Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County No. CK57529, Marilyn H. Mackel, Juvenile Court Referee.
Christopher R. Booth, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Raymond G. Fortner, Jr., County Counsel, James M. Owens, Assistant County Counsel, and Kirstin Andreasen, Senior Associate County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
EPSTEIN, P. J.
Angelica C. (mother) appeals the denial of her Welfare and Institutions Code section 388 motion to reinstate reunification services with her sons Dominic B. and V.B. She argues she received treatment for the mental illness that precipitated the juvenile court’s involvement with her family, and she argues reunification would be in her sons’ best interest. We conclude the court did not abuse its discretion in ruling that her circumstances had not changed and that reunification would not be in her sons’ best interest. Thus, we affirm.
All further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
Dominic’s name also appears in the record as Dominique and Domonique. We use the name on his birth certificate.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL SUMMARY
Three-month-old Dominic came to the attention of the Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) on December 22, 2004, by way of a referral alleging neglect and caretaker absence. When a children’s social worker (CSW) visited mother’s home that day, mother took Dominic and drove away; the CSW and two police officers pursued and subsequently detained mother. Dominic’s maternal grandmother told the CSW that mother had a long history of substance abuse and would leave Dominic screaming and crying for hours at a time. A mental health counselor who visited the home earlier that day told the CSW that mother had threatened to kill her family. Mother was involuntarily hospitalized under section 5150, and Dominic was taken into protective custody.
Six days later, DCFS filed a petition alleging Dominic and his two older siblings, Cecilia F. and Carmen F., were children described by section 300, subdivision (b) due to mother’s mental and emotional problems and history of substance abuse. The juvenile court found a prima facie case to detain the children and gave temporary custody of Dominic to DCFS. DCFS was ordered to provide mother with reunification services.
Cecilia and Carmen were released to the custody of their father, Daniel F. They are not involved in this appeal, and we limit our factual and procedural summary accordingly.
At Dominic’s jurisdictional hearing in February 2005, mother submitted on the section 300 petition. DCFS reported that mother was diagnosed with bipolar disorder in September 2003. She was hospitalized in November 2003 after she tried to set a fire at a gas station in order to determine whether some gasoline was diluted with water. Daniel F. reported that mother attempted to set fire to his sister’s garage in 2003. Mother denied having a mental illness and attributed her behavior to a head injury. The court sustained the petition, ordered Dominic’s continued detention in foster care and continued the disposition hearing.
At the disposition hearing in May 2005, the juvenile court declared Dominic to be a dependent of the court. Mother was ordered to attend individual counseling with a licensed counselor, to complete parent education classes and domestic violence training, to submit to 10 random drug tests and complete a substance abuse program if any tests were missed or failed, and to undergo evaluation by a court-appointed psychiatrist. She was allowed to have monitored visits with Dominic.
The court-appointed psychiatrist subsequently diagnosed mother with borderline, paranoid and narcissistic personality disorder traits. He noted “significant episodes of psychiatric deterioration, including homicidal threats towards the family and other bizarre types of behavior which clearly put the children at risk,” and recommended against allowing her to care for her children.
Mother gave birth to V. in June 2005, and DCFS filed a section 300 petition on his behalf. Mother initially testified that she abandoned V. at a hospital under the “Baby Safe Haven Law,” but she brought him to court the following day after the court told her that she could be charged with murder if V. was not found and she was last seen with him. The court found a prima facie case to detain V., ordered that he be placed in foster care and ordered reunification services for mother. Mother was ordered to receive psychiatric treatment and to take all prescribed medications.
A six-month review hearing (§ 366.21, subd. (e)) for Dominic and a jurisdictional hearing for V. (§ 300) were held in August 2005. DCFS reported that mother completed substance abuse treatment, anger management classes and parenting classes, but she stopped attending psychiatric therapy and failed to appear for a drug test. The court sustained the section 300 petition as to V., declared him a dependent of the court and ordered his continued placement in foster care with his brother Dominic. The court ordered reunification services to continue.
Dominic’s 12-month review hearing (§ 366.21, subd. (f)) was held in December 2005. DCFS reported that mother continued to visit Dominic and V. on a weekly basis, and that “[t]he overall quality of the visits has been good.” Mother reported she had begun counseling with a licensed counselor, as ordered, but DCFS investigation revealed that mother’s counselor was an unlicensed student intern. Mother also submitted a letter purporting to be from “Pete Rothenberg M.D., Psychiatry Specialist, Ph D, Board Ceritified [sic].” The letter stated that Dr. Rothenberg gave mother “an extensive pshychiatric [sic] evaluation” and “[did] not see or foresee her needing any further evaluations by any toher [sic] psychiatryst [sic] as there is no mental illness nor does Ms. [C.] need to take any medications ever.” Repeated attempts by a CSW to contact Dr. Rothenberg were unsuccessful, the address on his letterhead was discovered not to exist, and the telephone number on his letterhead was disconnected with no forwarding number. The court ordered reunification services to continue.
V.’s six-month review hearing was held in January 2006. DCFS reported that mother’s weekly visits with V. were regular and positive. Mother reported seeing “Ms. Mashadi” and “Dr. Jones” at a psychiatric hospital, but calls to Mashadi went unanswered and there was no Dr. Jones on staff at the hospital. Mother appeared in the hospital’s records, but she had not yet been seen by a doctor or therapist. The court ordered reunification services to continue.
A permanency review hearing (§ 366.22) for Dominic and a 12-month review hearing for V. were held in July 2006. The court found mother had not received psychiatric treatment and had only “moderate[ly]” complied with her order to receive counseling. The court terminated reunification services, and set a permanency planning hearing as to Dominic and V. (§ 366.26.)
Before the permanency planning hearing was held, mother filed a section 388 petition to vacate the scheduled section 366.26 hearing and reinstate reunification services. The petition was heard and denied on July 24, 2007. This appeal followed.
DISCUSSION
Mother argues the court abused its discretion in denying her section 388 petition. “Under section 388, a party may petition the court to change, modify, or set aside a previous court order. The petitioning party has the burden of showing, by a preponderance of the evidence, that (1) there is a change of circumstances or new evidence; and (2) the proposed change in the court’s previous order is in the child’s best interests.” (In re Carl R. (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 1051, 1071.) “After the termination of reunification services, a parent’s interest in the care, custody and companionship of the child is no longer paramount. [Citation.] Rather, at this point, the focus shifts to the needs of the child for permanency and stability.” (In re Angel B. (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 454, 464.) “‘Whether a previously made order should be modified rests within the dependency court’s discretion, and its determination will not be disturbed on appeal unless an abuse of discretion is clearly established.’ [Citation.]” (In re Amber M. (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 681, 685.)
Mother argues she demonstrated changed circumstances and implies that she complied with orders to receive psychiatric treatment and counseling. But during the year between termination of reunification services and the hearing of her section 388 petition, she provided the court with no evidence of such compliance. Approximately one and a half months before the hearing, DCFS reported it had been unable to verify any of her claims of having received counseling or psychiatric care. At the hearing, mother claimed she was unable to maintain regular psychiatric care “because the Department of Mental Health had staffing issues.” At most, mother indicated she was beginning to seek psychiatric help, but that does not demonstrate changed circumstances. (In re Baby Boy L. (1994) 24 Cal.App.4th 596, 610 [mere showing of changing—as opposed to changed—circumstances not enough to justify return of infant after two years].) The juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in ruling that mother did not show changed circumstances as to her mental illness.
On the day her section 388 petition was heard, appellant apparently submitted a letter to the court written on Los Angeles County Department of Mental Health letterhead, dated June 22, 2007, stating that mother had been a client at the Downtown Mental Health Center since September 13, 2006. Her treatment was interrupted when her case manager left the clinic at the end of January 2007, she saw a psychologist twice in the interim, and she had scheduled an appointment with a psychiatrist on July 31, 2007.
Mother argues she established a “strong parent-child bond” with Dominic and V. But the boys appear to have shown more attachment to their foster mother than to her. During observed visits, the boys paid more attention to their foster mother and readily left with her when the visits were over. Before the boys’ last two visits with mother, they cried for 20 minutes, did not want to enter the visitation room and called for their foster mother. Dominic said he did not want to see mother and refused to exit his foster mother’s car at the visit site. When asked who his mother was, Dominic pointed to his foster mother. The court did not abuse its discretion in impliedly ruling mother had not established a parental bond with her sons.
Mother argues the juvenile court abused its discretion in ruling that reunification would not be in the boys’ best interest. We disagree. Dominic and V. had been in the care of the same foster mother since they were three months old and one month old, respectively. The boys had an affectionate, loving relationship with their foster mother, and Dominic said he regarded her as his own mother. DCFS expected to approve the foster mother’s request to adopt them one week after the section 388 petition was heard. “[T]here is a rebuttable presumption that, in the absence of continuing reunification services, stability in an existing placement is in the best interest of the child, particularly when such placement is leading to adoption by the long-term caretakers.” (In re Angel B., supra, 97 Cal.App.4th at p. 465.)
As we have said, mother did not demonstrate a parental bond with her sons or show progress in overcoming her mental illness. During one visit, mother attempted to teach V., who was less than two years old at the time, how to dial 911. During another visit, mother talked to the children erratically for nearly an hour and did not appear to notice that they were ignoring her. The court did not abuse its discretion in ruling that reestablishing reunification services on the eve of adoption would not be in the boys’ best interest. (See In re Angel B., supra, 97 Cal.App.4th at p. 465 [mother did not show reunification was in best interest of child when child had been raised by foster family from birth, foster family planned to adopt child, and no reasonable person could conclude child regarded mother as parent].)
DISPOSITION
The order is affirmed.
We concur: MANELLA, J., SUZUKAWA, J.