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In re Destony

Court of Appeals of California, Second Appellate District, Division Seven.
Nov 19, 2003
No. B169238 (Cal. Ct. App. Nov. 19, 2003)

Opinion

B169238.

11-19-2003

In re DESTONY L., a Minor. CHRISTINA C., Petitioner, v. THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES, Respondent. LOS ANGELES COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES et al., Real Parties in Interest.

Joseph G. Wick for Petitioner. No appearance for Respondent. Lloyd W. Pellman, County Counsel, Pamela S. Cisneros, Deputy County Counsel for Real Party in Interest Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services. Law Offices of Lisa E. Mandel and Alan Jablonski for Real Party in Interest Destony L.


Petitioner Christina C. is the mother of one-year-old Destony L., a child who has been declared a dependent of the juvenile court. In the instant proceeding, Christina seeks extraordinary writ review (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 366.26, subd. (l) ; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 39.1B) of the juvenile courts order setting a hearing for the selection and implementation of a permanent plan for Destony, with the possibility of termination of the parental relationship. The petition is opposed by the Department of Children and Family Services (Department) and also by Destony, who has filed a joinder in the Departments brief in opposition to the petition. Christina principally contends she was not provided with reasonable reunification services by the Department, because the services she received were not tailored to meet her specific needs. We deny the petition.

All statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.

FACTS

At the time of Destonys birth in August 2002 Christina was seventeen years old, she was a runaway dependent of the juvenile court, and she had already lost custody of her eldest child (Angel) after she failed to make progress in her treatment plan and ran away from her own foster home placement. The day after Destony was born, hospital staff reported to the Department that during the delivery Christina had snatched out the IV, hit the nurse, and attempted to leave the hospital. The Department promptly filed a petition seeking to declare Destony a court dependent (§ 300), alleging she was at risk of harm due to Christinas mental and emotional problems and for Angels dependency status. The court detained Destony, with monitored visits so long as Christina remained in her foster care placement.

In a report for the jurisdictional hearing (§ 355), submitted in September 2002, the Department advised as follows: Christina, who was declared a court dependent in 1998 due to physical abuse by her father, had a history of running away from her placements, of engaging in sexual acts with men she did not know, and of mental and emotional problems which had resulted in medical intervention including psychiatric commitments. Christina did not know who was the father of Destony. She was visiting Destony on a regular basis and all visits had gone well. On October 9, 2002 the court sustained the petition, declared Destony a court dependent, and ordered the Department to provide family reunification services for six months. As had been agreed by all the parties in a mediation, the court ordered Christina to participate in individual counseling, complete a parenting education program, and take all prescribed medication.

In its report for the six-month review hearing (& sect; 366.21, subd. (e)), the Department indicated Christina was doing well in her foster placement, had completed a parenting program, was enrolled in individual psychotherapy, and regularly visited Destony and Angel who were placed together in a foster home. The social worker had taken Christina for assessment of eligibility for Regional Center services, and the evaluator had initially determined she was eligible and had scheduled a psychological evaluation. Christina was visiting her children regularly, but during the visits she displayed lack of patience, was easily overwhelmed, and lacked knowledge of even the most basic parenting skills such as changing diapers and feeding. The report described two incidents in which Christinas behavior had placed Destony at risk. Once, she dropped Angel while carrying him down the stairs yet showed no alarm, and the second time she lost grip of Angels hand while crossing the street, and simply giggled while the foster mother ran after Angel who was scurrying away through traffic. The Department recommended termination of reunification, as in its view Destony was at risk if placed in Christinas care due to Christinas immaturity, irresponsibility, and lack of even the most basic parenting skills. The Department also noted Christinas history of emotional and developmental problems made it difficult for her to provide appropriate care for her own needs, let alone the needs of a child.

Regional Centers are private nonprofit community agencies under contract with the state to provide services for persons who suffer from a developmental disability (§ 4620), defined as "a disability which originates before an individual attains age 18, continues, or can be expected to continue, indefinitely, and constitutes a substantial disability for that individual. [T]his term shall include mental retardation, cerebral palsy, epilepsy, and autism. This term shall also include disabling conditions found to be closely related to mental retardation or to require treatment similar to that required for mentally retarded individuals, but shall not include other handicapping conditions that are solely physical in nature." (§ 4512.)

On April 9, 2003, at Christinas request, the court continued the six-month review hearing for a contest. On July 15 the court ordered the Department to submit a supplemental report, addressing what services were available to Christina, what services had been provided, and with what services Christina had complied. The supplemental report, submitted August 7, noted Christina had completed a parenting education program and had made progress through regular participation in individual psychotherapy, and outlined the various services which had been provided to Christina during the previous six months. The Department further advised that following its assessment, the Regional Center had determined Christina was ineligible for its services because she was not developmentally disabled as defined by the statute, nor did she have a "substantial handicapping condition." The Department "strongly recommend[ed]" termination of reunification services as to Destony, for several reasons. First, Christinas history of depression and emotional and developmental problems made it unable for her to appropriately care even for herself. Secondly, Christinas immaturity, irresponsibility and lack of basic parenting skills would place Destony at a great risk of physical and emotional harm if she were to be returned to Christinas care. And finally, the Department noted Destony and Angel (as to whom services had already been terminated) were placed together with a loving family who wished to adopt both children, and further delay in termination of services as to Destony would jeopardize the childrens opportunity to be adopted together.

Also on July 15, the Department notified the court that as of June 19 Angel and Destony were living together in a new placement, in the home of a couple who wished to adopt both children.

Services included arranging and monitoring visitation; emergency response services; foster placement; provision of bus tokens; management of the case plan requiring participation in parenting classes and psychotherapy; and referral to the Regional Center for assessment of eligibility for its services.

In a separate document, counsel for Destony also strongly urged the court to terminate reunification and allow her to be adopted. Counsel noted that despite provision by the Department of reasonable reunification services, Christina had failed to make substantive progress and had shown an inability to develop parenting skills to a level that would not create a risk to Destonys well-being.

At the contested six-month review hearing, the Departments social worker testified that even though Christina had participated in parenting education programs and counseling for two full years during the dependency proceedings of Angel and Destony, she had been unable to implement the skills she had been taught, and remained incapable of carrying out even the most basic parenting tasks. The social worker noted the Regional Center had declined to provide treatment for Christina, and she was unaware of any other available resources which might enable a person with the sort of developmental problems afflicting Christina to properly take care of a child. The court proceeded to hear argument, with Destonys counsel joining in the Departments request that reunification services be terminated. At the conclusion of argument, the court found (inter alia) the Department exercised its best efforts to provide Christina with all appropriate services, and although Christina complied with her case plan she remained unable to provide a safe home for Destony. The court further found that no evidence had been presented to show there existed other services that might enable Christina to provide adequate care for Christina, and even if additional services were to be provided Christina would remain unable to provide proper care for Destony. The court proceeded to terminate reunification and set the matter for a hearing pursuant to section 366.26.

CONTENTION

Christina contends the reunification services offered to her by the Department were deficient, because they were not specifically designed to address the special needs resulting from her learning disabilities. She urges that under these circumstances she was entitled to provision of reunification services for an additional period.

DISCUSSION

Under the law, the reunification plan developed by the Department must be tailored to fit the circumstances of each family (In re Dino E. (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 1768, 1777), and must address the unique facts of the particular individual. (In re Misako R. (1991) 2 Cal.App.4th 538, 545.) The Department is charged with providing reasonable services in furtherance of the reunification plan. A finding that reunification services are reasonable is reviewed under the substantial evidence standard. (In re Shelley J. (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 322, 329.) In making our review, we may look only at whether there is any evidence, contradicted or uncontradicted, that supports the trial courts determination. We must resolve all conflicts in support of the determination, and indulge in all legitimate inferences to uphold the courts order. Additionally, we may not substitute our deductions for those of the trier of fact. (In re Katrina C. (1988) 201 Cal.App.3d 540, 547; In re John V. (1992) 5 Cal.App.4th 1201, 1212.) We also recognize that in most cases more services might have been provided, and that the services that are provided are often imperfect. The standard is not whether the services provided were the best that might have been provided, but whether they were reasonable under the circumstances. (In re Misako R., supra, 2 Cal.App.4th at p. 547.)

With this standard of review in mind, we find substantial evidence in the record to support the juvenile courts finding that the services offered to Christina by the Department were reasonable under the circumstances of her case. The record shows that the social worker provided Christina with referrals for parenting education and individual counseling, and as mentioned earlier Christina fully complied with the requirements of her case plan. The social worker also referred Christina for services from the Regional Center, but unfortunately she was found to be ineligible for Regional Center services and no further specialized services were found to address Christinas specific cognitive difficulties and learning disabilities. Christina cites the case of In re Victoria M. (1989) 207 Cal.App.3d 1317 in support of her contention the Department failed to explore specially designed services to address her developmental disabilities. But the circumstances in Victoria M. were different from those in this case. The mother in Victoria M. had been determined to be mentally retarded, and thus met the legal definition of developmentally disabled (§ 4512) and qualified for Regional Center services. Notwithstanding the mothers eligibility for those services however, the Department made no effort to refer her to the Regional Center, nor did the services offered to her by the Department make any accommodation for her special needs. By contrast, in this case the Department was fully aware of Christinas special needs and attempted to obtain Regional Center services for her, but unfortunately she was found to be ineligible for those services because she suffers from borderline intellectual functioning and does not meet the definition of developmentally disabled. The record also shows that after Christina was turned down by the Regional Center, the social worker contacted the caseworker who conducted the Regional Center assessment to inquire of any other assistance which might be available for Christina, and was told only monetary assistance might be available from another state entity. In an ideal world, additional services to address Christinas specific special needs would have been available, but their unavailability in the real world does not render the Departments reunification services insufficient.

Nor do we find abuse of discretion in the courts decision not to extend services beyond the six-month review period. A parent is generally accorded six months of reunification services for a child who was under the age of three when initially removed from the parents custody. (§ 361.5, subd. (a)(2).) Services can be extended up to a maximum of 18 months, measured from the date of initial removal, if the court finds it is likely the child will be returned to the parent by the 18-month date or that reasonable services have not been provided to the parent. (§ 361.5, subd. (a), 6th par.) The record in this case contains ample evidence to support the courts decision not to extend reunification services beyond the six-month review period. As we have determined, the services provided to Christina were reasonable under the circumstances of her case. The record also fully supports the juvenile courts determination Christina would be unable to regain custody of Destony with an extension of reunification beyond the six-month period. As noted earlier, this is not the sort of case in which a parent has failed to fully take advantage of reunification services and might perhaps turn herself around with an extension of services. Christina completed all of the programs as required by her case plan, and she visited regularly with Destony. Despite her full participation however, it is clear form the record that her developmental problems and cognitive limitations render Christina unable to care for a young child, and these problems and limitations cannot be eliminated to enable her to regain custody of Destony within the foreseeable future. Under these circumstances, the court properly declined to extend reunification services.

Destony was originally detained from Christina on August 15, 2002. The 18-month maximum period for extended reunification would thus expire February 15, 2004, which would be just six months after the (August 5, 2002) date of the six-month review hearing.

DISPOSITION

Because substantial evidence supports the juvenile courts order terminating reunification and setting a hearing under section 366.26, the petition is denied on the merits.

We concur: PERLUSS, P.J., JOHNSON, J.


Summaries of

In re Destony

Court of Appeals of California, Second Appellate District, Division Seven.
Nov 19, 2003
No. B169238 (Cal. Ct. App. Nov. 19, 2003)
Case details for

In re Destony

Case Details

Full title:In re DESTONY L., a Minor. CHRISTINA C., Petitioner, v. THE SUPERIOR COURT…

Court:Court of Appeals of California, Second Appellate District, Division Seven.

Date published: Nov 19, 2003

Citations

No. B169238 (Cal. Ct. App. Nov. 19, 2003)