Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
San Francisco County Super. Ct. No. JW066179
Pollak, J.
Sixteen-year-old D.S. appeals from the juvenile court’s disposition order of May 22, 2007, committing him to the probation department for permanent placement out of his mother’s and grandmother’s home. The trial court’s order is supported by substantial evidence and we shall affirm.
Background
D.S. became a dependent child under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300 in September 1997. His mother has been addicted to crack cocaine since she was 19 years old. On November 21, 2005, a juvenile wardship petition under section 602 was filed in Santa Cruz county, alleging that D.S. had committed misdemeanor battery (Pen. Code, § 242). On March 8, 2006, a bench warrant was issued against D.S. for failing to appear on this charge and that petition ultimately was sustained on June 13, 2006. Before that, however, a second petition was filed in San Francisco Superior Court on March 7, 2006, alleging that D.S. had committed grand theft (Pen. Code, § 487, subd. (a)). On March 27, an additional petition was filed alleging that D.S. had acted as an accessory after the fact to a crime (Pen. Code, § 32). On May 4, 2006, D.S. admitted the grand theft charge and it was sustained.
Further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code section unless otherwise noted.
A report was prepared by the San Francisco Probation Department in San Francisco for a detention hearing on March 28, 2006. The report recommended that the court detain D.S., noting that he had participated in a robbery and that D.S. was also in the dependency system, the dependency court having issued a warrant for his detention as had the court in Santa Cruz. The report also stated that D.S. had been arrested on July 15, 2005, for “possession of air soft gun [sic],” and that he had run away from a group home on February 9, 2006.
The copy of the report in the clerk’s transcript does not bear a file stamp.
At the March 28 hearing, the juvenile court ordered a report prepared pursuant to section 241.1 to determine whether D.S. should remain in the dependency system or be made a ward of the court under the delinquency system. That report was filed on April 10, 2006. It states that D.S. was 15 years of age at the time, and that he “became a 300 dependent at six years old. The minor was removed from his mother due to her substance abuse. The minor has been in seven placements in the last eight years. . . . He AWOL’d from [his last] placement in February and was AWOL until he was picked up on the current charges.” The report “recommended that the minor remain a 300 dependent and be placed on informal probation.”
Section 241.1 provides in relevant part: “(a) Whenever a minor appears to come within the description of both Section 300 and Section 601 or 602, the county probation department and the child welfare services department shall, pursuant to a jointly developed written protocol described in subdivision (b), initially determine which status will serve the best interests of the minor and the protection of society. The recommendations of both departments shall be presented to the juvenile court with the petition that is filed on behalf of the minor, and the court shall determine which status is appropriate for the minor. . . . [¶] (b) The probation department and the child welfare services department in each county shall jointly develop a written protocol to ensure appropriate local coordination in the assessment of a minor described in subdivision (a), and the development of recommendations by these departments for consideration by the juvenile court. These protocols shall require, which requirements shall not be limited to, consideration of the nature of the referral, the age of the minor, the prior record of the minor’s parents for child abuse, the prior record of the minor for out-of-control or delinquent behavior, the parents’ cooperation with the minor’s school, the minor’s functioning at school, the nature of the minor’s home environment, and the records of other agencies that have been involved with the minor and his or her family. The protocols also shall contain provisions for resolution of disagreements between the probation and child welfare services departments regarding the need for dependency or ward status and provisions for determining the circumstances under which a new petition should be filed to change the minor’s status.”
On May 4, 2006, another report was filed by D.S.’s probation officer. It stated that D.S. had been in detention since March 26, and that he had “received three write-ups while in custody. One write up was for threatening another detainee. The attempts to counsel the minor by staff were unsuccessful. He received two other write-ups for being disruptive in the unit.” It stated that D.S. had three siblings, two of whom were also in the dependency system. “There have been 18 CPS referrals on the family. The mother’s case was referred . . . for voluntary services on 10/11/96. Mother agreed to enter drug treatment and to obtain immunizations for D.S. She failed to follow through with either of these things and because she was not amenable to services the case was closed on 1/17/97.” The report concluded, “With this being the minor’s first official contact, DHS and Probation believed it would be in the best interest of the minor to remain a 300 dependent on 725(a) probation status. The minor has had some issues with each placement, but with some guidance he may be able to get back on track. [¶] One major concern with the minor is his possible substance abuse. Based on the minor’s family history of drug addiction, and his admittance to occasional use, the minor will probably benefit from a drug-counseling program if not a placement. The minor will continue receiving counseling and support services through DHS.”
The third “was raised by her paternal grandparents.”
Section 725, subdivision (a) provides in part, “If the court has found that the minor is a person described by Section 601 or 602, by reason of the commission of an offense . . . it may, without adjudging the minor a ward of the court, place the minor on probation, under the supervision of the probation officer, for a period not to exceed six months.”
On May 4, 2006, D.S. admitted the accessory allegation, the court found that a factual basis existed for the grand theft allegation, and the court placed him on probation under section 725, subdivision (a). On June 6, 2006, the juvenile court again placed D.S. on informal probation under section 725, subdivision (a), although he was still a dependent under section 300.
A psychological evaluation filed on June 7, 2006, stated that D.S. was placed with his maternal grandmother in September 1997, “after his mother went back to jail. [D.S.] remained living with his grandmother until June of last year, when apparently the older woman was no longer able to manage his behavior. There followed four separate private placements out of the home, none of which lasted more than two months. On each occasion, [D.S.] was reportedly removed from these placements ‘due to out of control behavior.’ . . . [¶] . . . Having failed four placements within a period of seven months, [D.S.] no longer presents himself as an ideal group home prospect. Unfortunately, none of his relatives have stepped forward to request custody of the minor; indeed, no relatives have visited [D.S.] since he was arrested two months ago.” The report stated that “[h]is maternal grandmother let it be known that she would no longer maintain contact with her grandson, given his felonious ways, while the minor’s mother has ‘flaked out since [D.S.]’s arrest and does not keep her promises.’ In fact, [Probation] Officer Speech stated that the minor’s mother does not even return her phone calls. Nevertheless, [D.S.] seems to take his mother at her word, and thus remains hopeful of reunification with someone upon whom Officer Speech believes he cannot rely.”
A representative of the Department of Human Services who had worked with D.S. for “six or seven years” stated that D.S.’s mother “simply did not follow through with promises to regain custody of D.S., or even visit him. In fact, both [the DHS representative] and [D.S.]’s grandmother suspect that the mother may be using drugs again, especially as she lost custody of her two youngest children within the last year. . . . [¶] As for [D.S.]’s father, [the DHS representative] said that [he] has never even made any inquiries about the boy during the years that he has had the minor’s case. He doubts that the father represents a placement option at this time.”
The evaluation “revealed [D.S.] to be tolerably intact on a bedrock psychological level. Said differently, there were no indications of psychosis or affective instability. Nevertheless, [D.S.] emerged from this interview as a lost and lonely boy who was hanging on by just a thread to the hope of family reunification. In my opinion, the next year or two will be crucial for saving this young man, even though his options appear to be quite limited at this time.” The evaluation described D.S. as having “been abandoned by the members of his family. His father has never been much involved in his life; his mother was out of the picture for many years, and may be using drugs again; and it would appear that his grandmother has washed her hands of him. None of these individuals has even come to visit [D.S.] since he was arrested two months ago.”
The psychologist recommended that D.S. be placed in “a small, highly structured residential program which can provide him individual attention and maintain control over his movements,” though he acknowledged that he was “ignorant of all the placement options currently available to the court, and I do not want to recommend something which may not exist.”
On August 29, 2006, D.S. failed to appear for a disposition hearing and the court issued a bench warrant. On October 13, he appeared in custody on the warrant. An updated status report filed on December 18 stated, “Since the minor’s last court appearance, there has been some improvement. He is going to school daily and following the rules of the group home . . .” The probation officer recommended continuing D.S. as a dependent. On December 19, the court ordered D.S. be continued on probation pursuant to section 725, subdivision (a).
On January 31, 2007, a report was filed informing the court that since the hearing on December 19, D.S. “has AWOL’d from his DHS placement . . . A DHS arrest warrant has been issued and the minor’s whereabouts are unknown.” The report recommends that if D.S. does not appear, a bench warrant be issued and that if he does appear, he “be remanded into custody and [h]is 725(a) W&I status be revoked.” The court issued a bench warrant.
On February 6, 2007, the court recalled the bench warrant, set a hearing on revocation of probation status under section 725, and ordered that a report under section 241.1 be prepared. On February 7, the court ordered D.S. remanded to custody and ordered “725a status revoked nunc pro tunc as of yesterday.”
A report filed on February 14 noted that “minor is currently pending a possible revocation of his 725(a) status. The minor AWOL’d from his DHS placement at the San Francisco General Hospital shelter on 1/29/07 and was picked up by SFPD on 2/2/07 on a Bench Warrant issued by the Juvenile Court for failure to appear in court on 1/31/07. The minor was picked up with a group of male Juveniles, in which one of the boys was in possession of a firearm.” The report recommended that D.S. be made a ward of the court. A report filed the next day reiterates the recommendation to declare D.S. a ward of the court, noting, “The minor is in great need of a highly supervised facility . . . which DHS can’t provide. The minor has not taken his 725(a) status serious[ly] and has demonstrated that a 602 status is necessary at this time.” On February 20, the juvenile court entered an order again revoking probation under section 725, subdivision (a), and continued the matter for disposition.
The report filed in advance of the disposition hearing again recommended that D.S. be made a ward of the court under section 602. “The minor has not taken his 725(a) status seriously and has demonstrated that a 602 status is necessary . . . . [¶] At this time, the minor has failed to comply with his 725(a) status court orders. He has failed to comply with DHS and remain at his placement. In addition, he has managed to get involved with other juveniles that are involved in criminal behavior. He managed to have three contacts with the police within a five-day period during the month of January of this year.”
On March 1, 2007, the probation department filed a case plan for D.S. The case plan is on a preprinted form which contains blank spaces for information about the individual child to be inserted. Most of the spaces provided for required information were left blank. On March 8, a contested disposition hearing was held. The court declared D.S. a ward of the court, found that his welfare required that he be taken from his parents “as a return of the minor to the home would be contrary to his welfare,” and recommended that he be placed in Walden House Behavior Modification Program. The court also found that no progress to “alleviate or mitigate the causes necessitating placement” had been made by D.S., his mother or his father. The court specified August 23, 2008 as the date by which permanent placement should be accomplished.
D.S. was placed at Walden House on March 15. On April 4 he left that placement without permission.
A new petition was filed on April 19, 2007, alleging that D.S. had received stolen property (Pen. Code, § 496), resisted arrest (Pen. Code, § 148, subd. (a)(1), falsely represented himself (Pen. Code, § 148.9, subd. (a)), and had possessed a burglary tool (Pen. Code, § 466.) The last two counts were subsequently dismissed.
On May 22, 2007, the court found the first two counts to be true and that both were misdemeanors. The court again declared D.S. a ward of the court and found that “[t]he welfare of the minor requires that his custody be taken from his mom, grandmother as a return of the minor to the home of the grandmother or mom would be contrary to his welfare. The minor is committed to the chief probation officer for out-of-home placement. . . . The probation department has complied with the case plan by making reasonable efforts to return the minor to a safe home and to complete whatever steps are necessary to finalize the permanent placement of the minor.”
Subsequent to the orders relevant to this appeal, on June 28, the juvenile court was informed that “[D.S.] was placed at Tripog yesterday.” The court stated, “The court has read and considered the probation officer’s report filed on June 26, 2007. The court finds that the probation department has taken appropriate steps to place the minor. The delay is reasonable and has not created undue hardship for the minor.”
An amended notice of appeal filed on July 10, 2007, challenges the disposition order of May 22, 2007.
The amended notice of appeal challenges orders made on June 6, 2006, July 21, 2006, August 15, 2006, August 29, 2006, October 13, 2006, December 19, 2006, February 6, 2007, February 7, 2007, February 20, 2007, February 23, 2007, February 28, 2007, and March 8, 2007. D.S.’s brief, however, focuses exclusively on the May 22 disposition order.
Discussion
D.S. argues that the disposition order of May 22, 2007 must be reversed for two reasons. First, he argues that the case plan filed in advance of the hearing was inadequate and, therefore, that the out-of-home placement order was not supported by substantial evidence that the probation department made reasonable efforts to avoid removal from his family home. Second, he argues that the juvenile court erred by failing to appoint a responsible adult to make educational decisions for him. We review the juvenile court’s disposition orders for abuse of discretion. (In re Lorenza M. (1989) 212 Cal.App.3d 49, 53.) “An appellate court will not lightly substitute its decision for that rendered by the juvenile court. We must indulge all reasonable inferences to support the decision of the juvenile court and will not disturb its findings when there is substantial evidence to support them. [Citations.] In determining whether there was substantial evidence to support the commitment, we must examine the record presented at the disposition hearing in light of the purposes of the Juvenile Court Law.” (Ibid.)
Case plan
Before a dispositional order is made for a minor determined to be a ward of the juvenile court, the probation department must prepare and the juvenile court must consider a case plan containing details of the minor’s history and needs. “[R]elevant policies of juvenile court law require that the court consider ‘the broadest range of information’ in determining how best to rehabilitate a minor and afford him adequate care.” (In re Robert H. (2002) 96 Cal.App.4th 1317, 1329.) Section 280 requires the probation officer “to prepare for every hearing on the disposition of a case . . . a social study of the minor, containing such matters as may be relevant to a proper disposition of the case. The social study shall include a recommendation for the disposition of the case.” Section 702, which provides for a dispositional order where the court has found that “the minor is a person described by Section 300, 601, or 602,” requires the juvenile court “to hear evidence on the question of the proper disposition to be made of the minor. Prior to doing so, it may continue the hearing, if necessary, to receive the social study of the probation officer.” Section 706 provides the court “shall receive in evidence the social study of the minor made by the probation officer and any other relevant and material evidence that may be offered, including any written or oral statement offered by the victim . . . . In any judgment and order of disposition, the court shall state that the social study made by the probation officer has been read and that the social study and any statement has been considered by the court.”
California Rules of Court, rule 5.785 likewise provides that “[t]he probation officer must prepare a social study of the child, which must contain all matters relevant to disposition, including any parole status information, and a recommendation for disposition . . . [¶] . . . [¶] The court must receive in evidence and consider the social study and any relevant evidence offered by the petitioner, the child, or the parent or guardian. The court may require production of other relevant evidence on its own motion. In the order of disposition the court must state that the social study has been read and considered by the court.”
Section 706.5, subdivision (c) provides in part that “[a]t each status review hearing, the social study shall include, but not be limited to, an updated case plan as described in Section 706.6 and the following information: [¶] (1) The continuing necessity for and appropriateness of the placement. [¶] (2) The extent of the probation department’s compliance with the case plan in making reasonable efforts to safely return the minor to the minor’s home or to complete whatever steps are necessary to finalize the permanent placement of the minor.” California Rules of Court, rule 5.785 (c)(5) states, “When a child is detained and is at risk of entering foster care placement, the probation officer must prepare a case plan. [¶] . . . [¶] If the probation officer believes that foster care placement is the most appropriate disposition for the child, the case plan must include all of the information required by section 706.6.”
Section 706.6 provides a detailed list of the information that the case plan must provide, including as relevant here, by subdivision, (b) an assessment of minor’s and family’s strengths and needs, and best type of placement; (c) the type of home or institution in which he is to be placed; (d) specific time-limited goals and related activities to enable safe return home, or to result in permanent placement or emancipation; (f) a schedule for family visits; (g) the reason for placement a substantial distance from homes of parents; (h) efforts to place the minor with siblings; (j) health and education information; and (n) why the parents are not participating in case plan.
These are the subdivisions of section 706.6 that D.S. argues were neglected by the case plan.
Although the case plan filed on March 1, 2007, did not include all of the information required by section 706.6, it did contain much of the information necessary to make an informed placement and the missing information was contained in other parts of the record. The report stated that D.S. had problems with anger management, lack of supervision, inadequate parenting, family instability, school, and inadequate housing. “The minor is currently a 300 dependent and has a history of awoling. Became a 300 after mom could not care for him due to her substance use. He lived with his maternal grandmother until he became too much for her to handle; he has a history of school truancy; his criminal activity has increased in recent months; he is also hanging around peers that is [sic] involved in criminal behavior.” No family strengths are identified. It continues, “The minor does not have much family support. His maternal grandmother does not visit because she told the minor if he ever got into trouble she was not going to visit him in jail. Minor’s mother does not visit minor.” The report identified the following “preplacement services that will reduce or eliminate the need for placement and/or return the minor safely home”: diversion, informal probation, intensive supervision, independent living skills, and psychological evaluation. “Minor was a 300 dependent and received many services through DHS. Minor is in need of a more structured facility that DHS can’t provide.” The report identifies previously offered services as: independent living skills, child welfare services (DHS), intensive supervision, placement intervention, informal probation, and psychological evaluation. The report states that these services were not effective. “Services ineffective due to the minor’s inability to comply with DHS rules. He needs a more structured facility that DHS can’t provide. In addition, needs consequences for defiant behavior and around the clock supervision.” D.S.’s school at the time of the report is identified as well as the fact that he has “tr[ua]ncy issues [and] low g[ra]des due to truancy.” It states that D.S. is a special education student with an Individual Education Plan prepared on June 5, 2006. D.S.’s school records are identified as being in the probation officer’s file. D.S.’s medical care is identified as provided through MediCal. Although spaces are provided for specific medical history, no further medical information is provided. Under a section concerning mental health, the report states that D.S. “has [a] current psychological evaluation” by Dr. French. The report also states that a transitional independent living plan is not attached to the report but is available in the probation officer’s file.
The second section of the case plan is the “plan for out of home placement recommendation.” The goal stated is for a permanent out-of-home placement rather than returning D.S. home on probation or attempting family reunification. “The minor is a current 300 dependent and was placed on 725(a) W&I status. Minor failed to comply with 725(a) W&I probation conditions. 725(a) W&I status revoked; no family members available; family reunification necessary before placing the minor back with any relatives; minor in need of a more structured setting.” The plan states that D.S. needs 24 hour supervision, needs to complete court orders, develop decision making and independent living skills, family and individual counseling, individual tutoring, a mental health referral, mental health counseling, regular physical activities, and substance abuse counseling. No information on D.S.’s current placement was provided. Various goals and responsibilities are identified for D.S. and his parents.
D.S. signed this plan on March 1, 2007. The signature page states that his mother was not available because her whereabouts were unknown.
The strongest support for D.S.’s contention that the disposition order should be reversed because of inadequacies in the case plan is In re L. S. (1990) 220 Cal.App.3d 1100 (overturned on other grounds by People v. Bullock (1994) 26 Cal.App.4th 985), in which the court reversed a disposition order committing a minor to the California Youth Authority without the benefit of a current social study. In that case, the juvenile court had before it at the disposition hearing only “a review report rather than a ‘full’ disposition report.” (In re L.S., supra, at pp. 1102-1103.) Although the probation officer stated that he needed more time to prepare a social study and the minor’s attorney argued that such a report was needed before disposition, the juvenile court committed the minor to the California Youth Authority. The appellate court held, “On this record, without the benefit of a current social study there is no evaluation or insight into appellant’s problems, aside from the obvious Health and Safety Code violation. Given the law’s concern for rehabilitation of minors, tempered with accountability [citation], it would seem impossible without the benefit of a current social study for the juvenile court to give the required sensitive consideration to all of the factors required to make any commitment, much less a CYA commitment which requires evidence of a probable benefit to the minor and the inappropriateness of less restrictive alternatives.” (Id., at p. 1105.) The court held that if a written social study is not filed with the juvenile court before disposition, the dispositional order must be reversed. (Id. at pp. 1106-1107.)
In In re Melvin J. (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 742, 755, disapproved on other grounds in John L. v. Superior Court (2004) 33 Cal.4th 158, 181, footnote 7, the minor objected that the juvenile court did not have a copy of the current social study before it when it made its dispositional order. That court distinguished In re L.S. “In In re L. S., the court at the disposition hearing had not handled the adjudication hearing and knew nothing about the case. There had never been a report prepared for the disposition hearing in that case and the court in that case was unaware of the minor’s problems and whether any drug abuse issues existed. Here, by contrast, the juvenile court had been working closely with the minor for months in an effort to help him and had the benefit of three recent written probation reports. In addition, the juvenile court in the instant case had the benefit of an oral report on the findings of the probation officer presented to it the very day of the disposition hearing by the court probation officer. [¶] Thus, the instant situation is not one where no report was ever prepared. It is a case where reports were continually prepared each time the disposition hearing was continued, even if it was only continued for a period of weeks. When the juvenile court in the instant case acted, it had received three written reports and one oral summary in the span of six months. The juvenile court was aware of all underlying facts at the time it acted.” (Ibid.)
The situation in the present case is far more akin to that in In re Melvin J. than in In re L.S. Like In re Melvin J., the court here had the relevant current information before it, even though some of that information was not repeated in the case plan. The case plan filed for the March 8 dispositional hearing was less than three months old at the time of the May 22 hearing. At the May 22 dispositional hearing, counsel for D.S. argued that the case plan did not provide the required information. He asked the juvenile court to “find that the case plan is defective, the dispositional recommendation is defective. Require probation to make a proper case plan, a thorough case plan that complies with the statutes and a proper specific dispositional recommendation, not an out-of-home placement . . . .” The court responded that it had reviewed the dispositional reports filed on February 26 and May 7, 2007, and D.S.’s brief for the dispositional hearing. The court told D.S.’s counsel, “even though you were able to point out a lot of factors, I can still make this finding based on the totality of the circumstances; the lack of a place, a safe home for the minor to return [to]. The grandmother cannot take this minor. The mother just came into the picture recently. [¶] . . . [¶] The permanent placement of the minor, the permanent plan may be home reunification. I think we can talk about that while we review the permanent plan later on, but the first thing is disposition here today which I am making for out of home placement.”
As to the information required by particular subdivisions of section 706.6 that D.S. argues was omitted, the juvenile court had ample information concerning the strengths and the extensive weaknesses of D.S. and his family situation, the recommendations of the psychologist, the case worker, and the probation officer concerning D.S.’s placement needs, D.S.’s health and education history, and information concerning both D.S.’s mother and father and the reason each was not participating in the case plan. As for a specific time-limited goal for permanent placement, there is no evidence to support the suggestion that the court neglected this objective, but substantial evidence that the court was repeatedly stymied in achieving this goal by D.S.’s refusal to remain in any of the placements that accepted him.
To the extent that D.S. is arguing that the court should have explored placement with his father, the record reflects that the father has never been involved in D.S.’s life and it contains no indication that he is available as a placement option. Moreover, D.S. told the psychologist who prepared the evaluation “that he would not feel comfortable living with his father in Richmond, in part because ‘there’s already three people living there.’ ”
D.S. also argues that the case plan was deficient because it lacked a schedule for family visits, the reason for placement a substantial distance from the homes of the parents, and reflected no effort to place him with his siblings. There is no schedule for family visits because, sadly, no member of D.S.’s family has expressed an interest or intention to visit him. Because he has not been successfully placed, the reason for placement a substantial distance from home is inapplicable. And as to placement with siblings, the reports show that his oldest sister is now 29, the next eldest brother is 23 and “has been a S.F. Court dependent since 2/89 . . . and he has been in [and] out of home placement since he was 4 years old. He suffers from serious emotional problems and he is currently in residential treatment . . . . His younger sister . . . was born with a positive tox screen for cocaine and was placed at St. Elizabeth’s following her discharge from the hospital.” As none of his siblings is in a stable placement, there appears to be no realistic or beneficial placement with any of them.
D.S. also complains that “[t]here is no explanation in the case plan or elsewhere in the record for why reunification services have not been offered, in particular, to D.S.’s grandmother or father.” Yet the record clearly reflects why services were not offered: his grandmother had informed the probation department that she would not allow D.S. to return to her home, and his father has never been involved in his life nor has he evinced any interest in becoming involved. D.S. cites section 727.2, which provides that “the juvenile court shall order the probation department to ensure the provision of reunification services to facilitate the safe return of the minor to his or her home or the permanent placement of the minor, and to address the needs of the minor while in foster care, except as provided in subdivision (b).” Subdivision (b) of section 727.2 provides that reunification services need not be provided to a parent or legal guardian if reunification services were previously terminated, the parent has been convicted of murder or voluntary manslaughter of a child, or parental rights have been terminated with respect to one of the minor’s siblings. This section cannot be read to require the department to offer reunification services to a parent or guardian who has no interest in receiving those services. And, though D.S. complains that the department has not adequately sought permanent placement, he has steadfastly resisted efforts to find an appropriate placement. There are limited options available and unfortunately none may be ideal. By continuing to abscond from his placements, D.S. reduces the available choices even further. Neither the department nor the juvenile court can be chastised for D.S.’s recalcitrance.
There is no reasonable probability that a different outcome would have resulted had the relevant information been included in the case plan in addition to inclusion elsewhere in the record. (In re Riva M. (1991) 235 Cal.App.3d 403, 412-413 [“Because the issue is not one of constitutional dimension, the question is whether there is a reasonable probability the outcome would have differed in the absence of the procedural irregularity.”])
Education
D.S. also argues that the disposition order must be reversed because the juvenile court did not make specific findings regarding his educational needs or limit his parents’ right to make educational decisions for him.
D.S. concedes that he did not raise this point at the disposition hearing. “As a general rule, a party is precluded from urging on appeal any point not raised in the trial court. [Citation.] Any other rule would ‘ “ ‘permit a party to play fast and loose with the administration of justice by deliberately standing by without making an objection of which he is aware and thereby permitting the proceedings to go to a conclusion which he may acquiesce in, if favorable, and which he may avoid, if not.’ ” ’ ” (In re Riva M., supra, 235 Cal.App.3d at pp. 411-412.)
Even assuming that the point is not waived, the lack of an express finding on this subject does not warrant reversal. California Rules of Court, rule 5.790(f)(5) provides in relevant part that when a minor is declared a ward, “[t]he court must consider whether it is necessary to limit the right of the parent or guardian to make educational decisions for the child.” The rule requires only that the court “consider” the issue; it does not require the court to state a finding on the record. There is no indication that the court did not consider D.S.’s educational needs when it made its order. The case plan states that D.S. was enrolled in the ninth grade at the Woodside Learning Center, and that he had “tr[ua]ncy issues; low g[ra]des due to tr[ua]ncy,” and that he was a special education student with an Individual Education Plan. It also states as objectives that D.S. “attend school regularly, report to school on time, participate in classroom activities, [and] complete all required school work.” The psychologists report also provided the court with details of D.S.’s educational history, stating that he had repeated the sixth grade and “skipped seventh grade when he went into private placement. It was at this point that his education fell apart, inasmuch as he attended eighth grade alone in four different locations: Antioch, Watsonville, El Sobrante, and finally in Juvenile Hall. [¶] [D.S.] denied any history of learning disability or special educational placement. He said that he does not have trouble performing school work in class, but that living in group homes made it almost impossible for him to complete his homework assignments. A review of [D.S.]’s school records suggests otherwise, and his grade reports are not encouraging.”
If D.S. truly needs to have a guardian appointed to make educational decisions for him, the proper mechanism is not to order an entirely new disposition hearing. By an appropriate application, pursuant to section 388 or otherwise, D.S. may still request such relief if circumstances warrant.
Disposition
The disposition order is affirmed.
We concur: McGuiness, P. J., Siggins, J.