Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County No. KJ27356, Morton Rochman, Judge; Gary Polinsky, Commissioner.
Holly J. Jackson, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Pamela C. Hamanaka, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Steven D. Matthews and Stacy S. Schwartz, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
WOODS, J.
Christopher C. appeals from the juvenile court’s order continuing him a ward of the court and ordering him placed at Dorothy Kirby Mental Health Center, contending there was insufficient evidence to support the finding he committed arson. We affirm.
The juvenile court calculated the maximum term of confinement as 11 years, which included aggregation of the maximum confinement terms for three previously sustained Welfare and Institution Code section 602 petitions.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A petition was filed pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 alleging then 16-year-old Christopher C. had committed arson by setting fire to an inhabited structure, a juvenile hall facility, where he was currently being detained (Pen. Code, § 451, subd. (b)).
Statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise indicated.
According to the evidence at the jurisdiction hearing, Detention Officer Wilbert James responded to a fire in one of the living units of a juvenile hall facility on the afternoon of March 3, 2007. In arriving at the unit, James saw dark smoke coming from a hallway and decided using the back entrance would be less hazardous. After entering the unit from the back, James began checking rooms off the hallway, but he was overcome by smoke and had to leave. James caught his breath and returned, calling out if anyone was still in the unit. He encountered Christopher C. in the hallway and saw a fire burning in one of the rooms. Christopher C. said to him, “I wanted to die. Just leave me.”
After the prosecution rested, Christopher C. moved to dismiss the petition under Welfare and Institutions Code section 701.1, arguing the evidence was insufficient the fire was caused by a criminal act. The juvenile court denied the motion.
Christopher C. did not testify or present other evidence in his defense.
The juvenile court found beyond a reasonable doubt that Christopher C. had committed arson.
DISCUSSION
1. Standard of Review
The same standard of appellate review is applicable in considering the sufficiency of the evidence in a juvenile proceeding as in reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a criminal conviction. (In re Cheri T. (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 1400, 1404.) In either case we review the whole record in the light most favorable to the judgment to determine whether it discloses substantial evidence -- that is, evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of solid value -- from which a reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. (People v. Kraft (2000) 23 Cal.4th 978, 1053.) We resolve all conflicts in the evidence and questions of credibility in favor of the verdict, and indulge every reasonable inference the trier of fact could draw from the evidence. (Ibid.) ““‘If the circumstances reasonably justify the trier of fact’s findings, the opinion of the reviewing court that the circumstances might also reasonably be reconciled with a contrary finding does not warrant a reversal of the judgment. [Citation.]’” [Citation.]” (Id. at pp. 1053-1054.)
2. Substantial Evidence Supports the Finding Christopher C. Committed Arson
“A person is guilty of arson when he or she willfully and maliciously sets fire to or burns or causes to be burned or who aids, counsels, or procures the burning of, any structure, forestland, or property.” (§ 451.) As defined in section 7, subdivision 1, “willfully” means a purpose or willingness to commit the act or make the omission. The term “maliciously,” as used in section 451, “imports a wish to vex, defraud, annoy, or injure another person, or an intent to do a wrongful act, established either by proof or presumption of law.” (§ 450, subd. (e).) Arson is a general intent crime that requires an “ . . . intent to willfully commit the act of setting on fire under such circumstances that the direct, natural, and highly probable consequences would be the burning of the relevant structure or property.” (People v. Atkins (2001) 25 Cal.4th 76, 90; see also People v. Fry (1993) 19 Cal.App.4th 1334, 1339.) Arson does not require a specific intent to cause the resulting harm -- i.e., the burning of the structure. (Atkins, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 86; Fry, supra, 19 Cal.App.4th at p. 1339.)
Penal Code section 451, subdivision (b) provides, “Arson that causes an inhabited structure or inhabited property to burn is a felony punishable by imprisonment in the state prison for three, five, or eight years.”
The record supports the finding Christopher C. had intentionally started the fire in the living unit. He was found near the room where the fire was burning, he told James he had wanted to die, and he demanded to be left behind in the smoke-filled hallway. The juvenile court reasonably inferred from this evidence that Christopher C. had set the fire for the purpose of killing himself. (See People v. Lee (1994) 28 Cal.App.4th 659, 664.)
DISPOSITION
The order under review is affirmed.
We concur: PERLUSS, P.J. JACKSON, J.