Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Stanislaus County. Super. Ct. Nos. 509259 & 509260 Nancy B. Williamsen, Commissioner.
Michael McPartland, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Michael H. Krausnick, County Counsel, Carrie M. Stephens, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Before Harris, Acting P.J., Cornell, J., and Kane, J.
OPINION
G.P. appeals from orders terminating her parental rights (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 366.26) to her two-year-old twin daughters. She contends the court erred by rejecting her claim that termination would be detrimental to the twins. According to appellant, termination would interfere with the twins’ relationship with their 10-month-old brother. On review, we disagree and will affirm.
All statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless otherwise indicated.
PROCEDURAL AND FACTUAL HISTORY
In July 2006, the Stanislaus County Superior Court adjudged twins D. and A., dependent children, removed them from appellant’s custody, and ordered reunification services. The court previously determined the twins came within its jurisdiction under section 300, subdivision (b) due to unexplained bites marks, scratches and bruises on A.’s body, and appellant’s neglect attributable to her drug abuse.
Despite 12 months of reasonable reunification services, appellant did not make progress toward mitigating the problems underlying the twins’ removal. Meanwhile, in December 2006, appellant gave birth to a son, V.P. He was immediately detained and declared a dependent child as well. Visitation was arranged such that the twins visited their baby brother during their twice-a-month visits with appellant.
Due to appellant’s lack of progress, the court in June 2007 terminated reunification efforts and set a section 366.26 hearing to select and implement a permanent plan for the twins. Relevant to this appeal, the court adopted a recommended finding that the twins did not have a significant relationship with their younger brother.
In advance of the section 366.26 hearing, respondent Stanislaus County Community Services Agency (agency) prepared a “366.26 WIC Report.” In it, the agency described the twins as adoptable and recommended that the court terminate parental rights.
In describing the twins’ current circumstances, the agency reported it placed the twins in the same foster home as their younger brother V.P. in late May 2007. Their caregivers reported the twins had adjusted very well to their new home and family. The caregivers were committed to adopting the twins.
The court conducted its section 366.26 hearing for the twins in November 2007. At that hearing, the agency called its social worker assigned to the twins’ case. She testified in part that she had observed the twins with their baby brother in their current placement. By this point, V.P. was 10 months old. Asked to describe the children’s relationship, the social worker responded the children were “very used to each other. They’re just like any other sibling relationship[.]” The twins also had four older siblings with whom they apparently never lived nor had any relationship.
Appellant also testified at the November hearing. She stated she would like all of her children to have an ability to maintain a relationship.
In closing arguments, appellant’s trial counsel asked the court to “consider the sibling exception” and find termination would be detrimental to the twins. She argued the agency failed to provide information regarding whether the twins would lose contact with their other siblings if the proposed adoption were successful. Counsel cited appellant’s preference that all her children have an ability to maintain a relationship. She added in the case of appellant’s youngest child, although he was placed in the same home with the twins, it was possible appellant would reunify with him and the twins’ prospective adoptive parents might not allow ongoing contact with V.P.
Upon submission of the case, the court found the twins adoptable and rejected appellant’s detriment claim. The court noted it would have to find termination would substantially interfere with the twins’ sibling relationship. However, although the twins were raised together, the court observed the same could not be said for their other siblings. As for the twins and their baby brother, their placement together was relatively new and there was no strong sibling relationship.
DISCUSSION
Because the twins were likely to be adopted, the law required the court to terminate parental rights, unless one of the specifically designated circumstances, set forth in section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1), provided a compelling reason for finding that termination of parental rights would be detrimental to them. (In re Celine R. (2003) 31 Cal.4th 45, 53.) Appellant bore the evidentiary burden of showing termination would be detrimental under one of the exceptions. (In re Zachary G. (1999) 77 Cal.App.4th 799, 809.)
Since the time of the superior court’s decision in this case, section 366.26, subdivision (c) has been amended effective January 1, 2008. We have applied the version of the law in effect at the time of the court’s ruling.
On appeal, we review the juvenile court’s rejection of appellant’s detriment claim for abuse of discretion. (In re Jasmine D. (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 1339, 1351.) Having completed our review, we conclude the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion. There was neither evidence of a significant sibling relationship, proof that termination would substantially interfere with the relationship that did exist, nor any showing that ongoing contact was in the twins’ best interests. Appellant failed to meet her heavy burden of proof.
For the so-called sibling relationship exception in section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(E) to apply, a court must find:
“There would be substantial interference with a child’s sibling relationship, taking into consideration the nature and extent of the relationship, including, but not limited to, whether the child was raised with a sibling in the same home, whether the child shared significant common experiences or has existing close and strong bonds with a sibling, and whether ongoing contact is in the child’s best interest, including the child’s long-term emotional interest, as compared to the benefit of legal permanence through adoption.”
As the California Supreme Court explained in In re Celine R., supra, 31 Cal.4th at page 61:
“the ‘sibling relationship exception contains strong language creating a heavy burden for the party opposing adoption. It only applies when the juvenile court determines that there is a “compelling reason” for concluding that the termination of parental rights would be “detrimental” to the child due to “substantial interference” with a sibling relationship.’ (In re Daniel H. [(2002)] 99 Cal.App.4th [804,] 813, quoting § 366.26, subd. (c)(1).)”
Here, the evidence simply did not compel a finding that termination would substantially interfere with a sibling relationship.
Appellant claims the facts show the children were raised together in the same home, shared common experiences, and had an existing substantial and strong sibling relationship. She relies on the visits the twins and their younger brother shared before they were placed together and the fact that they thereafter lived together for five months. The record, however, does not compel such a conclusion. In fact, appellant overlooks a number of the court’s factual findings to the contrary. First, when it set the section 366.26 hearing in June 2007, the court found the twins did not have a significant relationship with their younger brother. Second, at the section 366.26 hearing, the court found although the twins were raised together, they were not raised with any of their siblings. Third, addressing specifically the twins and their baby brother, the court found, their placement together was relatively new and there was no strong sibling relationship. The ages of these three children combined with the five months they had spent in the same home certainly supported the court’s finding in this regard.
Appellant also argues maintaining the sibling relationship was very important to the twins’ emotional wellbeing. However, she cannot cite any evidence in the record to support her argument. She refers instead to our state’s public policy recognizing the importance of developing and maintaining a dependent child’s sibling relationships to the child’s long-term emotional interests. (§ 16002.)
Appellant’s reliance on the state’s recognition of the general importance of sibling relationships is misplaced. If a parent could simply rely on this public policy to make the case for the sibling relationship exception, it would render meaningless the language in section 366.26 (Moyer v. Workmen's Comp. Appeals Bd. (1973) 10 Cal.3d 222, 230) and the need for a compelling showing that termination would be detrimental in these children’s cases (In re Celine R., supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 53).
Finally, appellant ignores the absence of evidence that termination would interfere, let alone substantially interfere, with the relationship between the twins and their younger brother, V.P. She claims V.P. was in the process of reunifying with her and if the twins were adopted and he were returned to her care, the twins’ adoptive parents might not allow them to have further contact with their younger brother. Not only does this argument fail as speculative, we add that currently pending before this court is appellant’s notice of intent to contest the termination of those services and the setting of a section 366.26 hearing in V.P.’s case. (G.P. v. Superior Court (F054710).)
In the end, appellant is in no position to fault the trial court for its decision. She simply failed to satisfy her heavy burden of proof to establish the elements of a sibling relationship exception to adoption as the permanent plan for the twins. Under these circumstances, we conclude appellant’s argument is meritless.
DISPOSITION
The orders terminating parental rights are affirmed.