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In re C.S.

California Court of Appeals, First District, Third Division
Sep 30, 2008
No. A119824 (Cal. Ct. App. Sep. 30, 2008)

Opinion


In re C.S., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. C.S., Defendant and Appellant. A119824 California Court of Appeal, First District, Third Division September 30, 2008

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

Contra Costa County Super. Ct. No. J0701526.

Siggins, J.

C.S. admitted to a charge that she drove a vehicle while she had a blood-alcohol level of .08 percent or higher. She appeals the juvenile court’s dispositional order that required her to wear and pay the cost of a Secure Continuous Remote Alcohol Monitor (SCRAM). Although the juvenile court was required by Welfare and Institutions Code section 903.2, subdivision (b) to determine the ward’s ability to pay the cost of the SCRAM program, we conclude its failure to do so was harmless error and affirm.

Subsequent statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.

Factual and Procedural Background

According to the probation report, a Danville police officer stopped C.S. at approximately 2:55 a.m., after he saw her driving a 2005 Mercedes sports utility vehicle with the headlights turned off and swerving between lanes. C.S. gave the officer a false date of birth and told him she left her driver’s license at home. The officer performed a DMV/warrant check, obtained C.S.’s correct date of birth and learned she had no permanent driver’s license. C.S. denied drinking, but her eyes were red and watery and she had an odor of alcohol on her breath. Following a field sobriety test, C.S. was arrested and submitted to a breath test that showed she had a blood-alcohol level of .21 percent.

A wardship petition alleged C.S. drove with a blood-alcohol level of .08 percent or higher and drove under the influence of alcohol. It was also alleged that she had a blood-alcohol level of .15 percent or more, and drove without a valid driver’s license. C.S. admitted the allegation that she drove with a blood-alcohol level of .08 percent or higher, and the remaining counts and special allegations were dismissed. At the conclusion of the dispositional hearing, C.S. was adjudged a ward of the court, and her maximum time of confinement was set at six months. She was placed on home supervision, and was ordered to undergo six months of juvenile electronic monitoring (JEM), with permission to attend work and school. Additional conditions of her probation included a curfew, participation in substance abuse assessment and counseling, an adolescent D.U.I. Program, a one-year driving privilege restriction, and 30 days on the SCRAM program. C.S. filed a timely notice of appeal.

The court declined to impose four weekends in Juvenile Hall that were requested by the People.

Discussion

C.S. argues “[t]he court had no authority to order [her] to use her earnings to pay for the SCRAM monitor,” and that the court failed to make a finding of her ability to pay for the monitor as required by statute. Two sections of the Welfare and Institutions Code are relevant to our consideration of the issues.

Section 730, subdivision (b) provides that “[w]hen a ward . . . is placed under the supervision of the probation officer . . . the court may make any and all reasonable orders for the conduct of the ward including the requirement that the ward go to work and earn money for the support of his or her dependents or to effect reparation and in either case that the ward keep an account of his or her earnings and report the same to the probation officer and apply these earnings as directed by the court. The court may impose and require any and all reasonable conditions that it may determine fitting and proper to the end that justice may be done and the reformation and rehabilitation of the ward enhanced.” “Section 730 grants courts broad discretion in establishing conditions of probation in juvenile cases.” (In re Christopher M. (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 684, 692.)

Section 903.2, subdivision (a) authorizes the court to order a minor’s family and the minor’s estate to pay for specific probation services, including the cost of electronic monitoring. But subdivision (b) of the statute states: “Liability shall be imposed on a person pursuant to this section only if he or she has the financial ability to pay. In evaluating a family’s financial ability to pay under this section, the county shall take into consideration the family income, the necessary obligations of the family, and the number of persons dependent upon this income.”

It is clear from a plain reading of section 730, subdivision (b) that the juvenile court’s discretion to order reasonable conditions of probation was broad enough to include the requirement that C.S. wear the SCRAM device. That condition of probation for a teenager who drove a motor vehicle while she had a blood-alcohol level of .08 percent or higher seems logically designed to enhance her prospects for “reformation and rehabilitation.” Imposing the requirement upon C.S. or her family to pay the cost of the SCRAM device is slightly more complicated. In this case, we conclude that while the juvenile court erred when it did not make a specific determination of ability to pay required by section 903.2, subdivision (b), its failure to do so was harmless error.

When the juvenile court indicated at the dispositional hearing that the cost of the SCRAM program was approximately $500 per month, counsel for C.S. objected. Counsel argued that C.S. was a client of the public defender and that her family could not pay the $13 to $15 daily fee for the monitor “unless the Probation Department will offer some financial supplement to cover that fee.” C.S.’s mother told the court that the family lost its home the previous year, and her husband lost his small business. Mother said that even though both she and her husband were currently employed, and C.S. was also working, the family was “$2,000 in the hole every month to pay our bills.”

According to the probation report, C.S. was employed as a hostess at a cantina, her father was employed at a technology company, and her mother was employed as a nanny. During the detention hearing, counsel stated C.S. was “keeping up with her studies despite working 40 hours a week.”

The court stated: “Given what appears to be a serious alcohol problem, I am going to order the SCRAM monitor for 30 days.” The court told C.S.: “You can use your earnings to pay for the SCRAM monitor. We are talking for 30 days.” C.S. was enrolled in the SCRAM program on November 1, 2007. At C.S.’s request, we take judicial notice of a “SCRAM ALCOHOL MONITORING FINAL REPORT” from her juvenile court file that states C.S. successfully completed the program, “was current in payment of her supervision fees,” and was released on December 1, 2007.

The evidence before the court suggested that C.S.’s family did not have the ability to pay for the cost of the SCRAM device. The juvenile court made no finding that they did. The court also made no explicit finding that C.S. had a sufficient estate to pay the cost. Instead, the court directed C.S. to pay for the device out of her earnings. While section 903.2, subdivision (b) requires the court to make a finding of ability to pay when it orders a juvenile’s estate or family to pay the cost of a program, section 730, subdivision (b) permits the court to order the minor to work and earn money to pay reparations. “In a general sense ‘reparation’ means reimbursement to the complainant or to a prosecuting government agency.” (People v. Labarbera (1949) 89 Cal.App.2d 639, 643.) Here, the juvenile court ordered that C.S. rather than the county absorb the cost of the SCRAM device, and that she pay for it out of her earnings. While section 730 requires that the minor report earnings to the assigned probation officer and apply the earnings as directed by the court, there is no indication that requirement would have had any operative effect in this case. In fact, all indications are that C.S. did exactly what the court directed and paid for the SCRAM monitor.

We are not persuaded by the Attorney General’s parting suggestion that the issue of ability to pay is moot because C.S. has completed the SCRAM program. The reply brief points out that C.S. “may have borrowed the money, and thus be in debt for that amount, or she may have obtained it in another way which does not reflect on her financial ability to pay under [section 903.2, subd. (b)].”

Although the juvenile court should have determined the ability of C.S.’s family or her estate to pay the cost of the SCRAM device, C.S.’s continuing employment and the authority given the court in section 730 render the lack of a finding in this case harmless. (People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836.)

Disposition

The dispositional order is affirmed.

We concur: McGuiness, P. J., Pollak, J.


Summaries of

In re C.S.

California Court of Appeals, First District, Third Division
Sep 30, 2008
No. A119824 (Cal. Ct. App. Sep. 30, 2008)
Case details for

In re C.S.

Case Details

Full title:THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. C.S., Defendant and Appellant.

Court:California Court of Appeals, First District, Third Division

Date published: Sep 30, 2008

Citations

No. A119824 (Cal. Ct. App. Sep. 30, 2008)