Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Ct. No. CK 58403 Jan Levine, Judge.
Deborah Dentler, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Raymond G. Fortner, Jr., County Counsel, Larry Cory, Assistant County Counsel, and Kim Nemoy, Deputy Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
FLIER, J.
L.C., the mother of now three-year-old E.C., appeals from the juvenile court’s January 2008 order terminating mother’s parental rights. We affirm.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The juvenile court initially terminated parental rights in July 2006. Mother appealed the order, and we reversed as to mother on the basis she had not received proper notice of the termination hearing. (In re E.C. (May 31, 2007, B193201) [nonpub. opn.].) The background facts are set forth in our prior opinion.
Our opinion was filed on May 31, 2007, and the remittitur issued on August 1, 2007. Pursuant to this court’s direction, the juvenile court subsequently set a new Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26 hearing for January 14, 2008. Mother received personal service of this hearing and appeared. After holding a trial, the juvenile court again terminated her parental rights. Mother timely appealed from this order.
In the court below, mother testified she learned of the reinstatement of her parental rights in July 2007.
All further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
DISCUSSION
On the present appeal, mother essentially argues there is insufficient evidence to support the court’s finding she failed to meet her burden of establishing a beneficial parent-child relationship exception under section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(B)(i). (In re Autumn H. (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 567, 574.)
Mother asserts that, upon learning her parental rights were restored, she began visiting the minor twice a month, during which she held the minor, fed her and stayed sometimes for dinner. Mother faults the caseworker for not informing her promptly in June 2007 that her rights had been restored. In truth, however, given the rate at which mother claims to have visited the child, a purported one-month delay in mother’s discovery of her restored rights would translate into only about two missed visits, which could hardly make a difference in whether she could establish a close bond with a child.
The caseworker testified mother visited her child only a total of four times in 2007.
In her argument, mother lays blame upon her dependency court counsel for expressing an initial reluctance to represent her, the Department for not keeping records of her visits, the caseworker for not observing her visitation, the minor’s counsel for not stating she observed her client in placement and the juvenile court for not requiring the infant to be brought to the courtroom to observe her interaction with the caregiver and others -- in short, mother blames everyone but herself for her predicament. Had she wished to develop and preserve a parental relationship, it was mother’s responsibility to take appropriate steps to act as a parent and to develop and nurture a physical and emotional bond with her child.
Mother points to efforts she made from July 2007 to December 2007 to regain custody of her child: (1) entering a residential drug treatment program in November 2007, two months before the final hearing in January 2008; (2) visiting the infant every other weekend; (3) holding and feeding the infant during visits; and (3) sometimes staying for dinner at the caregiver’s home.
Mother’s effort at rehabilitation was plainly too little, and too late. Her alleged contact with the minor rises no higher in status than that of a friend of the family. Twice monthly visitations over the course of six months do not constitute the type of “regular visitation and contact” with the minor envisioned by section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(B)(i). (See In re Autumn H., supra, 27 Cal.App.4th at p. 575.) Nor does an occasional feeding of a child during visitation suffice for taking a parental role in the child’s life. And, periodically dining with the child’s foster family is little more than the part taken by a friendly visitor. The discontinuation of a friendly relationship is insufficient to meet a parent’s burden of proving termination of rights will result in detriment to a child. (Id. at p. 576.)
In contrast, the foster parent had raised the child as an infant and toddler. The child and her foster parent had been together for a long period of time and had a strong and healthy bond. An adoptive homestudy of the foster parent had been approved. The court found the child would likely be adopted. Such considerations weigh heavily against any finding of extraordinary circumstances foreclosing adoption. (In re Jasmine D. (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 1339, 1352.)
In sum, the juvenile court did not err in terminating mother’s parental rights.
DISPOSITION
The order appealed from is affirmed.
We concur:, COOPER, P. J., RUBIN, J.