Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. TJ16613 Charles R. Scarlett, Judge.
Cindy Brines, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Pamela C. Hamanaka, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Michael R. Johnsen and Corey J. Robins, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
WOODS, J.
Dion H. was declared a ward of the juvenile court and placed home on probation after the court sustained a two-count petition (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 602) alleging he had committed the offenses of misdemeanor vandalism (Pen. Code, § 594, subd. (a)) and throwing a substance at a vehicle (Veh. Code, § 23110, subd. (a)). He challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support the findings. We affirm the order as modified.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The evidence at the jurisdiction hearing established that on the evening of April 11, 2007, Geovanni Porras was in his FedEx truck going south on Central Avenue in Compton when he stopped for a red light at Caldwell Street. He was about one-half block away from the intersection, when he noticed three boys running north on Central Avenue. They were on the sidewalk to Porras’s right, at a distance of about 10 feet from his truck. The light turned green, and Porras began to approach the intersection, when the tallest boy bent down, picked up a rock from the sidewalk, and threw it at the truck. The rock hit the windshield, leaving a hole about the size of a grapefruit. The boy and his companions fled north on Central Avenue. Porras immediately stopped his truck and waved to a patrol car directly behind him. He explained to the officers what had occurred and pointed to the boys as they ran towards a nearby house. The boys reached the house and remained outside where they were detained by the officers. Porras identified Dion H. as the rock thrower after seeing his face and because Dion H. was the tallest of the three boys. Porras testified that when the rock was thrown, he continuously watched the boys until they were detained by the officers about a minute later. Porras also testified that other than the three boys, no one of comparable age was outside the house.
Leon E. testified for the defense that on the evening of April 11, 2007, he was with Dion H. and three other boys. After getting something to eat at “Lucky Star,” they were all headed back to Craig’s house, but they stopped at an ice company where they found a pile of ice on the ground. Four of the boys collected the ice, chased after Craig and threw it as he was riding his bicycle. Leon E. did not see a FedEx truck, nor did he ever see Dion H. throw a rock. The four of them were just having fun with Craig. They were still running after Craig when the officers arrived.
Andre H. testified that he was with Dion H. and the others that evening. His testimony generally corroborated Leon E.’s testimony. Andre H. added that his older brother Darnell H. was among the boys; and he (not Dion H.) is the tallest of the five of them. Andre H. was arrested after he took a shortcut, alone, to a nearby school. He was not arrested outside someone’s house. Darnell H. went home and Craig went to his house. They were not arrested.
Dion H. testified in his own defense and corroborated the testimony of Leon E. and Andre H. Dion H also denied throwing a rock at all or throwing ice at anyone other than at his four friends. Dion H. testified that he noticed the FedEx truck but did not see a broken windshield because the truck was facing the opposite direction. Police arrived and arrested him, Leon E. and Andre H. outside someone’s house. Craig and Darnell H. were not with them and were not arrested.
At the conclusion of the jurisdiction hearing following counsels’ argument, the juvenile court found beyond a reasonable doubt that Dion H. had committed the alleged offenses, particularly in light of Porras’s testimony he never lost sight of the three boys, and police detained them about a minute after the rock was thrown.
At the disposition hearing, the juvenile court declared Dion H. a ward of the court, ordered him home on probation subject to certain terms and conditions, and declared both offenses to be misdemeanors.
The vandalism count was originally alleged as a felony. The court granted the prosecution’s motion to reduce the offense to a misdemeanor at the outset of the jurisdiction hearing. Porras testified the cost to repair his windshield was $261.
DISCUSSION
1. Standard of Review
The same standard of appellate review is applicable in considering the sufficiency of the evidence in a juvenile proceeding as in reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a criminal conviction. (In re Cheri T. (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 1400, 1404; In re Jose R. (1982) 137 Cal.App.3d 269, 275.) In either case we review the whole record in the light most favorable to the judgment to determine whether it discloses substantial evidence -- that is, evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of solid value -- from which a reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. (People v. Bolin (1998) 18 Cal.4th 297, 331; People v. Jones (1990) 51 Cal.3d 294, 314.)
We resolve all conflicts in the evidence and questions of credibility in favor of the verdict, and indulge every reasonable inference the jury could draw from the evidence. (People v. Autry (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 351, 358.) Reversal on this ground is unwarranted unless “‘that upon no hypothesis whatever is there sufficient substantial evidence to support [the conviction].’” (Bolin, supra, 18 Cal.4th at p. 331.)
2. The Evidence Supports the Juvenile Court’s Findings
Dion H. does not dispute the findings the crimes of vandalism and throwing a substance on a vehicle were committed. Instead, he argues, as he did before the juvenile court, that the evidence fails to prove his identity beyond a reasonable doubt. According to Dion H., Porras’s testimony as to his vantage point, driving activity, and time frame in purportedly witnessing Dion H. commit the offenses makes Porras’s identification inherently improbable. Specifically, Dion H. maintains that Porras could not have seen who threw the rock at his truck because he noticed the boys only after passing through the intersection, when they were 10 feet away, directly to the right of his truck, and running in the opposite direction of his travel. Dion H. further argues Porras’s testimony does not support a reasonable inference that he never lost sight of the boys in the midst of stopping his truck, signaling the officer and explaining to him what had occurred. Dion H. posits that Porras must have looked away at some point and missed the departure of Craig and Darnell H., the tallest of the five boys, suggesting the more reasonable inference is that Darnell H. threw the rock.
Determining witness credibility is the exclusive province of the trier of fact. (People v. Ochoa (1993) 6 Cal.4th 1199, 1206.) The testimony of a single witness, unless physically impossible or inherently improbable, is sufficient to support the verdict. (People v. Scott (1978) 21 Cal.3d 284, 296; People v. Elwood (1988) 199 Cal.App.3d 1365, 1372.) Nothing in the record suggests that Porras’s testimony was inherently improbable or physically impossible. Notwithstanding Dion H.’s assertions to the contrary, Porras consistently testified that prior to reaching the intersection he saw the three boys running and witnessed Dion H., the tallest boy, stop long enough to retrieve and to throw a rock at his truck. Porras subsequently identified Dion H. after seeing his face and as the tallest of the three boys.
Dion H.’s insistence there were five instead of three boys together is based entirely on his own and other defense witnesses’ testimony, which the juvenile court was free to disbelieve. By pointing to what Dion H. perceives as inconsistent or implausible aspects of Porras’s testimony, he is inviting us to reweigh the evidence and to engage in speculation, neither of which is the function of an appellate court. (People v. Culver (1973) 10 Cal.3d 542, 548; People v. Berryman (1993) 6 Cal.4th 1048, 1084, overruled in part on other grounds in People v. Hill (1998) 17 Cal.4th 800, 823, fn. 1.) As the juvenile court found, Porras’s testimony was “reasonable, credible and of solid value.” (People v. Bolin, supra, 18 Cal.4th at p. 331.) That is all that is required to support the convictions. (Ibid.)
Although unnecessary, the court specified the maximum period of physical confinement as one year, consisting of concurrent terms of one year for vandalism and six months for throwing a substance at a vehicle. Dion H.’s challenge to the juvenile court’s order setting the maximum period of physical confinement is well taken. Because he was placed home on probation, the court’s calculation of the maximum period of physical confinement has no legal effect. (See Welf. & Inst. Code, § 726, subd. (c); In re Ali A. (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 569, 573-574 [court required to specify maximum period of physical confinement only when minor removed from physical custody of his or her parent or guardian]; In re Joseph G. (1995) 32 Cal.App.4th 1735, 1744 [same].) Accordingly, we need not reach Dion H.’s alternative contention the juvenile court erroneously failed to stay pursuant to Penal Code section 654, the six-month term for throwing a substance at a vehicle. However, should the juvenile court in the future be required to calculate Dion H.’s maximum period of physical confinement, it is to do so in conformity with Penal Code section 654, if applicable. (Compare In re Danny H. (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 92, 106-107.)
DISPOSITION
The maximum term of physical confinement is stricken. As modified, the order is affirmed.
We concur: PERLUSS, P. J., ZELON, J.