Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Humboldt County Super. Ct. No. JV070077
SIMONS, Acting P.J.
Pursuant to rule 8.452 of the California Rules of Court, petitioner Delano W. (father) seeks a writ of mandate directing the juvenile court to vacate its orders denying his request for reinstatement of reunification services with his daughter, D.W. (minor), and setting a permanency planning hearing under Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26. We deny the petition.
All undesignated section references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
This background summary substantially borrows from our decision regarding a prior petition in the same case, Delano W. v. Superior Court (Dec. 10, 2010, A126339) (Delano I).
Minor was born in February 2005. In April 2007, minor was placed in protective custody by the Eureka Police Department; her mother’s whereabouts were unknown. The Humboldt County Department of Health and Human Services (Department) filed a petition alleging minor was subject to the jurisdiction of the juvenile court under section 300. In relation to father, the petition alleged jurisdiction over minor under section 300, subdivision (g), no provision for support. Father was incarcerated and unable to arrange for minor’s care and his ability to parent her was unknown. Father has a long criminal history which includes convictions for drug possession and sale, burglary, infliction of corporal injury on a cohabitant, and battery with serious bodily injury. The juvenile court sustained the section 300 petition in June 2007.
Mother has not challenged the juvenile court’s orders. Half-siblings of minor were involved in the dependency proceedings below, but the present petition only relates to minor.
The Department’s May 2009 six-month report indicated that father was living in Las Vegas, Nevada. The juvenile court found father had not complied with his case plan and had made minimal progress toward alleviating the causes necessitating placement outside the home.
The 12-month review hearing took place in September 2009. Despite the Department’s recommendation to continue services to father, the juvenile court terminated reunification services to mother and father and scheduled a hearing under section 366.26. Subsequently, father filed a petition for a writ of mandate directing the juvenile court to vacate its orders terminating reunification services and setting a section 366.26 hearing. In December 2009, this court denied the petition in Delano I, supra, A126339.
On remand, the case did not proceed to a section 366.26 hearing. Instead, the Department submitted a section 366.26 hearing report reflecting the social worker’s understanding that the minor’s current foster parents were not interested in adoption. The hearing was continued to allow the Department time to explore permanency options for the minor.
In March 2010, father filed a section 388 petition seeking reinstatement of reunification services. The Department’s response indicated that father had moved to West Virginia and recommended that the court initiate the Interstate Compact on the Placement of Children (ICPC; Fam. Code, § 7900 et seq.) process with West Virginia in order to obtain information regarding father’s living conditions and progress in counseling. At an April 20 hearing, petitioner’s counsel indicated her agreement that the section 388 petition should be continued pending the results of the ICPC process. On April 26, the juvenile court set the case for review hearings in June and September.
Section 388, subdivision (a) provides in pertinent part: “Any parent or other person having an interest in a child who is a dependent child of the juvenile court... may, upon grounds of change of circumstance or new evidence, petition the court in the same action in which the child was found to be a dependent child of the juvenile court... for a hearing to change, modify, or set aside any order of court previously made or to terminate the jurisdiction of the court....”
In a June 2010 addendum report, the Department stated that the minor continued to “thrive” in her foster home and reported that the minor’s sister had made a written statement asserting that father had raped her and the minor’s brothers.
In September 2010, in a caregiver information form, the minor’s foster parents stated, “Being [the minor’s] foster family... we have bonded and grown together. We love each other very much, and we are involved with her blood relatives with openness, to the best of our ability. We recommend [the minor] be adopted by us if her [f]ather is unable to have her.” A September 2010 CASA report strongly recommended that the minor remain with her current foster family, which “loves her very much and has provided a supportive, safe and stable home and is willing to take care of her permanently if her biological family cannot.”
In an October 2010 addendum report, the Department presented to the juvenile court the ICPC placement evaluation prepared by the West Virginia Department of Health and Human Services. The evaluation recommended against placing the minor with father in light of his extensive criminal history, the allegations of sexual abuse, and father’s unstable home and employment situation. The evaluation also noted that, although father maintained good phone contact with the minor, he had not seen her for two years. For largely the same reasons, the Department social worker concluded it was not in the minor’s best interests to pursue placement with father.
On December 21, 2010, the Department filed a section 388 petition requesting that the court set a section 366.26 hearing. The Department’s report in support of the petition indicated that the minor had formed a close bond with her foster parents, who were now taking active steps toward adoption. Father opposed the petition.
On February 22, 2011, father filed another section 388 petition seeking reinstatement of reunification services. Father submitted a letter from a West Virginia therapist, indicating he was in therapy for his anger issues and had completed the “formal part” of the treatment program. The Department opposed the petition.
On March 7, 2011, the juvenile court denied father’s section 388 petition, granted the Department’s petition, and set a section 366.26 hearing for July 5. Father’s petition for writ of mandate followed.
DISCUSSION
Father contends the juvenile court erred in denying his section 388 petition for reinstatement of reunification services. However, father fails to indicate what change in circumstances justified grant of the section 388 petition, and he fails to specify any extraordinary circumstances that would have justified reinstatement of reunification services at such a late stage in the proceedings. (Cf. In re Elizabeth R. (1995) 35 Cal.App.4th 1774, 1799 [concluding “unusual” facts may justify the continuance of services past 18-month review hearing]; In re Dino E. (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 1768, 1778-1779 [remanding for consideration of continuance of services where reasonable services were not previously provided].) In the present case, father already received reasonable reunification services, as this court concluded in Delano I, supra, A126339. Moreover, for the same reasons given by the Department and ICPC evaluation in recommending against placement of the minor with father, the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in denying father’s section 388 petition. (In re B.C. (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 129, 141.)
Father also contends the juvenile court erred in granting the Department’s section 388 petition and setting a section 366.26 hearing. Father’s principal argument is that the juvenile court erred in seeking and relying on the West Virginia ICPC evaluation. However, father agreed below that it was appropriate to obtain an ICPC evaluation. In In re C.B. (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 1024 (In re C.B.), the court held that the ICPC “does not apply to an out-of-state placement with a parent.” (Id. at p. 1026.) Although the decision in In re C.B. indicates the juvenile court in this case was not required to obtain an ICPC evaluation, nothing in that decision suggests it is reversible error for a court to obtain and give weight to an ICPC evaluation based on the agreement of the parties. Here, father fails to provide any reasoned argument or citations to authority supporting his claim of reversible error.
Father also appears to argue there was no substantial evidence supporting the Department’s recommendation to set a section 366.26 hearing. But, following the failure of father to reunify with the minor, it was proper for the juvenile court to set a section 366.26 hearing for the selection and implementation of a permanent plan. (Sara M. v. Superior Court (2005) 36 Cal.4th 998, 1008-1009.) In any event, the unfavorable results of the ICPC evaluation and the lack of any evidence showing a likelihood that minor could be placed with father in the near future provide substantial evidence for the juvenile court’s decision to set a section 366.26 hearing. (Edgar O. v. Superior Court (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 13, 15.)
DISPOSITION
The juvenile court’s orders are affirmed. Because the section 366.26 hearing is set for July 5, 2011, our decision is immediately final as to this court (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.490(b)(3)), and the request for a stay of that hearing is denied.
We concur. NEEDHAM, J., BRUINIERS, J.