In the Matter of Estate of Lindsay, No. 08-14-00232-CV, 2017 WL 4324973, at *1 (Tex. App.—El Paso Sept. 29, 2017, no pet.) (mem. op.).
This court has recognized that "[t]he jurisdiction of a probate court attaches at the time an application for the probate of a will is filed." In re Blankenship, 392 S.W.3d 249, 257 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2012, no pet.). "Once the probate court's jurisdiction attaches, it continues until the estate is closed." Id. Relevant to this case, section 405.004 of the Texas Estates Code provides that an independent executrix, such as Morales, may close the independent administration of an estate by filing with the court a closing report or a notice of closing the estate:
when all of the debts known to exist against the estate have been paid, or when they have been paid so far as the assets in the independent executor's possession will permit, when there is no pending litigation, and when the independent executor has distributed to the distributees entitled to the estate all assets of the estate, if any, remaining after payment of debts....TEX. EST. CODE ANN. § 405.004 (West 2014).
Application
Here, the probate court's jurisdiction attached when the application to probate Ramiro's will was filed in Bexar County Probate Court No. 2 on August 31, 2012. See In re Blankenship, 392 S.W.3d at 257. The Aguilars contend, however, that the estate was closed before the probate court entered the July 7, 2016 and July 13, 2016 orders. We disagree for the reasons explained in our recent opinion, In the Estate of Aguilar. See 2017 WL 4158092, at *2-*4. In the prior appeal, the Aguilars appealed six orders entered by the probate court. Id. at *1. Just as in the instant appeal, the Aguilars argued the estate was closed based on the following events: (1) the entry of the Order Approving Final Account on January 27, 2016; (2) the complete distribution of the estate's assets to each of the beneficiaries as evidenced in Leighner's letter to the probate court dated February 5, 2016; and (3) the inclusion of the "Mother Hubbard" clause in the probate court's June 7, 2016 order declaring Anthony a vexatious litigant. See id. at *2-*4.
In addressing each of these events, we first held the entry of the Order Approving Final Account did not operate as an event that closed the estate because it did not constitute either a closing report or a notice of closing of the estate. Id. at *2; see TEX. EST. CODE ANN. § 405.004 (stating independent executrix may close estate by filing closing report or notice of closing estate). In reaching this holding, we noted the order specified additional actions that needed to be accomplished to achieve final settlement and the closing of the estate. 2017 WL 4158092, at *2. We further noted the order recognized Morales's petition for declaratory judgment remained pending and nothing in our record indicated the probate court had entered an order disposing of the claims asserted in Morales's petition. Id.; see TEX. EST. CODE ANN. § 405.004 (identifying when an independent executrix may close an estate, specifically stating when there is no pending litigation). Similarly, nothing in the appellate record in this appeal indicates the probate court has entered an order disposing of the claims asserted in Morales's petition. See 2017 WL 4158092, at *2. Accordingly, we hold our decision in the prior appeal controls, compelling us again to hold the Order Approving Final Account does not constitute an event that closed the estate. See id.
With regard to the Aguilars' argument that the complete distribution of the estate's assets to each of the beneficiaries constituted an event that closed the estate, we also hold our previous decision controls. Id. at *2-*3. In our previous opinion, the Aguilars argued — just as they do here — that Leighner's letter to the probate court dated February 5, 2016 constituted evidence that all the assets in the estate had been distributed to the beneficiaries. Id. However, upon reviewing the letter, we noted the letter did not contain any assertions that a "complete distribution" had been made. Id. at *3. We also noted that Morales's Account for Final Settlement did not indicate all distributions had been made, and, as previously stated, the probate court's Order Approving Final Account contemplated additional steps needed to be taken before the closing of the estate. Id. Accordingly, in absence of evidence establishing that a complete distribution of the estate's assets has been made, we again hold the estate was not closed. See id.
Turning to the Aguilars' final contention that the "Mother Hubbard" clause contained in the probate court's June 7, 2016 order declaring Anthony a vexatious litigant constituted an event that closed the estate, we again hold our previous decision controls. Id. at *3-*4. According to the Aguilars, the clause contained in the June 7, 2016 order constituted the closing of the estate because the clause specifically stated "[a]ll other relief requested, be and hereby is Denied," signaling the finality of the probate proceedings. As we noted in our prior opinion, however, "[t]he standard Mother Hubbard clause is used in interlocutory orders so frequently that it cannot be taken as any indication of finality." Id. at *3 (quoting Lehmann v. Har-Con Corp., 39 S.W.3d 191, 192-93 (Tex. 2001)). We further explained the probate court's order addressed only Morales's motion seeking to declare Anthony a vexatious litigant, and thus, it did not constitute a final order with respect to any of the other outstanding parties or claims involved in the probate proceedings. Id. Therefore, for those same reasons, we again hold the "Mother Hubbard" clause contained in the June 7, 2016 order declaring Anthony a vexatious litigant does not constitute an event that closed the estate. See id.
Based on the foregoing, we hold the events outlined above do not constitute an event that closed the estate. See id. at *2-*4. Moreover, nothing in the appellate record in this appeal affirmatively demonstrates the estate was closed when the probate court entered its July 7, 2016 and July 13, 2016 orders. See TEX. EST. CODE ANN. § 405.004 (detailing independent executrix may file a closing report or notice of closing to close estate). Accordingly, because the probate court had subject matter jurisdiction to enter the July 7, 2016 and July 13, 2016 orders dismissing the Aguilars' claims against Morales, we overrule the Aguilars' first seven issues on appeal. See Stauffer, 438 S.W.3d at 213; Blankenship, 392 S.W.3d at 257-58.
July 7 , 2016 Order (Issues 8 and 9)
Having addressed the Aguilars' issues implicating the probate court's jurisdiction, we turn next to the Aguilars' complaints regarding the July 7, 2016 order. In their eighth and ninth issues on appeal, the Aguilars contend the probate court erred in entering the July 7, 2016 order. According to the Aguilars, the order violates their due process rights for a number of reasons.
We note the Aguilars argue the July 7, 2016 order is void because it dismisses a lawsuit filed in the "385th District Court of El Paso County," and no lawsuit was ever pending between the parties in the 385th District Court, which is located in Midland County. Nevertheless, when referencing the lawsuit, the order also identifies the lawsuit as the one that was "transferred to this Court [Bexar County Probate Court No. 2]." Moreover, a review of the record reflects that the only case transferred to Bexar County Probate Court No. 2 was the lawsuit filed by the Aguilars in the 384th District Court of El Paso County. Thus, we conclude the reference to the 385th District Court is a typographical error, and to the extent the Aguilars are arguing the typographical error voids the order, we disagree. See Gonzalez v. Lichtenberger, No. 04-16-00192, 2017 WL 2562768, at *2 (Tex. App.—San Antonio June 14, 2017) (mem. op.) (holding clerical or typographical errors do not void orders).
Before addressing the Aguilars' challenge to the July 7, 2016 order, we must first consider whether we have jurisdiction to consider any of the Aguilars' complaints. We addressed this same jurisdictional concern in In the Estate of Aguilar. See 2017 WL 4158092, at *4-*7. In that opinion, we noted an appeal generally may be taken only from a final judgment. Id. at *4 (citing Lehmann v. Har-Con Corp., 39 S.W.3d 191, 195 (Tex. 2001)). However, "[p]robate proceedings are an exception to the 'one final judgment' rule; in such cases, 'multiple judgments final for purposes of appeal can be rendered on certain discrete issues.'" Id. (quoting De Ayala v. Mackie, 193 S.W.3d 575, 578 (Tex. 2006)). To determine whether a probate court order is final for purposes of appeal, we first give controlling effect to an express statute. Id. In the absence of an express statute, we then determine a probate court order to be final and appealable only if it "dispose[s] of all parties or issues in a particular phase of the proceedings." Id. (quoting De Ayala, 193 S.W.3d at 579). If the order does not end a phase of the proceedings, but instead sets the stage for the resolution of the proceedings, then the order is interlocutory. Id.
Here, it is undisputed that on March 5, 2016, the Aguilars filed litigation in the 384th District Court of El Paso County, naming Morales, her attorneys — William Leighner and Arthur Bayern, her accountant — Rene Pena, and Lillian Eller as defendants. In their petition, the Aguilars alleged causes of action for fraud and breach of fiduciary duty. Subsequently, Leighner and Bayern filed a joint motion to dismiss the Aguilars' claims against them as baseless pursuant to Rule 91a of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 91a. The matter was ultimately transferred to Bexar County Probate Court No. 2 on June 7, 2016 for further proceedings, and thereafter, the probate court granted Leighner and Bayern's joint motion, dismissing the Aguilars' claims against them with prejudice. Although the Aguilars attempted to appeal the probate court's order granting Leighner and Bayern's joint motion to dismiss, we ultimately dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. Estate of Aguilar, 2017 WL 4158092, at *6. In our opinion, we held the probate court's order was not final as it only disposed of the Aguilars' claims against Leighner and Bayern. Id. Based on the record before us at that time, the Aguilars' claims against Morales, Pena, and Eller had not been dismissed, nor had the claims against them been severed from the claims against Leighner and Bayern. Id.
The record in this appeal further reflects that Morales also filed a motion to dismiss the Aguilars' claims against her as baseless — again, pursuant to Rule 91a of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 91a. The July 7, 2016 order which the Aguilars assert violates their due process rights grants Morales's motion, dismissing all of the Aguilars' claims against her with prejudice. Nevertheless, for the reasons we held in our prior opinion, the July 7, 2016 order is still not final or appealable. See Estate of Aguilar, 2017 WL 4158092, at *6. The order fails to dispose of the pending claims against Pena and Eller, and the record does not contain an order severing the claims asserted against Morales from any of the other pending claims. See id. And, although it has come to our attention in Cause No. 04-16-00813-CV, In the Estate of Ramior Aguilar, Jr., Deceased, that the probate court rendered summary judgment in favor of Pena, dismissing all the claims and causes of actions asserted against him in the El Paso lawsuit, there is nothing in the record to indicate the claims against Eller have been disposed or severed from the claims asserted against Morales.
Cause No. 04-16-00813-CV, In the Estate of Ramiro Aguilar, Jr., Deceased, was submitted on briefs on September 6, 2017, the same day this appeal, Cause No. 04-16-00503-CV, In the Estate of Alvilda Mae Aguilar, Deceased, and its companion appeal, Cause No. 04-16-00504-CV, In the Estate of Ramiro Aguilar, Jr., Deceased, were submitted.
Accordingly, we conclude the July 7, 2016 order is part of a larger proceeding as it does not dispose of "all [the] parties or issues in [this] particular phase of the proceedings." Id. (quoting De Ayala, 193 S.W. 3d at 579). The July 7, 2016 order is a "prelude" that "sets the stage" for resolution of the proceeding rather than a "finale" that ends a discrete phase of the proceedings. Id. (quoting De Ayala, 193 S.W. 3d at 578-79). We therefore hold the Aguilars' due process complaints regarding the July 7, 2016 order are not properly before this court. Thus, the Aguilars due process challenges — Issues 8 and 9 — are dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.
July 13 , 2016 Order (Issue 10)
In their final issue on appeal, the Aguilars challenge the July 13, 2016 order, which dismissed the counterclaim the Aguilars filed against Morales in the Bexar County probate court. As indicated above, the Aguilars filed a counterclaim and third-party claim against Morales and her attorneys. The record reflects that on June 7, 2016, the probate court declared Anthony a vexatious litigant, ordering him to furnish security for Morales's reasonable expenses in the amount of $150,000.00 on or before June 21, 2016. When that security was not furnished, Morales filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to section 11.056 of Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code, seeking to dismiss the counterclaim against her. On July 13, 2016, the probate court granted Morales's motion.
"A court shall order the plaintiff to furnish security for the benefit of the moving defendant if the court, after hearing the evidence on the motion, determines that the plaintiff is a vexatious litigant." TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 11.055(a).
"The court shall dismiss a litigation as to a moving defendant if a plaintiff ordered to furnish security does not furnish the security within the time set by the order." TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 11.056.
As part of their complaint, the Aguilars contend the probate court did not "have jurisdiction to enter a dismissal of the counterclaim filed by Anthony Aguilar." Because as we explained above, a probate court's jurisdiction continues until the estate is closed and there is nothing in the record demonstrating the estate has been closed, we hold the probate court had jurisdiction to enter the July 13, 2016. See Blankenship, 392 S.W.3d at 257.
The Aguilars also argue the probate court abused its discretion in dismissing their counterclaim against Morales because the underlying June 7, 2016 order that declared Anthony a vexatious litigant and ordered him to deposit security was error. We recognize the Aguilars raised this argument in In the Estate of Aguilar. See 2017 WL 4158092, at *5-*6. In that opinion, we dismissed his complaint for lack of jurisdiction because there was no evidence the order declaring Anthony a vexatious litigant was final. Id. We noted "that [t]he record in [that] appeal [did] not show Anthony Aguilar failed to post security or that his action was dismissed." Id. at *5. Here, however, the July 13, 2016 order is final for purposes of appeal because it ends a discrete phase of the proceedings declaring Anthony to be a vexatious litigant and dismissing his counterclaim against Morales after he failed to post security. See De Ayala, 193 S.W.3d at 578; see also In the Estate of Aguilar, 2017 WL 4158092, at *5.
According to the Aguilars, the probate court erred in declaring Anthony to be a vexatious litigant because the probate court failed to find that Anthony had commenced at least five litigations in the seven-year period immediately preceding the date that Morales filed her vexatious litigant motion. The Aguilars argue that although Anthony had initiated eight actions — recognizing the filings of his lawsuits, appeals, and original proceedings — against Morales over a seven-year period, the eight actions comprise three litigations. For support, the Aguilars rely on section 32.001(d) of the Texas Estates Code, which provides all proceedings incident to a probate proceeding are considered one proceeding for purposes of jurisdiction. See TEX. EST. CODE ANN. § 32.001(d) ("The administration of the estate of a decedent, from the filing of the application for probate and administration, or for administration, until the decree of final distribution and the discharge of the last personal representative, shall be considered as one proceeding for purposes of jurisdiction.").
Chapter 11 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code addresses vexatious litigants—persons who abuse the legal system by filing numerous, frivolous lawsuits. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 11.001-11.056. Under this chapter, one of the requirements necessary for a trial court to find that a plaintiff is a vexatious litigant is that the defendant must show the plaintiff has prosecuted, maintained, or commenced at least five other litigations that have been determined adversely to him within the seven-year period preceding the defendant's motion. Id. § 11.054. We review a trial court's declaration of a vexatious litigant under an abuse of discretion standard. Aubrey v. Aubrey, 523 S.W.3d 299, 309 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2017, no pet.) A trial court abuses its discretion only if it acts in an arbitrary or capricious manner without reference to any guiding rules and principles. Id.
The Aguilars do not dispute that Anthony initiated at least eight matters against Morales within the seven-year period, and that those matters were determined adversely against Anthony. Rather, the Aguilars contend the eight matters constitute only three litigations because the matters that concern the same probate proceeding should be considered as one litigation. Section 11.001(2) of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code defines "litigation" as meaning "a civil action commenced, maintained, or pending in any state or federal court." TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 11.001(2). The statute does not specify that matters involving the same case should be considered one litigation, and we decline to do so. See id; see also Restrepo v. All. Riggers & Constructors, Ltd., No. 08-15-00348-CV, 2017 WL 4216249, at *17 (Tex. App.—El Paso Sept. 22, 2017) (mem. op.) (considering three interlocutory appeals involving the same case as three separate litigations and three original proceedings involving the same case as three separate litigations). Here, it is undisputed Anthony initiated eight matters — comprising civil actions, appeals, and original proceedings - against Morales within the seven-year period preceding the filing of Morales's vexatious litigant motion, and each of those matters were determined adversely against him. See Restrepo, 2017 WL 4216249, at *17; see also Retzlaff v. GoAmerica Commc'ns Corp., 356 S.W.3d 689, 700 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2011, no pet.) (counting involuntary dismissals and mandamus actions toward total litigations required to satisfy second prong of section 11.054(1)(A)). Accordingly, we hold the probate court did not abuse its discretion in finding Anthony to be a vexatious litigant, and the Aguilars' final issue on appeal is overruled.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, the appeal of the July 7, 2016 order is dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, and the July 13, 2016 order is affirmed.
Marialyn Barnard, Justice