Opinion
E033313.
11-3-2003
In re CHAUNCE M., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. CHAUNCE M., Defendant and Appellant.
Susan S. Bauguess, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Bill Lockyer, Attorney General, Robert R. Anderson, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Gary W. Schons, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Lilia E. Garcia, Supervising Deputy Attorney General, and Douglas C. S. Lee, Deputy Attorney General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Following a contested jurisdictional hearing, the juvenile court found true that minor unlawfully drove or took a vehicle (Veh. Code, § 10851, subd. (a)) as alleged in a second subsequent Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 petition. Minor was thereafter continued a ward of the court and placed in a suitable group home. On appeal, minor contends (1) there was insufficient evidence to support the juvenile courts finding that he unlawfully drove or took a vehicle, and (2) the juvenile court erred when it considered matters outside the record at the time of the dispositional hearing. We reject these contentions and affirm the judgment.
I
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The factual background relates only to the second subsequent petition filed on January 27, 2003.
Shortly after midnight on January 25, 2003, Roger Gilstrap, a tow truck driver who worked for Blythe Freeway Towing, was dispatched on a tow call. When he arrived at the towing yard, he noticed that the back gate was in the middle of the road. Gilstrap had the dispatcher call the police and the owner of the company. Gilstrap then noticed that a GMC pickup truck was missing from the property. Shortly after speaking with Gilstrap, the police broadcast an auto theft report.
Officer Esequiel Escobedo was on patrol, heard the call that a truck had been reported missing, and began looking for the truck. Around 1:19 a.m., Officer Escobedo saw the truck, parked at a gas station, three blocks from Blythe Freeway Towing. Initially, Officer Escobedo drove past the truck. He then made a U-turn and drove by the truck again, this time noticing that the license plate number matched the one from the missing vehicle description. After watching the truck for about five minutes, Officer Escobedo saw an individual exit the liquor store of the gas station and get in the drivers seat. Thirty to 40 seconds later, he observed a second individual come out of the liquor store and get in the passenger seat. The individuals then left the parking lot of the gas station. After Officer Escobedo followed the truck for approximately two blocks, he initiated a traffic stop. The driver pulled over to the side of the road.
The driver of the truck was identified as A.E., and the passenger was identified as minor. As Officer Escobedo approached the truck, he noticed that both the driver and minor were wearing gloves. Officer Escobedo asked both individuals to exit the truck. After they complied, they were arrested and taken into custody.
A subsequent examination of the truck revealed the left front quarter panel was damaged, the right side mirror was damaged, and the front of the truck was extensively damaged. It was also noted that the keys to the vehicle were in the truck.
Minor testified on his own behalf. He claimed that although he was in the truck, he did not drive it; rather, his then 16-year-old friend A.E. drove it. He explained that A.E. picked him up in the truck around 10:00 p.m. at an apartment complex. A.E. told minor that he was heading to Hemet and asked him if he wanted to accompany him. Minor responded that he did. Minor also claimed he was unaware that the truck was stolen and that when A.E. told him to put on gloves, he simply obeyed, admitting, however, that he thought it was to avoid getting fingerprints on the truck. Minor was not surprised A.E. had the truck, since he had seen him drive other cars in the past.
II
DISCUSSION
A. Insufficiency of the Evidence
Minor contends there was insufficient evidence to support the juvenile courts true finding that he unlawfully drove or took a vehicle (Veh. Code, § 10851, subd. (a)). Specifically, he claims the evidence was insufficient to show that he took or drove the truck, aided and abetted A.E. in so doing, or had knowledge the truck was taken or driven without the owners consent. We disagree.
"`The standard of proof in juvenile proceedings involving criminal acts is the same as the standard in adult criminal trials. [Citation.]" (In re Babak S. (1993) 18 Cal.App.4th 1077, 1088, quoting In re Jose R. (1982) 137 Cal.App.3d 269, 275; see also In re Cheri T. (1991) 70 Cal.App.4th 1400, 1404.) Our review of any claim of insufficiency of the evidence is limited. "In assessing a claim of insufficiency of evidence, the reviewing courts task is to review the whole record in the light most favorable to the judgment to determine whether it discloses substantial evidence — that is, evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of solid value — such that a reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt." (People v. Rodriguez (1999) 20 Cal.4th 1, 11, citing People v. Johnson (1980) 26 Cal.3d 557, 578; see also People v. Bolin (1998) 18 Cal.4th 297, 331; People v. Valdez (2001) 89 Cal.App.4th 1013, 1016; People v. Clark (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 1072, 1082.) If the evidence presented below is subject to differing inferences, the reviewing court must assume that the trier of fact resolved all conflicting inferences in favor of the prosecution. (Jackson v. Virginia (1979) 443 U.S. 307, 326.) A reviewing court is precluded from making its own subjective determination of guilt. (Id. at p. 319, fn. 13.)
Given this courts limited role on appeal, minor bears an enormous burden in claiming there was insufficient evidence to sustain his conviction for unlawfully taking or driving a vehicle. If the verdict is supported by substantial evidence, we are bound to give due deference to the trier of fact and not retry the case ourselves. (People v. Ochoa (1993) 6 Cal.4th 1199, 1206.) It is the exclusive function of the trier of fact to assess the credibility of witnesses and draw reasonable inferences from the evidence. (People v. Barnes (1986) 42 Cal.3d 284, 303; People v. Hale (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 94, 105.) Minors hurdle to secure a reversal is just as high when the prosecutions case depends on circumstantial evidence. (People v. Kraft (2000) 23 Cal.4th 978, 1053.)
"`The elements necessary to establish a violation of section 10851 of the Vehicle Code are the defendants driving or taking of a vehicle belonging to another person, without the owners consent, and with specific intent to permanently or temporarily deprive the owner of title or possession. [Citations.] [Citation.]" (People v. Green (1995) 34 Cal.App.4th 165, 180.) This provision applies to a person who drives a vehicle when the driver "obtains the vehicle under circumstances which indicate the perpetrator has knowledge, absent his or her actual taking of the vehicle, that the use or operation of the vehicle is depriving the owner of possession of the vehicle." (Id. at p. 179.)
Circumstantial evidence is adequate to show intent. (People v. Green, supra, 34 Cal.App.4th at p. 180.) Indeed, "in most cases, evidence of intent [is] only circumstantial." (People v. Ivans (1992) 2 Cal.App.4th 1654, 1664.) "The specific intent to deprive [an] owner of possession of his car may be inferred from all the facts and circumstances of the particular case. [Citations.] Once the unlawful taking of the vehicle has been established, possession of the recently taken vehicle by the defendant with slight corroboration through statements or conduct tending to show guilt is sufficient to sustain a conviction of Vehicle Code section 10851. [Citations.]" (In re Robert V. (1982) 132 Cal.App.3d 815, 821.)
Subject to its determination of witness credibility, there was substantial evidence here from which a rational trier of fact could have concluded that minor unlawfully took or drove the truck, or aided and abetted A.E. in unlawfully taking or driving the truck. There was undisputed evidence that the truck was taken and driven and that minor was in the truck when he and A.E. were arrested. Circumstantial evidence showed that minor had knowledge the truck was stolen and that he presumably took the truck or aided A.E. in taking the truck. Minor and A.E. were arrested in possession of the truck approximately one hour after it was reported missing. In addition, they were found with the truck about three blocks from where the truck was stolen. When Officer Escobedo approached the truck after he initiated the traffic stop, he noticed that both minor and A.E. were wearing gloves. Minor testified that he wore the gloves "[s]o [he] wouldnt get fingerprints on the truck."
Based on the above facts, and viewing the evidence most favorably to the People, we conclude that there is substantial evidence from which a rational trier of fact could have concluded that minor either took or drove the truck, or at least aided and abetted A.E. in doing so, with the intent to permanently or temporarily deprive the owner of the vehicle.
B. Evidence Considered at Dispositional Hearing
For the first time on appeal, minor next claims the juvenile court erred when it considered matters outside the record when it ordered placement at the time of the dispositional hearing. The People respond minor waived this issue and, in the alternative, claim his contention lacks merit. We are inclined to agree with the People.
Minor also asserts that, if this court finds he waived this issue, he was denied the effective assistance of counsel for his trial counsels failure to object to this issue at the time of the dispositional hearing.
At the contested dispositional hearing, minor requested that he be given one more chance at home supervision. Minors mother then requested to be heard. She asked the court to give her a chance with minor. Thereafter, the court explained to minors mother the following: "Okay. I had the opportunity to speak to the other boy who was involved, and I must tell you that [minors] explanation of what happened, in my opinion, was totally, completely false. He lied to the court, that he — what they in fact did, they were involved in the theft of two vehicles. One was a vehicle, I think, from what, Imperial Irrigation District? [¶] . . . [¶] That car ran out of gas, so they broke into the Blythe Freeway Towing, knocked down the gate and stole a second car. He attempted to lay off all responsibility for this matter on the other boy, when, in fact, he was — he was the culprit in this matter. [¶] The other boy — the other boy told me — this was after the trial — told me the whole story, which was completely honest, forthright. This is [minors] fourth petition. Weve tried everything we can with him." The court then proceeded to explain to minors mother on why minor could not be released to her home, citing minors prior history with the juvenile court system and behavioral problems.
Minor was previously adjudged a ward of the court and placed on probation in the custody of his grandparents on September 9, 2002, after he admitted he unlawfully drove or took a vehicle (Veh. Code, § 10851, subd. (a)), received stolen property (Pen. Code, § 496, subd. (a)), committed burglary (Pen. Code, § 459), and committed arson (Pen. Code, §452).
Following the courts explanation to minors mother, the court formally sentenced minor. The court stated, "For the record, the court has read, signed, considered the [probation] report, adopts the findings and orders the recommendation contained therein[,] including that the child . . . will remain a dependent, a ward of this court. . . ."
Minor takes issue with the juvenile courts comments to minors mother regarding A.E.s statements to the court and argues the court improperly considered these statements before sending him to placement. Specifically, he claims the use of these statements deprived him his constitutional rights to due process and confrontation.
Minor did not object to this issue in the court below. He therefore waived this issue and is precluded from raising it for the first time on appeal. (People v. Scott (1994) 9 Cal.4th 331, 356.) In Scott our Supreme Court held that to prevent unnecessary appeals "complaints about the manner in which the trial court exercises its sentencing discretion and articulates its supporting reasons cannot be raised for the first time on appeal." (Id. at p. 356; see also In re John H. (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 1109, 1112-1113.) We acknowledge that, when there has been no opportunity to object, the failure to object cannot constitute a waiver. (See Scott at p. 356; People v. Prewitt (1959) 52 Cal.2d 330, 335; People v. Delahoussaye (1989) 213 Cal.App.3d 1, 12-13.) In the present matter, however, minor had the opportunity to address the court at the sentencing hearing but failed to do so. Thus, to the extent minor argues the court erred in considering matters outside the record, we find that issue waived. Nonetheless, in order to foreclose the ineffective assistance of counsel claim, we will address the merits of minors contention.
Initially, we note it is evident from the record that the court did not rely on matters outside the record before sending minor to placement. Rather, the court was explaining to minors mother why she was not going to be given custody of minor, pointing out various factors. Furthermore, the courts statements to minors mother were contained in the probation report filed on March 5, 2003. Hence, the matters considered by the court were contained in the record.
Moreover, even if we assume the juvenile court erred in considering matters outside the record, we would still conclude the court did not abuse its discretion in sending minor to placement.
We review a placement decision only for abuse of discretion and will indulge all reasonable inferences to support the decision of the juvenile court. (In re Asean D. (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 467, 473.) An appellate court will not lightly substitute its decision for that of the juvenile court and the decision of the court will not be disturbed unless unsupported by substantial evidence. (In re Eugene R. (1980) 107 Cal.App.3d 605, 617.) Although the juvenile court law contemplates a progressively restrictive and punitive series of placements, the juvenile court is not required to first attempt less restrictive alternatives before ordering a particular commitment. (In re Asean D. at p. 473.) Lastly, "the 1984 amendments to the juvenile court law reflected an increased emphasis on punishment as a tool of rehabilitation, and a concern for the safety of the public." (Ibid.) Since retribution must not be the sole reason for punishment, there must be evidence demonstrating probable benefit to the minor and the inappropriateness or ineffectiveness of the less restrictive alternatives. (In re Michael D. (1987) 188 Cal.App.3d 1392, 1396; In re Teofilio A. (1989) 210 Cal.App.3d 571, 576.) Evidence relevant to the disposition includes, but is not limited to, the age of the minor, the circumstances and gravity of the offenses committed, and the minors previous delinquent history. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 725.5.)
Here, even if the juvenile court had not considered A.E.s statements, its discretion would not have been abused by not placing minor with his mother and removing him from his grandfathers custody. Evidence submitted to the court demonstrated that minor (1) had already been on probation after he admitted he unlawfully drove or took a vehicle (Veh. Code, § 10851, subd. (a)), received stolen property (Pen. Code, § 496, subd. (a)), committed burglary (Pen. Code, § 459), and committed arson (Pen. Code, §452); (2) he had four prior petitions filed against him for various offenses; (3) he had inadequate parental/guardian supervision, and his grandfather was unable to control him; (4) his mothers parental rights had been terminated over him due to her drug abuse and general neglect of minor; (5) he was supposed to be under the custody of his grandfather at the time this vehicle theft offense occurred; (6) he had continued to do poorly in school; and (7) he had violated conditions of his probation.
When a minor is declared a ward of the court under Welfare and Institutions Code section 602, the juvenile court has several options available. This includes home supervision, suitable placement, detention, camp placement, and commitment to the California Youth Authority. (Welf. & Inst. Code, §§ 727, 730; In re Myresheia W. (1998) 61 Cal.App.4th 734, 740.) Here, the court did not use its power to commit minor to the most punitive detention scheme, the California Youth Authority. Instead, the court concluded minors best interests would be accomplished by removing him from the custody of his parents/guardians and placing him in a more suitable environment. The court concluded minors consistent problems with the law were not being remedied while living at home. Minors age, the circumstances and gravity of the current offense, minors previous delinquent history, the benefits of placement on minor, and the safety of the community all establish that minor requires commitment in a more structured and secure environment than at home probation can offer.
Based on the foregoing, even if we accept minors contention that the juvenile court improperly relied on A.E.s statements, there was more than substantial evidence in the record to support its conclusion that minor should be sent to placement.
III
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
We concur: RAMIREZ P.J., McKINSTER J.