Opinion
DOCKET NO. A-5535-14T2
12-05-2016
IN THE MATTER OF THE CIVIL COMMITMENT OF W.B.
Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for appellant (Lizzette Zayas, Assistant Deputy Public Defender, of counsel and on the brief). Courtney M. Gaccione, Essex County Counsel, attorney for respondent (Thomas M. Bachman, Assistant County Counsel, of counsel and on the brief).
RECORD IMPOUNDED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R.1:36-3. Before Judges Fisher and Vernoia. On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Essex County, Docket No. ESCC00116715. Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for appellant (Lizzette Zayas, Assistant Deputy Public Defender, of counsel and on the brief). Courtney M. Gaccione, Essex County Counsel, attorney for respondent (Thomas M. Bachman, Assistant County Counsel, of counsel and on the brief). PER CURIAM
W.B. appeals a July 15, 2015 civil commitment order entered by a municipal court judge continuing for a period of thirty days W.B.'s involuntary commitment pursuant to N.J.S.A. 30:4-27.15. We reverse.
We employ initials to protect appellant's privacy.
Involuntary commitment hearings may be conducted in the Superior Court or municipal court. N.J.S.A. 30:4-27.2(f) and N.J.S.A. 30:4-27.15.
W.B. was admitted to Newark Beth Israel Hospital on June 29, 2015, after he went to the hospital complaining he did not feel well. Following his admission, the hospital filed an application for a temporary order of commitment. The Law Division entered a July 2, 2015 order involuntarily committing W.B. for treatment at the hospital pursuant to N.J.S.A. 30:4-27.10(a), assigning counsel for W.B., and scheduling a hearing to determine whether there was a continuing need for an involuntary commitment.
At the hearing, the State presented the testimony of W.B.'s treating psychiatrist, Dr. Edward Shalts. Shalts testified that W.B. was psychotic and suffered from schizophrenia with symptoms including W.B.'s continuous internal dialogue, paranoia, and religious preoccupation.
Shalts described W.B.'s history of hospital admissions for psychiatric issues and lack of compliance with outpatient services. Shalts also detailed the medications W.B. had been prescribed and the slight improvement in W.B.'s condition, which Shalts attributed to the medication prescribed following the temporary involuntary commitment. Shalts acknowledged there was no evidence W.B. was violent or suicidal but nevertheless opined W.B. was a danger to himself because of his history of failing to take the prescribed medications. Shalts's only concerns were that if W.B. failed to take his medications as prescribed, he would continue to return to the hospital complaining he did not feel well and would otherwise not act in his own best interest.
W.B.'s mother testified W.B. resided with her. She did not think him violent and she was not afraid of having him in her home. She described W.B.'s prescription medication history, including his adverse reaction to certain medications, and the lack of affordable medical and therapy services available to him. She described that W.B.'s receipt of medical and psychiatric services had been terminated because W.B. was noncompliant with the conditions for his receipt of the services.
W.B. testified that the medication he was receiving was "working a little bit." He stated that he went to the hospital on June 29, 2015, because he felt "like something was moving on [his] body." He said that if he was discharged he would reside with his mother and comply with any conditions imposed, including attendance at a part-time hospital program.
The judge found Shalts's testimony credible and determined it clearly and convincingly established W.B. suffers from a mental illness. The judge further determined W.B. was chronically noncompliant with his medication prescriptions and the requirements of medical and psychiatric services that had been provided. The judge concluded W.B. lacked insight, judgment, and the ability to act in his own best interest and therefore required a continuation of the involuntary commitment. On July 15, 2015, the judge entered an order continuing W.B.'s involuntary commitment for thirty days.
Within thirty days of the entry of the July 15, 2015 order, a second civil commitment review hearing was held and W.B. was conditionally discharged. W.B. did not appeal the conditional discharge order. W.B., however, appealed the July 15, 2015 order.
We consider a decision to continue an individual's civil commitment under an abuse of discretion standard. In re D.C., 146 N.J. 31, 58-59 (1996). "[W]e afford deference to the trial court's supportable findings," In re Commitment of T.J., 401 N.J. Super. 111, 119 (App. Div. 2008), and "reverse[] only when there is clear error or mistake." In re Commitment of M.M., 384 N.J. Super. 313, 334 (App. Div. 2006). Our "narrow scope of appellate review is not the equivalent of . . . a license to avoid meticulous fact-finding." Id. at 332. A trial court's failure "to perform this essential duty 'constitutes a disservice to the litigants, the attorneys and the appellate court.'" Klajman v. Fair Lawn Estates, 292 N.J. Super. 54, 61 (App. Div.) (quoting Curtis v. Finneran, 83 N.J. 563, 569-70 (1980)), certif. denied, 146 N.J. 569 (1996). "A judge presiding over a commitment hearing is vested with extraordinary responsibility; when the judge does not apply the legal standards and find the relevant facts, our subsequent correction of the abuse of discretion is a poor remedy for the ill." M.M., supra, 384 N.J. Super. at 332-33.
To sustain W.B.'s involuntarily commitment, the State was required to establish by clear and convincing evidence that W.B. was "in need of involuntary commitment." In re Commitment of M.C., 385 N.J. Super. 151, 160 (App. Div. 2006). A person is in need of involuntary commitment when:
(1) the person is mentally ill, as that term is defined in N.J.S.A. 30:4-27.2r; (2) the mental illness causes the person to be dangerous (a) to self or (b) to others or property, as those terms are defined in N.J.S.A. 30:4-27.2h, i; (3) the person is unwilling to be admitted to a facility for voluntary care; and (4) the [person] needs care at a psychiatric facility or hospital because other available services will not meet the [person's] needs. N.J.S.A. 30:4-27.2m.
[M .M., supra, 384 N.J. Super. at 337.]
W.B. concedes Shalts's testimony established he suffers from a mental illness. W.B., however, asserts there was insufficient evidence supporting a finding that his mental illness caused him to be dangerous to self. A person is "dangerous to self" if
There was no evidence presented that W.B. was dangerous to others or to property, and the judge made no findings to suggest otherwise. --------
by reason of mental illness the person has threatened or attempted suicide or serious bodily harm, or has behaved in such a manner as to indicate that the person is unable to satisfy his need for nourishment, essential medical care or shelter, so that it is probable that substantial bodily injury, serious physical harm or death will result within the reasonably foreseeable future; however, no person shall be deemed to be unable to satisfy his need for nourishment, essential medical care or shelter if he is able to satisfy such needs with the supervision and assistance of others who are willing and available. This determination shall take into account a person's history, recent behavior and any recent act, threat or serious psychiatric deterioration.
[N. J.S.A. 30:4-27.2(h).]
To justify the continuation of an involuntary commitment, the court must find by clear and convincing evidence that the danger a committed person presents constitutes "a substantial risk of dangerous conduct within the foreseeable future." T.J., supra, 401 N.J. Super. at 119 (quoting In re S.L., 94 N.J. 128, 138 (1983)). The potential for dangerous conduct is insufficient. In re Commitment of J.R., 390 N.J. Super. 523, 530 (App. Div. 2007).
Although we defer to a trial court's supportable findings, In re Commitment of J.P., 339 N.J. Super. 443, 459 (App. Div. 2001), we "must consider the adequacy of the evidence," M.M., supra, 384 N.J. Super. at 334, and will not "hesitate[] to reverse involuntary commitments when the record fail[s] to contain clear and convincing evidence of 'a substantial risk of dangerous conduct within the reasonably foreseeable future.'" T.J., supra, 401 N.J. Super. at 119 (quoting S.L., supra, 94 N.J. at 138); J.R., supra, 390 N.J. Super. at 530.
Based upon our review of the record, we are convinced the judge's decision to continue W.B.'s involuntary commitment was not supported by clear and convincing evidence. Although there was evidence supporting the court's finding that W.B. suffered from a mental illness, the record is devoid of evidence upon which it could be concluded that W.B. was dangerous to self. Indeed, the judge failed to make any specific findings of fact supporting a determination that W.B. was dangerous to self. Instead, the court found only that if W.B. was discharged he would not be compliant with his medication prescriptions, he would not act in his own best interest, and he would continue to appear at the hospital complaining he did not feel well.
Shalts's testimony did not clearly and convincingly establish that W.B. was unable to satisfy his need for nourishment, essential medical care or shelter, or that it was probable substantial bodily injury, serious physical harm or death would result within the reasonably foreseeable future. N.J.S.A. 30:4-27.2(h). There is no evidentiary support for the court's implicit finding to the contrary. See, e.g., J.R., supra, 390 N.J. Super. at 531 (finding evidence that appellant's potential failure to continue taking medication was insufficient to support a finding appellant was dangerous to self); In re Commitment of W.H., 324 N.J. Super. 519, 523-24 (App. Div. 1999) (finding unsupported testimony appellant had a history of violence and testimony that defendant's failure to take medication caused delusions was insufficient to establish appellant was dangerous to self). We are therefore satisfied the evidence was insufficient to support the judge's determination that W.B. was dangerous to self and the order continuing W.B.'s involuntary commitment.
Last, we reject the State's argument that the appeal should be dismissed as moot. "[T]he involuntary commitment of an individual 'is a profound and dramatic curtailment of a person's liberty and as such requires meticulous adherence to statutory and constitutional criteria.'" In re Commitment of D.M., 285 N.J. Super. 481, 486 (App. Div. 1995) (quoting Fair Oaks Hosp. v. Pocrass, 266 N.J. Super. 140, 149 (Law Div. 1993)), certif. denied, 144 N.J. 377 (1996). The continuance of the involuntary civil commitment implicated W.B.'s constitutionally protected liberty interest, and we are convinced it warranted our review of the substantive merits of the court's decision. T.J., supra, 401 N.J. Super. at 118; In re Commitment of G.G., 272 N.J. Super. 597, 600 n.1 (App. Div. 1994).
Reversed. I hereby certify that the foregoing is a true copy of the original on file in my office.
CLERK OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION