Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Appeal from orders of the Superior Court of San Diego County No. NJ12084, Harry M. Elias, Judge.
O'ROURKE, J.
Yolanda C. appeals an order terminating her parental rights to her child, Danny C., and an order denying her motion for a continuance of the Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26 hearing. She contends the court lacked sufficient evidence of Danny's developmental status to support a finding he was likely to be adopted, and the court abused its discretion by not granting a continuance.
Statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On January 24, 2006, the San Diego County Health and Human Services Agency (the Agency) petitioned on behalf of three-year-old Danny and his infant half-sister, Diana C., alleging Yolanda was unable to provide care because of her substance abuse. Yolanda's parental rights to her two older children had been terminated in 2002 and these children were adopted by the maternal grandparents. Danny and Diana were detained with the grandparents, but later removed when the grandparents began having marital problems.
Diana reunified with her father. The appeal concerns Danny only.
On June 1, 2006, the court found the allegations of the petition true, declared Danny a dependent child, ordered services and ordered Yolanda to participate in the Substance Abuse Recovery Management System (SARMS).
In November 2006 the social worker reported Danny was referred for an evaluation because he had a speech delay. Yolanda had been scheduled to enter a drug abuse treatment program in August, but she was deported to Mexico. After obtaining proof of U.S. citizenship, she entered a treatment program. Subsequently, the court continued services and continued Danny in foster care.
Yolanda began having excessive absences from SARMS. In April 2007 the court found her in poor compliance, and on July 11 terminated her from SARMS because of her lack of participation.
At the 18-month hearing on August 1, 2007, the court found returning Danny to Yolanda's custody would pose a substantial risk of detriment, and reasonable services had been provided. The court terminated services and set a section 366.26 hearing.
In the assessment report, the social worker said Danny was healthy, appeared to be developing at an age appropriate level and was doing very well in his foster home. He was usually very obedient, but a previous foster parent had reported he cried and screamed when angry. Danny was scheduled to undergo a more extensive developmental evaluation in January 2007. His caregivers had an approved adoptive home study and were committed to adopting him. The social worker opined Danny was generally adoptable because of his young age, attractiveness and sociability.
At the section 366.26 hearing on November 20, 2007, Yolanda testified that Diana's father was able to have Danny placed with him. The court denied her request for a continuance to consider this possibility. It found Danny was likely to be adopted if parental rights were terminated, terminated parental rights and referred the matter for adoption.
DISCUSSION
I
Yolanda contends the court erred in selecting adoption as Danny's permanent plan because there was insufficient evidence that he was likely to be adopted.
Before a court frees a child for adoption it must determine by clear and convincing evidence the child is likely to be adopted within a reasonable time. (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1); In re Jennilee T. (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 212, 223.) "In resolving this issue, the court focuses on the child—whether his age [or her age], physical condition and emotional state make it difficult to find a person willing to adopt him [or her]." (In re David H. (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 368, 378.) Whether there is a prospective adoptive family is a factor for the court to consider, but is not determinative by itself. (Ibid.) The fact children are with families who want to adopt them supports a finding they are generally adoptable. (In re Sarah M. (1994) 22 Cal.App.4th 1642, 1649-1650.) "On appeal, we review the factual basis for the trial court's finding of adoptability and termination of parental rights for substantial evidence." (In re Josue G. (2003) 106 Cal.App.4th 725, 732.) The appellant bears the burden to show the evidence is insufficient to support the court's findings. (In re Geoffrey G. (1979) 98 Cal.App.3d 412, 420.)
The social worker assessed Danny as being generally adoptable. He was in good health, attractive and had normal development. He was doing well in kindergarten and scheduled to undergo a more extensive developmental evaluation. Although he had cried and had tantrums in his former foster home, he was described as very obedient when not experiencing a crisis. His prospective adoptive parents said he was doing very well in their home and they were committed to adopting him. In addition, 11 other approved adoptive homes were interested in adopting a child like Danny. Substantial evidence supports the finding that Danny is adoptable.
II
Yolanda also asserts the court abused its discretion by denying her motion for a continuance.
The juvenile court may grant a continuance only on a showing of good cause. "[T]he court shall give substantial weight to a minor's need for prompt resolution of his or her custody status . . . ." (§ 352, subd. (a).) "Continuances are discouraged [citation] and we reverse an order denying a continuance only on a showing of an abuse of discretion [citation]." (In re Ninfa S. (1998) 62 Cal.App.4th 808, 810-811.)
The court did not abuse its discretion by denying the motion for a continuance. Yolanda's counsel made an oral motion for a continuance on the day of the section 366.26 hearing. She stated Diana's father was willing to have Danny placed with him and requested a short continuance so that the court could hear his testimony. The court denied the motion.
Yolanda has not shown an abuse of the court's discretion. Diana's father had never expressed interest in having Danny placed with him although he was aware of the proceedings and began having unsupervised visits with Diana in early 2007. Danny had had multiple placements and was doing well in his prospective adoptive home. The court did not abuse its discretion by denying the motion for continuance on the day of the hearing.
DISPOSITION
The orders are affirmed.
WE CONCUR: HALLER, Acting P. J., AARON, J.