Opinion
No. 5-886 / 05-1647
Filed December 7, 2005
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Woodbury County, Mary L. Timko, Associate Juvenile Judge.
A mother and father appeal from the order terminating their parental rights to their daughter. AFFIRMED.
Joseph W. Kertels of Juvenile Law Center, Sioux City, for appellant-mother.
Patrick H. Tott, Sioux City, for appellant-father.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Kathrine Miller-Todd, Assistant Attorney General, Thomas S. Mullin, County Attorney, and Dewey P. Sloan, Assistant County Attorney, for appellee.
Lori Ubbinga, Sioux City, guardian ad litem for minor child.
Considered by Huitink, P.J., and Mahan and Hecht, JJ.
Jenny and Steven are the parents of Emma, who was born in March of 2002. Emma was first removed from Jenny's care in February of 2003 after Jenny was arrested for speeding, drinking while driving, possession of drug paraphernalia, and possession of methamphetamine. A subsequent urinalysis showed Jenny to be under the influence of methamphetamine and a hairstat test revealed that Emma had been exposed to the drug. Emma was adjudicated to be a child in need of assistance (CINA) in April of 2003 under Iowa Code sections 232.2(6)(b), (c)(2), and (n) (2003). Juvenile court jurisdiction was dismissed in October of 2004 after Jenny made progress in drug treatment.
Emma was soon removed again, however, because of the methamphetamine usage of both parents. Emma was again adjudicated CINA in April of 2005 under section 232.2(6)(n) (2005). The State subsequently filed a petition to terminate the parental rights of both Jenny and Steven. Following a hearing on that petition, the juvenile court terminated Jenny's rights under sections 232.116(1)(d) and ( l), and Steven's rights under sections 232.116(1)(d), (h), and ( l). Both Jenny and Steven appeal from this order.
We review these termination orders de novo. In re R.F., 471 N.W.2d 821, 824 (Iowa 1991). While the district court terminated the parental rights on more than one statutory ground, we will affirm the termination if the State has met its burden of proof on one of them. In re R.R.K., 544 N.W.2d 274, 276 (Iowa Ct.App. 1995). Our primary concern is the best interests of the child. In re C.B., 611 N.W.2d 489, 492 (Iowa 2000).
On appeal Jenny maintains (1) the State did not prove the elements for termination by clear and convincing evidence, and (2) that terminating her parental rights would be detrimental to Emma and therefore not in her best interest due to the closeness of the parent-child relationship. Steven also asserts the State failed to prove the statutory elements for termination, and termination was inappropriate due to the nature and extent of his relationship with Emma.
Steven additionally asserts the court erred in terminating his rights under section 232.116(1)(h) because that provision was not pled and never urged by the State as a ground for termination. We reject this claim. Our review of the termination order shows that the court granted the State's request to amend its termination petition and add this claim. The court's termination order further notes there were no objections to the proposed amendment.
Upon our de novo review of the record, we conclude the juvenile court properly terminated both Jenny's and Steven's parental rights under section 232.116(1)(d) based upon clear and convincing evidence proving that subsequent to the child's CINA adjudication, the parents were offered or received services to correct the circumstances which led to the adjudication, and the circumstances continue to exist despite the offer or receipt of services.
First, the record supports that both Jenny and Steven have long-term, extensive histories of substance abuse. Jenny started using drugs around thirteen or fourteen years of age, while Steven began using drugs around the age of twelve. Jenny started using methamphetamine when she was sixteen, and became a regular user at twenty-five. Steven was, in fact, incarcerated on drug charges at the time of this termination hearing. Emma's parents' drug use has had a significant impact on her young life. Consequently, it is clear a "circumstance" which led to adjudication, and which Jenny and Steven thus needed to remedy in order to achieve reunification, was their drug use. We adopt as our own the juvenile court's finding that despite the offer and/or receipt of such services, neither parent had significantly addressed their drug problem.
Jenny has a long history of drug treatment programs, all of which ultimately proved unsuccessful. In March of 2003, Emma joined Jenny in a treatment program. The program staff expressed concern about Jenny's defensiveness and denial of behaviors. In January of 2004, Jenny entered Synergy Center for another course of drug treatment. While in that program, Jenny was confronted for threatening and intimidating staff members. In March of 2004, she entered a halfway house and was later discharged with recommendations that she complete a continuing care program and attend Alcoholics Anonymous. Despite all these treatment services, Jenny continued her substance abuse and in late 2004 was arrested for a violation of her probation when she twice tested positive for methamphetamines. It was recommended that she enter a treatment program and, although she initially made arrangements to attend, Jenny later chose not to participate in the program.
Prior to juvenile authorities' involvement regarding Emma, Steven underwent inpatient drug treatment in 1986, as well as outpatient treatment in 1987 and 1994. In May of 2003, Jackson Recovery completed an extensive psychosocial evaluation, but due to his subsequent arrest, Steven was unable to follow the provider's recommendations. On March 23, 2005, Steven was arrested and later imprisoned on a probation violation when methamphetamine was found in his room.
We deem it significant that neither Jenny nor Steven requested additional or different services from those offered by the State.
Jenny and Steven also contend termination of their parental rights is not in Emma's best interest because they share a close parent-child relationship. See Iowa Code § 232.116(3)(c). Although the law does authorize the juvenile court to dismiss a termination petition if such a relationship is shown, we find no indication in the record that the parties urged the juvenile court to dismiss the termination petition on this or any other exception provided for in Iowa Code section 232.116(3). The juvenile court's termination order does not address the parents' claims pursuant to this code section, and neither parent filed a motion pursuant to Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 1.904(2) seeking enlargement of the court's termination order. Jenny and Steven therefore did not preserve for our review their claims based on section 232.116(3). In re A.H.M., 516 N.W.2d 867, 872 (Iowa 1994). Even if error had been preserved, we would adopt as our own the juvenile court's finding that the termination of Jenny's and Steven's parental rights is in Emma's best interests. Children should not be forced to endlessly await the maturity of a parent. In re C.B., 611 N.W.2d 489, 492 (Iowa 2000). At some point the rights and needs of the child must rise above the rights and needs of the parent. In re J.L.W., 570 N.W.2d 778, 781 (Iowa Ct.App. 1997).