Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Superior Court County of Ventura No. 2006003771, Manuel J. Covarrubias, Judge
Laini Millar Melnick, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Pamela C. Hamanaka, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Paul M. Roadarmel, Jr., Supervising Deputy Attorney General, Sonya Roth, Deputy Attorney General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
OPINION ON REHEARING
COFFEE, J.
A juvenile wardship petition was filed on January 31, 2006, alleging that appellant, Edgar G., was a person described by the provisions of Welfare and Institutions Code section 602, having allegedly committed the offense of first degree burglary. (Pen. Code, § 459.) The juvenile court found true the allegation and sustained the petition. Appellant moved for a new trial, and his motion was denied.
All further statutory references are to the Penal Code.
Appellant was declared a ward of the court, placed on probation, and returned to the custody of his parents. The juvenile court declared the offense to be a felony. Appellant was ordered to pay a $200 state restitution fine and victim restitution in an amount to be determined. Appellant argues that there was insufficient evidence to support the juvenile court's finding that he committed a burglary. We agree and reverse.
FACTS
Eric Campbell was the sole occupant and owner of a condominium located at 1010 Briana Circle in Oxnard, which he had originally purchased with a friend, Aimee, and her boyfriend. Aimee's minor brother, E.S., often visited her. Aimee and her boyfriend later moved out and Campbell had the locks changed. He had given each of them a garage door opener, but did not ask for them back. Aimee later sued Campbell over an issue relating to ownership of the condominium.
On January 27, 2006, at approximately 4:30 in the afternoon, Campbell was upstairs in his home when he heard the garage door open and close. He walked downstairs and saw E.S. and another minor, appellant, in his den. Both boys had two of Campbell's kitchen knives in their hands and they were walking towards Campbell's leather couch getting ready to "stab it up." Campbell shouted and ran towards them. They turned to face Campbell and he backed away. The boys ran through the garage, into the backyard and E.S. jumped over a fence. Campbell grabbed appellant and fell backwards. Appellant stood up and fled over the fence. During the chase, appellant and E.S. dropped three kitchen knives in the yard and a fourth in the den.
Campbell called the police and they drove him to another location where seven or eight boys were sitting on a curb. Campbell recognized appellant and E.S. Two neighbors later testified that, on the day of the offense, they saw two boys walk towards Campbell's home, open his garage door and enter the condominium. Appellant and E.S. were tried together, but E.S. is not a party to the appeal.
DISCUSSION
Standard of Review
When faced with a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, we apply the same standard in both juvenile and adult criminal appeals. (In re Roderick P. (1972) 7 Cal.3d 801, 809.) We will not disturb the judgment unless it appears "'that upon no hypothesis whatever is there sufficient substantial evidence to support [the conviction].'" (People v. Bolin (1998) 18 Cal.4th 297, 331.) The supporting evidence must be such that any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. (People v. Holt (1997) 15 Cal.4th 619, 667.)
Felonious Intent
In sustaining the petition, the juvenile court found that the charge of burglary had been sustained beyond a reasonable doubt. At both the jurisdictional hearing and at the dispositional hearing, the court stated that it was relying on alternative theories: first, that appellant had entered Campbell's home to commit felony vandalism and, second, that he had entered for the purpose of committing theft. We conclude that the evidence is insufficient on either theory.
Vandalism is defined as the malicious damage or destruction of the real or personal property of another. (§ 594, subd. (a).) If the amount of the damage exceeds $400, the crime is a felony; if it is less than $400, the offense is a misdemeanor. (Id., subd. (b)(1) & (2)(A).) The term larceny is synonymous with theft. (§ 490a; People v. Dingle (1985) 174 Cal.App.3d 21, 29.) An individual is guilty of theft when he feloniously steals, takes, or carries away another's personal property. (§ 484, subd. (a).)
"Every person who enters any house . . . with intent to commit grand or petit larceny or any felony is guilty of burglary." (§ 459, italics added.) "Burglary requires that the entry be accompanied by an intent to commit some felony." (People v. Fond (1999) 71 Cal.App.4th 127, 132.) "[T]he specific intent necessary to commit burglary is simply the felonious design with which the accused enters the building . . . ." (People v. Smith (1966) 63 Cal.2d 779, 793.) To establish the crime of burglary, there must be evidence of intent at the time of entry. (In re Leanna W. (2004) 120 Cal.App.4th 735, 742.)
Appellant claims that the petition cannot be sustained because there is insufficient evidence to show that he had the specific intent to vandalize property exceeding $400 in value, or the intent to commit larceny at the time he entered Campbell's home. We agree. The People failed to offer evidence of the value of the couch, thus there was no basis to support the juvenile court's finding that appellant had the intent to commit felony vandalism.
The People contend that appellant was found inside the home, in possession of stolen property, which he took from the home, and dropped on the lawn only to facilitate his escape. They claim that this constituted circumstantial evidence of appellant's intent to commit theft. This argument is without merit. There was no evidence that appellant intended to steal Campbell's knives (or anything else), or that such an intention was formed before he entered the home. The juvenile court erred in finding the burglary allegation true.
The judgment (order of the juvenile court) is reversed.
We concur GILBERT, P.J., PERREN, J.