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In re Christian A.

California Court of Appeals, Fourth District, Second Division
Mar 11, 2008
No. E042138 (Cal. Ct. App. Mar. 11, 2008)

Opinion


In re CHRISTIAN A., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. RIVERSIDE COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SOCIAL SERVICES, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. THERESE A., Defendant and Appellant. E042138 California Court of Appeal, Fourth District, Second Division March 11, 2008

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County Super.Ct.No. RIJ112403. William L. Gordon and Becky Dugan, Judges.

Temporary judge, pursuant to the California Constitution, article VI, section 21.

Niccol Kording, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, and Richard Pfeiffer for Defendant and Appellant.

Joe S. Rank, County Counsel, and Carole A. Nunes Fong, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

Andrea St. Julian, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Minor.

OPINION

RICHLI, Acting P.J.

Therese A. (Mother) appeals from an order of the juvenile court removing her son Christian A. from her care pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 387. On appeal, Mother contends (1) the juvenile court erred when it sustained the section 387 petition and ordered Christian removed from her home; (2) the juvenile court erred when it delegated authority to the Riverside County Department of Public Social Services (DPSS) to determine whether visitation should occur; and (3) the juvenile court erred in transferring the dependency case to Los Angeles County without making a finding that doing so was in Christian’s best interests as required by section 375. We reject these contentions and affirm the judgment.

All future statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless otherwise stated.

I

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

This dependency proceeding began in June 2006 when a section 300 petition was filed on behalf of two-year-old Christian following the death of the child’s twin brother, A., who reportedly choked on a piece of bread. Christian was not detained but was left in Mother’s care.

The family had past DPSS referrals dating back to 2003 and had been offered voluntary family maintenance services due to Mother’s inability to care for her twin sons. A. was born with multiple birth defects and was being provided services through Inland Regional Center (IRC). Christian was also being provided with services due to his developmental delays and aggressive behavioral issues. In one incident, it was reported that Mother had left A. outside all day and locked him out because she did not want to hear the child screaming; in another, it was reported that A. was being physically abused by Christian, and Mother failed to intervene. The investigating social worker had found Mother to be visibly stressed and reported that she wanted A. placed outside of the home. Mother had stated that she was willing to work with DPSS on accessing services for her children. However, Mother had stopped the services, including A.’s occupational therapy, about two months prior to A.’s death.

Prior to A.’s death, a public health nurse had a home visit with Mother and her sons on August 22, 2005. The nurse reported that A.’s mouth was malformed and that he had difficulty chewing; there was a banana stuck to the roof of his mouth, causing a foul odor. Mother said that it took too long to feed him, that the food fell out of his mouth, and that he made a mess. Mother did not say one word to A. during the visit; did not hug, kiss, or nurture him; and spoke frequently about wanting him to live someplace else. The nurse was concerned for A.’s welfare and saw no bonding, nurturing, or support for A. by Mother during the visit. A.’s IRC worker was also concerned; she did not believe that Mother was bonded to A. and that Mother blamed A. for Christian’s speech delay. Mother stated several times that she wanted the government to take care of A.

In a jurisdictional/dispositional report filed August 4, 2006, the social worker recommended that the allegations in the petition be found true, that Christian remain in Mother’s custody under a family maintenance plan, and that Mother be ordered to submit to a psychological evaluation. In an interview with Mother, the social worker noted Mother to be “visibly upset and overwhelmed.” Mother denied that she neglected the children. Christian was obese and out of control, and he had speech delays due to multiple languages being spoken in the home. At that time, the social worker did not believe Christian to be in any type of imminent danger and recommended he remain with Mother. The cause of A.’s death remained undetermined.

At the August 8, 2006, jurisdictional/dispositional hearing, the juvenile court found the allegations true as amended and Christian to be a dependent child under section 300, subdivision (b). The court ordered Christian to remain in Mother’s care under family maintenance supervision. The family maintenance plan required Mother to take Christian to his appointments, submit to a mental health examination, and participate in a parenting class.

On October 24, 2006, DPSS filed a section 387 petition, alleging that the disposition placing Christian with Mother was ineffective in protecting him, as Mother had “changed her story on how the child’s twin died” and scored a “7” on the polygraph test, which was deemed “deceptive” and “plac[ed] this child at risk.” Christian was removed from Mother’s care on October 20, 2006, and placed in foster care.

The polygraph test was not performed with the use of an Arabic translator based on the detective’s assessment that Mother understood English. Mother’s native language is Arabic. Though Mother understood English, the record shows that she was more comfortable with Arabic.

Mother’s initial story regarding A.’s death was documented by the emergency response worker. Mother claimed that she awoke on May 30, 2006, at 8:00 a.m., brought A. downstairs to the living room, and placed him on the floor in front of the television. She then went into the kitchen, made herself coffee, and grabbed some bread “‘similar to pita bread.’” She took a piece of the bread, about two inches, and placed it in A.’s mouth for him to eat. She sat on the sofa to relax and noticed A. was gasping for air. Mother performed the finger sweep in A.’s mouth, but the bread did not come out. She attempted to perform cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR). When there was no response from A., she picked him up, went upstairs, and told the maternal uncle to call 911. Despite A.’s multiple birth defects and Mother’s claim of A. choking on food “‘many times’” before, Mother believed she could feed the children “‘anything’” and that she had been feeding both children whole foods by the age of one.

Mother’s prior social workers were unaware that A. had a propensity for choking on food. Indeed, the IRC worker noted that had anyone at IRC been aware of A. having a history of choking on foods, IRC would have recommended and approved occupational therapy to address this issue. There was nothing in the IRC records of A. choking. A.’s occupational therapist, however, noted that A. was at a risk of choking due to his defects and disabilities, but Mother had been conservative in what she would allow him to eat. The therapist was surprised to learn that A. had choked. The therapist remembered Mother as a “very overwhelmed parent” who did not attend the occupational or physical therapy sessions consistently. A.’s feeding was part of the occupational therapy he had received.

Detective Morales informed the social worker on June 2, 2006, that upon re-interviewing Mother, Mother had made inconsistent and evasive statements in regard to the food she fed A. when he died and about A.’s temperament and mood. The detective also stated that the coroner’s findings were inconclusive, but further investigation was pending. The autopsy report noted that there were no contents in the child’s stomach, airway, or lungs, which revealed the child had not eaten for several hours.

Mother’s later account of the events leading to A.’s death was given to Detective Joseph on October 18, 2006. She stated that she had A. strapped to a wagon in the kitchen and that she had placed the end of a hotdog or steak bun in his mouth to feed him and left him unattended and out of sight for an unknown period of time. When she went back to check on him, his head was back and he was pale and unresponsive. Mother took the bread out of his mouth and threw it into the trashcan. She then took him out of the wagon and tried CPR without success. Mother told the maternal uncle to call 911. When Mother found out there would be an autopsy, she took the bread out of the trash and washed it down the drain.

The wagon was later determined to be used as a chair when feeding the child.

The doctor who examined A.’s deceased body believed a 2003 broken arm incident was abuse. A. was only four months old at the time. When A. was admitted, the emergency room treating doctor opined that the injury was not accidental. A later treating physician disagreed, the allegations were found “inconclusive,” and the case was closed. There were no signs of bread in A.’s mouth or stomach and there were no evident signs of choking when the autopsy was performed. There were also no signs of strangulation, and a chest hernia was attributed to CPR.

Mother was present at the October 25, 2006, hearing on the section 387 petition. At that time, Mother’s counsel indicated that Mother had offered to move out of her home and asked that her relatives be assessed for placement. Counsel also had a “request as to the validity of the polygraph.” Father’s counsel asked Christian to be placed with Father, noting that Father was in a position to care for the child, had been visiting with the child, and would be starting his counseling and anger management programs. The juvenile court detained Christian, removed him from Mother’s care, and ordered that relatives be assessed for placement. The court also authorized placement with Father after an acceptable home evaluation.

In a November 13, 2006, jurisdictional/dispositional report, the social worker recommended that Christian remain in foster care and that Father and Mother receive reunification services. Though the social worker found Father’s home to be appropriate, the social worker opined that he needed additional time to participate in counseling and parenting classes. Father’s visits with Christian were appropriate and went well; Father had a calming effect on Christian. However, Mother’s visits with Christian appeared to be detrimental to him. Mother complained almost the entire time about the care Christian was receiving in foster care, and Christian cried during the visits. In one incident, Mother went into such a rage when she discovered Father was waiting to see Christian that the social worker was concerned for her own safety, and police had to be called. Specifically, Mother cursed in front of the child, yelled at Father in Arabic, and then assaulted Father while the social worker stood in between Father and Mother. During the entire time, Father remained calm.

Father had been actively participating in services; however, Mother had not participated in any services, including her mental health services. It was reported that Mother had moved out of her home and was residing with her brother in Sierra Madre. Father was also residing in an apartment in Sierra Madre and felt he was ready to have Christian in his home. He had a room set up for Christian with books, clothes, toys, diapers, a car seat, and a bed. He also stated he was financially stable and was working on his immigration status.

A contested jurisdictional/dispositional hearing was set at the November 15, 2006, hearing. Over Mother’s objection, the juvenile court ordered placement of Christian with Father on a temporary basis pending the contested jurisdictional/dispositional hearing on the condition that a satisfactory home evaluation had been performed.

In a December 14, 2006, addendum report, the social worker requested that the section 387 petition be sustained, placement with Father be continued under family maintenance, family reunification services be offered to Mother, and the case be transferred to Los Angeles County. Mother did not object to the transfer of the case and in fact stated,“‘[T]hat would be better.’”

Mother was present at the contested jurisdictional/dispositional hearing. The juvenile court found the allegations in the section 387 petition true, placed Christian with Father, and ordered services be provided to Mother. The court also ordered that visitation “between minor(s) and . . . MOTHER be as directed by DPSS.” The court then transferred the case to Los Angeles County. This appeal followed.

II

DISCUSSION

A. Section 387 Petition

Mother contends the juvenile court erred when it sustained the section 387 petition and ordered Christian removed from her care.

Section 387, subdivision (a) states, “An order changing or modifying a previous order by removing a child from the physical custody of a parent . . . and directing placement in a foster home . . . shall be made only after noticed hearing upon a supplemental petition.” The substantive requirements of the section 387 petition are set out in subdivision (b) of section 387: “The supplemental petition shall be filed by the social worker in the original matter and shall contain a concise statement of facts sufficient to support the conclusion that the previous disposition has not been effective in the rehabilitation or protection of the child . . . .” (See also In re Joel H. (1993) 19 Cal.App.4th 1185, 1199.)

When a section 387 petition has been filed, DPSS must prove the jurisdictional facts by a preponderance of the evidence. (In re Jonique W. (1994) 26 Cal.App.4th 685, 691.) As the court explained in Joel H., section 387 does not require the same jurisdictional findings demanded under section 300, which authorizes the juvenile court’s initial jurisdiction over the child. “The ‘jurisdictional fact’ necessary to modify a previous placement is that the previous disposition has not been effective in the rehabilitation or protection of the minor.” (In re Joel H., supra, 19 Cal.App.4th at p. 1200.) Thus, the juvenile court need not find that there has been physical or emotional abuse. (Ibid.) Rather, the goal of the juvenile court’s inquiry “is to protect the child from some perceived danger or actual harm.” (Id. at p. 1201.)

Jurisdictional findings under section 387 are reviewed for the existence of substantial evidence. (In re Joel H., supra, 19 Cal.App.4th at p. 1199.) We will therefore affirm the jurisdictional findings if examination of the record, reviewed as a whole and in the light most favorable to the order, discloses evidence that is “‘reasonable, credible and of solid value’” which would allow a reasonable trier of fact to make the pertinent findings. (In re Christina A. (1989) 213 Cal.App.3d 1073, 1080.) Upon review for substantial evidence, we do not reweigh the evidence. (In re Spencer W. (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 1647, 1650.)

Here, the DPSS reports admitted at the section 387 hearing disclose ample evidence of “perceived danger or actual harm” to Christian. (In re Joel H., supra, 19 Cal.App.4th at p. 1201.) They disclose that A. died while in Mother’s care and that Mother changed her story regarding the circumstances of the death after the court declared Christian a dependent and placed him with Mother on family maintenance. As the juvenile court stated at the hearing, “it appears . . . that the basis for the petition is that the mother was not forthcoming in her version of the events that led in [sic] the death of the child and specifically not forthcoming in connection with her particular role or her particular failure to properly supervise or her role in the events that caused the death. And for that reason that there was some concern about whether or not the child should have been left with her in the first place, had that been known at the time.”

Mother argues that her two different stories regarding the events surrounding A.’s death are similar and that her story had not changed. However, at the hearing, Mother essentially admitted that she had changed her story. Her trial counsel stated, “Maybe [Mother] changed her story but what 387 is for, is, has the disposition been ineffective.” Regardless, contrary to Mother’s assertion, Mother’s first and second versions of the events surrounding A.’s death differed substantially. In version one, in the morning, after getting A. out of bed, Mother placed him on the floor in the living room in front of the television. In the second version, Mother stated that she placed A. in a wagon in the kitchen. In version one, Mother put a piece of pita-like bread in A.’s mouth. In version two, Mother said she put the end of a hotdog or steak bun in A.’s mouth. In version one, while on the sofa in the living room, Mother noticed that A. was gasping for air. In version two, Mother left A. unattended and out of sight for an unknown period of time, and when she went back to check on him, his head was back and he was pale and unresponsive. In version one, Mother performed the finger sweep in A.’s mouth, but the bread did not come out. In version two, Mother took the bread out of A.’s mouth and threw it into the trashcan and took A. out of the wagon.

Based on the second version of the story, if this is the true account, Mother’s intentional acts or neglect contributed to A.’s death. Given the fact that Mother told the social worker that A. choked on food “many times” and that he was unable to spit the food out, leaving him unattended for an unknown period of time after she placed food in his mouth would necessarily place him at risk of choking to death. Mother’s second account of the events is in contrast to her first account in which it appeared that Mother had done everything possible to care for and protect A.

Mother urges that the polygraph score was insufficient to support a finding of jurisdiction under the section 387 petition. As she acknowledges, however, Mother forfeited this claim by failing to raising it below. Mother did not challenge the reliability of the polygraph test at the section 387 hearing or any other hearing. Hence, Mother forfeited this issue. (In re S.B. (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1287, 1293.)

Nonetheless, even without the polygraph test, the change in Mother’s story itself established that Mother had been disingenuous regarding the circumstances of A.’s death. In addition, as recognized by Mother, the juvenile court did not rely on the polygraph test to find that the previous disposition was ineffective to protect Christian.

There also was substantial evidence supporting the order removing Christian from Mother’s care. Under section 361, subdivision (c)(1) a child may not be taken from the custody of the parent unless the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that “[t]here is or would be a substantial danger to the physical health, safety, protection, or physical or emotional well-being of the minor. . . .” The social worker’s reports indicate that Christian was at risk of harm if he remained in Mother’s care because she was unable to protect him, control him, or provide him with the structure or deal with the many problems that arose in the household. Though Christian did not have the disabilities of his twin brother, he was hard to control, and Mother had difficulties parenting him. Whether or not Mother intentionally or negligently caused A.’s death, the previous disposition (placement of Christian with Mother) could not ensure Christian’s safety and protection. Following A.’s death, the record shows that Mother still had not changed her parenting style. The foster mother reported that Christian had difficulty swallowing sometimes because he tried to swallow food whole instead of chewing.

In addition, Mother had not availed herself of services that would enable her to properly parent Christian. By the time of the section 387 hearing, she still had not begun any component of her family maintenance plan, i.e., undergoing a psychological evaluation or beginning a parenting class, despite requests to do so. Mother argues that the juvenile court erred in relying on her progress under the case plan to support jurisdiction under section 387. We disagree. Though the section 387 petition did not allege this ground, Mother’s progress under the case plan was relevant to the issue of whether the previous disposition was effective in protecting Christian. Contrary to Mother’s claim, the record in this case contains substantial evidence that there was substantial danger to the child if he remained in Mother’s custody and that removal of the child was warranted.

B. Visitation Order

At the conclusion of the section 387 hearing, the juvenile court ordered that “[v]isitation between the child and his mother is as directed by Social Services.” Mother argues this was in error, as the juvenile court “gave the DPSS complete authority over Mother’s visitation rights.”

We note that counsel for Christian filed a letter brief supporting the juvenile court’s orders, including the visitation order.

The juvenile court has broad discretion in fashioning visitation orders. (See, e.g., In re Julie M. (1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 41, 48.) “‘The reviewing court must consider all the evidence, draw all reasonable inferences, and resolve all evidentiary conflicts, in a light most favorable to the trial court’s ruling. [Citation.] The precise test is whether any rational trier of fact could conclude that the trial court order advanced the best interests of the child. [Citation.] We are required to uphold the ruling if it is correct on any basis, regardless of whether it is the ground relied upon by the trial judge. [Citation.]’ [Citation.] The trial court is accorded wide discretion and its determination will not be disturbed on appeal absent ‘a manifest showing of abuse.’ [Citation.]” (In re Robert L. (1993) 21 Cal.App.4th 1057, 1067.)

Assuming, without deciding, that Mother has not waived her right to raise this issue on appeal, we find no abuse of discretion. The juvenile court has the “power and responsibility” to regulate visitation between dependent children and their parents. (In re Moriah T. (1994) 23 Cal.App.4th 1367, 1373; see also In re Jennifer G. (1990) 221 Cal.App.3d 752, 756-757.) “The juvenile court has the sole power to determine whether visitation will occur and may not delegate its power to grant or deny visitation to” the child protective services agency. (In re Christopher H. (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 1001, 1008-1009.) The juvenile court may, however, delegate “the responsibility of managing the ministerial details of visitation” to the child protective services agency. (Moriah T., at p. 1375; see also In re Danielle W. (1989) 207 Cal.App.3d 1227, 1237; In re Randalynne G. (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 1156, 1164, superseded by statute on another ground as stated in In re S.B., supra, 32 Cal.4th 1287, 1294-1295.) “[T]he ministerial tasks of overseeing visitation as defined by the juvenile court ‘can, and should, be delegated to the entity best able to perform them, here the department of social services.’ [Citation.] ‘Such matters as time, place and manner of visitation do not affect the defined right of a parent to see his or her child and thus do not infringe upon the judicial function.’ [Citation.]” (Moriah T., at p. 1374.) “[T]he frequency and length of visits are simply aspects of the time, place and manner of visitation. Accordingly, the juvenile court may grant to the county agency the discretion to determine the frequency and length of visitation ordered by the court.” (Id. at pp. 1376-1377; but see In re Jennifer G., at p. 757 [stating in dicta that a court should determine “the frequency and length of visitation”].) “Only when the court delegates the discretion to determine whether any visitation will occur does the court improperly delegate its authority and violate the separation of powers doctrine.” (Christopher H., at p. 1009, italics added.)

Here, the juvenile court did not delegate to the DPSS the discretion to determine whether any visitation would be allowed. The juvenile court’s order provided that Mother and Christian shall have visitation “as directed by DPSS.” The court defined Mother’s right to visit with the child and then authorized DPSS to administer the details of visitation. Mother claims that the court did not do anything to ensure that visitation between Christian and Mother would occur, such as even designate that visitation be reasonable. We disagree. As the court explained in In re Christopher H., supra, 50 Cal.App.4th at page 1009, “[d]espite dictum to the contrary in In re Jennifer G. [supra] 221 Cal.App.3d [at p.] 757], most courts, including ours [citation], agree the visitation order need not specify the frequency and length of visits. Such specificity is at odds with the purposes and practical necessities of a visitation order intended to protect the well-being of a dependent child while both maintaining ties between the child and parent and providing the parent with an opportunity to demonstrate why his right to custody and care of the child should be reestablished. [Citation.]”

Additionally, our Supreme Court has approved an order stating “‘[v]isitation . . . for father . . . to be facilitated by [Chantal’s] therapist . . . .’” (In re Chantal S. (1996) 13 Cal.4th 196, 202.) There, the court concluded, “The order gives Chantal’s therapist no discretion whatsoever. The directive that Chantal’s therapist ‘facilitate’ visitation appears designed merely to mandate that Chantal’s therapist cooperate with the court’s order that visitation occur once certain conditions are met.” (Id. at p. 213; see also In re Precious J. (1996) 42 Cal.App.4th 1463, 1477 [order authorizing visits “‘on a schedule set up by the Social Services Department’” not impermissible delegation of judicial power].)

In the present matter, there is also no indication in the record that the juvenile court intended to delegate to DPSS the power to do anything more than supervise and facilitate the visits, to which the court itself determined that Mother was entitled. The court never indicated at any of the hearings that it intended to allow DPSS to determine whether Mother would receive any visits at all. Neither did DPSS ever request the court to delegate to it this power or suggest that a cessation of visits was necessary or desirable.

Furthermore, as the court of appeal pointed out in In re Danielle W., supra, 207 Cal.App.3d at page 1238, the limited power delegated to DPSS to implement Mother’s visitation rights given to her by the juvenile court is still subject to periodic review by the juvenile court. In other words, should Mother believe at some point that DPSS is preventing her from exercising her visitation rights, she can ask the court to order DPSS to carry out its duties or to order a specific visitation schedule. Finally, there is no indication in this record that DPSS has refused to allow Mother to exercise the visitation rights granted to her by the court. In fact, Mother was having weekly visits with Christian at the time of the visitation order. There is nothing in the record to suggest that this would change after the jurisdictional/dispositional hearing, especially in light of the fact that reunification services were ordered for Mother. We find no abuse of discretion in the juvenile court’s visitation order.

C. Transferring Case to Los Angeles County

Mother contends the juvenile court erred in transferring the case to Los Angeles County without making a finding that doing so was in Christian’s best interests as required by section 375.

Section 375 gives the juvenile court discretion to transfer a dependency case to the county of a custodial parent’s residence if transfer is in the child’s best interests. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.610(e); In re Christopher T. (1998) 60 Cal.App.4th 1282, 1291.) We will not disturb the juvenile court’s transfer order unless it constitutes an abuse of discretion, i.e., “unless it ‘exceed[s] the bounds of reason. When two or more inferences can reasonably be deduced from the facts, the reviewing court has no authority to substitute its decision for that of the trial court.’” (In re J.C. (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 984, 993.)

The juvenile court here did not state on the record that it was making a best-interest finding. However, as DPSS notes, any required findings may be inferred from the record. (See In re Steve W. (1990) 217 Cal.App.3d 10, 27; In re Corienna G. (1989) 213 Cal.App.3d 73, 83.) Accordingly, although the juvenile court did not expressly state that it found the transfer would be in Christian’s best interest, we may infer such a finding. Regardless, the juvenile court made a best interest finding in its transfer order filed on January 2, 2007. Specifically, the order signed by the court stated that the court found under section 375 and former California Rules of Court, rule 1425 (now rule 5.610) that the transfer of the child’s case was in the child’s best interests.

Substantial evidence supports a best-interest finding. Christian had been placed with his father pursuant to section 361.2, subdivision (b)(2). Hence, the residence of the child became Los Angeles County. A court may transfer the case to the juvenile court of another county if there is a change in the residence of the child or the residence of the person who has the legal right to physical custody. (§ 375; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.610(c)(1) & (d); In re Christopher T., supra, 60 Cal.App.4th at p. 1291.) Father had been residing in Los Angeles County consistently since the beginning of the case. Given that neither Father nor Christian, who would be receiving services, resided in Riverside County, continuing services in Riverside County would not be in Christian’s best interest.

Furthermore, Mother indicated that she had moved to Los Angeles County as well. The social worker reported that Mother was currently residing with her brother in Sierra Madre. Even if Mother had moved back to Riverside County by the time of the section 387 jurisdictional/dispositional hearing and the transfer would inconvenience her, it must be pointed out that even while the case was serviced in Riverside County, Mother did not avail herself of the services provided.

Under the circumstance of this case, we cannot say the juvenile court exceeded the bounds of reason when it concluded that the child’s best interest was served by having his case transferred to and serviced from Los Angeles County.

III

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed.

We concur: KING, J., MILLER, J.

Commissioner Gordon made the contested rulings, including the transfer order; Judge Dugan signed the transfer order.


Summaries of

In re Christian A.

California Court of Appeals, Fourth District, Second Division
Mar 11, 2008
No. E042138 (Cal. Ct. App. Mar. 11, 2008)
Case details for

In re Christian A.

Case Details

Full title:RIVERSIDE COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SOCIAL SERVICES, Plaintiff and…

Court:California Court of Appeals, Fourth District, Second Division

Date published: Mar 11, 2008

Citations

No. E042138 (Cal. Ct. App. Mar. 11, 2008)