Opinion
06-23-00083-CV
03-15-2024
IN THE INTEREST OF E.B. AND M.B., CHILDREN
Date Submitted: February 12, 2024
On Appeal from the 336th District Court Fannin County, Texas Trial Court No. FA-22-46025
Before Stevens, C.J., van Cleef and Rambin, JJ.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Jeff Rambin Justice
A.B., mother of E.B. and M.B., has attempted to appeal a parental-rights termination order entered by the 336th Judicial District Court of Fannin County, Texas. The case is styled In the Interest of E.B. and M.B., Children, cause number FA-22-46025. The issue before this Court is whether we have jurisdiction to hear the appeal. We conclude that we do not and dismiss the appeal for want of jurisdiction.
We use initials for the children and their parents to protect the identity of the minors. See TEX. R. APP. P. 9.8.
Our jurisdiction is constitutional and statutory in nature. See Tex. Const. art. V, § 6; TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 22.220 (Supp.). The Texas Constitution vests jurisdiction over appeals from final judgments, subject to restrictions and regulations prescribed by law. See Vacca v. Glass, 148 S.W.3d 207, 208 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2004, pet. denied) (recognizing "[a]s a general rule, Texas appellate courts have jurisdiction only over final judgments").
We have "no jurisdiction to consider the merits of an appeal from a void judgment." Ins. Co. of State of Penn. v. Martinez, 18 S.W.3d 844, 847 (Tex. App.-El Paso 2000, no pet.). "A judgment is void only when it is clear that the court rendering judgment had no jurisdiction over the parties or subject matter . . . ." Id. In this case, A.B. is attempting to appeal a termination order entered by Fannin County. Fannin County, however, did not have jurisdiction to enter the final termination order. Thus, based upon the following reasoning, the termination order is void.
I. Tarrant County Has Continuing, Exclusive Jurisdiction
On January 13, 2022, a final order of possession, access, and child support obligations was entered as to E.B. and M.B. in the 360th Judicial District Court of Tarrant County (the Chapter 155 Court). By entering the final order, Tarrant County "acquire[d] continuing, exclusive jurisdiction" over E.B. and M.B.'s case. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 155.001(a) (Supp.). As the Chapter 155 Court, and absent an otherwise valid transfer, only Tarrant County had jurisdiction to enter final orders in E.B. and M.B.'s case. See In re D.W., 533 S.W.3d 460, 465 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2017, pet. denied).
By November 2, 2022, E.B. and M.B. had moved to Bonham, Texas, in Fannin County. Thereafter, on November 3, 2022, the Texas Department of Family and Protective Services filed a termination petition in Fannin County to terminate A.B.'s parental rights. Fannin County's jurisdiction was pursuant to Section 262.001 of the Texas Family Code, which allows "[a] governmental entity with an interest in the child" to "file a suit affecting the parent-child relationship." TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 262.001.
Despite the new proceeding under Section 262.001 in Fannin County, Tarrant County still remained the court of continuing, exclusive jurisdiction, and Fannin County was only permitted to enter emergency and temporary orders. See In re L.S., 557 S.W.3d 736, 739 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2018, no pet.) ("[A]s to emergency and temporary orders, the Chapter 262 court shares jurisdiction with the Chapter 155 court of continuing, exclusive jurisdiction . . . ." (quoting In re D.W., 533 S.W.3d at 465)). Fannin County was not permitted to enter "final orders." Id.
II. Fannin County's Attempt to Transfer the Case Was Invalid
Recognizing another court may have jurisdiction, on November 15, 2022, Fannin County (the Chapter 262 Court) attempted to transfer the case from Tarrant County to itself. In the transfer order, Fannin County improperly characterized itself as the "Court of Continuing Exclusive Jurisdiction." Fannin County also improperly characterized the transfer as being "pursuant to § 262.203(a)(1)." On both accounts, Fannin County was incorrect.
First, Section 262.203(a)(1) of the Texas Family Code provides for transfer of the suit from a court which renders temporary orders "to the court of continuing, exclusive jurisdiction." TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 262.203(a)(1) (emphasis added). Accordingly, Section 262.203(a)(1) could have been used to transfer this case from Fannin County to Tarrant County, but not the other way around.
Second, the trial court lacked the basis to use Section 262.203(a)(2) of the Texas Family Code. It is true that Section 262.203(a)(2) permits a "transfer of the suit from the court of continuing, exclusive jurisdiction [the Chapter 155 Court]," TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 262.203(a)(2), by a Chapter 262 Court to itself, but this is a "limited exception to the rule that the court of continuing, exclusive jurisdiction decides all transfer motions," In re D.W., 533 S.W.3d at 465 (emphasis added). If the children had lived in Fannin County six months or longer, then transfer by and from Tarrant County to Fannin County would have been mandatory under Section 155.201(b) of the Texas Family Code, and relatedly, Fannin County could have followed the procedure of the "limited exception" of Section 262.203(a)(2) to transfer the case to itself. In re D.W., 533 S.W.3d at 465-66. Here, though, the children had lived in Fannin County for less than six months.
See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 155.201(b) (Supp.).
Because this case was not properly transferred, Fannin County did not acquire jurisdiction over E.B. and M.B.'s case. See 29A Morgan & Gaither, Texas Practice, Juvenile Law & Practice § 73:4 (3d ed. 2022) ("Any attempted transfer to another district court for a reason not authorized by sections 103.002, 155.201 to 155.207 of the Family Code, is void; thus, the court to which the cause is transferred is without jurisdiction."); see also Alexander v. Russell, 699 S.W.2d 209 (Tex. 1985) (per curiam) (invaliding a purported transfer that was improper).
This is not a situation where E.B. and M.B. had resided in Fannin County for six months when the transfer order was entered. See In re D.W., 533 S.W.3d at 467. Based upon the record before us, E.B. and M.B. began living in Fannin County in November 2022. The transfer order was also entered in November 2022.
III. The Termination Order Is Void
As we have previously held, "[T]he continuing, exclusive jurisdiction statutory scheme is 'truly jurisdictional'-that is, when one court has continuing and exclusive jurisdiction over a matter, any order or judgment issued by another court pertaining to the same matter is void." In re L.S., 557 S.W.3d at 740 (alteration in original) (quoting In re C.G., 495 S.W.3d 40, 44-45 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi-Edinburg 2016, pet. denied)). Because Fannin County did not have jurisdiction to enter the final judgment, it is void, and we do not have jurisdiction over a void judgment. See Martinez, 18 S.W.3d at 847 (recognizing an "appellate court has no jurisdiction to consider the merits of an appeal from a void judgment").
By letter dated February 12, 2024, A.B. and the parties were notified of this potential defect in our jurisdiction, and we afforded A.B. the opportunity to demonstrate proper grounds for our retention of the appeal. We also warned A.B. that a failure to respond "within ten days of the date of [said] letter" would give us "no choice but to dismiss this appeal for want of jurisdiction." A.B. did not respond to our letter.
In light of the foregoing, we vacate the trial court's termination order and dismiss the appeal for want of jurisdiction.