Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, No. CK59898, Randolph Hammock, Referee Presiding. (Pursuant to Cal. Const., art. VI, § 21.)
Merrill Lee Toole, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
James M. Owens, Assistant County Counsel and O. Raquel Ramirez, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Croskey, J.
This is an appeal in a dependency case (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 300 et seq.) in which April A., the mother of the minor child E.A. (Mother and E.A., respectively), challenges the trial court’s order reinstating a prior order that terminated parental rights as to E.A. The prior termination of parental rights was reversed by this court in an unpublished opinion (case B202585) because compliance with the notice provisions of the Indian Child Welfare Act (25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq., the ICWA) had not been achieved.
Unless otherwise indicated, all references herein to statutes are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
There is another minor in this case, O.A. She has been placed in a legal guardianship and the parents’ parental rights as to her have not been terminated.
The instant appeal is actually the third one filed by Mother. The reversal of the order terminating parental rights was pursuant to her second appeal. In the instant appeal, we granted her request to take judicial notice of the appellate records, briefs, and our opinions in those prior appeals.
In that prior opinion, we directed the juvenile court to “(1) order the Department [of Children and Family Services] to solicit information from the minors’ maternal uncle and grandfather regarding possible Indian heritage, and to comply with the ICWA notice provisions, and (2) thereafter make a new determination whether proper ICWA notice has been given and whether the ICWA applies to this case.” We further directed that if the juvenile court determined that proper ICWA notice was given and the ICWA does not apply to the case, then the court should reinstate its section 366.26 order terminating parental rights as to E.A. and proceed accordingly.
The remittitur in Mother’s second appeal issued on July 24, 2008. New ICWA notices were sent by the Department of Children and Family Services (the Department) to Indian tribes, the Secretary of the Department of the Interior, and the Bureau of Indian Affairs. At a hearing on November 10, 2008, the dependency court determined that the Department had made “reasonable [ICWA] inquiry.” The court stated it had reviewed “all the responses [to those inquiries],” and it found no reason to know that E.A. is an Indian child. Thus, finding that the ICWA does not apply to E.A., the court reinstated its prior order terminating parental rights with respect to her.
The ICWA notices sent by the Department included both E.A. and O.A. Because both children have the same biological mother and father, the dependency court’s finding that the ICWA does not apply to E.A. would be equally applicable to O.A.
In the instant appeal, Mother contends that because the juvenile court refused to permit her to be present at the November 10, 2008 hearing (she and the minors’ father are incarcerated but were represented by counsel in the trial court), she was not able to contest the authenticity of the ICWA notices. She also contends the court erred when it did not address the issue of her visitation with the minor E.A. Anticipating that the respondent in this appeal, the Department, would raise an issue regarding the validity of Mother’s notice of appeal from the November 10, 2008 order, Mother also contends that (a) the form “Notice of Intent to File Writ Petition” that she filed after the November 10 hearing should be liberally construed as a notice of appeal, and (b) the fact that she did not file such notice until March 5, 2009 should not make it untimely because the November 10, 2008 order was made by a referee and the trial court never notified her (Mother) of her statutory right to request a rehearing of that order by a dependency court judge.
Mother and the father were sentenced to prison for the crime of attempted murder in a freeway shooting. Father is not a party to this appeal.
We find that Mother’s Notice of Intent to File Writ Petition should be deemed a notice of appeal, and further find that because mandatory notice provisions regarding the November 10, 2008 findings and order were not complied with by the referee who heard this case, Mother’s notice of intent was timely filed. However, there is no merit in the ICWA and visitation issues that she raises. Therefore, we will affirm the order terminating parental rights as to the minor child E.A.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Some portions of the dependency court’s case file for this case were not included in the clerk’s transcript for this appeal. However, pursuant to the Department’s written request for judicial notice, which included copies of missing portions of the court’s file, we have taken judicial notice of those papers. The Department also requested that we take additional evidence, which the Department states was lodged in the juvenile court’s file. We also granted that request. The additional evidence includes a January 26, 2009 letter written by Mother to the Department social worker handling this case, and Mother’s petition for extraordinary writ together with its attachments.
Pursuant to an order made on July 22, 2008, a hearing was held on August 25, 2008 to address the ICWA issue, and a supplemental report from the Department was prepared for the hearing. The report states the children’s maternal uncle (O.A.’s legal guardian) indicated that his father (the minors’ maternal grandfather), had told him there are Choctaw Indians in their family but the uncle could not give the social worker any more information than that. The maternal grandfather had the same information for the social worker. The report states ICWA notices were sent to “the Indian tribes that mother claimed heritage to.” The social worker received responses from six tribes (the report lists them), and all six of those tribes indicated negative Indian connection with the minors. Responses were still due from one tribe, and from the Sacramento BIA, and the Interior Department.
The ICWA notices that were sent out include information on the maternal grandfather, on the minors’ aunt Heather C. in Texas, and on the aunt who, with her husband, is a legal guardian of O.A. At the August 25, 2008 hearing, Mother’s attorney indicated that Mother had “names and addresses of maternal relatives” concerning ICWA, and the attorney mentioned the wife of the same maternal uncle, and the same maternal aunt in Texas. The issue of Mother’s telephone visitation with minor O.A. was also addressed. The Department indicated that the court’s most recent order was that Mother was not to call O.A.’s legal guardians collect, and Mother should have one monitored telephone call each week, to be arranged by the Department. Mother’s attorney indicated Mother had not able to have those telephone visits. The court ordered that the visitation order would remain in effect and the Department should insure that it is complied with. The court set a hearing for November 10, 2008, for a progress report on the ICWA matter, and the Department’s attorney mentioned to the court that the issue of reinstating the order terminating parental rights could also be addressed at that November hearing. The court’s minute order indicates that the Department’s report for the November hearing should address compliance with ICWA, reinstatement of the order terminating parental rights, and the issue of Mother’s visits.
Thereafter, Mother’s attorney submitted a written request to the court for a walk on hearing to address Mother’s desire to be present at the November 10, 2008 hearing, and on October 14, 2008, the issue of Mother being brought to court or having a presence at the November hearing by telephone was discussed by the court and the attorneys for Mother, the Department and the children. Mother’s attorney indicated she had been “in good communication” with Mother and Mother has “maintained her position that she would like to be present at the hearings regarding her children,” and if the court were not inclined to permit Mother to be physically present, then Mother could be present by telephone. The attorney indicated that telephone presence was “something that we have done before.”
The court asked Mother’s attorney what Mother would add to the November hearing since the issue at that hearing would be ICWA, and “[i]t is a legal issue only.” The court asked for a “compelling reason” “that really requires her attendance here.” The court stated that it if found that ICWA notice was proper, it would reinstate the termination of parental rights, there would be no new evidence taken, nor any arguments, and “Mother will not be heard on the I.C.W.A. issues.” The court added that while it understood that Mother “would like to be informed,” Mother’s attorney “could certainly inform her of what took place.” Mother’s attorney responded that Mother is “extremely active in following with the case,” Mother talks with her appellate attorney, and Mother is “well aware of what is going on,” and is “very on top of this case,” and Mother “feels she should be here because it is regarding her children.” The attorney acknowledged that she (the attorney) could not give the court a legal basis for why Mother should attend the November 10 hearing. The children’s attorney indicated she did not believe there was any statutory authority for Mother to participate in the upcoming hearing and the Department’s attorney agreed.
The court ruled that because the legal issue of ICWA compliance would be addressed and there would not be a rehearing on the issue of termination of parental rights because our directive was to reinstate termination if the dependency court found that ICWA notice was proper, there was no cause for Mother to be present at the November 10, 2008 hearing. As for a telephone presence, the court explained that logistically it would use up resources of the court (time and effort) to have a telephone hearing in chambers and “assemble everybody back there,” and to arrange the phone call to Mother.
The Department’s report for the November 10, 2008 hearing states the Department received a negative ICWA report from the last Indian tribe, and no response had been received from the BIA and the Secretary of the Interior. The green cards for delivery of the ICWA notices to the BIA and the Secretary of the Interior showing the date of receipt and person who received the notices were included in the report, as well as the replies from the various tribes. The report also states that the social worker informed Mother that she can call the minor O.A. collect at the minor’s legal guardian’s home, the Department will pay for the call, and the guardians “have no problem” with such calls.
At the November 10, 2008 hearing, the trial court stated the ICWA notices “seem appropriate [and] the child does not seem to be an Indian child as defined.” The court found it had no reason to know that E.A. is an Indian child, and the court asked if anyone objected to that finding. The father’s attorney stated: “Yes. The father will object without any further comment or providing of a factual basis for his opinion.” Mother’s attorney stated: “On behalf of the mother, I know she provided different sources as to the I.C.W.A. issue. Given that those things have been addressed as to whatever information the Department was able to receive from Mother, I would just object for the record to termination of parental rights.” The court responded that it reviewed the responses from the various tribes, and examined the efforts made by the Department, and it found that the Department made a reasonable inquiry into the ICWA issues. The court also noted that no factual or legal basis for not finding that the ICWA was complied with was presented by the parents’ attorneys. On the basis of those ICWA findings, the court reinstated its prior order terminating parental rights as to minor E.A.
On March 5, 2009, Mother filed a judicial council court form Notice of Intent to File Writ Petition, wherein she stated her appeal of the November 10, 2008 order.
CONTENTIONS ON APPEAL
Mother contends she did not receive proper notice of the November 10, 2008 hearing and she should have been permitted to be present for it. She also asserts trial court error regarding visitation. The Department contends Mother failed to file a proper, timely notice of appeal.
DISCUSSION
1. Mother’s Notice of Intent to File Writ Petition Constitutes a Notice of Appeal
Mother’s Notice of Intent to File Writ Petition states she was not informed of the November 10, 2008 section 366.26 court order “until February 2009 through mail from Social Worker Erika Price. I have not been informed of several hearings. However I do want to appeal this decision.” The notice of intent is dated March 3, 2009 and signed by Mother. It was mailed from the institution in which Mother is incarcerated and sent to the superior court’s children’s court and file stamped there on March 5, 2009. Although Mother did not file a paper entitled “notice of appeal,” clearly she intended to challenge the dependency court’s November 10, 2008 order. California Rules of Court, rule 8.400 (c) (2), requires that we liberally construe the paper she did file, and further provides that the paper is sufficient if it identifies the judgment or order that is being appealed. Therefore, Mother’s notice of intent constitutes a notice of appeal.
All references herein to rules are to the California Rules of Court.
2. Mother’s Appeal Was Timely
After the remittitur issued on our opinion in Mother’s second appeal, the dependency court hearings in this case were conducted by a referee. Section 248 et seq. addresses duties, powers and orders made by a referee in a juvenile court. Section 248 provides in relevant part that after a juvenile court hearing held by a referee, the referee must promptly serve a minor’s parent and the parent’s attorney with a written copy of the referee’s findings and order, and also serve on the parent, when it serves the findings and order, a written explanation of the parent’s right to seek review of the order by a juvenile court judge. Service is by mail. Rule 5.538 (b) contains the same directive, but provides that a written explanation of the right to seek review of a referee’s order should also be served on the parent’s attorney. This review of the referee’s order may also occur on application of the minor, his or her guardian or adult relative, or the county welfare department. (§§ 248 & 252; rules 5.538 (b) & 5.542 (a).) Additionally, a judge of the juvenile court may, on his or her own motion, order a rehearing. (§ 253; rule 5.542(d).)
Some statutes and rules characterize the right to seek review of a referee’s order and findings as a right to seek rehearing.
Rule 5.538 pertains to proceedings before a referee who is not acting as a temporary judge. There is no indication in the record that the referee who held hearings in this case was acting as a temporary judge pursuant to stipulation of the parties under rules 5.536 (b) and 2.816.
Applications for review of the referee’s order must be made prior to the expiration of 10 days after the referee serves the written copy of his or her order and findings. (§ 252; rule 5.542 (a).) The application may be directed to all or to a specified part of the findings or order, and must contain a statement of the reasons for the requested rehearing. (Ibid.) After reading the reporter’s transcript of the proceedings that are the subject of the application, a judge may grant or deny rehearing, but if there is no reporter’s transcript, a rehearing is granted as a matter of right. (Ibid.) Rehearings are before a judge of the juvenile court and are conducted de novo. (§ 254; rule 5.542(e).)
Unless the presiding judge of the juvenile court establishes requirements that any or all orders of referees must be approved by a judge of the juvenile court before becoming effective, and except for referee orders removing minors from their home (which must be expressly approved by a judge of the juvenile court), orders of referees are effective immediately, and they continue in full force and effect until they are modified or vacated by order of a judge of the juvenile court pursuant to a rehearing. (§§ 251, 249, 250; rule 5.540 (a), (b).)
Rule 5.540 pertains to referees not acting as temporary judges.
Orders of a referee which become effective without approval of a judge of the juvenile court will become final “on the expiration of the time allowed by Section 252 for application for rehearing” so long as no application for rehearing is made within that time and no judge of the juvenile court has ordered a rehearing on his or her own motion. (§ 250; rule 5.540(c).) Similarly, section 395 provides that “[a] judgment or subsequent order entered by a referee shall become appealable whenever proceedings pursuant to Section 252, 253, or 254 have become completed or, if proceedings pursuant to Section 252, 253, or 254 are not initiated, when the time for initiating the proceedings has expired.”
Section 253 provides that a judge may order rehearing on his or her own motion “made within 20 judicial days of the hearing before a referee.”
The orders of a referee sitting as a temporary judge become final in the same manner as those made by a judge. (§ 250.)
We set out these code sections and rules to facilitate an answer to the question whether Mother’s appeal from the November 10, 2008 order was timely. But there are additional rules that must be considered. Rule 5.585 (f) states that a “[n]otice of appeal must be filed within 60 days after the making of an appealable order or, if the matter was heard by a referee who was not sitting as a temporary judge, within 60 days after the order becomes final under rule 5.540 (c).” (Accord rule 8.400 (d) (2).)
“When an application for rehearing of an order of a referee not acting as a temporary judge is denied under rule 5.542, a notice of appeal from the referee’s order must be filed within 60 days after that order is served under rule 5.538 (b) (3) or 30 days after entry of the order denying rehearing, whichever is later.” (Rule 8.400 (d) (3).)
To recap, when a referee who is not sitting as a temporary judge makes an order, an appeal from that order must be made within 60 days after the referee’s order becomes final and appealable, and it will become final and appealable on the expiration of the time allowed by section 252 for filing an application for rehearing (10 days after service of a written copy of the referee’s order and findings) if no application for rehearing is made within that time and if a judge of the juvenile court has not ordered a rehearing on his or her own motion. These rules do not provide for the situation we find in this case-where a parent and her attorney have not been served with a copy of the referee’s order and findings. Instead, the rules assume that such service has been made.
Nor do the rules provide for the situation where there has been no service of a written explanation of the right to seek a rehearing. However, it has been held that “the failure to give express written notice of the statutory right to a rehearing in a civil juvenile dependency proceeding may be waived when a party who is represented by counsel fails to request such a rehearing.” (In re Brittany K. (2002) 96 Cal.App.4th 805, 816, italics omitted.)
Here, nothing in the clerk’s transcript indicates that the findings and order required to be served by the referee on Mother and her attorney were actually served on them. Moreover, the additional evidence that we received at the Department’s request contains (1) a copy of a December 4, 2008 letter and a copy of a January 26, 2009 letter, both sent by Mother to the Department social worker, wherein Mother asked both times for the court’s minute order from the November 10, 2008 hearing, and (2) the writ petition that Mother submitted (after she filed her Notice of Intent to File Writ Petition), wherein Mother stated that it was in the first week of February that she received notification of the reinstatement of order terminating her parental rights. It is reasonable to infer that she would not twice ask the social worker for the minute order of the November 2008 hearing if that minute order and the explanation of her right to apply for a rehearing on such order had already been sent to her by the referee. Further, we observe that in Mother’s Notice of Intent to File Writ Petition, filed on March 5, 2009, she stated she was “not notified of this action until February 2009 through mail from social worker Erika Price.”
In seeking to determine when Mother’s notice of appeal had to be filed, we could use the statutes and rules that govern appeals of orders of referees, and apply them to the social worker’s mailing of notice to Mother in the first week of February 2009 of the action taken by the referee on November 10, 2008. In doing so, we would find that sending Mother such notice triggered her right to make an application for a rehearing. We could then further find that the referee’s November 10, 2008 order became final and appealable on the 11th day after the social worker mailed such notice to Mother because Mother did not apply for a rehearing. Rounding things out, we could find that thereafter, Mother had 60 days to file her notice of appeal, which she did on March 5, 2009. That would make Mother’s appeal timely.
Alternatively, we could simply hold that because there is no proof that the November 10, 2008 order and findings of the referee were actually sent to Mother, the running of the time for filing her appeal never commenced. That is the position taken by Mother in this appeal. Unlike appeals from orders and judgments in other types of civil cases, which are governed by rule 8.104, the juvenile court rules have no outside time limit for filing a notice of appeal in those situations when a copy of the minute order or judgment is not served on the appellant. In any event, we find that Mother’s appeal is timely. It was filed within a month of when she states she received notice of the court’s November 10, 2008 order reinstating termination of parental rights. A month is less time than that provided by the rules of court.
For its part, the Department studiously ignores all of the statutes and rules of court respecting orders issued by referees, finality of such orders, and time parameters for filing appeal from the orders, except to say that “[a]dmittedly, there is no evidence in the record that the juvenile court clerk mailed mother a copy of the court’s written findings and orders after the November 2008 hearing.” None of the statutes and rules which we set out above is mentioned in the Department’s brief. In “analyzing” the question whether Mother’s notice of appeal was timely, the Department simply asserts that because Mother’s January 26, 2009 letter to the social worker letter indicates Mother was aware that there had been a hearing on November 10, 2008, Mother’s notice of appeal “should have been filed much sooner than March 5, 2009, because mother was clearly aware of the November 2008 hearing at the end of January 2009.” The analysis implicitly concedes that the rules regarding when appeals from orders made by referees not sitting as temporary judgment should be filed do not fit this case.
3. Mother’s Notice of Hearing Argument Has No Merit
Mother asserts that she and her attorney were not provided with written notice of the November 10, 2008 hearing, and therefore, as far as they knew, that hearing was only a “special interim” hearing at which the sole issue would be compliance with ICWA notice requirements. We reject Mother’s position. To begin with, lack of notice was not raised as an issue by Mother’s attorney at the November hearing. Therefore, the notice issue was forfeited. (In re S.B. (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1287, 1293.)
Further, Mother’s position ignores the facts of the case. The record shows that at the August 25, 2008 hearing, whereat the court set the November 10, 2008 hearing, the Department’s attorney indicated that both ICWA compliance and reinstatement of the order terminating parental rights could be addressed at the November hearing, and the August 25 minute order confirms the fact that both matters would be taken up. Mother’s attorney was present at the August hearing. Moreover, at the October 14, 2008 hearing at which Mother’s attorney sought to secure Mother’s presence at the November 10, 2008 hearing, the court stated that if, at the November hearing, it found ICWA notice proper, then it would reinstate its prior order terminating parental rights. Thus, Mother’s attorney was informed at two hearings that both IWCA and reinstatement of the termination of parental rights order were to be considered at the November hearing. Further, at that same October hearing, Mother’s attorney repeatedly stated that Mother is aware of what goes on in her case.
4. Mother’s Presence Was Not Required at the November 2008 Hearing
Mother complains she was not permitted to participate at the November 2008 hearing and therefore the court did not have her input there. We disagree. Mother participated by and through her attorney. The judicially noticed evidence submitted by the Department in this appeal shows that in early July 2008 the social worker mailed to Mother a copy of the ICWA notice that was sent to seven tribes, the Secretary of the Interior, and the BIA. At the August 25, 2008 hearing, Mother’s attorney indicated there were two persons whom Mother believed could have ICWA notice information and the attorney stated their names and stated she would pass the information to the Department. As it happens, the two persons were already noted in the ICWA notices that were sent out the prior month. The appellate record shows that Mother’s attorney represented to the court at the October 2007 hearing that Mother was on top of this case and that the attorney was in “good communication” with Mother. The judicially noticed evidence contains Mother’s statement that she sent several letters to her attorney and to her attorney’s supervisor regarding what Mother believed to be an “incorrect spelling to properly check for Indian Heritage.” The record further shows that Mother’s attorney participated in the November 2008 hearing, found no fault with the Department’s current ICWA notification, and simply objected to termination of Mother’s parental rights. Clearly Mother was provided with participation in the case after we filed our opinion in May 2008.
In In re Justin S. (2007) 150 Cal.App.4th 1426, upon which Mother relies, the reviewing court, in an initial appeal, reversed an order terminating parental rights and remanded for the purpose of compliance with ICWA notice requirements. The mother was not given notice of the subsequent hearings in the trial court and the dependency court did not appoint counsel for her. After the dependency court again found compliance with ICWA and terminated her parental rights, the mother appealed and the reviewing court held she should have been given notice and representation by counsel in the renewed ICWA hearings. (Id. at pp. 1429, 1435-1437.) The facts of Justin S. are far different from those in the instant case. Here, an attorney was appointed for Mother at the July 22, 2008 hearing, two days before our remittitur issued, and that attorney continued to represent Mother through at least the November 2008 hearing. Mother’s attorney had notice of the hearings, including notice that ICWA compliance and reinstatement of the termination of parental rights would be addressed at the November 10, 2008 hearing, and the attorney represented to the court that Mother was on top of the case.
Nor is the instant case similar to In re Glorianna K. (2005) 125 Cal.App.4th 1443, another case cited by Mother. There, the reviewing court declined a request by the Department to take certain evidence into consideration in reviewing a parent’s appeal on the issue whether there was compliance with ICWA notice requirements. The evidence had been presented to the dependency court several months after that court made a finding that the Department complied with ICWA notice provisions. The Court of Appeal observed that not only was the evidence not authenticated, but neither the parent nor her attorney were present at the hearings at which the evidence was presented to the trial court and thus they were not able to object to the trial court’s admission of the evidence.
Additionally, we find no cause for reversal in Mother’s assertion to her attorney that the ICWA notice did not contain proper spellings of family names. This was something Mother’s attorney could have raised at the November hearing had she believed it necessary. In In re S.B. (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 808, 813, where the court considered a third appeal challenging ICWA notice, the court stated that attorneys who represent parents in a dependency case have a responsibility to raise prompt objections to ICWA notice deficiencies so that they “can be corrected in a timely fashion.” In In re Amber F. (2007) 150 Cal.App.4th 1152, 1155-1156, the court observed that even though generally a parent may be permitted to raise an ICWA notice defect on appeal that he or she did not raise in the trial court, once an initial ICWA challenge has been successful on appeal and a case has been remanded for proper ICWA notice, then the interest of Indian tribes in receiving proper notice must be balanced against the minor’s interest in permanency and stability, and permitting a parent to raise ICWA notice issues in a second appeal when the issues could have been addressed in the trial court “opens the door to gamesmanship” by the parent. Accord In re X.V. (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 794, 804-805, where the court stated that “[a]s a matter of respect for the children involved and the judicial system, as well as common sense, it is incumbent on parents on remand to assist the Agency in ensuring proper [ICWA] notice is given.” The In re X.V. court observed that the claimed inadequacies in the ICWA notices in that case were “a misspelling and the apparent use of a nickname,” and they could have been rectified had the juvenile court been given a timely objection.
5. There Was No Trial Court Error Regarding Visitation
One of the matters raised by Mother in her second appeal was that the trial court made orders respecting visitation with O.A. (by telephone and letters) but did not include E.A. in those orders. We stated in our opinion that visitation between Mother and E.A. was “something Mother can address upon remand of this case to the trial court.” Contrary to Mother’s assertion in this appeal, we did not include visitation in the directions that we made to the trial court in our disposition. Our directions concerned only ICWA notice and the possibility of reinstating the dependency court’s order terminating parental rights as to E.A.
Further, Mother was not deprived of an opportunity to address visitation on remand of the case. She was provided with an attorney to pursue the matter for her. Indeed, the record reflects that at the August 25, 2008 hearing, Mother’s attorney raised the issue of visitation, but with respect to O.A., not E.A., and the trial court stated that its prior order regarding telephone visits between Mother and O.A. would remain in effect and the Department should facilitate those telephone visits between Mother and O.A. The trial court cannot be faulted for following Mother’s attorney’s lead with respect to which child had visitation issues. Moreover, at the November hearing, the court asked Mother’s counsel if she “wish[ed] to be heard on something else,” and the only topic raised by the attorney was Mother’s wish to be present at an upcoming March 2009 hearing.
DISPOSITION
The order from which Mother has appealed is affirmed.
We Concur: Klein, P. J., Aldrich, J.