Opinion
F055458
9-8-2008
In re D.R. et al., Persons Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. FRESNO COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. M.O., Defendant and Appellant.
Linda J. Conrad, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. No appearance by Plaintiff and Respondent.
Not to be Published
OPINION
THE COURT
Before Vartabedian, Acting P.J., Levy, J., and Kane, J.
All statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless otherwise indicated.
M.O. appeals from an order terminating parental rights (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 366.26) to her son and daughter.1 Appellants appointed appellate counsel submitted a letter dated July 25, 2008, advising that no brief would be forthcoming (In re Sade C. (1996) 13 Cal.4th 952). This court in turn extended time for appellant to personally file a letter brief, which she has done.
Appellant contends the court should not have terminated her rights because she and her children were very bonded. In the process, she relies on her testimony to support her contention and challenges a bonding assessment, admitted into evidence, which concluded she did not share a parent/child relationship with her children. Appellant is critical of the fact that the psychologist who conducted the assessment saw the family for only 60 minutes and, in appellants view, misrepresented her childrens behaviors during that 60 minutes.
Appellants contention does not amount to an arguable claim that the juvenile court committed an error affecting the outcome of this case. (In re Sade C., supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 994.) At most, she argues over conflicting evidence regarding whether she shared a parent/child relationship with her children which should be maintained and the weight that the trial court should have attributed to her testimony over the bonding assessment. Her contention is fatally flawed for at least two reasons.
One, it is the role of the trial court, not the appellate court, to decide questions of fact. (Tupman v. Haberkern (1929) 208 Cal. 256, 262-263.) An appellate court must accept as true all evidence tending to establish the correctness of the trial courts decision, and take into account all reasonable inferences in support of the trial courts conclusion. In addition, every substantial conflict in the evidence is resolved in favor of that conclusion. (Bancroft-Whitney Co. v. McHugh (1913) 166 Cal. 140, 142.) We may not reweigh or express an independent judgment on the evidence. (In re Laura F. (1983) 33 Cal.3d 826, 833.) In this regard, issues of fact and credibility are matters for the trial court alone. (In re Amy M. (1991) 232 Cal.App.3d 849, 859-860.)
Two, it was appellants burden to establish termination would be detrimental under one of the statutory exceptions (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)). (In re Zachary G. (1999) 77 Cal.App.4th 799, 809.) When a trial court rejects a parents detriment claim and terminates parental rights, as in this case, it is the parents burden on appeal to affirmatively show that the trial court abused its discretion. (In re Jasmine D. (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 1339, 1351.) The appropriate test for abuse of discretion is whether the trial court exceeded the bounds of reason. When two or more inferences can reasonably be deduced from the facts, the reviewing court has no authority to substitute its decision for that of the trial court. (In re Stephanie M. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 295, 318.) Here, appellant makes no case for abuse of discretion.
Having reviewed appellants letter brief and the record herein, we conclude appellant raises no arguable issue regarding the courts decision. (In re Sade C., supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 994.)
DISPOSITION
The order terminating parental rights is affirmed.