Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Appeal from postjudgment orders of the Superior Court of Orange County No. DP015283, Gary Bischoff, Temporary Judge. (Pursuant to Cal. Const., art. VI, § 21.)
Marsha F. Levine, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Benjamin P. de Mayo, County Counsel, Karen L. Christensen and Aurelio Torre, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
OPINION
IKOLA, J.
The court returned dependent D.B. to his mother under a family maintenance plan at dependent’s 18-month review hearing. (See Welf. & Inst. Code, § 366.21, subds. (f), (g)(1).) Father K.B. appeals, claiming the court abused its discretion at the hearing by providing only monitored visitation to father (rather than unmonitored visitation). Father also alleges the court improperly issued a restraining order against him pursuant to section 213.5 because there was insufficient evidence to support the order. We affirm. The record is replete with evidence supporting the court’s exercise of discretion in setting the terms of father’s visitation rights and in protecting dependent and mother against unmonitored contact by father by means of a restraining order.
All statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
This is father’s second appeal of postjudgment orders made in this dependency case. The first two paragraphs of our factual summary are taken verbatim from the nonpublished opinion, In re D.B. (Jan. 21, 2009, G040767).
Following mother’s arrest in May 2007 on charges of willful cruelty to a child, a juvenile dependency petition was filed under section 300, subdivision (b). The petition alleged father, who was not living with mother, had a history of domestic violence, anger management issues, and a criminal background. Dependent received various placements following his detention, but never with mother or father. The jurisdictional/dispositional hearing concluded in August 2007, at which time the court declared D.B. to be a dependent, approved a service plan for the parents, and scheduled a six-month review hearing for January 7, 2008. At the six-month review, the court accepted the parties’ stipulation to continued services for parents and scheduled a 12-month review hearing for July 1, 2008.
The 12-month review proceeded in July over the course of several days. The court declined to return dependent to either parent. On the other hand, the court found parents had not received reasonable services in a timely fashion. The court ordered continued services for parents and ordered the Orange County Social Services Agency (SSA) to investigate further father’s psychiatric treatment needs. The court set an 18-month review hearing for October 30, 2008.
The 18-month review hearing commenced on November 3, 2008. SSA submitted a status review report, describing father’s case plan progress as “moderate.” Father struggled to make progress in his anger management class because (according to the therapist) he was too defensive and might lack the ability to understand his problems. Dependent’s social worker testified that he had observed father’s behavior during interviews. The social worker was concerned about father’s “impulse control issues,” explaining father’s tendency to have “outbursts” could be “a risk to the child.” Father continued to be treated by several mental health professionals at the time of the 18-month review.
Father testified at the hearing. He acknowledged taking prescription drugs under his psychiatrist’s supervision. He acknowledged past behavior which led to instances of arguing in front of dependent. He conceded he had made a “small little misjudgment” by calling mother the previous month despite his instructions not to directly contact mother. Throughout the dependency proceedings, father had outbursts and engaged in inappropriate behavior in court.
Past visits of dependent by father raised concerns with SSA and the court. An SSA worker described father as a “scary guy” who could be “quite dangerous” following a May 2007 visit when father “stomped out... yelling and screaming” at mother. Father became extremely emotional, loud, and restless at a visit later in May 2007. In May 2008, father took dependent away from mother’s car against mother’s will and placed dependent in his own car, shoving a car door into mother. Dependent cried during this incident. Father claimed he had been having unauthorized contact with mother because she had requested him to transport dependent in his car.
Reviewing the evidence presented at the 18-month review and the entire dependency file, the court found both parents had now received reasonable services. The court returned dependent to the custody of mother, and ordered family maintenance services to be provided to dependent, mother, and grandmother. The court terminated father’s services, but provided for monitored visitation between father and dependent. Finally, the court identified the need for a restraining order against father to allow mother “to protect herself and the child.”
The court signed a temporary restraining order (Judicial Council Form JV-250) against father on November 13, 2008. The restraining order, effective on a temporary basis until December 2, indicated father “must not harass, attack, strike, threaten, assault (sexually or otherwise), hit, follow, stalk, molest, destroy personal property of, disturb the peace of, keep under surveillance, or block movements of” dependent, mother, and mother’s other children. The restraining order further barred father from contacting dependent, mother, and mother’s other children “except for brief and peaceful contact as required for court-ordered visitation of children....”
The court made the following findings in support of its issuance of the restraining order: “On or about April 4, 2006, during an altercation in the mother’s apartment with the mother’s father-in-law, [father] ran with [dependent] out of the apartment, through the complex and to an alley. [Father] has an unresolved history of domestic violence and anger management. On or about May 18, 2008, [father] kidnapped [dependent] from the mother when the mother was placing [dependent] in her car, shoving the door into the mother. On October 11, 2008, [father] contacted the mother [despite a prior court order requiring him not to contact the mother].” The court commented that the restraining order was “designed to effectuate the family maintenance plan that the court is setting out and the court believes that absent this order, [it] could not return the child to the home of the mother because she wouldn’t have a legal means of protecting herself and her child... from the conduct of the father....” On December 2, 2008, the court extended the same restraining order through December 2011.
DISCUSSION
Visitation
Father first claims the court erred in ordering monitored, rather than unmonitored, visitation. The trial court is vested with broad discretion in matters concerning visitation. (In re Megan B. (1991) 235 Cal.App.3d 942, 953.) An abuse of discretion does not occur unless the court “‘“‘“has exceeded the limits of legal discretion by making an arbitrary, capricious or patently absurd determination.”’”’” (In re Tamneisha S. (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 798, 806.)
We see no plausible argument that the court abused its discretion by ordering monitored visitation to occur in this case. Father suffers from psychological and anger management problems. He has endangered the safety of others in the past. His inability to control his emotions in court, during interactions with social workers, and in past interactions with mother hardly inspires confidence in his parenting abilities. The court did not deny visitation rights altogether to father. Nor does the court’s order forever preclude father from unmonitored visitation. The court simply, and prudently, maintained monitoring during father’s visits with dependent following the return of dependent to mother’s custody.
Restraining Order
Father also challenges the court’s issuance of a restraining order against him for lack of substantial evidence. Section 213.5 authorizes courts to issue restraining orders during dependency proceedings. (See also Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.630.) “If there is substantial evidence supporting the order, the court’s issuance of the restraining order may not be disturbed.” (In re Cassandra B. (2004) 125 Cal.App.4th 199, 210-211.) Based on the same evidence set forth above, we find no error in the court’s issuance of the restraining order.
Father claims the order was not justified because “there was simply no evidence that anything had happened since the car seat incident to warrant the court’s concern.” But something had changed — the court returned dependent to the custody of mother and was concerned with creating the best possible opportunity for mother to succeed in maintaining custody of dependent. With dependent back in the custody of mother, the court found it necessary to impose a legally enforceable obligation upon father to prevent his interference with mother’s custody. The restraining order was justified based on father’s prior acts involving mother and dependent, his mental health issues, and his inability to control his emotions before the court and SSA.
DISPOSITION
The postjudgment orders are affirmed.
WE CONCUR: O’LEARY, ACTING P. J., FYBEL, J.