Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from the Superior Court No. VJ32424 of Los Angeles County. Benjamin Campos, Commissioner (pursuant to Cal. Const., art. VI, § 21.)
Melanie K. Dorian, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Pamela C. Hamanaka, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Steven D. Matthews, Supervising Deputy Attorney General, and Timothy M. Weiner, Deputy Attorney General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
MOSK, J.
INTRODUCTION
C.O. (minor) appeals from a sustained petition finding that he is a person described by Welfare and Institutions Code section 602. The juvenile court found minor guilty of the unlawful driving or taking of a vehicle in violation of Vehicle Code section 10851, subdivision (a) (section 10851), and that minor’s crime was a felony. Minor contends that the juvenile court improperly admitted rebuttal evidence that the People had not previously disclosed to him, and that no substantial evidence supported the juvenile court’s finding that minor drove the stolen vehicle with the intent to deprive its owner of its possession. We disagree with both contentions and affirm.
Statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless stated otherwise.
BACKGROUND
A. The People’s Case
Nicolas Morales was the registered owner of a 1992 Honda Accord with license plate number 5RKR171. Shortly after 5 p.m. on April 6, 2007, Mr. Morales got out of his car to deliver a pizza; he left the engine running. He heard a noise, and turned around to see someone driving off in his car. He had not given permission to anyone to take the car.
Shortly after 9:00 p.m. that evening, deputies Russell Boucher and Robert Thomas of the Los Angeles County Sherriff’s Department were patrolling near the intersection of Pioneer Boulevard and Rosecrans Avenue in Norwalk. Deputy Boucher saw a light blue, four-door Honda Accord matching the description of Morales’s stolen car sitting at a red light in a southbound lane on Pioneer. The license number was 5RKR171. Deputy Boucher made a U-turn to get back to the vehicle; as he did so, four young men jumped out of the car and fled into a nearby shopping center.
Deputy Thomas searched the Honda and found a sheet of white paper containing phone numbers in the driver’s side door slot. One number was designated “P.O.” Deputy Boucher called the number and found it to be the number of a probation officer. He also called several of the other numbers on the page. Based on the information learned from the telephone calls, police identified minor as the suspected driver of the stolen Honda. At 11:30 p.m. that evening, Deputy Boucher went to minor’s residence. When minor returned home shortly thereafter, Deputy Boucher recognized minor as the person he had seen exiting the driver’s door of the Honda. Deputy Boucher identified minor in court as the person who had been driving the Honda.
B. Minor’s Case
Minor’s uncle Juan testified that minor lived with him, and that minor had returned home from school on April 6 “probably around 5:20” p.m. Minor went out to eat with friends sometime between 5:00 p.m. and 6:00 p.m., and returned home at 8:00 p.m. Sometime after 9:00 p.m., minor left the residence with his uncle Ignacio to see Ignacio’s new apartment.
We refer to minor’s relatives by their first names not from disrespect, but to preserve minor’s anonymity.
Minor’s uncle Ignacio testified that he telephoned minor at 6:30 p.m. to ask if minor could help him move into a new apartment. Ignacio picked minor up from Juan’s apartment after 9:00 p.m. and took minor to his new apartment. Shortly after 11:00 p.m., Juan called Ignacio and told him that the police were at Juan’s apartment looking for minor. Ignacio took minor back to Juan’s apartment, where minor was arrested.
C. Rebuttal Case
The People called Deputy Boucher to rebut minor’s alibi defense. Deputy Boucher testified that minor’s uncle (presumably Juan) told him on the evening of April 6 that minor had been out most of the evening and had returned home at approximately 9:30 p.m., and had left with his mother and his other uncle (presumably Ignacio) to look at an apartment. Deputy Boucher further testified that, after he had advised minor of his Miranda rights and minor waived those rights, minor admitted that the list of telephone numbers was his, and that he had been in the Honda when Deputies Boucher and Thomas had approached it. Minor claimed, however, that he was a passenger, not the driver. On cross-examination, Deputy Boucher acknowledged that the police report Deputy Boucher had authored stated that minor admitted that he had been in the car, but had been dropped off before the deputies approached it.
D. Procedural Background
The People filed a petition alleging that minor was a person described by section 602 in that minor, then 17 years old, had committed one count of grand theft auto (Pen. Code, § 487, subd. (d)(1)) and one count of unlawfully driving or taking a vehicle (§ 10851, subd. (a)). At the close of the People’s case, the juvenile court dismissed the grand theft auto charge for insufficient evidence, pursuant to section 701.1. The juvenile court sustained the allegation that minor unlawfully drove or took the Honda, found that the crime was a felony, and declared minor a ward of the court. Minor was placed in the short-term community camp placement program for three months. The juvenile court set a maximum term of confinement of four years, consisting of 40 months on a prior sustained petition and eight months on the sustained petition in this case. Minor was given 105 days of predisposition credit, consisting of 52 days on the prior sustained petition and 53 days on the sustained petition in this case.
DISCUSSION
A. Rebuttal Evidence
Minor argues that the juvenile court erred by permitting Deputy Boucher’s rebuttal testimony because (1) the testimony did not rebut the testimony regarding minor’s whereabouts offered by Juan and Ignacio, and (2) the People had failed to disclose to the defense the content of Deputy Boucher’s rebuttal testimony. We review the admission of rebuttal evidence for an abuse of discretion. (People v. Harris (2005) 37 Cal.4th 310, 335; People v. Young (2005) 34 Cal.4th 1149, 1199.)
1. Rebuttal Evidence Related to Defendant’s Alibi Defense
Minor objected at trial that Deputy Boucher’s testimony was improper rebuttal. The People’s rebuttal evidence must relate to the subject matter of evidence offered by the defense. (People v. Lancaster (2007) 41 Cal.4th 50, 98.) “‘[P]roper rebuttal evidence does not include a material part of the case in the prosecution’s possession that tends to establish the defendant’s commission of the crime. It is restricted to evidence made necessary by the defendant’s case in the sense that he has introduced new evidence or made assertions that were not implicit in his denial of guilt.’ ” (People v. Young, supra, 34 Cal.4th at p. 1199; see Pen. Code, § 1093, subd. (d).) Testimony that reiterates or reinforces a part of the prosecution’s case that has been impeached by the defense properly may be admitted in rebuttal. (People v. Young, supra, 34 Cal.4th at p. 1199.)
Minor’s uncle Juan testified that minor was at home from “probably around 5:20” p.m. until approximately 6:00 p.m., when he went out to eat with friends. That testimony tended to establish that minor could not have been present when the Honda was stolen from Mr. Morales at approximately 5:10 p.m. Juan further testified that defendant returned home from dinner at approximately 8:00 p.m. and that minor remained at home until he left with his uncle Ignacio. Ignacio testified that minor was with him from approximately 9:30 p.m. until approximately 11:30 p.m. Combined, the testimony of Juan and Ignacio tended to establish an alibi for minor for the time when Deputies Boucher and Thomas approached the Honda and saw its occupants flee. By placing defendant elsewhere, the testimony of Juan and Ignacio also contradicted Deputy Boucher’s identification of minor as the person who was driving the Honda.
On rebuttal, Deputy Boucher testified that, on the night of the crime, Juan had told him that defendant had not returned home from dinner until 9:30 p.m., and that minor had told Deputy Boucher that minor was in the stolen Honda shortly after 9:00 p.m. when Deputies Boucher and Thomas approached it. Deputy Boucher’s testimony regarding these statements tended to rebut the testimony of Juan and Ignacio establishing minor’s alibi, and to reinforce Deputy Boucher’s identification of minor as the person driving the Honda. “[I]t is . . . established that when a defendant presents an alibi defense, the prosecution may introduce evidence that rebuts it even though that evidence could have been introduced as part of the case in chief.” (People v. Orabuena (1976) 56 Cal.App.3d 540, 543-544; accord, People v. Ambriz (1968) 260 Cal.App.2d 842, 846; People v. Jeffrey (1965) 233 Cal.App.2d 279, 281-282.)
The People were not required to present evidence regarding Juan’s and minor’s statements during their case in chief. (See People v. Thompson (1980) 27 Cal.3d 303, 330 [“If evidence is directly probative of the crimes charged and can be introduced at the time of the case in chief, it should be”].) Minor’s admission that he was a passenger in the car was not directly probative of his guilt—he was charged with grand theft auto and with driving or taking the Honda without its owner’s consent. Minor’s statement that he was a passenger in the stolen car would not suffice to prove either charge (People v. Clark (1967) 251 Cal.App.2d 868, 874; People v. Zervas (1943) 61 Cal.App.2d 381, 385) and was inconsistent with the People’s theory that minor was the driver. (See People v. Mayfield (1997) 14 Cal.4th 668, 772 [prosecutor not required to introduce defendant’s incriminating statement in case in chief if inconsistent with prosecution’s theory of the case; statement properly admitted as rebuttal evidence].) Further, there is no indication in the record that the People knew that minor would present an alibi defense before the close of the People’s case in chief. To the contrary, defense counsel informed the prosecuting attorney prior to trial only that “minor’s mother and uncle may testify.” The prosecuting attorney twice complained to the juvenile court that he had “no idea what they will testify to . . . .” The relevance of Juan’s and minor’s statements thus became clear only when the defense presented its case. The juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that the statements were proper rebuttal evidence.
2. Failure to Disclose
Minor argues that the trial court erred by permitting Deputy Boucher’s rebuttal testimony because the People failed to disclose that testimony prior to trial, purportedly in violation of Penal Code section 1054.1. Minor, however, did not object to Deputy Boucher’s testimony or request a continuance on this ground. Minor objected to the testimony on the grounds that it was improper rebuttal and, with respect to Deputy Boucher’s testimony regarding minor’s statement, hearsay. Minor thus forfeited any claim of error based on a purported violation of the People’s statutory discovery obligations. (See People v. Zambrano (2007) 41 Cal.4th 1082, 1132, fn. 12.)
In any event, minor has failed to establish a discovery violation. As minor’s attorney successfully argued in the juvenile court, the discovery provisions of section 1054 et sequéns do not apply in juvenile delinquency proceedings. (In re Thomas F. (2003) 113 Cal.App.4th 1249, 1255; Robert S. v. Superior Court (1992) 9 Cal.App.4th 1417, 1420-1422.) Discovery in juvenile delinquency proceedings is governed by California Rules of Court, rule 5.546. The only mandatory duties of disclosure imposed by that rule are that the People “must promptly deliver to or make accessible for inspection and copying by the child and the parent or guardian, or their counsel, copies of the police, arrest, and crime reports relating to the pending matter” (rule 5.546(b)), and “any evidence or information within Petitioner’s possession or control favorable to the child, parent, or guardian.” (Rule 5.546(c).) Minor does not contend that the police report was not disclosed prior to trial; it appears from the reporter’s transcript that defense counsel had the police report and cross-examined Deputy Boucher on its contents. Deputy Boucher’s oral testimony regarding Juan’s and minor’s statements does not constitute a “police, arrest or crime report” subject to disclosure under rule 5.546(b), nor was that evidence favorable to minor and therefore subject to disclosure under rule 5.546(c).
Rule references are to the California Rules of Court.
Minor makes no claim of Brady error. (Brady v. Maryland (1963) 373 U.S. 83.)
Other information—including “[r]ecords of statements, admissions, or conversations by the child, parent, or guardian”—must be provided by the People only after a timely request by the child, parent, guardian or their counsel. (Rule 5.546(d)(2).) The record contains no request for records of minor’s statements, nor does the record contain a motion by minor for an order compelling disclosure pursuant to rule 5.546(e). There was no error in the admission of Deputy Boucher’s rebuttal testimony.
Prior to trial, defense counsel made an oral motion for a continuance based on outstanding discovery relating to a 911 call and Mr. Morales’s criminal history. There was no mention by minor’s counsel of any outstanding discovery relating to defendant’s statements.
B. Sufficiency of the Evidence
Minor argues that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his conviction under Vehicle Code section 10851. In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, we ask not whether there is evidence from which the trier of fact could have reached some other conclusion, but whether there is substantial evidence of minor’s guilt. (In re Michael M. (2001) 86 Cal.App.4th 718, 726.) Substantial evidence is evidence of credible and solid value, from which a reasonable trier of fact could have found guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. (Ibid.) “‘In determining whether a reasonable trier of fact could have found defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, the appellate court “must view the evidence in a light most favorable to respondent and presume in support of the judgment the existence of every fact the trier [of fact] could reasonably deduce from the evidence.”’” (People v. Staten (2000) 24 Cal.4th 434, 460, quoting People v. Johnson (1980) 26 Cal.3d 557, 576.) We must affirm if “‘any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.’” (People v. Rowland (1992) 4 Cal.4th 238, 269, quoting Jackson v. Virginia (1979) 443 U.S. 307, 319.) This standard applies to juvenile appeals. (In re Ryan N. (2001) 92 Cal.App.4th 1359, 1373.)
Vehicle Code Section 10851, subdivision (a) provides in relevant part, “Any person who drives or takes a vehicle not his or her own, without the consent of the owner thereof, and with intent either to permanently or temporarily deprive the owner thereof of his or her title to or possession of the vehicle, whether with or without intent to steal the vehicle, or any person who is a party or an accessory to or an accomplice in the driving or unauthorized taking or stealing, is guilty of a public offense . . . .” Minor argues that the evidence was insufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that minor had the required “intent either to permanently or temporarily deprive the owner thereof of his . . . possession of the vehicle.” We disagree.
“To establish a defendant’s guilt of violating Vehicle Code section 10851, subdivision (a), the prosecution is required to prove that the defendant drove or took a vehicle belonging to another person, without the owner’s consent, and that the defendant had the specific intent to permanently or temporarily deprive the owner of title or possession. [Citation.]” (People v. O'Dell (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 1569, 1574.) “A person can violate section 10851(a) ‘either by taking a vehicle with the intent to steal it or by driving it with the intent only to temporarily deprive its owner of possession (i.e., joyriding).’ [Citations.]” (People v. Garza (2005) 35 Cal.4th 866, 876.) Specific intent to deprive the owner of possession of his or her vehicle may be inferred from all the facts and circumstances of the particular case. (In re Robert V. (1982) 132 Cal.App.3d 815, 821.) Indeed, “in most cases, evidence of intent [is] only circumstantial.” (People v. Ivans (1992) 2 Cal.App.4th 1654, 1664.) The possession of a recently stolen vehicle “itself raises a strong inference that the possessor knew the property was stolen; only slight corroboration is required to allow for a finding of guilt. [Citation.] This principle, applicable to theft offenses, applies as well to the unlawful driving of a vehicle. [Citation.]” (People v. O’Dell, supra, 153 Cal.App.4th at p. 1574; accord, People v. Windham (1987) 194 Cal.App.3d 1580, 1590; In re Robert V., supra, 132 Cal.App.3d at pp. 821-822.) “Knowledge that the vehicle was stolen, while not an element of the offense, may constitute evidence of the defendant’s intent to deprive the owner of . . . possession.” (People v. O'Dell, supra, 153 Cal.App.4th at p. 1574.)
This case is similar to People v. Hopkins (1963) 214 Cal.App.2d 487. In that case, the owner of a car discovered one morning that the car had been stolen. (Id. at p. 488.) Later that afternoon, police officers on patrol passed the stolen car. (Id. at p. 489.) As the officers turned around, the car suddenly turned right and three young men jumped out of the car and fled on foot. (Ibid.) The defendant was apprehended while fleeing. (Ibid.) The defendant first told the officers that friends had picked him up in the car as they drove by earlier that day and had let him drive; a few minutes later, the defendant told the officers that the others had picked him up in the car the day before—that is, before the car had been stolen. (Ibid.) The court held that the evidence that defendant was driving the stolen car, combined with his flight from the officers and his inconsistent statements to police, was sufficient to permit a trier of fact to infer the defendant’s intent to deprive the owner of possession of the car at least temporarily. (Id. at pp. 491-492.) Accordingly, there was substantial evidence to sustain the defendant’s conviction under section 10851. (Id. at p. 492.)
In this case, the Honda was stolen from Mr. Morales at approximately 5:10 p.m. Four hours later, Deputy Boucher spotted the Honda at an intersection not far from where it was stolen. When Deputies Boucher and Thomas approached the car, minor and the other occupants of the car fled. Deputy Boucher saw minor get out of the driver’s door; two hours later, when minor arrived back at his home, Deputy Boucher recognized minor as the person who had been driving the Honda. Deputy Boucher also identified minor as the driver in open court. Police recovered a list of telephone numbers from the driver’s side of the Honda that included the number of minor’s parole officer; minor admitted to Deputy Boucher that the list was his. There was evidence that minor made inconsistent statements to Deputy Boucher, telling the deputy on the one hand that he had been in the car earlier but had been dropped off before the deputies approached it, and on the other hand, that he was in the car when the deputies approached it but was a passenger, not the driver. There was thus sufficient evidence to permit the juvenile court to infer minor’s intent to deprive the car’s owner of its possession at least temporarily. Substantial evidence supported the juvenile court’s finding of guilt.
Minor relies on People v. Clark, supra, 251 Cal.App.2d 868. That case is distinguishable. In that case, there was no evidence that the defendant had taken or driven the car; accordingly, the defendant could only have been convicted on an accomplice theory. To convict the defendant as an accomplice, however, “require[d] proof of more than mere presence in the automobile. At a minimum, defendant must have known that the vehicle had been unlawfully acquired and must have had that knowledge at a time when he could be said to have, in some way, aided or assisted in the driving.” (Id. at p. 874.) The prosecution had presented no evidence, however, that the defendant had done anything to aid or abet either the taking or the driving of the car. (Ibid.) Although the defendant had fled after the driver of the stolen car had crashed it into another vehicle while attempting to evade capture, “there [was] nothing to show . . . that [defendant’s] running away was not a result of something other than a consciousness of guilt.” (Id. at p. 874.)
Unlike People v. Clark, supra, 251 Cal.App.2d 868, minor in this case was identified by Deputy Boucher as the driver of the car. There is therefore no need to rely on an accomplice theory of liability. As explained above, the evidence in this case was sufficient to permit an inference that minor intended to deprive the Honda’s owner of its possession.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
We concur:, TURNER, P. J., KRIEGLER, J.