Opinion
F040950
7-24-2003
In re CONRAD B., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. CONRAD B., Defendant and Appellant.
Paul E. Lacy, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Bill Lockyer, Attorney General, Robert R. Anderson, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Jo Graves, Assistant Attorney General, Janis Shank McLean and Alan Ashby, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Appellant Conrad B., a minor, admitted an allegation that he committed a first degree burglary (Pen. Code, §§ 459; 460 subd. (a)). The juvenile court adjudged him a ward of the court pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 602; placed him on probation; and ordered him committed to Camp Erwin Owen. In addition, following a restitution hearing, the court ordered appellant pay restitution to the victims in the amount of $ 3,515.43, an amount which included $ 150 for door and window locks, $ 1,999 for the purchase and installation of a home security system, $ 30 for outdoor security motion lights, and $ 113.43 for bedroom furnishings.
Except as otherwise indicated, all further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
The court mistakenly stated the total as $ 3,515.93. The correct amount, reflecting the total of the individual amounts enumerated by the court, is $ 3,515.43, as set forth in the text. The court stated that the individual amounts it announced "were the ones . . . intended" in the event "[the courts] math is off . . . ."
On appeal, appellant challenges the portion of the restitution award for the items enumerated in the preceding paragraph. We will strike the portion of the award based on the purchase and installation of home security related items and a portion of the award based on bedroom furnishings, and, as so modified, affirm the restitution order.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Instant Offense
Appellant left his bicycle by the side of the home of Susan D. and her two daughters, 22-year-old Jennifer and 13-year-old Alicia, and entered the house through an unlocked side door. While appellant was in the house, Jennifer returned home. She noticed the bicycle by the side of the house but thought nothing of it. She cleaned out her car and then entered the house. Appellant later told police he stayed in the garage for approximately 15 minutes when Jennifer came home and that when she entered the house he left the garage, retrieved his bicycle and rode home, approximately five minutes away.
In order to protect the privacy interests of the minor, Alicia, we refer to the adult members of her family by their respective first names.
Jennifer was home for approximately 15 minutes when Susan, who was at Centennial High School registering Alicia for school, telephoned and asked Jennifer to pick up Alicia at school. Jennifer went to the school, picked up her sister and returned home with her at approximately 8:10 p.m. Jennifer asked Alicia about the bicycle, and then noticed it was gone. The girls became frightened and went to the high school to tell their mother.
After Jennifer and Alicia left, appellant returned to the house, entered by the same unlocked door by which appellant entered and went into Alicias bedroom. He was there approximately 10 minutes when he heard the garage door.
Susan returned home at approximately 8:25 p.m. and found appellant in the garage. She ordered him to sit down and not move. She saw that he had something in his hands but could not see what it was; it was later determined appellant was holding six pairs of Alicias panties. Susan called the police on her cell phone.
Alicia "looked through her bedroom and noted it appeared someone had gone through her desk and dresser drawers, as well as a laundry basket outside her bedroom." Appellant told police that he was in Alicias bedroom when he heard the garage door, and that he " couldnt resist grabbing some of Alicias underwear . . . ."
Appellant was 14 years old at the time of the instant offense.
Restitution
Following the disposition hearing, a separate hearing was held to determine the amount of victim restitution.
In advance of the hearing, Susan prepared and submitted to the court a written statement that included the following losses claimed as a result of the burglary: approximately $ 30 for "security lights"; approximately $ 150 for "lock [sic] for doors, window & gate"; and $ 113.43 for "bedding - comforter, sheets, pillow cases, wall decorations, rug[.]"
At that hearing, Susan testified to the following. After appellant had been taken into custody, Susan inspected Alicias bedroom and found that "every one of [Alicias] drawers had been opened and there were clothes coming out of them," and Alicias bed "had been messed up."
After the burglary, Alicia at first, because of her "fears," would not sleep in her own room. She slept on the floor in her sisters room. Just prior to the burglary, Susan had purchased "new bedding" for Alicia, but since the burglary Alicia "will not sleep in her covers anymore." Approximately six weeks after the burglary Alicia went back to sleeping in her bed "but not with that bedding." Since the burglary, Susan had not seen Alicia wear anything that had been kept in the same drawer as the panties that appellant had taken.
"In order to feel more secure in [her] own home as a result of the burglary,"
Susan paid $ 14.99 for each of two outdoor security motion lights; $ 199 for the purchase and installation of new locks for the doors and windows; and $ 1,999 for the purchase and installation of a home alarm system.
The court ordered appellant to pay restitution that included $ 113.43 "for the bedding, comforter, sheets, pillow case, wall decorations and rug"; $ 1,999 for the "alarm system"; and $ 150 for "the locks for the doors, window and the gate[.]"
The court also ordered appellant to pay restitution as follows: $ 20 for a "bed pad"; $ 15 for a "filing fee," related to a restraining order proceeding instituted against appellant; $ 824 for expenses related to Susans enrollment as a student at California State University at Bakersfield; and $ 304 for Jennifers lost wages. Appellant does not challenge these amounts on appeal.
DISCUSSION
Section 730.6 governs restitution in cases in which a minor is adjudicated a ward of the court pursuant to section 602. Appellant challenges the portion of the courts restitution order awarding a total of $ 2,179 for home security related expenses, viz., $ 1,999 for an alarm system, $ 30 for exterior lights and $ 150 for door, window and gate locks, on the grounds that restitution for these items was not authorized by section 730.6. We agree.
Subdivision (a)(1) of section 730.6 provides: "It is the intent of the Legislature that a victim of conduct for which a minor is found to be a person described in Section 602 who incurs any economic loss as a result of the minors conduct shall receive restitution directly from that minor."
Subdivision (a)(2) of section 730.6 provides, in relevant part: "Upon a minor being found to be a person described in Section 602, the court shall order the minor to pay, in addition to any other penalty provided or imposed under the law, . . . the following: . . . [P] (B) Restitution to the victim or victims, if any, in accordance with subdivision (h)."
Subdivision (h) of section 730.6 provides, in relevant part: "Restitution ordered pursuant to subparagraph (B) of paragraph (2) of subdivision (a) shall be imposed in the amount of the losses, as determined. . . . A restitution order pursuant to subparagraph (B) of paragraph (2) of subdivision (a) . . . shall be of a dollar amount sufficient to fully reimburse the victim or victims for all determined economic losses incurred as the result of the minors conduct for which the minor was found to be a person described in Section 602, including" certain enumerated types of losses. (Emphasis added.)
Those types of losses are as follows: "(1) Full or partial payment for the value of stolen or damaged property. The value of stolen or damaged property shall be the replacement cost of like property, or the actual cost of repairing the property when repair is possible. [P] (2) Medical expenses. [P] (3) Wages or profits lost due to injury incurred by the victim, and if the victim is a minor, wages or profits lost by the minors parent, parents, guardian, or guardians, while caring for the injured minor. Lost wages shall include any commission income as well as any base wages. Commission income shall be established by evidence of commission income during the 12-month period prior to the date of the crime for which restitution is being ordered, unless good cause for a shorter time period is shown. [P] (4) Wages or profits lost by the victim, and if the victim is a minor, wages or profits lost by the minors parent, parents, guardian, or guardians, due to time spent as a witness or in assisting the police or prosecution. Lost wages shall include any commission income as well as any base wages. Commission income shall be established by evidence of commission income during the 12-month period prior to the date of the crime for which restitution is being ordered, unless good cause for a shorter time period is shown." ( § 730.6, subd. (h).) This list is not exhaustive. (In re Johnny M. (2002) 100 Cal.App.4th 1128, 1135.)
Thus, the question before us is whether the home security related expenses incurred by the victims here qualify as "economic losses incurred as the result of the minors conduct," within the meaning of section 730.6, subdivision (h). In making this determination, we are mindful of the following: "Restitution statutes are to be interpreted broadly and liberally. [Citation.] Any interpretation that limits a victims rights to restitution would be in derogation of the expressed intent and purposes of Proposition 8 and the provisions adopted by the Legislature to implement this measure." [Citation.] [Citation.] The term economic losses is thus entitled to an expansive interpretation." (In re Johnny M. , supra, 100 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1132-1133, fn. omitted.)
However, a liberal interpretation of a statutory term "should not exceed the limits of statutory intent." (County of Madera v. Carleson (1973) 32 Cal. App. 3d 764, 769, 108 Cal. Rptr. 515.) "In any case involving statutory interpretation, our fundamental task . . . is to determine the Legislatures intent so as to effectuate the laws purpose." (People v. Murphy (2001) 25 Cal.4th 136, 142.) "We look first to the words of the statute itself, which should be the best indicator of the lawmakers intent. [Citation.] If those words are clear and unambiguous, we may not modify them to accomplish a purpose not apparent on the face of the statute or from its legislative history. [Citation.] But whether a statute is ambiguous is not always readily ascertainable. A statute must be considered in the context of the relevant statutory framework. [Citations.]" (People v. Goodloe (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 485, 490-491.) Thus, when a particular provision appears in one statute but is omitted from a related statute, such omission may create an ambiguity inviting inquiry into the Legislatures intent in enacting the statute. (People v. Hernandez (1988) 46 Cal.3d 194, 201, 249 Cal. Rptr. 850, 757 P.2d 1013, disapproved on another point in People v. King (1993) 5 Cal.4th 59, 78, fn. 5, 851 P.2d 27.) And, "the most obvious conclusion from [such an] omission is that a different legislative intent existed. [Citation.]" (People v. Goodloe, supra, 37 Cal.App.4th at p. 490; accord, In re Marquis D. (1995) 38 Cal.App.4th 1813, 1827 ["if a statute on a particular subject omits a particular provision, inclusion of that provision in another related statute indicates an intent [that] the provision is not applicable to the statute from which it was omitted"].) "On the other hand, an examination of legislative history and the pertinent statutory scheme may suggest that the omission was an oversight." (People v. Goodloe, supra, 37 Cal.App.4th at p. 490.)
With the foregoing principles in mind, we examine Penal Code section 1202.4, which governs restitution in adult criminal proceedings. Subdivision (a) of Penal Code section 1202.4, provides, in language substantively identical to subdivision (a)(1) of section 730.6: "It is the intent of the Legislature that a victim of crime who incurs any economic loss as a result of the commission of a crime shall receive restitution directly from any defendant convicted of that crime."
The amount of restitution to the victim of an adult offender is determined in accordance with subdivision (f) of Penal Code section 1202.4 (Pen. Code, § 1202.4, subd. (a)(3)(B)), which parallels subdivision (h) of section 730.6, and which provides in pertinent part: "In every case in which a victim has suffered economic loss as a result of the defendants conduct, the court shall require that the defendant make restitution to the victim or victims in an amount established by court order, based on the amount of loss claimed by the victim or victims or any other showing to the court. . . . [P] . . . [P] (3) To the extent possible, the restitution order . . . shall be of a dollar amount that is sufficient to fully reimburse the victim or victims for every determined economic loss incurred as the result of the defendants criminal conduct, including, but not limited to, all of the following: [P] (A) Full or partial payment for the value of stolen or damaged property. The value of stolen or damaged property shall be the replacement cost of like property, or the actual cost of repairing the property when repair is possible. [P] (B) Medical Expenses. [P] . . . [P] (D) Wages or profits lost due to injury incurred by the victim, and if the victim is a minor, wages or profits lost by the minors parent, parents, guardian or guardians, while caring for the injured minor. [P] (E) Wages or profits lost by the victim, and if the victim is a minor, wages or profits lost by the minors parent, parents, guardian or guardians, due to time spent as a witness or in assisting the police or prosecution. . . . [P] . . . [P] (J) Expenses to install or increase residential security incurred related to a crime, as defined in subdivision (c) of Section 667.5, including but not limited to, a home security device or system, or replacing or increasing the number of locks." (Pen. Code, § 1202.4, subd. (f), emphasis added.)
As indicated above, both section 730.6 and Penal Code section 1202.4 mandate victim restitution for all "economic losses" incurred as the result of the offenders conduct. ( § 730.6, subd. (h); Pen. Code, § 1202.4, subd. (f).) And Penal Code section 1202.4 provides that included in such losses are the same four types of losses enumerated in section 730.6. (Pen. Code, § 1202.4, subd. (f)(3), subparagraphs (A), (B), (D), (E).) However, Penal Code section 1202.4 also includes in its list of covered losses, in subparagraph (J) of subdivision (f)(3) of that statute, home security related expenses of the type appellant claims here in cases in which the defendant commits a serious felony within the meaning of Penal Code section 667, subdivision (c). This provision was added by amendment to the statute in 1999. No such provision appears in section 730.6.
The People argue that the failure of the Legislature to add a similar provision to section 730.6 "must . . . be deemed to be a legislative oversight," and that "no other view is reasonable." We disagree. First, we reject the Peoples claim that there could be no other reasonable explanation for the omission. The Legislature reasonably could have determined that the restitution burden imposed on minors should be less severe than that imposed on adult offenders. Moreover, we note that there was no amendment to section 730.6 in 1999 when subdivision (f)(3)(J) of Penal Code section 1202.4 was added to the statute, and although section 730.6 was amended again the following year, in a bill which also contained amendments to Penal Code section 1202.4 (Assem. Bill No. 2491 (1999-2000 Reg. Sess.), the Legislature did not take the opportunity then, or at any time since, to add home security related expenses to the list of covered losses in section 730.6. These factors argue against the view that omission of such expenses from the list of types of losses for which restitution is required under section 730.6 is simply a legislative oversight. On the contrary, in our view such omission involved the exercise of legislative judgment and indicates that the Legislature intended that home security related expenses of the kind claimed by appellant not be considered "economic losses incurred as the result of the minors conduct" within the meaning of section 730.6, subdivision (h).
Appellant also contends the court improperly included in the restitution order $ 113.43 for what Susan described as "bedding — comforter, sheets, pillow cases, wall decorations, rug" for Alicias bedroom. Specifically, appellant argues that although the evidence indicates he entered Alicias bedroom and pulled down the bedding on the bed that had previously been made, there was no evidence of damage to any of the furnishings in the room, and therefore the victims suffered no "economic loss" within the meaning of section 730.6. As we explain below, we conclude the restitution properly awarded restitution for bedclothes, but the court abused its discretion including in the restitution award amounts for the newly purchased bedroom rug and wall decorations.
As indicated above, the term "economic losses" should be construed "broadly," "liberally" and "expansively." (In re Johnny M., supra , 100 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1132-1133.) It is reasonably inferable from the record that 12-year-old Alicia was traumatized by appellants entry into her bedroom, going through her drawers, taking her underwear and turning down her bed, and that as a result Alicia initially refused to sleep in her room, eventually began sleeping in that room in her bed, but continued to refuse to sleep with the bedding that was on her bed at the time of the burglary. Under these circumstances, it is reasonable to interpret the term "economic losses incurred as a result of the minors conduct" (730.6, subd. (h)) to include the modest amount necessary to replace the childs bedclothes, notwithstanding that the sheets, comforter and pillow cases on the bed at the time of the burglary were not damaged. (People v. Dalvito (1997) 56 Cal.App.4th 557, 562 ["when there is a factual and rational basis for the amount of restitution ordered by the trial court, no abuse of discretion will be found by the reviewing court"].)
On the other hand, although the record indicates Alicia refused to sleep in her room for several weeks following the burglary, the evidence also indicates she eventually returned to her bedroom, and there is no evidence she suffered any particular aversion to any rugs or wall decorations in her room. A store sales receipt submitted by Susan D. at the restitution hearing indicates that she paid a total of $ 27.47 for wall decorations and a rug. We conclude the record does not demonstrate a factual and rational basis for including this amount in the restitution award.
DISPOSITION
The portion of the restitution order awarding $ 2,179 for home security related losses and $ 27.47 for the purchase of new wall decorations and a new rug is stricken. As so modified, the order appealed from is affirmed.