Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Appeal from postjudgment orders of the Superior Court of Orange County Super. Ct. No. DP005382, Carolyn Kirkwood, Judge.
Roni Keller, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Benjamin P. de Mayo, County Counsel, and Karen L. Christensen and Alexandra G. Morgan, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
IKOLA, J.
Maria S. (mother) appeals the denial of her Welfare and Institutions Code section 388 petition and the termination of her parental rights over Clarissa (now age nine), the child who is the sole subject of this appeal. Mother contends the court abused its discretion by denying her section 388 petition without an evidentiary hearing. She further asserts the court’s termination of her parental rights was detrimental to Clarissa under the statutory exceptions to adoption for a beneficial parental relationship or significant sibling relationship. (§ 366.26, subds. (c)(1)(A) and (c)(1)(E).) We affirm.
All statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless otherwise stated.
Section 366.26 was amended effective January 1, 2008. Former subdivisions (c)(1)(A) and (c)(1)(E) are now designated subdivisions (c)(1)(B)(i) and (c)(1)(B)(v) respectively. Because this matter was heard before the effective date of the amendment, and the record reflects the statutory designations then in effect, we use the former subdivision designations for convenience and clarity.
FACTS
In a prior dependency proceeding commenced in September 2001, Clarissa, then age three, and her three siblings were detained and declared court dependents after the court found true the Orange County Social Services Agency’s (SSA’s) allegations that, inter alia, (1) mother had borne, one week earlier, a baby who, together with mother, “presented with a positive drug toxicology screen for amphetamines,” and (2) mother had a history of abusing drugs, including marijuana and methamphetamine, “since at least 1995.” In August 2002, after mother had successfully completed her case plan (including testing clean for drugs and graduating from the perinatal program), the court placed Clarissa and two siblings in mother’s care. In May 2003, the court terminated the dependency cases of the three children in mother’s care and granted mother custody of them.
The baby born in 2001 was not placed with mother, as he had already been placed with his father.
Less than two years later, in March 2005, when Clarissa was age 7, SSA initiated the current dependency proceedings by filing a petition alleging the three children in mother’s custody (Clarissa and her older half-brother and half-sister) came within the provisions of section 300, subdivisions (b) (failure to protect) and (g) (no provision for support). In an April 2005 amended petition, SSA alleged, inter alia, (1) the children were taken into protective custody because mother left them “without food, money, supervision, and [with] no way to contact their mother”; (2) mother admitted she had recently used methamphetamine; (3) the children had “not attended school for at least 2 months”; and (4) on March 17, 2005, one week after the filing of the March 2005 petition, mother “was arrested for felony possession of a controlled substance . . . and taking a vehicle without owners’ consent/vehicle theft,” “was subsequently convicted,” and was currently incarcerated. The court found true the allegations in the petition and declared the children dependents of the court.
The children were first placed with their maternal aunt, but were returned to Orangewood Children’s Home in October 2005 due to allegations Clarissa’s 13-year-old half-brother sexually molested his eight-year-old male cousin. By then, mother had been released from jail and placed on probation for three years. She had begun drug testing, had “missed numerous appointments and admitted to relapsing on at least three occasions,” and was terminated from the perinatal program “for excessive absences and missed drug tests.” After being dismissed from a recovery home for failure to follow the home’s rules, she took residence with a friend. She was employed as a receptionist.
SSA’s reports prepared for the March 2006 12-month review hearing stated Clarissa and her half-sister were placed in the foster home of Jessy M., while Clarissa’s half-brother was in a group home “due to his sexualized behavior.” Mother had re-enrolled in the perinatal program in February 2006, but had admitted to using alcohol and tested positive for methamphetamine. She left the perinatal program, anticipating “she would be terminated from the program” for being late to class. Mother visited the children about once a week and also called them every night before they went to bed. The children wanted “to return to their mother’s care.”
SSA reports prepared for the September 2006 18-month review hearing stated mother resided at the Ashland House, a residential drug treatment facility, and admitted she needed the treatment she received there. As of September 2006, mother had “visited the children almost weekly; however, she ha[d] completed very little of her case plan and ha[d] had several relapses in her sobriety.” In October 2006, Clarissa’s half-brother and half-sister began a 60-day trial visit with their father, Thomas Sr. They enjoyed “living with their father and wish[ed] to continue living there.” Clarissa, whose father was serving a life term for attempted murder, still resided with her foster mother, Jessy. Although Thomas Sr. and his wife had offered to provide care for Clarissa, Clarissa had “stated that, although she enjoys her weekend overnight visits at [Thomas Sr.’s] house with [her siblings], she really wants to live in the home of her foster mother, Jessy.” Clarissa was “bonded” with Jessy and Jessy’s daughters. Jessy provided “a stable and loving environment,” wished to adopt Clarissa, and intended to “make sure the children continue[d] to have visitation together because she recognizes [they] are bonded.” The court ordered reunification services to Clarissa’s parents terminated and set an April 2007 section 366.26 hearing (the .26 hearing) to select a permanent plan for Clarissa.
SSA reports prepared for Clarissa’s .26 hearing indicated Clarissa had no medical, developmental, or educational problems, but she did receive weekly therapy where she had become “much more open” and talked “about her family dynamics and her wish to be adopted.” She had completed the third grade “with excellent grades” and participated in extracurricular sports. She had “weekly visitation with her siblings” and mother, but mother had been “inconsistent about calling for visits and request[ed] multiple changes of days and times.” Jessy had “supported the child in school and ha[d] cared for all her basic needs, resulting in a caring relationship” and “a nurturing home” where Clarissa thrived; it was “apparent the child [saw Jessy] as her mother.” Clarissa expressed “a strong desire to remain permanently” in Jessy’s home.
The adoption social worker provided a preliminary assessment which stated, inter alia: Jessy was “truly invested in [Clarissa’s] future and display[ed] a great love for her,” and had “fully integrated [Clarissa] into her life”; Clarissa “was observed to be happy and safe with [Jessy]” and was “securely attached” to her. Jessy lived “in a family-oriented community in a three-bedroom, three-bathroom home,” “work[ed] full-time as an insurance claims adjuster,” and was a divorced mother of two daughters, one of whom was “a freshman at a four-year university [who came] home occasionally on weekends and holidays.” Clarissa had “expressed some confusion in fully understanding adoption,” and had stated “she wants to remain in the care of [Jessy], but also reports loving her birth mother.” Clarissa was “eager to have a permanent family that is committed to her well being.”
Clarissa’s court appointed special advocates (CASA) report recommended Clarissa be adopted by Jessy.
In April 2007, the court granted Jessy de facto parent status and appointed counsel for her.
On the scheduled date in April 2007 for Clarissa’s .26 hearing, mother submitted to the court a petition under section 388. The court scheduled a prima facie hearing on the petition for July 16, 2007 and also continued the .26 hearing to that date.
Mother’s section 388 petition challenged the court’s December 2006 order terminating her reunification services and setting a .26 hearing. Mother requested that the court return Clarissa to her care under a family maintenance plan or on a 60-day trial visit, or to reinstate her reunification services. She stated the requested changes would benefit Clarissa because (1) during every visit, Clarissa “asks if she (Clarissa) is coming home yet,” (2) mother is “now in a place, mentally, physically, and financially to provide care for” Clarissa, and (3) mother can “provide stability and support for Clarissa.” In her attached declaration, mother maintained: she entered the perinatal program on October 17, 2006; since then she had drug tested twice a week with uniformly negative results; in response to an incorrect report that she drank alcohol, she had submitted “two additional breathalyzer tests a week, therefore testing four times a week”; she had “successfully completed phase one of the perinatal program, which focused on recovery planning” and staying sober, and phase two “which focuses on assertion/conflict resolution”; she was “currently in phase three” focusing on parenting skills and was soon “scheduled to advance to phase four”; she currently resided in her own room in a sober living home which “allows for women with children to remain in the home”; she was employed full time at a hotel where she “was recently promoted to a supervisor”; she has “consistently visited with [her] children and participated in all available services that would enable [her] to become a nurturing parent”; she had requested increased visitation but had not received it, and “did miss some visits because [she]was training for [her] new position at [her] employment”; she phones Clarissa three times a week; at the beginning of each visit Clarissa “runs to [mother] and showers [her] with hugs and kisses and tells [mother] that she loves [her]”; the end of each visit is “an extremely sad time for [them]”; and, lastly, mother is “a changed woman, ready to take on the responsibility of raising [Clarissa] and, in doing so, staying sober so that [she] can provide a stable home . . . .” Mother attached as exhibits to the petition: (1) certificates of completion of phases one and two of the perinatal program; (2) a statement of earnings from her employer; and (3) a perinatal progress Evaluation report showing she had not missed any drug tests, had consistently tested clean, and had “made improvement in help-seeking, self-disclosure, insight, and ha[d] accepted responsibility for the consequences of her past drug use.”
Although the court held a prima facie hearing on mother’s section 388 petition on the morning of July 16, 2007, the record does not contain a reporter’s transcript of the hearing. (Neither mother nor SSA complains of, or even mentions, the omitted record.) The minute order, however, reflects the court “read and considered” the petition, heard argument and additional information, found mother had not met the burden to warrant a full hearing, and denied “mother’s 388 motion for reasons as stated on the record.” The court found the petition did not state new evidence or a change of circumstances nor did the petition show that changing the court’s order would serve Clarissa’s best interests.
The court then proceeded to conduct the .26 hearing and heard testimony from the social worker and mother. (The record does contain a reporter’s transcript for this hearing.) Mother called Clarissa to testify, but the court excused the child who had buried her face in Jessy’s “arm and shoulder area” and would “not respond in any way to the court’s inquiries.” At the close of the .26 hearing, the court found Clarissa was likely to be adopted and the section 366.26 subdivision (c)(1)(A) beneficial relationship and (c)(1)(E) sibling relationship exceptions to adoption did not apply. The court ordered the termination of the parental rights of mother and Clarissa’s father, and that Clarissa be placed for adoption.
DISCUSSION
The Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion by Denying Mother’s Section 388 Petition Without a Hearing
On appeal mother contends “a prima facie case for a hearing was well set out in the section 388 petition, and it was egregious not to afford the mother a hearing . . . .” Mother argues she sufficiently showed (1) new evidence in that she “was in phase three of her rehabilitation program and had been sober for at least nine months,” and (2) her requested modification would serve Clarissa’s best interests due to her “very bonded relationship” with Clarissa. Mother further asserts her visitation with Clarissa was partially “frustrated by the foster mother’s refusal to allow visits on the mother’s days off from work” and the juvenile court should have “heard” her on this issue.
Section 388, subdivision (a) authorizes a parent to petition the juvenile court for a hearing to change or set aside an order on “grounds of change of circumstance or new evidence.” “If it appears that the best interests of the child may be promoted by the proposed change of order, . . . the court shall order that a hearing be held . . . .” (§ 388, subd. (c).) But “[i]f the petition fails to state a change of circumstance or new evidence that may require a change of order . . ., or that the requested modification would promote the best interest of the child, the court may deny the application ex parte.” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.570(d) [Denial of hearing, italics added].) Thus, to trigger a full hearing, a petitioner must make a twofold prima facie showing that (1) there exists “a genuine change of circumstances or new evidence, and that (2) revoking the previous order would be in the best interests of the children.” (In re Anthony W. (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 246, 250; see also In re Daijah T. (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 666, 672.) “The prima facie requirement is not met unless the facts alleged, if supported by evidence given credit at the hearing, would sustain a favorable decision on the petition.” (In re Zachary G. (1999) 77 Cal.App.4th at p. 806.) The petitioner bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that “the child’s welfare requires such a modification.” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.570(h)(1).) A juvenile court should liberally construe the petition “in favor of granting a hearing to consider the parent’s request.” (In re Zachary G., supra, 77 Cal.App.4th at p. 806.)
We review a court’s summary denial of a section 388 petition for abuse of discretion. (In re Anthony W., supra, 87 Cal.App.4th at p. 250.) “‘The appropriate test for abuse of discretion is whether the trial court exceeded the bounds of reason.’” (In re Stephanie M. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 295, 318-319.)
Here, the court did not abuse its discretion in denying mother’s section 388 petition without a full hearing because mother failed to make the requisite prima facie showing. As to the first prong of the required showing, she failed to show genuine changed circumstances. Although mother’s recent nine-month period of drug abstinence is to be highly commended, she has a history of relapse. In fact, she achieved a 20-month period of sobriety prior to the children’s return to her custody in May 2003, only to suffer a relapse that resulted in the children’s March 2005 detention precipitating the current dependency proceedings. “A petition which alleges merely changing circumstances and would mean delaying the selection of a permanent home for a child to see if a parent, who has repeatedly failed to reunify with the child, might be able to reunify at some future point, does not promote stability for the child or the child’s best interests.” (In re Casey D. (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 38, 47.)
As to the second prong of the required showing, mother failed to show returning Clarissa to her care or reinstating her reunification services would serve Clarissa’s best interests. At the time mother filed her section 388 petition, Clarissa had lived with Jessy for almost 18 months. Clarissa wanted to be adopted by Jessy and was “eager to have a permanent family . . . committed to her well being.” The social worker, CASA, and the adoption social worker concluded Jessy provided Clarissa a positive and nurturing environment. Moreover, because mother’s reunification services had been terminated, a presumption existed that continued care in the prospective adoptive home was in Clarissa’s best interests. (In re Stephanie M., supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 317 [after reunification services are terminated, “‘the focus shifts” to the child’s need for permanency].) Mother failed to rebut this presumption. Her averments of changed circumstances and a strong relationship speak more to her own interests than to those of Clarissa, and fail to show how removing the child from Jessy’s home would promote Clarissa’s need for stability and permanence.
Mother contends she “deserved a full and fair hearing on the frustration of her visitation rights alleged in her section 388 petition.” She asserts that at the .26 hearing “follow[ing] the denial of the section 388 petition, it came out that the mother who was employed, working a rehabilitation program, and traveling a distance for visits, had asked for visits on her days off, but had been denied that simple request by the foster mother who instead forced her to come for visits on days [when] she had to leave visits early in order to get to work.” But mother never suggested in her petition that Jessy frustrated mother’s efforts to visit Clarissa by forcing mother to visit on mother’s work days. Mother cannot now complain of the court’s failure to grant her a hearing on an issue she failed to describe in her petition.
Mother relies on several cases where a trial court’s summary denial of a section 388 petition was reversed, but these cases do not assist her. In In re Jeremy W. (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 1407, the Department of Social Services acknowledged the mother “complied with almost all the court-ordered requirements” (id. at p. 1414), “a ‘bonding’ study conclud[ed the child] was strongly bonded to his mother, so strongly that the bonding evaluator . . . believed there would be a significant risk of harm to [the child] if he were permanently separated from his mother” (id. at p. 1415, fn. omitted), the court-appointed psychologist believed the child “could be returned to [the mother’s] full physical custody within one month”; and the child wished to be reunited with his mother. (Id. at pp. 1415-1416.) In In re Hashem H. (1996) 45 Cal.App.4th 1791, a therapist’s letter attached to the section 388 petition recommended the child be returned to the mother, but the trial court misunderstood the level of proof required for a prima facie showing and therefore refused to consider the letter since it was unverified hearsay. (Id. at pp. 1797-1798.) In In re Aljamie D. (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 424, the sole reason for the dependency was the mother’s drug abuse and she had tested clean consistently for over two years at the time of the section 388 petition; in addition, the children there “repeatedly made clear that their first choice was to live with their mother,” and although their aunt was willing to be their legal guardian, there was no potential adoptive parent. (Id. at pp. 424, 427, 432.) In In re Daijah T., supra, 83 Cal.App.4th 666, the juvenile court erred by concluding the section 388 “petition was defective because it failed to allege a change of circumstances with respect to the minors” (id. at p. 674), even though the mother “sufficiently pleaded changed circumstances to herself.” (Id. at p. 673.)
Mother quotes the following passage from In re Jeremy W., supra, 3 Cal.App.4th at p. 1414: “[A] hearing may be denied only if the application fails to reveal any change of circumstance or new evidence which might require a change of order. Only in this limited context may the court deny the petition ex parte.” But mother neglects to include the very next sentence of the passage, which reads, “In In re Heather P. [(1989) 209 Cal.App.3d 886], we stated: ‘Thus, if the petition presents any evidence that a hearing would promote the best interests of the child, the court will order the hearing.’” (Ibid.)
As discussed above, to warrant a full evidentiary hearing, a section 388 petitioner must make a prima facie showing of (1) changed circumstances (or new evidence) and (2) the promotion of the child’s best interests. Here, mother failed to make either showing. Whether to modify its previous order rested squarely “within the dependency court’s discretion.” (In re Michael B. (1992) 8 Cal.App.4th 1698, 1704.) We will not interfere with the court’s exercise of its discretion, as it was not abused.
Substantial Evidence Supports the Court’s Finding the Section 366.26, Subdivision (c)(1)(A) Beneficial Relationship Exception Did Not Apply
Mother contends insufficient evidence supports the court’s finding she “did not meet her burden of showing a beneficial relationship.” At the .26 hearing, the court found the section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(A) exception did not apply, noting “that visitation had not been regular and consistent,” mother did “not occupy a parental role,” Jessy had “indicated a willingness to allow contact with the mother if the child wishes,” and Clarissa had “expressed a strong desire to remain in” Jessy’s home. The court concluded Clarissa’s “need for permanency and a forever home outweighs any benefit [she] would have by a continuing relationship with mother.”
The preferred disposition at a .26 hearing is to “[t]erminate the rights of the parent . . . and order that the child be placed for adoption . . . .” (§ 366.26, subd. (b)(1).) “[A]doption should be ordered unless exceptional circumstances exist.” (In re Casey D., supra, 70 Cal.App.4th at p. 51.) An exception to the adoption preference occurs when termination of parental rights would be detrimental to the child because the parent has “maintained regular visitation and contact with the child and the child would benefit from continuing the relationship.” (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(A).) “The parent has the burden of proving that termination would be detrimental to the child” (In re Melvin A. (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 1243, 1252), and must establish that “the relationship promotes the well-being of the child to such a degree as to outweigh the well-being the child would gain in a permanent home with new, adoptive parents.” (In re Autumn H. (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 567, 575.) The court must “balance[] the strength and quality of the natural parent/child relationship in a tenuous placement against the security and the sense of belonging a new family would confer. If severing the natural parent/child relationship would deprive the child of a substantial, positive emotional attachment such that the child would be greatly harmed, the preference for adoption is overcome and the natural parent’s rights are not terminated.” (Ibid.)
“[P]leasant and cordial . . . visits are, by themselves, insufficient to mandate a permanent plan other than adoption.” (In re Brian R. (1991) 2 Cal.App.4th 904, 924.) Similarly, “frequent and loving contact” is insufficient to establish the type of beneficial relationship “contemplated by the statute.” (In re Beatrice M. (1994) 29 Cal.App.4th 1411, 1418.) “‘Interaction between [a] natural parent and child will always confer some incidental benefit to the child,’” but the basis of a beneficial relationship is that the parent have “occupied a parental role.” (Id. at p. 1419.) “‘While friendships are important, a child needs at least one parent. Where a biological parent . . . is incapable of functioning in that role, the child should be given every opportunity to bond with an individual who will assume the role of a parent.’” (In re Jasmin D. (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 1339, 1350.)
On review, applying the substantial evidence test, we “accept the evidence most favorable to the order as true and discard the unfavorable evidence . . . .” (In re Casey D., supra, 70 Cal.App.4th at pp. 52-53.) We give “the prevailing party the benefit of every reasonable inference and [resolve] all conflicts in support of the order.” (In re Autumn H., supra, 27 Cal.App.4th at p. 576.) “‘Evidence sufficient to support the court’s finding “must be ‘reasonable in nature, credible, and of solid value; it must actually be “substantial” proof of the essentials which the law requires in a particular case.’”’” (Constance K. v. Superior Court (1998) 61 Cal.App.4th 689, 705.)
Mother argues she “had a strong bond with” Clarissa. She notes Clarissa lived with her until age seven, “and was a well behaved child with strong family values, and no significant behavior or physical issues, deemed adoptable even at the age of nine.” Mother reprises her “uncontested testimony” about how excited Clarissa was to see mother at the start of each visit and how sad the child was at the close of the visit. But the court found, based on substantial evidence, that mother did not occupy a parental role. (At the .26 hearing, the social worker testified mother acted more like a “slightly older child” when visiting Clarissa, showed “no parental concern about medical appointments [or] grades,” exercised no discipline, and offered no teaching, but instead emphasized “having fun.”)
Mother also asserts Clarissa “was unable to express an interest in being adopted,” but that averment is contrary to the record. In addition, mother’s assertion Clarissa lived with her until age seven ignores the first dependency proceeding.
Mother argues children benefit from “relationships with more than one caregiver” and therefore “a positive relationship . . . should [not] be disposed of . . . .” But as the court noted, Jessy is willing to allow mother continued visitation with Clarissa, if Clarissa desires it. Mother also criticizes adoption as a permanent plan because “one in ten adoptions is set aside” and “some adoptions may be permanent but unstable or unhappy . . . .” Nonetheless, pursuant to legislative mandate, the clear preference at this stage of the dependency proceedings is for adoption.
Finally, mother asserts “that the benefit of continued contact between a minor and a parent must be considered in the context of the limitations placed on the [parent’s permitted] visitation,” citing In re Brandon C. (1999) 71 Cal.App.4th 1530. But in that case, the juvenile court found the mother had “‘maintained regular visitation’” and “it would be in the children’s best interest ‘to maintain the relationship between the minors and their mother.’” (Id. at p. 1533.) Mother acknowledges that in In re Brandon C., the mother “took full advantage” of her permitted visitation and visited “regularly and consistently to the extent allowed.” Here, in contrast, the court found, based on substantial evidence, that mother’s visitation had not been regular. (At the .26 hearing, the social worker testified that although mother was entitled to four visits per month, she had averaged only two to three times per month and was often late to visits. Even Clarissa was “dismayed over [mother’s] inconsistency, . . . scheduling at the last minute, [and] last minute cancellations” which disrupted the child’s busy schedule of athletic, church and family events.)
Applying the appropriate standard of review, we conclude substantial evidence supports the court’s finding mother failed to prove termination of her parental rights would be detrimental to Clarissa due to the strength of their relationship.
Substantial Evidence Supports the Court’s Finding the Section 366.26, Subdivision (c)(1)(E), Sibling Relationship Exception Did Not Apply
Mother contends the court erred by terminating her parental rights to Clarissa despite the child’s relationship with her siblings. According to mother, Jessy’s assurances of “continued contact [between Clarissa] and her siblings, without legal obligation, should be inadequate to substantiate the drastic measure of termination of parental, and familial, rights.”
Under section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(E), adoption is the preferred disposition at a .26 hearing, “unless the court finds a compelling reason” for determining termination of parental rights would be detrimental to the child due to the “substantial interference with a child’s sibling relationship.” “In enacting this exception, the legislature was concerned with preserving long-standing relationships between siblings which serve as anchors for dependent children whose lives are in turmoil.” (In re Erik P. (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 395, 404.)
We “draw all reasonable inferences in support of the findings, consider the record most favorably to the juvenile court’s order, and affirm the order if supported by substantial evidence even if other evidence supports a contrary conclusion. [Citation.] The appellant has the burden of showing the finding or order is not supported by substantial evidence.” (In re L.Y.L. (2002) 101 Cal.App.4th 942, 947.)
Here, the court found “insufficient evidence for a (c)(1)(E) exception,” noting that while Clarissa did have “a very strong attachment to her siblings,” the evidence showed Jessy “is willing to allow sibling visits to continue.” The court found “no reason to believe that sibling visitation would terminate with the termination of parental rights.” The court also noted Jessy “has a bed in her home for [Clarissa’s sister] and has allowed Clarissa to spend the night over at her siblings’ house.”
Substantial evidence supports the court’s finding that terminating mother’s parental rights would not substantially interfere with Clarissa’s relationship with her siblings who reside with their father, Thomas Sr., and his wife. At the .26 hearing, the social worker testified Clarissa spends some weekends at Thomas Sr.’s house, her half-sister spends some weekends at Jessy’s home, and Clarissa has a bed in her room for her sibling. The siblings frequently phone each other and, in general, there is “tons of contact.” Jessy recognizes the bonding between Clarissa and her siblings and intends that their “visits will always continue.” In contrast, Mother does not explain how continuing her parental rights to Clarissa would better protect the child’s relationship with her siblings, given that Thomas Sr. and his wife have custody of the siblings. “Where the parents’ continuing relationship with the dependent child, or absence thereof, can in no way affect the nature of the sibling relationship because the parent no longer has a relationship with the sibling, the exception does not apply.” (In re Erik P., supra, 104 Cal.App.4th at p. 404 [child’s sibling had already been adopted].) Finally, although Clarissa is bonded to her siblings, she chose to stay with Jessy rather than be placed with her siblings in Thomas Sr.’s home, reflecting the strength of her bonding with Jessy.
Mother cites no authority for her proposition the sibling relationship exception should apply unless Jessy is legally obligated to facilitate Clarissa’s continued contact with her siblings. She refers us to In re Naomi P. (2005)132 Cal.App.4th 808 as a case where there was “some doubt about whether the minor’s caretaker [would] actually allow adequate sibling contact once adoption [was] finalized.” But in that case, the appellate court stated: “Importantly, the juvenile court also observed that, having heard [the caretaker] testify, it had some doubts about her intentions, and of her appreciation of the importance of [the minor’s] sibling relationships. On that basis, the court had reason to question whether, if adoption were ordered, visitation would be allowed to continue to the extent [the minor] needs.” (Id. at p. 824.) Here, in contrast, the juvenile court had no doubts as to Jessy’s true intentions.
Substantial evidence supported the court’s finding termination of mother’s parental rights would not interfere with Clarissa’s sibling relationships.
DISPOSITION
The postjudgment orders are affirmed.
WE CONCUR: RYLAARSDAM, ACTING P. J., MOORE, J.