Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from the Superior Court of San Bernardino County Nos. J226763, J226764, Wilfred J. Schneider, Jr., Judge.
Diana W. Prince, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Jean-Rene Basle, County Counsel, and Jeffrey L. Bryson, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Appellant.
OPINION
CODRINGTON J.
I
All statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless stated otherwise.
Mother appeals from the juvenile dependency court’s termination of her parental rights and its related findings that the two dependent children are adoptable and proper ICWA notice was given. We reject mother’s contentions and affirm the court’s order.
Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978, 25 United States Code section 1901 et seq.
II
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In April 2009, Children and Family Services (CFS) for the County of San Bernardino filed an original dependency petition involving P.G., born in September 2002, and C.G., born in October 2006. The petition alleged failure to protect because of the parents’ years of substance abuse and the presumed father’s sexual abuse, which was condoned by mother. (§ 300, subds. (b), (d).) The detention report described father’s history of molesting female children. The court ordered the children to be detained in foster care. Both parents then tested positive for drug use and father was arrested for felony sexual abuse on April 30, 2009.
CFS’s jurisdiction/disposition report discussed at length the risk of sexual abuse to the children, beginning in 2005 before C.G. was born. Father had been accused of molesting young girls, including his daughters and nieces. In spite of ongoing criminal investigations, mother had refused to admit the children were in possible danger. In addition, mother and father had a history of substance abuse and intermittent neglect of the children. P.G. displayed the characteristics of fetal alcohol intrauterine exposure. Mother had admitted using methamphetamine during her pregnancy with C.G.
After the initial detention, CFS recommended the children be placed with father’s ex-wife, H.G. Because of the risk to the children, CFS did not recommend family reunification services for mother or father.
In May 2009, the children were placed with H.G. H.G. disclosed that P.G. talked about sexual matters and displayed sexualized behaviors, including humping her pillow. In July 2009, the court ordered the children removed and maintained with H.G. The court ordered services for mother but not for father.
The parents had disclosed some Indian heritage. On May 5, 2009, the Cherokee nation requested more information—including a middle name and birth date—for the maternal great-grandfather. DCS could not obtain any additional information. On July 21, 2009, the juvenile court found ICWA did not apply.
In January 2010, CFS reported that mother had completed a substance abuse program but tested positive for marijuana in September and November 2009. Mother had not completed prescribed parenting and Narcotics Anonymous/Alcoholics Anonymous programs. Mother did not have employment or housing. Her visitation with the children was unsuccessful because mother was verbally abusive toward P.G. and disengaged with the children. Although the children were adjusting well to foster care, H.G. reported that P.G. was “acting out sexually” and trying to kiss boys on the school bus. Both girls were referred to therapy.
At the six-month review hearing on February 11, 2010, the social worker testified that visitation was detrimental to the children and mother still denied father’s abuse. Mother also disagreed that she needed counseling. Father was in custody pending trial. The court terminated mother’s services and suspended visitation. Father subsequently pleaded guilty and was sentenced to a seven-year prison term.
In June 2010, CFS reported its concern that H.G. was not actually divorced from father and that her live-in fiancé had a pending arrest warrant, which was complicated by the threat of deportation. The fiancé had spanked both children. For these reasons, CFS petitioned the court to change the children’s placement. The children were relocated to another home on June 4, 2010. The children were relocated again on September 16, 2010, because the foster parent found P.G. to be too challenging and sexualized in her behavior.
In the children’s fourth foster placement with the N. family, the foster mother did not work outside the home and the foster parents were experienced in dealing with sexually-abused children. The children adjusted well to the change of placement.
Mother errs when she states there was another placement between the N. family and the G. family. The children were with the N. family from September 2010 until they were placed with the G. family in March 2011.
In January 2011, the children were matched with the G. family and they began the transition for placement with their prospective adoptive family. P.G. was struggling in school but her sexual behaviors had minimized. Mother’s visitation was suspended in February 2011. On March 6, 2011, the children were placed with the G. family as prospective adoptees.
In May 2011, C.G., age four, was attending preschool and P.G, age eight, was attending second grade and demonstrating improvement. Both children were attached to their adoptive parents and said they loved “mom” and “dad.” Both girls seemed “content, happy and satisfied.” P.G. expressed her wish to be adopted. Therapy for the children was pending.
The social worker determined the children were appropriate for “adoption by their current caregivers [to] allow the girls to remain together in a family that is of the same ethnicity.” The adoptive parents had met the children in January 2011. They had no children of their own and loved the girls as daughters. They were practicing Catholics and had been married four years. Both were employed. The children had their own decorated bedrooms. The parents described a comfortable routine, of school, family, and church with the children.
The social worker recommended the juvenile court terminate parental rights so the G. family could adopt the children. At the section 366.26 permanency hearing in June 2011, mother argued the children should not be placed for adoption because she shares a bond with the children. The juvenile court found clear and convincing evidence that it was likely the children would be adopted and terminated parental rights. Mother has appealed.
III
ADOPTABILITY
Mother argues there is not clear and convincing evidence of adoptability because the record shows there were problems with the children’s placements and because it does not contain any psychological information about P.G. Mother asserts there have been at least two failed placements and speculates that P.G.’s behavior may have been the primary cause of the failures. We review the record for substantial evidence, in the light most favorable to the juvenile court’s order. (In re S.A. (2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 1128, 1140.)
First, we disagree with mother’s factual predicate that the children suffered two or more failed placements. The children have been moved a number of times since the dependency proceedings began in April 2009. The initial placement was changed to H.G., their stepmother, because she wished to adopt them but H.G. was not suitable for reasons unrelated to the children. The children were removed from only one placement, between June and September 2010, because of difficulties with P.G. The children adjusted well to their temporary placement with the N. family but that was not a suitable adoption placement for other reasons. Instead, the present placement with the G. family was the first suitable and desirable placement for the children.
Second, we reject mother’s position that psychological evidence should have been presented on the issue of P.G.’s adoptability. The children had been referred for therapy in January 2010. In May 2011, therapy for the children was “pending.” Mother argues there should be more information in the record about P.G.’s treatment in therapy and that information might bear on the issue of adoptability. But the record does not show any such information existed in May 2011 when therapy was described as “pending.” Mother’s speculation about missing reports and opinions from a therapist does not serve to contradict the juvenile court’s finding of the adoptability of the children.
Instead, the record demonstrates there is substantial evidence supporting the trial court’s finding. The G. family was introduced to the children in January 2011 and took placement of them in March 2011. By May 2011, CFS reported that P.G.’s behavioral problems had minimized and she was showing great improvement with the G. family. C.G. was also showing positive development. Most importantly, the G. family was willing and enthusiastic about adopting both girls. (In re Sarah M. (1994) 22 Cal.App.4th 1642, 1649.) Substantial evidence supported the juvenile court’s finding that there was clear and convincing evidence the two children were likely to be adopted.
IV
ICWA NOTICE
There was an insignificant technical error in completing the ICWA form but the parties agree the issue involving ICWA notice is whether CFS satisfied its duty to inquire about the children’s Indian status after the Cherokee nation sought more information about the birth date and middle initial of the deceased maternal great-grandfather. (In re Louis S. (2004) 117 Cal.App.4th 622, 628-631.) We assume an official duty has been regularly performed. (Evid. Code, § 664.) Based on a deferential review, we conclude the record demonstrates CFS complied with ICWA. (In re Rebecca R. (2006) 143 Cal.App.4th 1426, 1430 [Fourth Dist., Div. Two], citing In re Misako R. (1991) 2 Cal.App.4th 538, 545.)
The ICWA notice was prepared by CFS under penalty of perjury. The ICWA-030 form listed names, addresses, and birth information for a number of maternal relatives. The maternal grandfather was identified by name, address, birth date and place. The subject great-grandfather was born in Oklahoma and was listed as deceased in 1998. CFS had interviewed the maternal grandfather “to gather more Indian heritage information for the maternal side of the family.” Apparently he could not provide his father’s birth date or middle initial (if he had one.) Even if CFS continued to have contact with various maternal relatives throughout the proceedings, it is speculative whether they would know more than the maternal great-grandfather’s own son.
Based on these circumstances, CFS could correctly aver to the court it had no more information about the maternal great-grandfather than what was already submitted in the ICWA notice. In essence, mother claims that there was no substantial evidence to show that the duty of inquiry was satisfied. We disagree. The evidence in the entire record shows that the duty of inquiry was satisfied.
Furthermore, mother has failed to make an offer of proof or other affirmative representation that one of the maternal relatives could provide the requested information. “In the absence of such a representation, the matter amounts to nothing more than trifling with the courts.” (In re Rebecca R, supra, 143 Cal.App.4th at p. 1431, citing People v. Beebe (1989) 216 Cal.App.3d 927, 932.)
V
DISPOSITION
For the reasons stated, mother’s claim that the termination order should be reversed is without merit. The order terminating parental rights is affirmed.
WE CONCUR: RICHLI ACTING P.J., KING J.