Opinion
E032547.
11-5-2003
In re DANIEL C., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. DANIEL C., Defendant and Appellant.
John E. Roth, Public Defender, and Michael J. Kennedy, Deputy Public Defender, for Defendant and Appellant. Bill Lockyer, Attorney General, Robert R. Anderson, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Gary W. Schons, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Steven T. Oetting, Supervising Deputy Attorney General, and Heather F. Wells, Deputy Attorney General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Following the denial of Daniel C.s motion to suppress evidence (Pen. Code, § 1538.5), he admitted that he had received stolen property (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 602, Pen. Code, § 496, subd. (a)). The juvenile court continued him as a ward and placed him on probation. He appeals, challenging the denial of his suppression motion. We affirm.
FACTS
At minors suppression hearing, San Bernardino County Sheriffs Deputies Calvert and Thornberg testified that they responded to a reported theft at a liquor store shortly after 10:30 p.m. on January 23, 2002. The owner of the liquor store told Deputy Calvert that someone entered the store, picked up an 18-pack of Budweiser beer, and ran out the door without paying. One of the clerks ran after the person and saw him meet another person subsequently identified as minor outside of the liquor store. The two then ran away. The clerk gave the deputies descriptions of the two and specified where he had last seen them. The deputies found footprints in the dirt at the location where the clerk lost sight of the two men. While tracking the footprints, Deputy Thornberg discovered an empty 18-pack Budweiser box that appeared to be unweathered. The footprints led the deputies to a trailer about a half-mile from the liquor store.
Deputy Calvert knocked on the door of the trailer around 11:36 p.m. and a male juvenile answered. The deputy detected a strong smell of alcohol coming from the juvenile and saw other people, including minor, through the opened door. Deputy Calvert also saw cans of what appeared to be Budweiser beer, at least one of which was open. Deputy Calvert asked the juvenile to get the adult responsible for the residence and followed the juvenile inside. The juveniles father, Mr. Annas, spoke with the deputy and gave him permission to search the residence. Upon examining the shoes of the occupants, the deputies found two pairs of shoes with patterns which appeared to match those of the shoeprints the deputies had tracked from the liquor store.
Waiving his Miranda rights, minor told Deputy Calvert that he and Chavez had planned a "beer run," or to steal beer. Minor also said that he waited outside while Chavez went into the liquor store. Chavez returned with beer and a bottle of wine. After Chavez gave the wine to minor, the two made their way back to the trailer. Minor did not live at that residence, the deputies did not ask him whether he had been invited to stay at that residence or to spend the night there. But it did not appear from conversations with Mr. Annas that minor was not welcome.
Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436.
Mr. Annas testified at the suppression hearing that around midnight on January 23, 2002, officers were in his trailer when he came out of his bedroom where he had been sleeping. At that time minor was an overnight guest in the Annas home. Minor previously spent the night there and was a welcomed visitor in the Annas home. Mr. Annas did not tell the deputies that minor was an overnight guest at his home because no one asked him.
Denying minors motion, the court expressly found "that Mr. Annas was not credible" and that it did not "believe the minor was an overnight guest," therefore, minor did "not have a reasonable expectation of privacy pursuant to Carter and Olson."
Minnesota v. Carter (1998) 525 U.S. 83; Minnesota v. Olson (1990) 495 U.S. 91.
DISCUSSION
On appeal, minor challenges the courts denial of his suppression motion.
"A person who is aggrieved by an illegal search and seizure only through the introduction of damaging evidence secured by a search of a third persons premises or property has not had any of his Fourth Amendment rights infringed. [Citation.] And since the exclusionary rule is an attempt to effectuate the guarantees of the Fourth Amendment [citation], it is proper to permit only defendants whose Fourth Amendment rights have been violated to benefit from the rules protections. [Citation.]" (Rakas v. Illinois (1978) 439 U.S. 128, 134, fn. omitted.) Consequently, as minor is challenging a search of a third persons premises or property, he has no right to benefit from the protections of the exclusionary rule.
Minor argues that under Minnesota v. Carter, supra, 525 U.S. 83 (hereafter Carter), he has a right to contest the search because he was an invited social guest of the homeowner and was present at the time of the search. We disagree and quote at length from the Carter opinion.
In Carter, supra, 525 U.S. 83, Carter and the lessee of an apartment, were sitting in one of its rooms, bagging cocaine. While so engaged, they were observed by a police officer who looked through a drawn window blind. The officer notified headquarters which began preparing affidavits for a search warrant while he returned to the apartment building. When Carter and another man men left the building in a previously identified Cadillac, the police stopped the car and observed a black, zippered pouch and a handgun on the vehicles floor. Carter was arrested. The police learned that Carter lived in Chicago and had come to the apartment for the sole purpose of packaging the cocaine. Carter had never been to the apartment before and was in the apartment for approximately two and one-half hours. In return for the use of the apartment, Carter had given the lessee one-eighth of an ounce of the cocaine. (Id. at pp. 85-86.)
Carter was charged with drug-related crimes and moved to suppress the evidence. He argued that the initial observation of the drug packaging activities was an unreasonable search in violation of the Fourth Amendment and that all evidence obtained as a result of this unreasonable search was inadmissible as fruit of the poisonous tree. The Minnesota trial court held that since, unlike the defendant in Minnesota v. Olson, supra, 495 U.S. 91, Carter was not an overnight social guest but a temporary out-of-state visitor, he was not entitled to claim the protection of the Fourth Amendment against the government intrusion into the apartment. On appeal, the Minnesota Court of Appeals held that Carter did not have "standing" to object to the officers actions because his claim that he was predominantly a social guest was "`inconsistent with the only evidence concerning his stay in the apartment, which indicates that he used it for a business purpose—to package drugs." (Carter, supra, 525 U.S. at pp. 86-87.)
A divided Minnesota Supreme Court reversed, holding that Carter had "standing" to claim the protection of the Fourth Amendment because he had "`"a legitimate expectation of privacy in the invaded place."" (Carter, supra, 525 U.S. at p. 87, quoting Rakas v. Illinois, supra, 439 U.S. at p. 143.) The Minnesota Supreme Court noted that even though "`society does not recognize as valuable the task of bagging cocaine, we conclude that society does recognize as valuable the right of property owners or leaseholders to invite persons into the privacy of their homes to conduct a common task, be it legal or illegal activity. . . ." (Carter, supra, 525 U.S. at p. 87.) The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari, 523 U.S. 1003, and reversed, stating:
"The Minnesota courts analyzed whether [Carter] had a legitimate expectation of privacy under the rubric of `standing doctrine, an analysis which this Court expressly rejected 20 years ago in Rakas, 439 U.S., at 139-140, . . . In that case, we held that automobile passengers could not assert the protection of the Fourth Amendment against the seizure of incriminating evidence from a vehicle where they owned neither the vehicle nor the evidence. (Ibid.) Central to our analysis was the idea that in determining whether a defendant is able to show the violation of his (and not someone elses) Fourth Amendment rights, the `definition of those rights is more properly placed within the purview of substantive Fourth Amendment law than within that of standing. [Citation.] Thus, we held that in order to claim the protection of the Fourth Amendment, a defendant must demonstrate that he personally has an expectation of privacy in the place searched, and that his expectation is reasonable; i.e., one that has `a source outside of the Fourth Amendment, either by reference to concepts of real or personal property law or to understandings that are recognized and permitted by society. [Citations.]" (Carter, supra, 525 U.S. at pp. 87-88.)
"[W]e have held that in some circumstances a person may have a legitimate expectation of privacy in the house of someone else. In Minnesota v. Olson . . ., for example, we decided that an overnight guest in a house had the sort of expectation of privacy that the Fourth Amendment protects. We said: [¶] `To hold that an overnight guest has a legitimate expectation of privacy in his hosts home merely recognizes the every day expectations of privacy that we all share. Staying overnight in anothers home is a longstanding social custom that serves functions recognized as valuable by society. We stay in others homes when we travel to a strange city for business or pleasure, when we visit our parents, children, or more distant relatives out of town, when we are in between jobs or homes, or when we house-sit for a friend . . . ." (Carter, supra, 525 U.S. at p. 89.)
"`From the overnight guests perspective, he seeks shelter in anothers home precisely because it provides him with privacy, a place where he and his possessions will not be disturbed by anyone but his host and those his host allows inside. We are at our most vulnerable when we are asleep because we cannot monitor our own safety or the security of our belongings. It is for this reason that, although we may spend all day in public places, when we cannot sleep in our own home we seek out another private place to sleep, whether it be a hotel room, or the home of a friend. [Citation.]" (Carter, supra, 525 U.S. at p. 89.)
"In Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 259 . . ., the defendant seeking to exclude evidence resulting from a search of an apartment had been given the use of the apartment by a friend. He had clothing in the apartment, had slept there `"maybe a night," and at the time was the sole occupant of the apartment. But while the holding of Jones—that a search of the apartment violated the defendants Fourth Amendment rights—is still valid, its statement that `anyone legitimately on the premises where a search occurs may challenge its legality, [citation] was expressly repudiated in Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 . . . . Thus, an overnight guest in a home may claim the protection of the Fourth Amendment, but one who is merely present with the consent of the householder may not." (Carter, supra, 525 U.S. pp. 89-90.)
The Carter court found Carter was not an overnight guest, but was present for a business transaction and was in the home for only a matter of hours. There was no suggestion that he had a previous relationship with the lessee of the apartment, or that there was any other purpose to his visit. Nor was there anything similar to the overnight guest relationship in Olson to suggest a degree of acceptance into the household. While the apartment was a dwelling place for the lessee, it was for Carter simply a place to do business. But there was no indication that Carter had nearly as significant a connection to the apartment as a worker has to his own private office. (Carter, supra, 525 U.S. at p. 90.)
The Carter court continued: "If we regard the overnight guest in Minnesota v. Olson as typifying those who may claim the protection of the Fourth Amendment in the home of another, and one merely `legitimately on the premises as typifying those who may not do so, the present case is obviously somewhere in between. But the purely commercial nature of the transaction engaged in here, the relatively short period of time on the premises, and the lack of any previous connection between [Carter] and the householder, all lead us to conclude that [Carters] situation is closer to that of one simply permitted on the premises. We therefore hold that any search which may have occurred did not violate [his] Fourth Amendment rights." (Carter, supra, 525 U.S. at p. 91.)
As the foregoing discloses and contrary to minors assertion, Carter does not support a determination that minor, as a mere social guest who was legitimately on the premises, had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the Annas residence.
Minors argument that he had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the Annas residence because he was an invited overnight guest is also rejected. While Mr. Annas testified minor was an invited overnight guest, the juvenile court expressly found that testimony was not credible.
As the finder of fact in a proceeding to suppress evidence (Pen. Code, § 1538.5), the juvenile court was vested with the power to judge the credibility of the witnesses, resolve any conflicts in the testimony, weigh the evidence and draw factual inferences. (People v. Woods (1999) 21 Cal.4th 668, 673.) As this court stated many years ago: "The law has long recognized the problem of appellate review in the matter of credibility of witnesses based upon their demeanor, and for that reason the rule has evolved that the trier of facts is the sole and exclusive judge of the credibility of witnesses as determined by their demeanor. A written transcript of testimony is but a pallid reflection of what actually happens in a trial court. `"The best and most accurate record is like a dehydrated peach; it has neither the substance nor the flavor of the fruit before it was dried." It resembles a pressed flower. [Citation.] `The cold record cannot give the look or manner of the witnesses; their hesitations, their doubts, their variations of language, their precipitancy, their calmness or consideration. A witness may convince all who hear him testify that he is disingenuous and untruthful, and yet his testimony when read, may convey a most favorable impression. [Citation.] `There are many factors aiding in a reasonable conclusion which are presented to the trier of facts in the first instance and not available to one going over the cold record. There is what might be called the "feel" of the case. This embraces a consideration of the witnesses, the manner in which they testify and their general attitude in the court room. [Citation.] `". . . one witness may give testimony that reads in print . . . as if falling from the lips of an angel of light, and yet not a soul who heard it . . . believed a word of it; and another witness may testify so that it reads brokenly and obscurely in print, and yet there was that about the witness that carried conviction of truth to every soul who heard him testify. . . ." [Citation.] [Citation.]
"On the cold record a witness may be clear, concise, direct, unimpeached, uncontradicted—but on a face to face evaluation, so exude insincerity as to render his credibility factor nil. Another witness may fumble, bumble, be unsure, uncertain, contradict himself, and on the basis of a written transcript be hardly worthy of belief. But one who sees, hears and observes him may be convinced of his honesty, his integrity, his reliability. All of this is because a great deal of that highly delicate process we call evaluating the credibility of a witness is based on what might be called, for lack of a better word, `intuition—that intangible, inarticulable capacity of one human being to evaluate the sincerity, honesty and integrity of another human being with whom he comes in contact. There is no way of knowing or proving how much of the testing process is encompassed in the `traditional tests of credibility such as provable bias or interest, contradiction or impeachment, all demonstrable on the record, and how much of that evaluation process comes from the purely subjective reaction of the trier of facts to the attitude, demeanor and manner of testifying of the witness—not demonstrable on the record." (Meiner v. Ford Motor Co. (1971) 17 Cal.App.3d 127, 140-141.)
Thus, we are bound by the juvenile courts determination that Mr. Annass testimony was not credible and, therefore, minor was not an overnight guest entitled to the protection of the Fourth Amendment and the exclusionary rule, as explained in Carter.
DISPOSITION
The dispositional order is affirmed.
We concur, McKINSTER, J. and WARD, J.