Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from an order of the Los Angeles Superior Court. Sheri Sobel, Juvenile Court Referee. Affirmed in part, reversed in part. Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. CK61585
Donna Balderston Kaiser, by appointment of the Court of Appeal, for Appellant.
Raymond G. Fortner, Jr., County Counsel, James M. Owens, Assistant County Counsel, and Jacklyn K. Louie, Deputy County Counsel, for Respondent.
OPINION
Judge of the Los Angeles Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.
SUMMARY
A father appeals from an order terminating his parental rights. He asserts the juvenile court erred by not placing his son with a paternal aunt and by failing to ensure that proper notice of this proceeding was provided under the Indian Child Welfare Act, 25 U.S.C. section 1901, et seq. (ICWA). Assuming for argument’s sake that the father has standing to challenge the relative placement issue, his substantive argument lacks merit. However, the notice provided was inadequate under the ICWA. We therefore reverse and remand the action for the limited purpose of effectuating proper notice.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Corey R. was born in February 2001. Corey’s mother, Tiana R., was 15 when she gave birth to Corey. Corey’s birth certificate does not list a father, but appellant Lonnie Y. is his declared father. Lonnie was 32 when he had sex with Tiana, who was 14. Lonnie – who has a lengthy criminal history – was convicted of lewd conduct on a minor in violation of Penal Code section 288, subdivision (c)(1) as a result of his intercourse with Tiana. He admitted a strike prior for robbery and was sentenced to four years in the state prison.
After Lonnie was paroled, he began to see Tiana and Corey, even though a term of his parole was that he stay away from Tiana. Late on the night of November 22, 2005, Tiana – then 19 – was shot in the head. Corey, who was four years old at the time, was the only witness to the murder. Lonnie called 9-1-1 but said he was not there when Tiana was killed. He just happened to be nearby, he said, and heard the shots. At the time of the proceedings giving rise to this appeal, Lonnie was the prime suspect in Tiana’s murder.
Respondent Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) filed a Welfare and Institutions Code section 300 petition. (Further unspecified statutory references are to this code.) As sustained, the petition alleged that Lonnie’s “detrimental and endangering life style” not only rendered him unable to protect Corey, but actively placed the child at significant risk. Lonnie had at least 10 felony convictions and was a registered sex offender. Because Lonnie was in custody on a parole violation when Corey was detained, he could not be interviewed to identify family members who might be able to provide a placement. So Corey was put in foster care.
DCFS’s detention report said police were summoned to Corey’s mother’s home by Lonnie’s 9-1-1 call. Lonnie told police he had been nearby when he heard shots. He was not supposed to be at the house. However, DCFS reported Lonnie had been living with Tiana for some time, in violation of his parole. The police found Corey at the house. The child said he had been sleeping in a closet and had not seen or heard anything.
After several continuances, the combined adjudication and disposition hearing was conducted on March 3, 2006. DCFS reported Lonnie remained incarcerated for parole violations. Lonnie did not want to relinquish his parental rights, and hoped to have Corey placed in his care once he was released. He asked that Corey be placed with his sister, Celia Y., in the meantime. Corey’s caregiver told DCFS Corey never mentioned his father except to say Lonnie had “killed his mother.” DCFS recommended the court set a hearing to select a permanent plan for Corey, and refuse reunification services for Lonnie under the authority of section 361.5, subdivision (b)(8), because Corey had been “conceived by means of the commission of an offense listed in Section 288 or 288.5 of the Penal Code.”
Lonnie had been found with a knife (he claimed he needed the knife for his job as a tow truck driver), and he had violated the prohibition against visits with Corey’s mother.
The court found Lonnie to be a “declared” father seeking status as a presumed father.
The trial court sustained the petition and declared Corey a dependent under section 300, subdivision (b). At the dispositional phase of the hearing, Lonnie requested reunification services but the court denied them, based on the circumstances of Corey’s conception and the absence of clear and convincing evidence that reunification services would serve the child’s best interests. (§ 361.5, subd. (b)(8).) However, while he remained incarcerated, Lonnie was given permission to write to Corey, and DCFS was ordered to give the letters to the boy, if appropriate. The court told DCFS that Corey needed to be placed in a potential adoptive home, and continued the matter for a permanent planning (§ 366.26) hearing in June.
The section 366.26 hearing was supposed to take place on June 30, 2006. However, DCFS reported that -- although Corey was “adoptable” -- one potential adoptive family had backed out in May 2006, and the foster parent with whom he was placed was not interested in adoption. DCFS also reported that the foster mother had read to Corey one of Lonnie’s letters from prison. The child had a “horrendous reaction” to the letter from his “bad daddy.” Corey had nightmares and began to wet the bed. The court ordered DCFS to hold Lonnie’s letters until Corey’s therapist believed it was appropriate for the child to see them. The court continued the hearing so DCFS could try to find an adoptive home.
Lonnie’s attorney told the court a paternal aunt had contacted DCFS about having Corey placed with her, and asked the court to have the inquiry investigated. The court agreed, noting the “relative preference” was relevant again, given the need to change Corey’s placement. It ordered DCFS to look into appropriate placements with “any and all relatives and actually walk it on if [DCFS had] a 361.3 and -4 and 309 on an appropriate relative.” The court wanted to make sure the relative preference issue was addressed before Corey was moved to a new placement. The court continued the section 366.26 hearing to October 27, 2006.
In preparation for the October 27 hearing, DCFS reported that -- after several increasingly lengthy visits with a new set of potential adoptive parents beginning on August 23, 2006 -- Corey had been moved into their home on October 6. The family was prepared and approved to adopt him. Corey told DCFS he “like[d] [these prospective adoptive parents] and they [were] nice to [him] and [he] would like to live with them.” In response to the court’s order to investigate relative placements, DCFS reported there were “no appropriate relatives for placement. Though several relatives have been assessed, they have been found to be inappropriate.” According to DCFS, the maternal relatives or people with whom Tiana had had some relationship were not appropriate. An uncle had an extensive criminal history; a grandmother used drugs and had failed to reunify with her own children; and a family friend was suspected of identity fraud against Tiana. As for its investigation of a possible placement with Lonnie’s relative, DCFS reported only that, “[d]ue to the nature of this case and the on going [sic] criminal investigation on [Lonnie], placing Corey with paternal relatives would not be appropriate.”
At the hearing on October 27, 2006, the court continued the matter again because DCFS had not complied with its order to provide a “complete 361.3 and -4 on any relatives who had stepped forward and requested to have the child.” DCFS appeared not to have investigated fully the possibility of placing Corey with Lonnie’s sister, Celia. The court again ordered DCFS to conduct an adoptive assessment of the paternal aunt. The court continued the matter to December 27, 2006.
In December, DCFS reported on its investigation of Celia and another paternal aunt, Lenore Y.M., who lives with Celia. Celia owns a four-bedroom home in Riverside that is neat, clean, and largely hazard-free. Celia is the legal guardian for four children who live with her. One of them is Lenore’s son; the other three are another brother’s children. A background check revealed no criminal history for Celia. However, a check of Lenore’s criminal history turned up several convictions between 1981 and 2001, including one for felony burglary. Celia told DCFS she had no relationship with Corey; she had met him only once. However, Celia believed she could provide care and supervision for Corey, as she did for her other nieces and nephews. She would need financial assistance, though, if she were required to provide care on a permanent basis. Celia told DCFS she would adopt Corey “if [she had] to.”
All four children had open DCFS cases in other counties.
DCFS expressed strong reservations about placing Corey in Celia’s care. First, it noted that Lenore -- who had an extensive criminal record and had been unable to reunify with her own children -- lived in the home. Lenore’s residence there rendered Celia ineligible for the federal funds she would need. Second, the deputy district attorney in charge of the criminal case against Lonnie had sent DCFS a letter strongly objecting to having Corey placed with any paternal relatives. The prosecutor -- assigned to the Family Violence Division of the DA’s office -- opposed such a placement because: (1) Corey was the only known witness to the unresolved murder of his mother, in which his father was the principal suspect; (2) Lonnie had been prosecuted for assaulting Corey’s mother’s boyfriend just a few months before her death; (3) Corey was extremely afraid of Lonnie, his “bad daddy”; and (4) a placement with paternal relatives could be psychologically and emotionally harmful to Corey, and it would present a dangerous opportunity for “witness dissuasion.”
According to the DA, when Lonnie (who is married to another woman) learned Corey’s mother was dating someone else, he went to her apartment, beat up her boyfriend, and threatened him with a gun.
Third, Corey’s therapist had observed that Corey was “very bonded and [had] begun to build a solid relationship with his pre-adoptive parents.” The therapist opined that moving Corey to a new placement -- particularly one with paternal relatives with whom he had no relationship and who might facilitate contact between Corey and Lonnie -- would not be in the boy’s best interest. For these reasons, DCFS believed it “would be both mentally and emotionally harmful to Corey” to place him in Celia’s care. DCFS recommended that Corey remain with his preadoptive parents and that the court terminate parental rights. DCFS noted the preadoptive parents were willing to allow Corey to maintain ties with his biological family. Corey’s attorney agreed with DCFS’ recommendation.
Celia, Lenore, and Corey’s paternal grandmother attended the section 366.26 hearing on December 27, 2006. However, the hearing did not proceed on that day because Lonnie’s attorney was ill. The court continued the case to January 30, 2007. The court then continued the matter again when a new attorney appointed to represent Lonnie needed more time to prepare. No paternal relative ever has sought formally to participate in this action.
The court finally conducted a contested section 366.26 hearing on February 27, 2007. At issue was Lonnie’s desire to have Corey moved from his preadoptive placement into Celia’s home.
Celia testified. She said she called DCFS about two weeks after Corey’s detention and left her name. She and a DCFS representative exchanged several phone calls. In these calls, Celia gave DCFS her personal information and told them she wanted to care for Corey. Celia asked the representative “a couple of times” when she would be asked to submit to a livescan, but DCFS did not ask her to do so for about a year. When she did, Celia was told DCFS would contact her if she was eligible to have Corey placed with her. DCFS never contacted her. Had the opportunity been made available, Celia testified she would have arranged visitation, because she wanted “to establish a relationship with Corey” and wanted him to know his family. Celia believed the best way to accomplish those goals was for Corey to move in with her, and she had the desire, ability, and means to provide and care for him. Celia said no one at DCFS ever expressed to her any concern about Lenore’s criminal history, the fact that she lived with Celia, or any impediment Lenore might pose to Corey’s placement in her home. If they had, or if Corey were placed in Celia’s home, arrangements could and would be made for Lenore to live elsewhere. Celia reiterated her willingness to adopt Corey “if . . . necessary.”
At the conclusion of the hearing the juvenile court noted the relative preference for placement had lapsed at the dispositional phase of the case; Lonnie and his attorney both had been present but had raised no objection. The preference came into play again in 2006, when it became necessary to find a new adoptive placement for Corey, and DCFS again was required to investigate placement with interested and appropriate relatives. However, among the factors DCFS was required to consider in determining the appropriateness of a relative placement was the extent and nature of any relationship between the child and his relative. The court noted that Corey was four years old when this case began. Celia had met him only once by that time; she had “never established or maintained any relationship whatsoever with the child . . . .” The court was very concerned about the extensive criminal records of Celia’s family members in general. It also had “real concern about [Celia’s] ability to make good judgments regarding Corey,” if it had never “occur[red] to her that her sister should probably move out of the home” so Corey could move in. The court found DCFS was not derelict in its duty under section 361.3, subdivision (d) or (e). And, even though the time for considering the relative preference had passed, the court agreed Celia’s home would not provide an appropriate placement for Corey under the section 361.3 criteria in any event.
The court then found by clear and convincing evidence that Corey was likely to be adopted. No exceptions having been established, the court terminated parental rights. Lonnie appeals. He also appeals DCFS’ failure to provide proper notice under the ICWA, an error DCFS concedes. We set forth the facts on that issue below.
DISCUSSION
Lonnie argues that (1) the juvenile court erred in denying placement with the paternal aunt; and (2) DCFS did not give proper notice under the ICWA. Only the latter contention has merit.
1. Assuming that Lonnie has standing to appeal the order denying the relative placement, the juvenile court did not err.
The sole substantive error Lonnie asserts is the juvenile court’s refusal to place Corey with Celia, his paternal aunt. Lonnie maintains DCFS failed adequately to investigate a possible placement with Celia, and thus the juvenile court did not exercise its independent judgment in choosing a nonrelative adoption over a placement with Celia. DCFS argues we need not reach the merits of Lonnie’s claim because he is not legally aggrieved by the placement order, and thus lacks standing to appeal it.
Whether a person has standing depends on whether he “has rights that may suffer some injury, actual or threatened.” (Clifford S. v. Superior Court (1995) 38 Cal.App.4th 747, 751; In re Carissa G. (1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 731, 734 [party is aggrieved if his legally cognizable interest is injuriously affected by the court’s decision].) The leading case on standing in relative placement cases is Cesar V. v. Superior Court (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 1023 (Cesar V.). There, a social services agency had denied a paternal grandmother’s application to have the child placed with her. The court found the father -- for whom reunification services had been terminated by stipulation and who “. . . ‘was resigned to losing his parental rights because [he was] incarcerated’ ” (id. at p. 1027) -- lacked standing to appeal the relative placement issue. The father’s only asserted interest in the action was reunification with his child, the court noted, but resolution of the placement issue would not affect this interest. (Id. at p. 1035.) Nevertheless, the court permitted the father to present his arguments because the paternal grandmother – who did have standing – also had raised the placement issue. (Ibid.)
Here, neither Celia nor anyone else other than Lonnie challenges – or ever has formally challenged – the order denying relative placement. Under section 361.5, subdivision (b)(8), Lonnie was not entitled to reunification services, because his felonious sexual act with a 14-year-old was what led to Corey’s birth. So even if relative placement had been appropriate at the permanency planning stage, reunification was not in issue. And, even if relative placement had been appropriate, that placement would not have prevented the court from terminating parental rights, because Corey was adoptable. (See § 366.26, subd. (c)(1).) Although Lonnie did not stipulate to the termination of reunification services, he did not appeal from the order denying him reunification services and he does not question that order on this appeal. (Cf. In re Jasmine J. (1996) 46 Cal.App.4th 1802, 1807-1808 [father lacks standing to appeal termination of his parental rights on grounds he was denied contested hearing on placement of child with sibling because father’s rights are not affected by this placement].)
Lonnie insists, nevertheless, that the juvenile court’s refusal to place Corey in his sister’s care injuriously affected his interest in maintaining a familial connection with his son. (Cf. In re H.G. (2006) 146 Cal.App.4th 1, 9-10 [even where reunification is no longer the goal of a dependency action, a parent retains a fundamental interest in his child’s companionship, management, and care, and section 361.3, subd. (a)(2) obligates the juvenile court to consider parent’s wishes in determining if relative placement is appropriate under section 387].) Any future relationship between Lonnie and Corey was speculative at best, given Corey’s fearful and very negative reaction to even one letter from Lonnie. Indeed, in permitting Celia to visit Corey (with his therapist’s permission), the juvenile court ordered that Celia not even mention Lonnie to Corey. Ultimately, however, we need not decide this issue, because we have considered Lonnie’s arguments and reject them on the merits.
When a child is removed from his parent’s custody under section 361, his care, custody, and control are placed under DCFS’ supervision. (§ 361.2, subd. (e).) DCFS may place the child in any of several locations, including the home of an approved relative. (§ 361.2, subd. (e)(1)-(8).) A relative who requests placement of a dependent child is given preferential consideration. (§ 361.3, subd. (a).) In determining whether to place the child with a requesting relative, the court and DCFS consider the factors listed in section 361.3, subdivision (a). The relative preference applies when the child is removed from a parent’s physical custody and, after the disposition hearing (§ 358), whenever a new placement is required. (§ 361.3, subd. (d); In re Lauren R. (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 841, 854.)
As pertinent here, those factors are: “(1) The best interest of the child, including special physical, psychological, educational, medical, or emotional needs [¶] (2) The wishes of the parent, the relative, and the child, if appropriate. [¶] . . . [¶] (5) The good moral character of the relative and any other adult living in the home, including whether any individual residing in the home has a prior history of violent criminal acts or has been responsible for acts of child abuse or neglect. [¶] (6) The nature and duration of the relationship between the child and the relative, and the relative’s desire to care for, and to provide legal permanency for, the child if reunification is unsuccessful. [¶] (7) The ability of the relative to . . . [¶] . . . [p]rovide a safe, secure, and stable environment for the child[;] [¶] . . . [e]xercise proper and effective care and control of the child[;] [¶] . . . [p]rovide a home and the necessities of life for the child[;] [¶] . . . [p]rotect the child from his or her parents[;] [¶] . . . . [f]acilitate visitation with the child’s other relatives[;] [¶] . . . [¶] . . . [p]rovide legal permanence for the child if reunification fails[;] [¶] . . . [¶] . . . [a]rrange for appropriate and safe childcare, as necessary. [¶] (8) The safety of the relative’s home.” (§ 361.3, subd. (a).)
Corey’s paternal aunt was eligible for preferential consideration as a relative placement. (§§ 361.2, 361.3, subd. (c)(2).) “ ‘Preferential consideration’ means that the relative seeking placement shall be the first placement to be considered and investigated.” (§ 361.3, subd. (c)(1).) It does not create an evidentiary presumption in favor of the relative; it merely puts him or her at the front of the line when the court is determining which placement is in the child’s best interest. (In re Stephanie M. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 295, 320-321 (Stephanie M.); Alicia B. v. Superior Court (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 856, 863(Alicia B.).) In evaluating the preferential consideration of relative placement under section 361.3, the juvenile court must examine the evidence independently and without deference to DCFS’s determination of the appropriateness of a particular placement. (See Cesar V., supra, 91 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1033-1034.) The court’s task under section 361.3 “is to determine whether such a placement is appropriate, taking into account the suitability of the relative’s home and the best interest of the child.” (Stephanie M., supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 321.)
On the other hand, we will not interfere with the juvenile court’s placement decision unless it manifestly abused its discretion in making its independent evaluation. In other words, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to that court’s ruling, it must appear no judge reasonably could have made the same determination. (Alicia B., supra, 116 Cal.App.4th at p. 863.) Where, as here, the ruling involves primarily factual issues, our analysis of the juvenile court’s exercise of discretion is similar to analyzing the sufficiency of the evidence to support that ruling. (See In re Robert L. (1993) 21 Cal.App.4th 1057, 1065, superseded on other grounds by statute, as stated in Cesar V., supra, 91 Cal.App.4th at p. 1032.)
Our review of the record reveals that substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s decision denying placement of Corey with his paternal aunt. That decision was well within the court’s discretion. “Balancing the benefits of maintaining extended family relationships against the best interests of the child is a critical element in the placement decision. (§ 361.3, subd. (a)(1)-(8).)” (Alicia B., supra, 116 Cal.App.4th at p. 864.) The linchpin of the section 361.3 analysis is whether placement with a relative is in the child’s best interest. (Stephanie M., supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 321.) As aptly stated by one Court of Appeal, “We realize the importance of according relatives a ‘fair chance’ to obtain custody. [Citation.] At the same time, however, the fundamental duty of the juvenile court is to ‘assure the best interest of the child . . . .’ [Citation.]” (Alicia B., supra, 116 Cal.App.4th at p. 864 [concluding court did not err in declining to place infant with maternal grandmother where grandmother had not visited the child for two months, and her own history with child protective services included a substantiated referral for neglect of another grandchild in her care].)
Corey was just four years old when he was detained, and five years old at the time of the section 366.26 hearing. He was placed in foster care under the emotionally wrenching circumstances of his mother’s brutal murder. He plainly fears and has never really known his father, who has been incarcerated for all but about a year of the child’s life. To the extent Corey has expressed any feelings for Lonnie, he seems to view him only as the “bad daddy” who “killed his mother.” Moreover, at the time the relative preference question arose, Corey already had been in two placements since his mother’s death. A move to Celia’s home would have been the third placement in about 15 months. Since early October 2006, Corey had been living with foster parents, who wanted and were ready to adopt him. He was happy in this placement, felt safe, and was, according to DCFS, developing a strong attachment to his prospective adoptive parents. The juvenile court reasonably could have found it was in Corey best interest to remain in a stable placement at that point. Even when the relative preference applies, “the fundamental duty of the court is to assure the best interests of the child, whose bond with a foster parent may require that placement with a relative be rejected.” (Stephanie M., supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 321.)
We are deeply troubled by DCFS’ clear reluctance, if not its outright refusal, to comply with the juvenile court’s order to investigate the appropriateness of a placement in Celia’s home in Spring 2006. The record strongly suggests DCFS ignored the court’s order, and proceeded instead to facilitate a nonrelative preadoptive placement. One easily could surmise that the sooner such a placement was made and the longer it lasted, the more likely it would be that Corey would develop a growing attachment to new caretakers, one the court might be reluctant to disrupt in favor of a re-placement down the road with an appropriate but unfamiliar relative. This was precisely what the court wanted to avoid when it ordered that DCFS investigate all of Corey’s relatives before the child was moved from his second foster placement. Despite our concerns about potential misconduct by DCFS, we find sufficient other independent indicia supporting the court’s conclusion that, in the end, Celia’s home was not an appropriate placement for Corey.
Two other important factors the court must consider are the nature and duration of the relationship between the child and the relative (§ 361.3, subd. (a)(6)), and the relative’s ability to protect the child from his parents (id. subd. (a)(7)(D). Neither of these factors favored Corey’s placement with Celia. Corey had met Celia only once in his life. He had no relationship at all with her. In addition, both DCFS and the DA had profound reservations about whether Corey would be safe in Celia’s home. On the record before us, it appears Lonnie remains the prime suspect in an unsolved murder to which his son was the only eyewitness. Celia maintains a close relationship with her brother, and the court could well question her ability or motivation to keep Corey safe from his father. The court also must consider the moral character of other relatives living in the prospective placement. Celia continues to share her home with Lenore, who has failed to reunify with her own children and who, like Lonnie, has an extensive criminal history. Celia’s allegiance to her siblings is obvious – even to the extent it may jeopardize her ability to obtain financial assistance to care for her brother’s and Lenore’s biological children for whom Celia is now legally responsible.
Finally, the wishes of the parent, relative, and (if appropriate) the child, as to a relative placement are also factors to be taken into account. Lonnie and his sister want Corey placed with Celia. Celia has said she will adopt Corey “if she has to.” But the aunt’s tepid desire to assume long-term responsibility for her nephew “if necessary” does not approach the enthusiastic embrace Corey has received from his prospective adoptive parents, or their strong desire immediately to establish a permanent adoptive family. Corey clearly has expressed his own desire to stay with and be adopted by his current caretakers. “Our job is not to reweigh the evidence.” (Alicia B., supra, 116 Cal.App.4th at p. 864.) The juvenile court, sitting as the trier of fact, has extensive familiarity with the parties and the facts, and is in a better position than we are to judge the evidence and testimony. (Ibid.) The court did not abuse its discretion in determining Celia would not provide an appropriate relative placement or in denying Lonnie’s request to have Corey placed with his paternal aunt.
2. Limited reversal is required for compliance with the ICWA.
In this case, Corey’s paternal grandfather gave DCFS information indicating that Corey has possible Cherokee and Choctaw heritage. DCFS sent notices to some tribes, the BIA, and Secretary of the Interior. However, the notices did not include any information about the maternal side of Corey’s family, the paternal grandfather’s address, the child’s paternal grandmother, or the dates of birth or death of Corey’s paternal great-grandparents. In addition, the notices DCFS sent failed to identify the tribal chairperson or designated agent for service, and no return receipt was signed. Lonnie also told the court his family had American Indian heritage, and that his sister had more information. There is no indication DCFS made any inquiry of either of Lonnie’s sisters, let alone of Corey’s maternal relatives, to obtain additional information.
Four tribes sent letters stating Corey was not enrolled or eligible for enrollment as a member. However, no response ever was received from the Cherokee Nation of Oklahoma or the United Keetoowah Band of Cherokee Indians; we cannot assume those tribes received notice. (In re Karla C. (2003) 113 Cal.App.4th 166, 175-176.) And the tribal responses the court did receive were no less defective than the initial notices DCFS sent out. Proper notice is a key component of the Congressional goal advanced by the ICWA, to protect and preserve Indian tribes and families. (In re Kahlen W. (1991) 233 Cal.App.3d 1414, 1421.) Only proper notice – and the concomitant ability meaningfully to participate in a dependency action – can ensure a tribe is given an opportunity to assert its rights under the ICWA. (Ibid; see also In re J.T. (2007) 154 Cal.App.4th 986, 994 [where tribal chairperson or designated agent is not identified, and where there is either no tribal response, or return receipt does not indicate that chairperson or designated agent signed, notice fails to conform to statutory mandates, and is insufficient]; In re H. A. (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 1206, 1213 [failure to serve correct person is reversible error, even if notice is sent to right address].) A tribe cannot conduct a meaningful search of its records unless it is given as much information as can be obtained from everyone in the lineal line. (In re Robert A. (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 982, 989.)
Limited reversal and remand is required so DCFS may conduct the inquiry it should have performed long ago of the maternal and paternal relatives about Corey’s Indian heritage, if any, and to provide proper notice to all appropriate recipients. Although remand unfortunately results in further delay to implementing Corey’s permanent plan, reversal is necessary to get it right and to protect and advance the goals underlying the ICWA. “Compliance with the ICWA is not a mere technicality.” (In re Elizabeth W. (2004) 120 Cal.App.4th 900, 908.)
DISPOSITION
The judgment (that is, the order terminating parental rights) is reversed and the matter remanded for the limited purpose of effectuating proper notice under and further proceedings, if necessary, in compliance with the provisions of the ICWA. In all other respects, the judgment is affirmed.
We concur: COOPER, P. J., FLIER, J.