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In re Interest of D.I.T.M.

SUPERIOR COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
Sep 12, 2016
J-A17015-16 (Pa. Super. Ct. Sep. 12, 2016)

Opinion

J-A17015-16 No. 342 EDA 2016 No. 343 EDA 2016

09-12-2016

IN THE INTEREST OF: D.I.T.M., A MINOR APPEAL OF: S.R.T., MOTHER IN THE INTEREST OF: M.T., A MINOR APPEAL OF: S.R.T., MOTHER


NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

Appeal from the Decree December 17, 2015 in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
Family Court at Nos.: CP-51-AP-0000580-2015 CP-51-DP-0001714-2013 FID: 51-FN-003381-2013 Appeal from the Decree December 17, 2015 in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
Family Court at Nos.: CP-51-AP-0000579-2015 CP-51-DP-0001713-2013 FID: 51-FN-003381-2013 BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J., LAZARUS, J., and PLATT, J. MEMORANDUM BY PLATT, J.:

Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

In these consolidated appeals, S.R.T. (Mother) appeals from the decrees of the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County, entered December 17, 2015, that terminated her parental rights to her son, D.I.T.M., born in September of 2011, and her son M.T., born in May of 2010 (Children), and changed the Children's goals from reunification to adoption. We affirm on the basis of the trial court opinion.

This Court consolidated these appeals, sua sponte, on February 24, 2016. Mother apparently filed two previous appeals of these decrees pro se, at 255 and 256 EDA 2016, that this Court docketed on January 27, 2016. Mother filed praecipes to discontinue those appeals on February 11, 2016.

The trial court also terminated the parental rights of the Children's fathers, who did not appeal those terminations. --------

In its opinion entered February 5, 2016, the trial court aptly summarized the events that led the Philadelphia Department of Human Services (DHS) to file a petition for involuntary termination. We respectfully direct the reader to that opinion for a more complete summary of the facts of this case.

However, for the convenience of the reader, we note briefly that Mother became known to DHS when it received a General Protective Services Report that Mother appeared to be intoxicated while pushing one of her sons in a stroller. Mother was previously diagnosed with ADHD, bipolar disorder and depression. She had left her Children with her own eighty year-old Mother, who was not physically able to care for them. Mother enrolled in several drug and alcohol treatment programs but continued to test positive for PCP and benzodiazepines. After the Children were in foster care for twenty-eight months, Mother had still failed to achieve compliance with the objectives of her Single Case Plan. DHS filed petitions to terminate Mother's parental rights to the Children on August 27, 2015.

The trial court held a hearing on DHS' petitions on December 17, 2015. Testifying at that hearing, in addition to Mother, were Turning Points for Children Case Manager, Essence Jones, and Turning Points visitation coach, Olanda Owens. The trial court entered its decrees terminating Mother's parental rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8) and (b) and changing the Children's goals to adoption, on December 17, 2015. Mother timely filed her notice of appeal and statement of errors complained of on appeal in regard to D.I.T.M. on January 7, 2016, and in regard to M.T. on January 15, 2016. The trial court filed an opinion on February 5, 2016. ( See Trial Court Opinion, 2/05/16). See Pa.R.A.P. 1925.

Mother raises the following two inter-related questions on appeal:

1. Did the trial court commit an error of law and abuse of discretion by involuntarily terminating [Mother's] parental rights where [DHS] failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that involuntary [sic] terminating [Mother's] parental rights would best serve the emotional needs and welfare of [the Children]?

2. Did the trial court commit an error of law and abuse of discretion by involuntarily terminating Mother's parental rights without fully considering the impact of termination on the emotional needs and welfare of [the Children]?
(Mother's Brief, at 3).

Our standard of review is well-settled:

In an appeal from an order terminating parental rights, our scope of review is comprehensive: we consider all the evidence presented as well as the trial court's factual findings and legal conclusions. However, our standard of review is narrow: we will reverse the trial court's order only if we conclude that the trial court abused its discretion, made an error of law, or lacked competent evidence to support its findings. The trial judge's decision is entitled to the same deference as a jury verdict.
In re L.M., 923 A.2d 505, 511 (Pa. Super. 2007) (citations omitted).

Furthermore, this Court has explained:

Where the hearing court's findings are supported by competent evidence of record, we must affirm the hearing court even though the record could support an opposite result.

We are bound by the findings of the trial court which have adequate support in the record so long as the findings do not evidence capricious disregard for competent and credible evidence. The trial court is free to believe all, part, or none of the evidence presented, and is likewise free to make all credibility determinations and resolve conflicts in the evidence. Though we are not bound by the trial court's inferences and deductions, we may reject its conclusions only if they involve errors of law or are clearly unreasonable in light of the trial court's sustainable findings.
In re M.G., 855 A.2d 68, 73-74 (Pa. Super. 2004) (citations omitted).

We note our standard of review of a change of goal:

When we review a trial court's order to change the placement goal for a dependent child to adoption, our standard is abuse of discretion. In order to conclude that the trial court abused its discretion, we must determine that the court's judgment was manifestly unreasonable, that the court did not apply the law, or that the court's action was a result of partiality, prejudice, bias or ill will, as shown by the record.
In the Interest of S.G., 922 A.2d 943, 946 (Pa. Super. 2007).

Termination of parental rights is governed by Section 2511 of the Adoption Act, 23 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2101-2938, which requires a bifurcated analysis.

Initially, the focus is on the conduct of the parent. The party seeking termination must prove by clear and convincing evidence that the parent's conduct satisfies the statutory grounds for termination delineated in Section 2511(a). Only if the court determines that the parent's conduct warrants termination of his or her parental rights does the court engage in the second part of the analysis pursuant to Section 2511(b): determination of the needs and welfare of the child under the standard of best interests of the child. One major aspect of the needs and welfare analysis concerns the nature and status of the emotional bond between parent and child, with close attention paid to the effect on the child of permanently severing any such bond.
In re L.M., 923 A.2d 505, 511 (Pa. Super. 2007) (citations omitted).

Here, the trial court terminated Mother's parental rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8), and (b). In order to affirm the termination of parental rights, this Court need only agree with any one cited subsection of Section 2511(a). See In re B.L.W., 843 A.2d 380, 384 (Pa. Super. 2004) (en banc), appeal denied, 863 A.2d 1141 (Pa. 2004). Section 2511 provides, in pertinent part:

§ 2511. Grounds for involuntary termination

(a) General rule.—The rights of a parent in regard to a child may be terminated after a petition filed on any of the following grounds:

(1) The parent by conduct continuing for a period of at least six months immediately preceding the filing of the petition either has evidenced a settled purpose of
relinquishing parental claim to a child or has refused or failed to perform parental duties.


* * *

(b) Other considerations.—The court in terminating the rights of a parent shall give primary consideration to the developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare of the child. The rights of a parent shall not be terminated solely on the basis of environmental factors such as inadequate housing, furnishings, income, clothing and medical care if found to be beyond the control of the parent. With respect to any petition filed pursuant to subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not consider any efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions described therein which are first initiated subsequent to the giving of notice of the filing of the petition.
23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1), (b).

It is well settled that a party seeking termination of a parent's rights bears the burden of proving the grounds to so do by "clear and convincing evidence," a standard which requires evidence that is "so clear, direct, weighty, and convincing as to enable the trier of fact to come to a clear conviction, without hesitance, of the truth of the precise facts in issue." In re T.F., 847 A.2d 738, 742 (Pa. Super. 2004). Further,

A parent must utilize all available resources to preserve the parental relationship, and must exercise reasonable firmness in resisting obstacles placed in the path of maintaining the parent-child relationship. Parental rights are not preserved by waiting for a more suitable or convenient time to perform one's parental responsibilities while others provide the child with his or her physical and emotional needs.
In the Interest of K.Z.S., 946 A.2d 753, 759 (Pa. Super. 2008) (citations omitted).

Here, preliminarily, we note that Mother neither raises nor argues the question of whether the trial court erred when it terminated her parental rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a) in either her statement of questions or in the argument section of her brief. ( See Mother's Brief, at 3, 6-19); see also Krebs v. United Refining Company of Pa., 893 A.2d 776, 797 (Pa. Super. 2006) (holding that appellant waives issues not raised in both concise statement of errors complained of on appeal and statement of questions involved in appellate brief); Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)(4)(vii) (providing that "Issues not included in the Statement and/or not raised in accordance with the provisions of this paragraph (b)(4) are waived."); In re W.H., 25 A.3d 330, 339 n.3 (Pa. Super. 2011), appeal denied, 611 Pa. 643, 24 A.3d 364 (2011) ("[W]here an appellate brief fails to provide any discussion of a claim with citation to relevant authority or fails to develop the issue in any other meaningful fashion capable of review, that claim is waived."). Accordingly, Mother has waived any challenge pursuant to section 2511(a).

Additionally, Mother has waived any challenge to the change of permanency goal to adoption by her failure to raise the issue in both her concise statement and in the statement of questions involved portion of her brief, and her failure to develop any challenge to the change of permanency goal in the argument portion of her brief. ( See Concise Statements, 1/07/16; 1/15/16; Mother's Brief, at 3, 6-19).

Also, Mother has failed to raise in her concise statement her claim that the trial court should have ordered a formal bonding evaluation. ( See Mother's Brief, at 18-19; see also Concise Statement of Errors). Therefore, she has waived this issue as well.

Finally, Mother challenges the trial court's finding that termination of the parent-child bond would best serve the needs of the Children.

The Adoption Act provides that a trial court "shall give primary consideration to the developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare of the child." 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(b). The Act does not make specific reference to an evaluation of the bond between parent and child but our case law requires the evaluation of any such bond. See In re E.M., 620 A.2d 481, 485 (Pa. 1993). However, this Court has held that the trial court is not required by statute or precedent to order a formal bonding evaluation performed by an expert. See In re K.K.R.-S., 958 A.2d 529, 533 (Pa. Super. 2008).

After a thorough review of the record, the briefs of the parties, the applicable law, and the well-reasoned opinion of the trial court we conclude that there is no merit to the issues Mother has raised on appeal. The trial court opinion properly disposes of the questions presented. ( See Trial Ct. Op., at 5-13) (concluding that: DHS met its statutory burden by clear and convincing evidence regarding (1) change of goal to adoption and (2) termination of Mother's parental rights, where Mother exhibited a pattern of not complying with court orders or her single case plan, continued to test positive for PCP, and failed to obtain verified employment, stable housing or mental health treatment; and (3) termination would best serve Children's emotional needs and welfare where the Children's current placement provides them with stability, parental care and permanency.). Accordingly, we affirm on the basis of the trial court's opinion.

Decrees affirmed. Judgment Entered. /s/_________
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary Date: 9/12/2016

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Summaries of

In re Interest of D.I.T.M.

SUPERIOR COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
Sep 12, 2016
J-A17015-16 (Pa. Super. Ct. Sep. 12, 2016)
Case details for

In re Interest of D.I.T.M.

Case Details

Full title:IN THE INTEREST OF: D.I.T.M., A MINOR APPEAL OF: S.R.T., MOTHER IN THE…

Court:SUPERIOR COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Date published: Sep 12, 2016

Citations

J-A17015-16 (Pa. Super. Ct. Sep. 12, 2016)