Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County No. MJ12846 Robin Kesler, Temporary Judge. (Pursuant to Cal. Const., art. VI, § 21.)
Laini Millar Melnick, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Pamela C. Hamanaka, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Steven D. Matthews and Victoria B. Wilson, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
EPSTEIN, P. J.
Darius T. appeals from the order continuing wardship pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 following the denial of his motion to suppress evidence and his admission that he possessed cocaine for sale in violation of Health and Safety Code section 11351. Pursuant to the terms of his negotiated plea, the allegation that he possessed marijuana in violation of Health and Safety Code section 11357, subdivision (b) was dismissed and appellant was placed in the short term camp community placement program. He contends the juvenile court erred in denying his motion to suppress because there was no probable cause to arrest based upon the totality of the circumstances. For reasons stated in the opinion we find the search of appellant incident to a lawful arrest and affirm the order continuing wardship.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On February 9, 2007, at approximately 5:15 p.m., Los Angeles Deputy Sheriff Allen Dollens, who had been a deputy for approximately 17 years and who had been assigned to the department’s Operation Safe Streets for seven years, was patrolling the area of Avenue H-15 and Kingtree Avenue in the City of Lancaster. He was patrolling the area because it is a high gang and narcotics trafficking area. In the past year, he had arrested approximately 20 gang members from the area who had been involved in street level sales of marijuana and rock cocaine. Other deputies had conducted arrests for narcotics in the area as well. During the patrol, Deputy Dollens saw several males standing in the middle of the street and two standing on the curb. From prior contacts, Deputy Dollens knew that three of the individuals were documented gang members, one of them had been arrested for sales in the past, and that just east of the location where the individuals were standing was a location from which narcotics were sold.
The Operation Safe Street team focuses on “all gang-related crimes” and the crimes of possession of and sales of narcotics are gang-related crimes.
Deputy Dollens saw appellant and another male juvenile riding bicycles in circles around the area. Appellant and his companion were “on bikes slow[ly] circling in that intersection area, not around the block, not down the street[,] in that immediate area, very close distances. Probably the furthest they got from the other gentlemen who were standing there is 25 to 40 feet. . . .”
After Deputy Dollens approached the individuals who were in the street, appellant and his companion rode their bikes up toward the front of the patrol car. Deputy Dollens asked appellant and his companion to get off their bikes, to approach and to put their hands on the patrol car. The deputy intended to either cite or warn appellant because he was riding a bike without a helmet. As appellant bent over to put his bike on the ground, he appeared to stuff something in his sock. During a pat down search for weapons, Deputy Dollens asked appellant his name, age, where he lived and whether he was on probation or parole. Appellant stated he was on probation for stealing a bike.
Deputy Dollens placed appellant inside the patrol car while he confirmed appellant’s probationary status, that the information appellant had given was correct and whether appellant had any warrants outstanding. A computer check confirmed appellant was on probation. While appellant was seated in the patrol car, Deputy Dollens checked appellant’s shoes and socks, where appellant was seen to have stuffed something, and found in one of the socks a plastic baggy that was knotted at one end. The baggy contained four larger size pieces of rock cocaine and numerous smaller chips of rock cocaine. During the pat down of appellant, Deputy Dollens found $80 in cash.
Appellant had two socks on each foot.
Apparently a baggy of less than an ounce of marijuana was recovered from appellant at the sheriff’s station.
Deputy Dollens testified that throughout his career he has found contraband in suspects’ socks. He predominantly has found narcotics, but has also found knives, money, and keys. When he has found narcotics on a person, 90 percent of the time it was in their socks. The deputy conducted the pat down search of appellant because, for deputy safety, he always pats a person down before seating him or her in the radio car. It was approximately five minutes from the time Deputy Dollens called appellant over to the radio car until the time the deputy found the baggy in appellant’s sock.
Previously in this area, Deputy Dollens had observed drug transactions, people on bikes and other individuals loitering. Based on his background, training and experience, he believed it was significant to see two males riding around on their bikes where three to five adults were loitering. It was the deputy’s experience that a person selling narcotics would have a younger person, usually a juvenile, on a bike holding the actual narcotics, who would be called over when the drugs were needed for the sale. As several of the people who were standing on the corner were known to the deputy to be gang members, and one was known to have been arrested for sales in the past, and because there were two individuals on bikes, Deputy Dollens concluded there was a strong possibility that one of the juveniles on the bikes could be in possession of narcotics.
The court denied the motion to suppress based on the totality of the circumstances, “all of the individuals, the area, the officer’s history and [appellant’s] movement giving . . . probable cause to search the sock.”
DISCUSSION
“‘An appellate court’s review of a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress is governed by well-settled principles. [Citations.] [¶] In ruling on such a motion, the trial court (1) finds the historical facts, (2) selects the applicable rule of law, and (3) applies the latter to the former to determine whether the rule of law as applied to the established facts is or is not violated. [Citations.] “The [trial] court’s resolution of each of these inquiries is, of course, subject to appellate review.” [Citations.] [¶] The court’s resolution of the first inquiry, which involves questions of fact, is reviewed under the deferential substantial-evidence standard. [Citations.] Its decision on the second, which is a pure question of law, is scrutinized under the standard of independent review. [Citations.] Finally, its ruling on the third, which is a mixed fact-law question that is however predominantly one of law, . . . is also subject to independent review.’ [Citation.]” (People v. Alvarez (1996) 14 Cal.4th 155, 182, quoting People v. Williams (1988) 45 Cal.3d 1268, 1301; accord, People v. Ayala (2000) 23 Cal.4th 225, 255.)
The Fourth Amendment prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures. Stopping and detaining a person who is suspected of criminal activity is analyzed under the framework of Terry v. Ohio (1968) 392 U.S. 1. (See United States v. Sharpe (1985) 470 U.S. 675, 682.) “A detention is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment when the detaining officer can point to specific articulable facts that, considered in light of the totality of the circumstances, provide some objective manifestation that the person detained may be involved in criminal activity.” (People v. Souza (1994) 9 Cal.4th 224, 231; People v. Williams (2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 949, 958-959.) Here the officer observed appellant riding a bicycle on the street without wearing a helmet which was in violation of the Vehicle Code and sufficient cause to detain. Appellant does not argue the detention based on this code violation was unreasonable.
Vehicle Code section 21212, subdivision (a) provides: “A person under 18 years of age shall not operate a bicycle . . . upon a street, bikeway, as defined in . . . the Streets and Highways Code, or any other public bicycle path or trail unless that person is wearing a properly fitted and fastened bicycle helmet . . . .”
“Probable cause to arrest exists if facts known to the arresting officer would lead a person of ordinary care and prudence to believe and conscientiously entertain an honest and strong suspicion that the person is guilty of a crime. [Citation.] A lawful arrest, in turn, justifies a full custodial search of the person. [Citation.]” (People v. Guajardo (1994) 23 Cal.App.4th 1738, 1742.)
“No exact formula tells us how to decide whether there was probable cause to arrest. Instead, we look to the totality of the surrounding circumstances and decide each case on its own facts, taking into account such things as (1) the officer’s experience (which may render suspicious that which appears innocent to a layman); (2) the officer’s prior contacts with the suspect; (3) the officer’s awareness that the area is one known for street drug transactions; (4) the defendant’s conduct (such as a covert or secretive display, transfer or exchange); (5) a caching of an object given or received in a peculiar receptacle designed for a different, specialized purpose; (6) some indication by the defendant of a consciousness of guilt; and so on. [Citations.]” (People v. Guajardo, supra, 23 Cal.App.4th at p. 1742.)
Based on the totality of the circumstances, we conclude that a person of ordinary care and prudence would believe and conscientiously entertain an honest and strong suspicion that appellant was in possession of drugs. Deputy Dollens had been a sheriff’s deputy for 17 years and had been assigned to Operation Safe Streets, which focused on gang-related crimes, including drug offenses, for seven years. During the past year he had arrested 20 gang members in the area for street sales of marijuana and cocaine. He recognized several of the adults loitering in the area as gang members and knew that one had been arrested for selling drugs. Through his experience, Deputy Dollens knew that adults selling drugs often used juveniles on bicycles to hold the drugs and to be summoned when the drugs were needed to complete the sale. Deputy Dollens observed appellant and another juvenile on bikes, slowly circling the area around the known gang members, one of whom was a known drug dealer. Additionally, when the deputy called appellant over for not wearing a helmet, appellant appeared to stuff something in his sock. In sum, there was probable cause to arrest appellant and the search was proper incident to the arrest.
DISPOSITION
The order continuing wardship is affirmed.
We concur: WILLHITE, J. SUZUKAWA, J.