Opinion
No. H14-CP07-008948-A
December 10, 2008
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE PETITION FOR TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS
The commissioner of the department of children and families ("DCF," the "Department" or the "petitioner") seeks termination of the parental rights of the respondent mother, Christina C., ("Mother") and the respondent father, Michael G., ("Father") the biological parents of Donavin C. ("Donavin"). Mother was represented by legal counsel at trial and opposed the termination of her parental rights with respect to Donavin. At an earlier proceeding, Father, with his counsel present, consented to the termination of his parental rights as to Donavin.
In addition, pursuant to General Statutes § 46b-129(k), on October 23, 2007 DCF filed a Motion to Review Permanency Plan for the child. The plan proposed by DCF was termination of the parental rights of the respondents and adoption. Mother objected to such plan.
The court finds that the court has jurisdiction and there is no known action pending in any other court affecting custody of this child. Despite references in Exhibits, including, without limitation, Exhibits 1 and H, to Mother being of Cherokee and Native American descent, there is no evidence before the court that Mother claimed Donavin is an Indian Child or that Mother herself is a member of an Indian Tribe as those terms are defined in 25 U.S.C. § 1903. Until the party asserting the applicability of the Indian Child Welfare Act 25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq. ("ICWA"), establishes on the record the child is an Indian Child, the ICWA does not apply. The burden of proof is upon the party asserting the applicability of ICWA to produce evidence for the court to decide whether a child is an Indian child. In re Adoption of C.D., 751 N.W.2d 236, 242 (N.D., 2008) citing In re A.L., 2001 ND 59, 623 N.W.2d 418; In re H.D., 343 Ill.App.3d 483, 278 Ill.Dec. 194, 797 N.E.2d 1112, 1117-18 (2003); In re J.D.B., 584 N.W.2d 577, 582 (Iowa Ct.App. 1998); In re J.L.M., 234 Neb. 381, 451 N.W.2d 377, 387 (1990); Anderson, 31 P.3d at 512; In re A.S., 2000 SD 94, 614 N.W.2d 383; 42 C.J.S. Indians § 156 (2007). If there is insufficient reason to believe a child is an Indian Child, notice under the ICWA need not be given. See In re O.K., 106 Cal.App. 4th 152, 157 (2003), In re Aaron R., 130 Cal.App. 4th 697, 707 (2005). Accordingly, based on the paucity of information presented to the court, the court finds there is no evidence the child is an Indian Child.
The proceedings relative to the termination of parental rights are governed by General Statutes § 17a-112 et seq. In a proceeding for termination of parental rights, the petitioner must first prove, in the adjudicatory phase, a ground for termination alleged in the petition, as of the date of filing the petition or the last amendment, by clear and convincing evidence. In re Joshua Z., 26 Conn.App. 58, 63 (1991); Practice Book § 32a-3(b), 35a-7. Only one ground need be established for the granting of the petition. In re Juvenile Appeal (84-BC), 194 Conn. 252, 258, 479 A.2d 1204 (1984); In re Shane P., 58 Conn.App. 234, 242-43 (2000). However, "[i]n the adjudicatory phase, the court may rely on events occurring after the date of the filing of the petition to terminate parental rights when considering the issue of whether the degree of rehabilitation is sufficient to foresee that the parent may resume a useful role in the child's life within a reasonable time." (Emphasis in original.) In re Stanley D., 61 Conn.App. 224, 230 (2000).
If a ground for termination is proven, the court must next consider the disposition stage. Therein, the court must consider whether the facts, as of the last day of trial, establish by clear and convincing evidence that termination is in the child's best interest. As permitted under our law, the evidence as to the adjudicatory and dispositional phases was presented in the same proceeding. See In re Eden F., 250 Conn. 674, 688-89 (1999); In re Juvenile Appeal (84-BC), supra, 194 Conn. 258.
I FACTUAL FINDINGS
The petitioner presented two witnesses and fifteen exhibits (Exhibits 1-15). The respondent Mother presented one witness and nine exhibits (Exhibits A-I.) The credible and relevant evidence offered at trial and a review of the judicially noticed court orders, memoranda and findings supports the finding of the following facts. Unless otherwise specified, all facts are found by clear and convincing evidence.
The court has also taken judicial notice of court records including court memoranda and orders made in these cases for their existence, content and legal effect. See Colin C. Tait Eliot D. Prescott, Tait's Handbook of Connecticut Evidence §§ 2.3.4(d), 2.4.1 and 2.4.2. (4th ed. 2008).
A. Procedural History
On January 16, 2007, the Department issued a 96-hour administrative hold on behalf of Donavin and he was placed in the temporary care of the Department. On January 18, 2007, the Department filed an ex parte Order of Temporary Custody ("OTC") and a Neglect Petition. The OTC was granted by the Court, Baldwin J., on the same date and subsequently sustained by agreement on January 26, 2007. On August 1, 2007, Mother entered into a plea of nolo contendere to the allegation that the child was being permitted to live under conditions injurious and the court, Baldwin J., found Donavin neglected. He was committed to the care and custody of the Department on the same day and has remained committed to date.
On December 19, 2007, the Department filed a Termination of Parental Rights ("TPR") petition. On March 7, 2008 Father filed a motion seeking a court-ordered paternity test; the motion was granted and Father confirmed as the biological father of Donavin.
On November 3, 2008, Father executed a written consent to the termination of his parental rights with respect to Donavin. The consent was accepted by the court on the same date. The petitioner amended the TPR petition to plead as the sole ground for the termination of Father's parental rights his consent to the termination.
B. Mother
Mother is twenty-two years old. She was born in New London, Connecticut. She has two older brothers. Mother reported early memories of domestic violence and verbal and physical abuse between her parents. She also reported that one of her older brothers would abuse her physically and verbally; Mother would retaliate in kind. Mother's parents divorced when Mother was eleven years old and her father moved out the household. Mother further reported being sexually abused when she was eight years old, although the allegation went unreported.
In August 2002, Mother was removed from maternal grandmother's home due to physical neglect resulting from inadequate supervision and she was committed to DCF. She had several placements and reported being abused and harassed by her peers while in placement. Her commitment to DCF was revoked in March 2004 and, despite being eligible therefore, Mother refused further services from DCF, including an independent living program.
Mother graduated from high school in 2004. She collects social security benefits. She reported having insurance through Maine Care and is now living in subsidized housing.
Mother has never married and has only one child, Donavin. Mother became involved with Father in early 2006 and moved in with him shortly thereafter. She quickly became pregnant. Approximately four months after learning she was pregnant with his child, Father broke off the relationship with Mother and asked her to move out. Mother became homeless. She reported that in the summer of 2006, while she would have been pregnant with Donavin, she would go for days without eating.
While living with Father, Mother became friends with Carrie S. ("Carrie"). Mother was at some point during her pregnancy invited to move in with Carrie and Carrie's mother, paramour, three children and two other roommates. As more particularly set forth below, Mother's relationship with Carrie was volatile. After a conflict with Carrie that led to police involvement Mother was admitted to the Hospital for Central Connecticut with suicidal ideation.
Donavin was removed from Mother's care on January 16, 2007. Mother again became homeless. In July 2007, Mother moved to Maine. She did not maintain a stable residence until she settled, with the assistance of a church support group, into a subsidized apartment in Biddeford, Maine. She remains living in Maine to date.
Mother has a limited criminal history in Connecticut; all of Mother's arrests have arisen as a result of her inability to co-exist with others. Mother was arrested (i) December 25, 2006 for disorderly conduct; (ii) January 16, 2007 for risk of injury to a minor, assault on personnel and interfering/resisting arrest; (iii) March 17, 2007 for breach of peace 2nd and assault 3rd; and (iv) March 23, 2007 for breach of peace 2nd and violation of a protective order. All of the charges were nolled.
Additional facts will be set forth below as warranted.
C. Father
Father is twenty-five years old. He was born, prematurely, in Farmington, Connecticut and during his first year of life spent a fair amount of time in the hospital. His parents separated when he was young and both parents have remarried. His mother reported that he burned down the family house as a result of playing with matches when he was three years old. He reportedly went into shock after the incident, spent several months without speaking and was enrolled in counseling at Wheeler Clinic. He reported that he lived with and was primarily raised, together with his father's siblings, by his paternal grandmother. He has had little, if any, relationship with his mother.
When Father was fifteen he had his first serious relationship with an eighteen-year-old woman. She gave birth to his daughter.
Father at seventeen was charged with sexual assault in the 1st degree and risk of injury to a minor after allegedly molesting his ten-year-old step-sister. He served one year in jail. He was later accused of molesting another step sibling. He served a sentence of three years and one month and received a term of probation of ten years. Father is a registered sex offender. He was incarcerated at the time he tendered his consent to the termination of his parental rights.
Additional facts will be set forth below as warranted.
D. The Child
Donavin was born on December 5, 2006 to Mother and Father. He was born prematurely and having a low birth weight.
He was removed from Mother's care on January 16, 2007 under a 96-hour administrative hold. He was placed in an emergency non-relative foster home. Maternal grandmother offered to take in Donavin, after the heat was turned on at her home, but her home was determined not to be appropriate due to, among other reasons, her having three previous neglect substantiations. On January 26, 2007, Donavin was moved to a long-term non-relative foster family and he has remained with this family.
Donavin was referred to the Birth to Three program for an evaluation. He was determined to be eligible for services due to gross motor skills delays. Due to a concern that he was not walking at fourteen months of age, he was referred to Connecticut Children's Medical Center for an orthopedic consult. No orthopedic services were recommended and he began walking shortly thereafter.
Donavin has been with his foster family for almost his entire life. He seeks them out for comfort and is thriving in their care. This family is available to provide permanency to Donavin.
Additional facts will be set forth below as warranted.
E. Specific Steps:
On August 1, 2007, the date of the neglect adjudication, final specific steps were ordered by the court. The court finds the following with respect to the Specific Steps and Mother's compliance therewith:
Keep all appointments set by or with DCF. Cooperate with DCF home visits, announced and unannounced and visits by the child's court-appointed attorney or guardian ad litem.Mother was generally compliant with this step while she lived in Connecticut, although she was not receptive to the referrals and services offered by DCF. Since moving to Maine, Mother's contact with DCF has been limited. As Mother had no stable home in Connecticut, there have been no home visits. As more particularly set forth below, a home visit was conducted by the Maine Office of Child and Family Services ("OCFS").
Keep child's whereabouts and your own whereabouts known to DCF, your attorney and the attorney for the child.
Mother has not always complied with this step. After Mother's discharge from the Friendship Center, Mother was reportedly staying with friends. She moved to Maine in August 2007, advising DCF that she was moving to Biddeford, but failing to provide DCF with an address. She moved in with Carrie, however, the duration of her stay in that household is unknown. Further findings with regard to Mother's transitory living arrangements are set forth below.
Participate in counseling and make progress toward identified goals.
Mother's general goals were for parenting and individual counseling. Her specific goals were impulse control, anger management, [understanding the] impact of neglect on child.
Mother initially engaged in individual counseling at the Hospital of Central Connecticut; however she self-discharged from treatment without giving notice to her therapist and prior to completing her treatment goals. Mother has engaged in individual therapy in Maine at Counseling Services, Inc. ("CSI.") Contrary to the recommendations of the providers in Connecticut, she is no longer on psychotropic medication as a physician at CSI reported that Mother does not require the same.
Mother received parenting education with the Wheeler Clinic Family Center. While engaged in services, Mother displayed, on July 30, 2007, "verbally and aggressive and assaultive behavior" which led to the center's amending Mother's reunification/visitation contract. (Exhibit 5.) Mother re-engaged in service, but shortly thereafter, Mother informally advised staff at the center that she was moving to Maine. She was asked to formally report the same and failed to do so. After receiving no further communication from Mother, the center discharged Mother and closed her case. Mother, at the time of discharge, was found to be "lacking the skills in order to . . . meet [Donavin's] basic and developmental needs." (Exhibit 5.)
Accept and cooperate with in-home support services referred by DCF.
In-home support services could not be provided initially due to Mother's transient living arrangements, and thereafter due to Mother's relocation to Maine.
Cooperate with recommended service providers for parenting/individual . . . counseling . . .
Mother's recommended providers as set forth in the Specific Steps were: CMHA for housing and vocational, Connections supportive housing, DMHAS, further services to be determined after psychological evaluation, Wheeler Family Center and Wheeler Clinic.
Mother was referred to both the Community Mental Health Affiliates vocational program and to Connecticut Supportive Housing for Families ("SHF") to address her lack of housing. She elected to proceed with SHF only. SHF succeeded in obtaining a subsidized apartment for Mother in August 2007, but she had just moved to Maine and elected not to return to Connecticut to take advantage of the housing despite her lack of stable housing in Maine. DCF referred Mother to the department of mental health and addiction ("DMHAS"), but Mother would not to take advantage of the support that agency could have provided to her as she believed that DMHAS would take her money. The psychological evaluation recommended that Mother needed to continue with individual counseling, coordinated with anti-depressant medication to stabilize her moods, engage in parenting and child development classes, and develop a support network. (Exhibit 15, pages 15 and 16.) As to individual counseling, Mother was referred to the Hospital of Central Connecticut. Mother self-discharged from the therapy against the recommendation of the treatment providers reportedly because Mother did not like her therapist. Since moving to Maine, Mother has engaged in services with CSI. As to parenting and child development services, DCF referred Mother to the Wheeler Family Center for parenting and child development services. Mother was not compliant with the center and she was unsuccessfully discharged from the program in August 2007. Mother obtained a Certificate of Completion from the Parent Resource Center Inc. in Maine, which confirmed her completion of a parent education series. Mother has also been provided with supervised, therapeutic visitation through Community Residences, Inc. ("CRI"). Although she is reportedly cooperative with CRI, she has missed visits. As to developing a support network, Mother has not complied with this recommendation inasmuch as she continues to disrupt from her friends and church groups.
Cooperate with court-ordered evaluations or testing and follow recommendations.
Mother cooperated with the court-ordered evaluation.
Obtain and /or cooperate with a restraining/protective order and/or other appropriate safety plan as approved by DCF to avoid further domestic violence incidents.Mother did not comply with this step as she was arrested on March 23, 2007 for violation of the protective order issued having Carrie as the protected party.
Secure and maintain adequate housing and legal income.
Mother continued her pattern of instability, homelessness and transience during the course of the proceedings. During the latter part of her pregnancy and after Donavin's birth she was living with Carrie. The conditions in which Mother lived with Donavin were not clean, safe or stable. At the time of the December 2006 domestic violence arrest of Mother (when Donavin would have been twenty-one days old) the New Britain police notified DCF of the poor living conditions in the household. The officer's report notes the residence to have been in disarray and "cluttered with garbage, food and miscellaneous items throughout the residence." In addition to Carrie and Carrie's boyfriend, mother and three children and an unrelated roommate (as well as Mother and Donavin) there were three pit bulls living in the four-bedroom residence. (Exhibit 7.) Mother and Donavin stayed in that household until Mother was hospitalized after the January 2007 domestic violence incident resulting in Donavin's removal.
Following Mother's release from the hospital she accepted a referral to the Friendship Center shelter. She resided at the shelter from March 2007 to June 2007, when Mother was discharged from the shelter after engaging in a physical altercation with another shelter resident. Mother thereafter refused referrals for shelters outside of New Britain and she reported that she was staying with another friend until other housing became available to her. Mother informed DCF on August 10, 2007 she was relocating to Maine to get a fresh start and get away from the negative influences in Connecticut. Notwithstanding such reported aspirations, Mother moved to Maine with the friends, Carrie and Carrie's boyfriend, with whom she had earlier conflicts. Mother did not, at the time of her move, provide DCF with her new address. The duration of Mother's stay with Carrie in Maine is not known, but it could not have been for too long, as she moved in with a couple she met at church and this couple helped Mother obtain placement at a religiously oriented group home, St. Andre's, in September 2007. This arrangement must also have been of a short duration as she was admitted to the York County Shelter Programs on October 5, 2007 and then discharged from such program four days later, on October 9, 2007, due to her disruptive and aggressive behavior. At discharge she reported to the York shelter program that she had a place to stay in Biddeford. (Exhibit 13.) On November 19, 2007, Mother took up residence at the Shalom House North Street Transitional Unit in Saco. She reportedly was homeless before going to the House. (Exhibit A.) The Shalom House assisted Mother in obtaining rental assistance and she moved into a subsidized apartment in February 2008. She remained in such apartment at the time of the TPR trial.
Have no involvement or further involvement with the criminal justice system.
Since the issuance of the final steps, Mother was been compliant with this step.
Immediately advise DCF of any changes in the composition of the household.
Until moving to Maine and obtaining her subsidized housing, Mother did not have a stable household. Since moving into her apartment in February 2008, Mother has complied with this step.
CT Page 19643
Visit the child as often as DCF permits.
Mother's visitation, before she moved to Maine, was increased to two visits of two hours duration per week. While the Wheeler Clinic Family Center was supervising visits during July and August 2007, five visits were scheduled and Mother missed two of the five due to her housing crisis, including the discharge from the Friendship Center. (Exhibit 5.) During the visits, Mother needed constant redirection from staff as to the purpose of the visit (to spend time with her son and not to discuss her case) and parenting skills coaching so as to be able to effectively interact with Donavin.After her move to Maine, Mother was initially inconsistent with the visitation due to difficulty in transportation. In late November 2007, a bus pass was provided to Mother and her visitation schedule was changed to two visits on consecutive days every other week; as a result thereof she became more consistent with her visitation. In the fall of 2008, Mother again had difficulty attending visits due to a lack of housing in Connecticut. She missed two out of seven visits scheduled by CRI. During such visits and despite Mother's having completed a parenting class in Maine, she did not demonstrate adequate parenting skills as she continued to require direction. As recently as late summer, early fall 2008 the CRI worker observed that Mother was not interacting "with [Donavin] a great deal, unless there was a safety concern, such as him climbing the stairs." (Exhibit H.) DCF continues to have concerns as to Mother's inability to interact with Donavin.
The specific steps also included the following: Do not engage in substance abuse — Mother complied with this step; Sign releases within thirty days authorizing DCF to communicate with service providers to monitor attendance, cooperation and progress toward identified goals and for use in future proceedings before the court — there was no evidence of Mother's compliance with this step; and Cooperate with child's therapy and medical appointments — there was no evidence submitted that Mother attended such appointments.
F. The Interstate Compact
After Mother relocated to Maine, the Department, as the sending agency, pursuant to the Interstate Compact on the Placement of Children, General Statutes § 171-75 et seq., requested from OCFS, the child protection agency of the state of Maine, as the receiving state, a home study to determine if a placement of Donavin with Mother in Maine would be contrary to the interests of the child. The placement was approved, with conditions, pursuant to the report dated September 10, 2008. (Exhibit 2.) The home study conducted by OCFS was dated August 11, 2008.
The conditions to reunification set forth in the home study included Mother's need to continue to receive parenting help and support, case management services from DHHS, counseling and therapeutic support from her therapist and continued "help and support from her church family."
DCF does not support the placement of Donavin with Mother in Maine. Since the date of the home study, DCF has learned that Mother has broken her ties with the church group — this being the church group that was providing her with parenting education, mentoring and assistance in obtaining and furnishing her housing. Mother reportedly broke her ties with this group because she no longer trusted them and did not want any further involvement with them. Mother has reportedly found another, yet unidentified, church group. Notwithstanding Mother's purported engagement with a new support group, her break with the prior group evidences Mother's continuing pattern of disrupting from relationships, supports and mentors which have provided her with much needed assistance. She continues her self-destructive behaviors.
II ADJUDICATION
The petition filed by DCF for the termination of Mother's parental rights alleges three grounds in General Statutes § 17a-112(j)(3) — grounds A, B(i) and C. Only one ground needs to be established for the granting of the petition. In re Juvenile Appeal (84-BC), supra, 194 Conn. 258; In re Karrlo K., 44 Conn.Sup. 101, 106 (1994), aff'd., 40 Conn.App. 73 (1996). Father consented to the termination of his parental rights as to Donavin and therefore, pursuant to General Statutes § 17a-112, no further findings are necessary to be made as to Father.
A. Location and Reunification § 17a-112(j)(1)
In order to terminate parental rights, unless the court grants the petition due to the consent of the respondent parent, DCF must prove, by clear and convincing evidence, the statutory element requiring "reasonable efforts to locate the parent and to reunify the child with the parent." General Statutes § 17a-112(j)(1). "The court need not make that finding, however, if the evidence establishes that the parent is unable or unwilling to benefit from reunification efforts." In re Shaiesha O., 93 Conn.App. 42, 47 (2005).
"The word reasonable is the linchpin on which the department's efforts in a particular set of circumstances are to be adjudged, using the clear and convincing standard of proof." Id. at 48. "Although [n]either the word reasonable nor the word efforts is . . . defined by our legislature or by the federal act from which the requirement was drawn . . . [r]easonable efforts means doing everything reasonable, not everything possible." (Internal quotation marks omitted; citation omitted.) In re Ryan R., 102 Conn.App. 608, 619 (2007); In re Mariah S., 61 Conn.App. 248, 255, 763 A.2d 71 (2000). The court must look to events prior to the date the petition was filed, to determine whether reasonable efforts at reunification were made, In re Shaiesha O., supra, 93 Conn.App. 47.
Mother: As detailed in this decision and as evidenced by the exhibits and testimony presented, DCF made referrals and offered services to Mother. The offered services included, without limitation, case management services, referrals for shelter and housing through CMHA, SHF and the Friendship Center, mental health counseling through the Hospital for Central Connecticut and Wheeler Clinic, supervised visits and parenting coaching through the Wheeler Clinic Family Center and CRI, as well as bus passes to facilitate her returns to Connecticut to visit Donavin and the Interstate Compact. DCF also referred Mother to DMHAS. Since Mother has moved to Maine, Mother has, through self-referral and referral by support groups, obtained referrals for counseling, housing and parenting classes; there was no need for DCF to offer duplicate services. The court finds by clear and convincing evidence that DCF has made reasonable efforts to reunify Donavin with Mother. As more particularly set forth above, Mother elected to discontinue services with the Wheeler Clinic and the Wheeler Clinic Family Clinic; she declined the subsidized housing located for her in Connecticut; she was discharged from the Friendship Center; and she self-discharged against advice of her therapist from the Hospital of Central Connecticut. While in Maine, she was discharged from the York County Shelter Program; it is not known how her relationship with St. Andre's ended, but no evidence of successful completion of that program was submitted; she attended and completed parenting classes, but has not demonstrated a proficiency in parenting that one would hope to see in a parent who has had the benefit of parenting classes and on-going supervised visits. Based on all of the above, the court further finds by clear and convincing evidence Mother is unable or unwilling to benefit from reunification efforts.
B. Termination of Parental Rights on Ground A
DCF claims Mother has abandoned Donavin. Abandonment focuses on the parent's conduct. A lack of interest in the child is not the sole criterion in determining abandonment. "Section [17a-112(j)(3)(A)] does not contemplate a sporadic showing of the indicia of interest, concern or responsibility for the welfare of a child. A parent must maintain a reasonable degree of interest in the welfare of his or her child. Maintain implies a continuing, reasonable degree of concern." In re Deana E., 61 Conn.App. 185, 193, 763 A.2d 37 (2000).
The court finds although Mother has not provided financial support to Donavin she has made inquiry as to his well being, visited with relative consistency, expressed interest in being reunited with him and provided a fully furnished room for him in her apartment in Maine. Notwithstanding Mother's move to Maine instead of remaining in Connecticut and focusing her efforts on being reunified with Donavin, the court finds that the move, although misguided and evidence of Mother's immaturity and poor judgment, does not constitute abandonment. The credible evidence does not support a finding that she has abandoned Donavin within the meaning of the statute. The court finds the petitioner has not satisfied her burden and the Ground A has not been proven by clear and convincing evidence. Ground A is dismissed.
C. Termination of Parental Rights on Ground B(i):
The petitioner alleges that respondent Mother's parental rights to Donavin should be terminated because such respondent has failed to achieve rehabilitation within the meaning of General Statutes § 17a-112(j)(3)(B).
On August 1, 2007, Donavin was adjudicated neglected and committed to DCF. Thus, the critical issue for this court is whether Mother has achieved a sufficient degree of rehabilitation as would allow the court to find that she would be able to care for Donavin within a reasonable time considering the age and needs of the child.
"Personal rehabilitation as used in [Section 17a-112] refers to the restoration of a parent to his or her former constructive and useful role as a parent . . . [The statute] requires the trial court to analyze the [parent's] rehabilitative status as it relates to the needs of the particular child, and further, that such rehabilitation must be foreseeable within a reasonable time . . . [The statute] requires the court to find, by clear and convincing evidence, that the level of rehabilitation [she] has achieved, if any, falls short of that which would reasonably encourage a belief that at some future date [she] can assume a responsible position in her child's life." In re Amneris P., 66 Conn.App. 377, 384-85 (2001) quoting In re Eden F., supra, 250 Conn. 706. In assessing rehabilitation, the critical issue is not whether the parent has improved her ability to manage her own life, but rather whether she has gained the ability to care for the particular needs of the child at issue. In re Amneris P., supra, 66 Conn.App. 385. "Terminating a parent's rights is not ordered to punish a parent who has not tried to rehabilitate; it is ordered so as not to punish a child by denying her a safe, permanent home with proven competent care-takers because her biological mother has tried hard but continues to be incapable of providing such a home for her." In re Samantha B., 45 Conn.Sup. 468, 477, 722 A.2d 300 (1997), aff'd, 51 Conn.App. 376, 721 A.2d 1255 (1998).
In assessing rehabilitative progress, the question is not simply how far the parent has come, but has the parent come far enough to encourage the belief that within a reasonable period of time, the parent can assume the role as parent in the life of the child. In re Stanley D., supra, 61 Conn.App. 230. See also In re Sheila J., 62 Conn.App. 470, 479-80 (2001). "What constitutes a reasonable time is a factual determination that must be made on a case-by-case basis." In re Stanley D., supra, 61 Conn.App. 231 (quoting In re Michael L., 56 Conn.App. 688, 694 (2000)). Further, the court may, in considering the issue of whether the degree of rehabilitation is sufficient to foresee that the parent may assume or resume within a reasonable time a useful role in the child's life, rely on events occurring after the date of the filing of the termination of parental rights petition. In re Stanley D., supra, 61 Conn.App. 230.
Mother: With the above standards as the court's parameters, the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that Mother has failed to achieve such a degree of rehabilitation so as to encourage the belief that within a reasonable period of time, she could resume her role as a parent for Donavin. At the time of the neglect adjudication, Mother's presenting problems arose from her mental health needs, domestic violence with her roommates, lack of parenting skills, and her transience and inability to provide a safe, stable and nurturing home for Donavin.
Dr. Freedman conducted the court-ordered psychological evaluation of Mother. He reported that Mother was diagnosed while at New Britain General Hospital (the Hospital for Central Connecticut) in February 2007 with bi-polar disorder, post traumatic stress disorder, alcohol abuse and mild mental retardation. (Exhibit 15, page 2.) Dr. Freedman did not perform testing to determine Mother's mental capacity, but found, based on his evaluation, Mother to be instead on the lower end of the borderline range of intelligence and to show many signs of limited mental ability. He stated "[a]dults at this level of mental functioning, particularly with added psychological problems, often have difficulty and varied success with independent living." (Exhibit 15, page 10.) This has been borne out by Mother's issues occurring since the date of the evaluation.
Due to Mother's "emotional immaturity, limited mental ability and judgment, and limited social skills and skills for independent living" a residential program was recommended by Dr. Freedman as being an excellent placement for Mother. (Exhibit 15, page 10.) This recommendation was made around the time that Mother was apparently in such a program — at the St. Andre's program. Mother did not last long in such program and she is now in an independent living situation — not an optimal situation for Mother.
Dr. Freedman testified that he found, at the time of the evaluation, Mother's psychological functioning to be impacted. He found her to (i) make errors in judgment, (ii) have significant problems in her personal relationships and in setting and achieving goals, (iii) experience trouble creating a stable life for herself and in telling the truth and (iv) have limited parenting skills and knowledge of children. "All of those [issues and problems] add up to create a young adult that would have a lot of trouble taking care of herself, much less a child." Mother has continued to exhibit errors in judgment and problems in relationships as evidenced by her move to Maine without a plan for her own housing or support and without a plan for how she would reunify with Donavin, her discharges from the Friendship Center and the York County Shelter Program and her broken relationships with her church groups and friends in Maine as well as with those in Connecticut who had provided her with shelter during her visits with Donavin. She also continues to have limited child care skills — as evidenced by her continuing need for redirection and coaching during supervised visits.
For the record ("FTR") November 17, 2008 2:26:00 p.m.
During his testimony at the TPR trial and after being advised, among other things, that Mother had disrupted from the church support group in Maine that offered her very real and valuable support, that in doing so she laid the blame for the break up with the church group and further that Mother was having difficulty in maintaining relationships with the friends and resources in Connecticut which provided her with a place to stay while visiting with Donavin, Dr. Freedman inferred, psychologically, based on his knowledge of Mother, that Mother makes an initial good impression on people who then want to help Mother due to her impoverished and poor early life. But she then tangles with those people and through fights and arguments, the relationship ends. Mother needs to learn to get along with others and accept the support that she requires. In raising a child, one needs to be able to support oneself (even if such support requires assistance) before one can support and care for a child. If Mother is unable to get along with the very groups that offer her the help she needs to support herself, then the chances of Mother being able to provide a secure home for Donavin are, according to Dr. Freedman, "pretty slim." As Mother is now without the support of her prior groups and due to her limited relationship with Donavin, he further testified that sending Donavin to Maine to be reunified with Mother at this time would be out of question.
FTR November 17, 2008 2:45:16 p.m.
FTR November 17, 2008 2:47:19 p.m.
FTP November 17, 2008 2:50:52 p.m.
Rehabilitation has a context and must take into consideration the age and needs of the child. The linchpin to a determination of rehabilitation necessarily includes a finding that the parent can begin or resume parenting within a reasonable period of time. The question is not simply one of rehabilitation; it is whether the particular needs of the child can be met within a reasonable timeframe, See, In re Amneris P., supra, 66 Conn.App. 384-85.
Donavin has been in care since he was approximately one month old. He is now two years old. A child of that age needs according to Dr. Freedman, in addition to the basic requirements of food and shelter, direct and constant supervision and diligence; he needs consistency, stability and a parent with good enough judgment to know how to promote a healthy psychological development. Mother has not from the date of the filing of the neglect petition through the date of the TPR trial made sufficient progress to allow for any belief that she could resume care for Donavin at this time or in any reasonable period of time. Dr. Freedman believed, practically speaking, that even if Mother moved back to Connecticut and engaged in a reunification program that it would be nine months to a year before reunification would be recommended by the service providers and Donavin, at that point would have been in placement "way beyond" that which is the recommended maximum period of time in placement for a child of that age.
FTR November 17, 2008 2:48:52 p.m.
FTR November 17, 2008 2:56:28 p.m.
The court found Dr. Freedman's testimony to be credible. The court may, in its discretion, give great weight to the opinion of a professional in a TPR proceeding. See In re Emerald C., 108 Conn.App. 839, 860 (2008), cert. den., 289 Conn. 923 (2008), In re Christina V., 38 Conn.App. 214, 221, 660 A.2d 863 (1995) and In re Shyliesh H., 56 Conn.App. 167, 176, 743 A.2d 165 (1999).
Mother was unable to comply with the court-ordered specific steps. She was discharged from the services offered in Connecticut without completion of the programs. She then, in essence, ran to Maine even though she had no job, apartment or family or stable relationships in that state — she followed one of the very people, Carrie, with whom she had a volatile and tumultuous relationship — instead of staying nearer to her son and taking advantage of the services offered to her. Once in Maine she continued her pattern of instability. She has been unable to develop and maintain stable support systems. She continues to rely upon the kindness of strangers; she takes advantage of the kindness afforded to her and then is unable to maintain a relationship with her supporters. She has not demonstrated any significant period of stability that is at all sufficient for the court to conclude that she is able to provide for and support herself, let alone provide a safe and stable home for this child. Taking into considerations the findings made above together with the age of the child, his time spent in the care of the Department and his need to be raised in a secure home, the court concludes, by clear and convincing evidence, Mother has failed to rehabilitate to a degree as to allow for any reasonable assurance that the child could safely be returned to her care.
The court finds by clear and convincing evidence, the petitioner has met her burden and, Ground B(i), the "failure to rehabilitate" ground for termination of Mother's parental rights to Donavin, is proven by clear and convincing evidence.
D. Termination of Parental Rights under Ground D
The petitioner also seeks to terminate the parental rights of Mother on the ground that there is no ongoing parent child relationship between Mother and Donavin.
This ground is established when there is no ongoing parent-child relationship with the parent, which is defined as the relationship that ordinarily develops as a result of a parent having met on a continuing day to day basis the physical, emotional, moral and educational needs of the child and where allowing further time for the establishment of the parent-child relationship would be detrimental to the best interest of the child. General Statutes § 17a-112(j)(3)(D).
"This part of the statute requires the trial court to undertake a two-pronged analysis. First, there must be a determination that no parent-child relationship exists, and second, the court must look into the future and determine whether it would be detrimental to the child's best interest to allow time for such a relationship to develop . . . In considering whether an ongoing parent-child relationship exists, the feelings of the child are of paramount importance . . . The ultimate question is whether the child has no present memories or feelings for the natural parent . . . Feelings for the natural parent connotes feelings of a positive nature only." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Jonathon C., 63 Conn.App. 516, 525, 777 A.2d 695 (2001). Where the child's feelings toward the parent are ambivalent, there must be a finding that "no positive emotional aspects of the relationship survive." In re Jessica M., 217 Conn. 459, 470, 586 A.2d 597 (1991).
In re Brea B., 75 Conn.App. 466 (2003). No ongoing parent-child relationship contemplates, among others, a situation in which, regardless of fault, a child either has never known his or her parent, or that no relationship has ever developed between them. In re Juvenile Appeal (Anonymous), 181 Conn. 638, 645-46 (1980).
In the adjudicatory phase, the petitioner must establish as to respondent: (1) that no ongoing parent-child relationship exists; and (2) that the allowance of further time for the establishment of such a relationship would harm the interests of the child. In re Jonathon C., 63 Conn.App. 516, 525 (2001).
DCF claims that Mother has failed to establish an ongoing parent-child relationship with Donavin. Mother, prior to moving to Maine, was visiting the child twice a week for two hours at a time and after moving to Maine, Mother continued to visit — albeit with some missed visits — Donavin. The DCF worker testified there is some positive interaction between Mother and Donavin during visits and that D seems happy to see her. The CRI worker testified that Donavin refers to Mother as "mama" on occasion and greets her with a hug. The court finds the petitioner has not presented sufficient evidence to satisfy her burden on the first prong of Ground D as she has failed to establish, by clear and convincing evidence, that Donavin has no positive memories of Mother and no on-going relationship exists between Mother and Donavin. Accordingly, there is no reason for the court to reach a conclusion as to the second prong of the Ground. Ground D is dismissed.
FTR November 18, 2008 10:21:35 a.m.
FTR November 18, 2008 12:07:53 p.m.
To conclude, the petitioner has established, by clear and convincing evidence, one statutory ground exists for the termination of Mother's parental rights to Donavin. Having so determined, the court must next consider whether clear and convincing evidence has been presented that it is in the best interests of the child that the parental rights of the respondents to Donavin be terminated
III DISPOSITION
During the dispositional phase, the trial court must determine whether "termination is in the best interests of the child." In re Quanitra M., 60 Conn.App. 96, 103, 758 A.2d 863, cert. den., 255 Conn. 903, 762 A.2d 909 (2000). "In arriving at that decision, the court is mandated to consider and make written findings regarding seven factors delineated in General Statutes [17a-112(k)]." In re Jonathon G., supra, 63 Conn.App. 528 (quoting In re Denzel A., 53 Conn.App. 827, 833 (1999)). The court is not, however, mandated by the statute to make the findings with respect to Father due to his consent. The court considers each of them with respect to Mother in determining whether to terminate parental rights under this section. The court makes the following seven written findings:
(1) As to the timeliness, nature and extent of services offered, provided and made available to the parents and the child by an agency to facilitate the reunion of the child with respondent. The court finds DCF offered timely and appropriate services to Donavin and Mother.
(2) As to whether DCF has made reasonable efforts to reunite the family pursuant to the federal Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980, as amended. The court finds that DCF made such efforts as to Mother and Donavin.
(3) As to the terms of any applicable court order entered into and agreed upon by any individual or agency and the parent and the extent to which all parties have fulfilled their obligations under such order, the court finds specific steps were ordered as to respondent Mother. As set forth above, Mother has not complied with many of the steps that were crucial to the ability of Mother to rehabilitate herself to allow the court to determine that she could parent the child in a reasonable period of time. DCF complied with such steps.
(4) As to the feelings and emotional ties of the children with respect to the children's parents, any guardian of such children's person and any person who has exercised physical care, custody or control of the child for at least one year and with whom the child has developed significant emotional ties. The court finds that Mother loves her child and would like to be reunified with him. The court finds that the child has some positive feelings to Mother. The credible evidence is that Donavin is bonded to his foster family. He has been placed with them for the majority of his young life and looks to them to meet his daily needs.
(5) As to the age of the child: Donavin is two years of age.
(6) As to the efforts the parents have made to adjust such parent's circumstances, conduct, or conditions to make it in the best interest of the children to return such children home in the foreseeable future, including, but not limited to, (A) the extent to which the parents have maintained contact with the children as part of an effort to reunite the children with the parent, provided the court may give weight to incidental visitations, communications or contributions, and (B) the maintenance of regular contact or communication with the guardian or other custodian of the children; the court finds as follows: Mother has made some effort to adjust her conduct by engaging in counseling and taking parenting classes while in Maine. She has also maintained contact with the Department in her efforts to facilitate reunification. The court finds, however, that the efforts made by Mother fall short. The court finds that she has not adjusted her circumstances, conduct and behavior to make it in the best interest of Donavin that he be reunified with Mother in the foreseeable future. Giving Mother a reasonable period of additional time would not likely bring her performance as a parent to an acceptable level.
(7) As to the extent to which a parent has been prevented from maintaining a meaningful relationship with the child by the unreasonable act or conduct of the other parent of the child, or the unreasonable act of any other person or by the economic circumstances of the parent, the court finds no unreasonable conduct by the child protection agency, foster parent(s) or third parties nor does the court find economic circumstances of the respondent preventing a meaningful relationship with Donavin.
In addition to considering the evidence presented in this case, the court has also considered the totality of the circumstances surrounding the child including the child's interest in sustained growth, development, well-being, stability, continuity of his environment, length of stay in foster care, the nature of his relationship with the foster and biological parents and the degree of contact maintained with the biological parents. In re Alexander C., 60 Conn.App. 555, 559, 760 A.2d 532 (2000); In re Shyina B., 58 Conn.App. 159, 167, 752 A.2d 1139 (2000); In re Savanna M., 55 Conn.App. 807, 816, 740 A.2d 484 (1999). The court has also balanced the child's intrinsic need for stability and permanency against the benefits of maintaining a connection with the biological parents. Pamela B. v. Ment, 244 Conn. 296, 314, 709 A.2d 1089 (1998). The court has also considered that the attorney for the child advocated for the termination of the parents' parental rights. Based upon all of the foregoing, the court by clear and convincing evidence finds termination of the parental rights of Mother and Father as to Donavin is in the best interest of the child.
IV REVIEW OF PERMANENCY PLANS
The Department further seeks to have the court approve the permanency plan of termination of parental rights and adoption filed on October 23, 2007.
General Statutes § 46b-129(k)(1) provides in pertinent part: "Nine months after placement of the child or youth in the care and custody of the commissioner . . . or removal of the child . . . pursuant to section 17a-101g or an order issued by a court of competent jurisdiction, whichever is earlier, the commissioner shall file a motion for review of a permanency plan." The court is required to hold a permanency hearing even absent an objection. The department has the burden of proving that the proposed permanency plan is in the best interests of the child. General Statutes § 46b-129(k)(1). At a permanency hearing held in accordance with this provision, the court shall approve a permanency plan that "is in the best interests of the child . . . and takes into consideration the child's . . . need for permanency. The child's . . . health and safety shall be of paramount concern in formulating such plan." General Statutes § 46b-129(k)(2). Having considered the evidence presented at the consolidated permanency plan hearing and the termination of parental rights trial, the court hereby finds by a preponderance of the evidence the plan for termination parental rights and adoption is in the best interests of the child.
The court hereby approves the plan filed on October 23, 2007. Objections to the plan are overruled.
The court further finds DCF has made reasonable efforts to achieve the plan.
V ORDERS
It is accordingly, ORDERED that the parental rights of Mother to Donavin are hereby terminated.
It is further, ORDERED, that the parental rights of Father to Donavin are hereby terminated.
The Commissioner of the Department of Children and Families is hereby appointed the statutory parent for this child.
The Commissioner will file, within thirty days hereof, a report as to the status of this child as required by statute and such further reports shall be timely presented to the court as required by law.
The Clerk of the Probate Court with jurisdiction over any subsequent adoption of each of this child shall notify in writing the Deputy Chief Clerk of the Superior Court for Juvenile Matters at New Britain of the date when any adoption is finalized.
Judgment may enter accordingly.
It is so ordered this 10th day of December 2008.