Opinion
NO. 09-11-00554-CV
01-26-2012
IN RE COMMITMENT OF ROBERTO JOSE DELACRUZ
On Appeal from the 435th District Court
Montgomery County, Texas
Trial Cause No. 11-01-00196 CV
MEMORANDUM OPINION
The State of Texas filed a petition to commit Roberto Jose Delacruz as a sexually violent predator. See Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. §§ 841.001-.151 (West 2010 & Supp. 2011). A jury found that Delacruz suffers from a behavioral abnormality that makes him likely to engage in a predatory act of sexual violence. The trial court signed a final judgment and order of civil commitment. In three appellate issues, Delacruz challenges the legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence to prove that he has an inability to control his behavior, and the trial court's denial of his motion for a protective order, in which he sought protection from the State's requests for admissions. We affirm the trial court's judgment and order of civil commitment.
ISSUES ONE AND TWO
In his first and second issues, Delacruz argues that the evidence was legally and factually insufficient to prove that he has an inability to control his behavior. In issue one, Delacruz contends the trial court erred by denying his motion for directed verdict. We address issues one and two together.
Pursuant to the SVP statute, the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that "the person is a sexually violent predator." Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. § 841.062(a) (West 2010). The SVP statute defines "sexually violent predator" as a person who "(1) is a repeat sexually violent offender; and (2) suffers from a behavioral abnormality that makes the person likely to engage in a predatory act of sexual violence." Id. § 841.003(a). The statute defines "behavioral abnormality" as "a congenital or acquired condition that, by affecting a person's emotional or volitional capacity, predisposes the person to commit a sexually violent offense, to the extent that the person becomes a menace to the health and safety of another person." Id. § 841.002(2) (West Supp. 2011). The inability to control behavior "must be sufficient to distinguish the dangerous sexual offender whose serious mental illness, abnormality, or disorder subjects him to civil commitment from the dangerous but typical recidivist convicted in an ordinary criminal case." Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 407, 413, 122 S.Ct. 867, 151 L.Ed.2d 856 (2002).
We review a trial court's ruling on a motion for directed verdict under a legal sufficiency standard. City of Keller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802, 823 (Tex. 2005). In reviewing the legal sufficiency of the evidence, we review all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict to determine whether a rational jury could have found, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Delacruz is a sexually violent predator. See In re Commitment of Mullens, 92 S.W.3d 881, 885 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2002, pet. denied).
In reviewing the factual sufficiency of the evidence in a civil case in which the burden of proof is beyond a reasonable doubt, an appellate court weighs the evidence to determine whether a verdict that is supported by legally sufficient evidence nevertheless reflects a risk of injustice that would compel ordering a new trial.In re Commitment of Day, 342 S.W.3d 193, 213 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2011, pet. denied).
The record contains legally sufficient evidence from which the jury could determine that Delacruz is a sexually violent predator and is unable to control his behavior. Board-certified forensic psychiatrist Dr. Michael Arambula and forensic psychologist Dr. Antoinette McGarrahan testified that based on actuarial tests, risk assessments, interviews with Delacruz, Delacruz's records and history, and his diagnosed conditions, Delacruz has a behavioral abnormality that makes him likely to commit predatory acts of sexual violence. The jury heard evidence concerning Delacruz's risk factors, actuarial test scores, criminal history, repeated sexual offenses, lack of sex offender treatment during incarceration, and disciplinary cases during his incarceration, as well as his diagnoses of pedophilia, antisocial personality disorder, and polysubstance dependence.
The jury could reasonably conclude that Delacruz is likely to engage in a predatory act of sexual violence. See Mullens, 92 S.W.3d at 887; see also In re Commitment of Almaguer, 117 S.W.3d 500, 505-06 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2003, pet. denied); In re Burnett, No. 09-09-00009-CV, 2009 Tex. App. LEXIS 9930, at *13 (Tex. App.—Beaumont Dec. 31, 2009, no pet.) (mem. op.). The conclusion that Delacruz is unable to control his behavior is implicit in the jury's finding that Delacruz suffers from a behavioral abnormality that makes him likely to engage in a predatory act of sexual violence. See In re Commitment of Grinstead, No. 09-07-00412-CV, 2009 Tex. App. LEXIS 228, at *16 (Tex. App.—Beaumont Jan. 15, 2009, no pet.) (mem. op.) (citing Almaguer, 117 S.W.3d at 505).
Reviewing all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, a rational jury could have found, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Delacruz is a sexually violent predator; therefore, the evidence is legally sufficient. See Crane, 534 U.S. at 413; Mullens, 92 S.W.3d at 885. In addition, weighing all of the evidence, including Delacruz's testimony that he has become a Christian, attended anger management and Christian education classes, and is not sexually attracted to children, as well as the experts' testimony concerning Delacruz's positive factors, the verdict does not reflect a risk of injustice that would compel ordering a new trial; therefore, the evidence is factually sufficient. See Day, 342 S.W.3d at 213. Accordingly, we overrule issues one and two.
ISSUE THREE
In his third issue, Delacruz complains that the trial court erred by denying his motion for a protective order, in which he sought protection from the State's requests for admissions. See generally Tex. R. Civ. P. 192.6. Specifically, Delacruz argues that discovery in the form of requests for admissions is improper because it "impermissibly lessens or eliminates the State's burden to prove the ultimate issues in the case[,]" "(2) undermines the SVP Act's requirement that the State prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt[,]" and "(3) in the case of trial by jury, denies [a]ppellant his statutory right to a unanimous jury verdict." "By classifying SVP cases as civil cases, the Legislature intended that, in the absence of conflict, the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, which include the rules of discovery, would be applied to civil commitment cases." In re Commitment of Malone, 336 S.W.3d 860, 862 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2011, pet. filed). In Malone, this Court held that there is no conflict between the SVP statute and the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure with respect to requests for admissions. Id. A matter admitted in response to requests for admissions is conclusively established unless the trial court allows withdrawal or amendment of the admission. Tex. R. Civ. P. 198.3; In re Commitment of Frazier, No. 09-10-00033-CV, 2011 WL 2566317, at *2 (Tex. App.— Beaumont June 30, 2011, no pet.) (mem. op.).
With respect to Delacruz's arguments that the State's use of his responses to requests for admissions lowers the State's burden to prove the ultimate issues in the case beyond a reasonable doubt, we note that the State explained the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt burden of proof during voir dire and closing argument, and the jury charge included the proper burden of proof. Therefore, we conclude that permitting the State to use Delacruz's admissions did not lower the State's burden of proof. See In re Commitment of Serna, No. 09-10-00029-CV, 2011 WL 1203987, at *3 (Tex. App.— Beaumont Mar. 31, 2011, no pet.) (mem. op.); see also Frazier, 2011 WL 2566317, at *2. We now turn to Delacruz's argument that the State's use of his responses to requests for admissions denied him his right to a unanimous jury verdict. Delacruz's brief does not contain citations to the record and applicable authorities, nor does he explain how the use of his responses to requests for admissions violated his right to a unanimous jury verdict. Therefore, we find that Delacruz has failed to adequately brief this argument. See Tex. R. App. P. 38.1 (i) (Appellant's brief must contain a clear and concise argument for the contentions made, with appropriate citations to authorities and to the record.). We overrule issue three and affirm the trial court's judgment and order of civil commitment.
Delacruz cites Murillo v. Superior Court of San Bernardino County, 143 Cal. App. 4th 730 (Cal. App. 4th Dist. 2006), a California case which is not binding upon this Court.
AFFIRMED.
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STEVE McKEITHEN
Chief Justice
Before McKeithen, C.J., Gaultney and Kreger, JJ.