Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Super. Ct. No. JD224956
RAYE, J.Appellant, mother of the minor, appeals from orders entered at the 12-month review hearing continuing the dependency. (Welf. & Inst. Code, §§ 366.21, subd. (f), 395.) Appellant contends substantial evidence does not support continued removal of the minor or the court’s finding that reasonable services were provided. Further, appellant argues the court should have ordered unsupervised visits and erred in finding the minor was not an Indian child within the meaning of the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 (ICWA). (25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.) We affirm.
All further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless otherwise indicated.
FACTS
The newborn minor was placed in protective custody in Yolo County in December 2005 because appellant, who had mental health issues and no stable housing, left the minor with a convicted sex offender. Appellant’s parental rights were previously terminated as to two other children.
Prior to the detention hearing, appellant informed the social worker that she may have Indian heritage in the “Hoppehaw” tribe. The social worker sent notice of the proceedings to the Hoopa tribe and the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA).
The disposition hearing report recommended a plan that included parenting classes and therapy; however, appellant did not think she needed either service. Appellant had a traumatic past and was found to need long-term therapy both to deal with her past and to understand how it impacted her current functioning. Appellant resisted taking a parenting class because she had taken one before, but eventually agreed to go. Initially, appellant had unsupervised visits but did not show she understood how to protect the minor or what circumstances could place him at risk of harm. Appellant took the minor to an unapproved friend’s house, refused to consider medical advice during a visit when the minor was ill, and appeared to be more concerned about her right to visit than the minor’s welfare. The report concluded that appellant had housing and employment but resisted parenting and visitation guidelines.
A psychological evaluation in May 2006 diagnosed appellant with a personality disorder and a history of sexual abuse. According to the evaluation her current behavior and choices suggested that appellant had not dealt with her past trauma. The evaluation concluded appellant was probably able to meet the intellectual and physical needs of the minor but there were concerns about her ability to meet his emotional needs. Without long-term intervention, appellant was likely to gain only superficial benefit from therapy. The prognosis for successful reunification was poor because appellant did not recognize the need for extended treatment. The court adopted the reunification plan in June 2006.
An interim review report stated that appellant continued to violate visitation rules by having an unapproved male friend present during her visits, then denying she had done so. Visits were changed to supervised visits three times a week. Once supervision began the minor was observed to sleep most of the visit which, according to the foster parents, was unusual.
The six-month review report stated that notice for the six-month hearing was again sent to the Hoopa tribe and the BIA, but there was no response. The social worker requested the court find the minor was not an Indian child. Appellant continued to be employed and maintain housing. There was concern about appellant’s male friend, who had a criminal history that included drugs and spousal abuse. The report noted appellant had a history of dependent behavior and abusive relationships. Appellant was actively engaged in therapy although she did not see the need for it and did not understand that her lack of empathy directly related to her ability to form meaningful relationships. Similarly, although appellant did not think she needed it, she did complete the parenting class. Appellant visited regularly and was generally appropriate in meeting the minor’s needs but took phone calls during visits and had inappropriate conversations with the minor, complaining about her anger and frustration with the Yolo County Department of Employment and Social Services, and occasionally requested the visits end early. She continued to have difficulty consoling the minor when he cried. The report indicated appellant was doing services only because she was ordered to do so and did not understand the importance of placing the minor’s needs before her own.
At the six-month review hearing in October 2006, the court continued reunification services and transferred the case to Sacramento County, where appellant lived. The adopted findings and orders contained a finding that the minor was not an Indian child “as defined in 25 USC 1903 (4).”
The December 2006 report for the transfer-in hearing stated that the Yolo County social worker’s biggest concern was that appellant was indifferent to the minor’s crying during visits, noting the general pattern of visits was that the minor would arrive happy, cry until he was tired, and then fall asleep. According to the visit supervisor, visits had improved somewhat recently, although the minor remained anxious when the foster parents left, and the observer said the minor appeared miserable at visits despite some engagement with appellant. The report stated appellant had completed most services but needed long-term therapy because she had a lack of insight and acknowledgment of her family history of abuse, which was reflected both in her inappropriate response to the minor’s crying during visits and in her continued association with an individual who had a history of domestic violence.
The 12-month review report stated that appellant remained employed and had maintained housing. The court ordered another 13 sessions of psychotherapy. Appellant was referred to therapy, but the social worker did not know whether she had begun the new sessions. Appellant also was referred for individual mentoring for parenting during visits to teach her appropriate techniques for communicating with the minor. A recent visit had gone well, with no crying by the minor. The report concluded risk factors remained, because appellant needed parenting training and further therapy. While there were still concerns about appellant’s parenting, the report stated there was no evidence appellant would not be able to care for the minor. Nonetheless, according to the report, appellant still needed to demonstrate her ability to parent the minor day to day and had not yet moved to unsupervised visits.
At the 12-month review hearing, appellant argued the report did not establish a substantial risk of detriment to the minor if returned to her care, and because she had not had mentoring, there was a lack of reasonable services. The court found the case “a close call” but found that the Department of Health and Human Services had met its burden because appellant had not progressed to unsupervised visits and had maintained a connection with a person who had a history of domestic violence. The court believed it was necessary to provide appellant the opportunity to make proper choices in unsupervised visits before returning the minor.
DISCUSSION
I
Appellant contends substantial evidence does not support the juvenile court’s finding that there was a substantial risk of detriment to the minor in returning home.
When the sufficiency of the evidence to support a finding or order is challenged on appeal, even where the standard of proof in the trial court is clear and convincing, the reviewing court must determine if there is any substantial evidence -- that is, evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of solid value -- to support the conclusion of the trier of fact. (In re Angelia P. (1981) 28 Cal.3d 908, 924; In re Jason L. (1990) 222 Cal.App.3d 1206, 1214.) In making this determination we recognize that all conflicts are to be resolved in favor of the prevailing party and that issues of fact and credibility are questions for the trier of fact. (In re Jason L., supra, 222 Cal.App.3d at p. 1214; In re Steve W. (1990) 217 Cal.App.3d 10, 16.) The reviewing court may not reweigh the evidence when assessing the sufficiency of the evidence. (In re Stephanie M. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 295, 318-319.)
At the 12-month review hearing, “[t]he court shall order the return of the child to the physical custody of his or her parent . . . unless the court finds, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the return of the child to his or her parent . . . would create a substantial risk of detriment to the safety, protection, or physical or emotional well-being of the child.” (§ 366.21, subd. (f).)
At the outset, the minor was at risk of physical harm because of appellant’s indifference to his care. According to the therapist and psychological assessment, this lack of empathy was the result of appellant’s own traumatic childhood. By the time of the 12-month review hearing, the social worker felt appellant was probably able to care for the minor’s purely physical needs, but continued to be concerned about appellant’s ability to address his emotional well-being and make appropriate choices regarding his care. Appellant’s performance in visitation did not demonstrate any emotional response to the minor’s chronic distress or any ability to deal with it despite her participation in parenting classes and therapy. It is doubtless true that appellant was able to perform the mere mechanical tasks involved in child care, but a child needs more. The stimulation of loving interaction and a demonstration of care and concern promote a feeling of safety and stability in a child that is critical to emotional growth and development. Until appellant became more aware of the need to provide this care and understood the impact of neglect on the minor, he remained at risk if returned to her care.
II
Appellant further asserts there is not substantial evidence that reasonable services were provided because she had been referred to, but had not yet received, a parenting mentor.
The social worker must make “a good faith effort” to provide reasonable services responding to the unique needs of each family. (In re Kristin W. (1990) 222 Cal.App.3d 234, 254; In re Dino E. (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 1768, 1777.) The question is not whether more or better services could have been provided, but “whether the services were reasonable under the circumstances.” (In re Misako R. (1991) 2 Cal.App.4th 538, 547.)
In Yolo County, appellant was offered unsupervised visitation until her parenting choices made it clear she was placing the minor at risk. Appellant was resistant to suggestions about where and how to visit with the minor. Supervised visitation began in conjunction with appellant’s parenting classes and therapy, both of which were expected to improve appellant’s interaction with the minor and her overall understanding of how her past impacted her current relationships with the minor and others. Because little improvement was seen after six months, further therapy was recommended. These services were reasonable and addressed the goals of the case plan.
After the case was transferred, a new social worker with potentially different resources available decided to try parent mentoring to improve appellant’s interactive parenting skills. This service was also a reasonable response to the circumstances. The fact that the new program had not yet begun did not render the service unreasonable in light of the transfer and necessary reassessments. Moreover, the remedy for inadequate services is a further period of services. (In re Alvin R. (2003) 108 Cal.App.4th 962, 975.) The juvenile court has already provided this remedy to appellant.
III
Appellant contends the court erred in failing to order unsupervised visitation instead of leaving the decision to the social worker.
“In order to maintain ties between the parent . . . and the child, and to provide information relevant to deciding if, and when, to return a child to the custody of his or her parent,” an order placing a child in foster care must include visitation. (§ 362.1, subd. (a); see In re Christopher H. (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 1001, 1008.) Such visitation must be “as frequent as possible, consistent with the well-being of the child.” (§ 362.1, subd. (a)(1)(A).) However, the court may craft appropriate orders for limited parent-child contact if visitation would be harmful to the child’s well-being since “[n]o visitation order shall jeopardize the safety of the child.” (§ 362.1, subd. (a)(1)(B).)
In making visitation orders, the court can properly delegate “the ministerial tasks of overseeing the right as defined by the court. . . . Such matters as time, place and manner of visitation do not affect the defined right of a parent to see his or her child . . . .” (In re Jennifer G. (1990) 221 Cal.App.3d 752, 757.) “[T]he role of the agency and its agent is subject to the juvenile court’s supervision and control. Accordingly, if the agency is abusing its responsibility in managing the details of visitation, [appellant] may bring that matter to the attention of the juvenile court . . . .” (In re Moriah T. (1994) 23 Cal.App.4th 1367, 1377.)
The decision whether to supervise visits is the type of ministerial task that the court may delegate to the social worker in a proper case. Such delegation is particularly appropriate in cases such as this where the parent previously lost the privilege of unsupervised visitation and is in need of one-on-one parenting instruction before moving to unsupervised visitations. The court’s order simply recognizes that the social worker is in a better position than the court to continually monitor appellant’s progress toward unsupervised visitation and to implement it. (In re Moriah T., supra, 23 Cal.App.4th at p. 1376.) Should matters not progress appropriately, appellant can seek further orders in the juvenile court. No error appears.
IV
Appellant contends that, at the six-month review hearing, the court improperly determined the minor was not an Indian child, thereby usurping the tribe’s prerogative to determine who qualifies for membership in the tribe. Appellant argues that continued notice of further hearings was required and reversal is necessary to permit proper notice of the 12-month review hearing.
We note at the outset that appellant did not challenge the finding at the time or appeal the six-month review rulings. Thus, the claim is forfeited. (In re Daniel K. (1998) 61 Cal.App.4th 661, 667; In re Dakota S. (2000) 85 Cal.App.4th 494, 501-502.) Even if not forfeited, the argument fails.
The ICWA protects the interests of Indian children and promotes the stability and security of Indian tribes by establishing minimum standards for, and permitting tribal participation in, dependency actions. (25 U.S.C. §§ 1901, 1902, 1903(1), 1911(c), 1912.) To facilitate participation, notice of the pending proceeding and the right to intervene must be sent to the tribe or to the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) if the tribal affiliation is not known. (25 U.S.C. § 1912; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.664(f).) Once notice is provided, it must be sent for each subsequent hearing unless the juvenile court determines that the ICWA does not apply under the facts before it. (In re Marinna J. (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 731, 736; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.664(f)(5).) The court may make this determination “[i]f, after a reasonable time following the sending of notice under this rule -- but in no event less than 60 days -- no determinative response to the notice is received” from the tribe. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.664(f)(6).)
Here, initial notice of the proceedings was sent seven months before the review hearing, more than a reasonable time for reply. Having received no response to the notice, the court found: “The minor is not an Indian Child as defined in 25 USC 1903 (4).”
The cited statute, section 1903 of title 25 of the United States Code, defines certain terms in the ICWA. Subdivision (4) of that section states: “‘Indian child’ means any unmarried person who is under age eighteen and is either (a) a member of an Indian tribe or (b) is eligible for membership in an Indian tribe and is the biological child of a member of an Indian tribe[.]” Determination of the fact of tribal membership is made exclusively by the tribe. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.664(g).)
It is apparent that the court’s finding that the minor was not an Indian child did not infringe upon the right of a tribe to determine its membership. It merely acknowledged that, after a reasonable time, there was no evidence that the minor met the definition of Indian child as set forth in the statute. Juvenile courts frequently make findings that the ICWA does not apply; the court in this case made an equivalent finding. The specific language used does not convert the finding into an impermissible usurpation of the tribe’s function.
DISPOSITION
The orders of the juvenile court are affirmed.
We concur: DAVIS, Acting P.J., BUTZ, J.