Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Super. Ct. Nos. JD224622 & JD224623
BLEASE, Acting P. J.
Appellants D. B. (mother) and J. D. (C.D.’s father), parents of R.B. and C.D. (the minors), appeal from an order of the juvenile court terminating parental rights. (Welf. & Inst. Code, §§ 366.26, 395; further undesignated references are to this code.)
Mother and C.D.’s father contend (1) the juvenile court erred in finding there was insufficient evidence of a compelling reason for determining termination of parental rights would be detrimental to the minors due to the beneficial parental relationship between mother and C.D., and (2) given that error, not only should that order of termination be reversed, but so too should the order of termination as to C.D. based on her sibling bond with R.B. We will affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Mother married Rodney B. in 1999. They had one child together, R.B., in 2001. They were divorced in 2005 and, a year later, Rodney B. died.
Mother began a relationship with C.D.’s father in 2005 and, that same year, gave birth to C.D. At the time of C.D.’s birth, mother tested positive for methamphetamine. She disclosed to social workers that domestic violence was occurring in the home between her and C.D.’s father. Mother agreed to participate in voluntary informal supervision services including drug testing and treatment and domestic violence counseling. At that time, C.D.’s father was not living in the home.
After progressing in services for approximately four months, mother stopped drug testing and failed to participate in drug treatment or a domestic violence program. The Department learned that C.D.’s father was again living with her in the home.
During the social worker’s visit on July 20, 2006, R.B. reported he had witnessed a number of incidents of domestic violence by C.D.’s father against mother. As a result, the County of Sacramento Department of Health and Human Services (the Department) filed a non-detaining juvenile dependency petition on behalf of R.B. and C.D. alleging the mother’s substance abuse problems, her lack of compliance with the informal supervision case plan, and the ongoing incidents of domestic violence by C.D.’s father.
The juvenile court sustained the allegations in the petition, adjudged the minors dependent children of the court (§ 300, subd. (b)), placed them with their maternal aunt and uncle and ordered regular visitation. The court ordered reunification services to address the problems of the mother’s substance abuse and ongoing domestic violence between the mother and C.D.’s father.
The parents failed to reunify and the court terminated services in April 2007. Review reports stated the minors were very bonded with each other. C.D. was bonded to her maternal aunt and uncle. R.B. had ongoing behavioral problems stemming from the death of his father, Rodney B., but was adjusting to foster care and responding well to therapy. At times, R.B. expressed a desire to live with his paternal relatives, but also stated he did not want to be separated from his sister, C.D. At other times, R.B. stated he liked living with his maternal relatives “and would like to live there forever.” Still other times, R.B. stated he wanted to be reunited with his mother.
R.B.’s therapy included treatment for the Post Traumatic Stress Disorder, suffered as a result of the death of his father, to “decrease angry outbursts and aggressive episodes and to increase his ability to process the loss of his father.”
The reports stated the mother and C.D.’s father were visiting the minors twice a week and that visits went well. However, as a result of an incident of domestic violence, visits were decreased to once a week and mother and C.D.’s father were required to visit separately. Visits thereafter continued to be “nurturing and appropriate,” and the minors were always excited to see their parents. Reports noted that “mother is able to set limits with both children and is loving in her interactions with both children.” The court ordered a bonding study between mother and R.B.
The bonding study stated R.B. appeared to be comfortable with his mother, who he called “Mommy.” He listened to her and responded to her questions, and reciprocated when she displayed physical affection. R.B. did not appear to be sad or distressed when it was time for his mother to leave, nor did he seem distressed at leaving with his aunt when the visit was over. Between visits, R.B. spoke frequently about his mother, expressing his love for her and his fear that he would not get to see her again if he is adopted. The study noted that R.B. has a “relatively strong, positive emotional attachment to his mother,” who “continues to occupy a central position in his emotional life.” It also noted R.B. is thriving in his maternal relatives’ care. The report concludes that, while R.B. will continue to miss his mother and will likely suffer some emotional detriment if parental rights are terminated, “the advantages he stands to gain from remaining in his aunt and uncle’s home where his safety, needs and welfare are given priority and are provided for on a consistent basis will offset any transient symptoms of acute psychological distress he experiences” from termination of parental rights.
At the section 366.26 hearing, the Department recommended termination of parental rights. Mother and father objected to that recommendation, requesting guardianship with the maternal relatives. The social worker testified that mother and father had both communicated to him that they were in agreement with the minors being adopted by the maternal relatives, although mother’s preference was that her parental rights not be terminated. The social worker opined that adoption was preferable to guardianship because of the age and adoptability of the minors, the fact that there is an appropriate home identified for both of them, the strong bond between the minors and their prospective adoptive parents, and the absence of any medical or behavioral concerns. The social worker noted guardianship would not be appropriate due to the need for permanency, particularly with respect to C.D., the younger of the two minors. He reiterated the strong bond he observed between the minors and the prospective adoptive parents. He admitted he never witnessed any interaction between the parents and the minors.
Neither parent testified. They argued guardianship was the appropriate plan given the “consistent and regular” visitation with the minors, and the fact that R.B., who was in the care of his mother his entire life until being removed a year earlier, knows who his mother is and shares a bond with her. The parents further argued there was no guarantee the adoptive parents would allow them to have continued visitation with the minors, the loss of which would likely result in trauma, particularly to R.B. who had already suffered trauma due to the death of his biological father.
The court first found there was clear and convincing evidence the minors were likely to be adopted. Next, the court noted that, although the parents maintained regular visitation, “the advantages [R.B.] stands to gain from remaining in his aunt and uncle’s home where his safety needs and welfare are given priority and provided for on a consistent basis will offset any transient symptoms of acute psychological distress he experiences from his contact with his mother being restricted.” The court concluded “the benefits of adoption outweigh any negative effects” and found no compelling reason “to avoid the legislative preference for adoption . . . .”
DISCUSSION
I
The parents claim the juvenile court erred by failing to find an exception to adoption based on the mother’s beneficial relationship with the minor. We disagree.
“‘At the selection and implementation hearing held pursuant to section 366.26, a juvenile court must make one of four possible alternative permanent plans for a minor child . . . . The permanent plan preferred by the Legislature is adoption.’ If the court finds the child is adoptable, it must terminate parental rights absent circumstances under which it would be detrimental to the child.” (In re Ronell A. (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 1352, 1368 [citations omitted].) There are only limited circumstances which permit the court to find a “compelling reason for determining that termination of parental rights would be detrimental to the child . . . .” (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B).) One of those circumstances is: “The parents have maintained regular visitation and contact with the child and the child would benefit from continuing the relationship.” (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i).) The party claiming the exception has the burden of establishing the existence of any circumstances which constitute an exception to termination of parental rights. (In re Cristella C. (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 1363, 1373; In re Melvin A. (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 1243, 1252; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.725(e)(3); Evid. Code, § 500.) “Because a section 366.26 hearing occurs only after the court has repeatedly found the parent unable to meet the child’s needs, it is only in an extraordinary case that preservation of the parent’s rights will prevail over the Legislature’s preference for adoptive placement.” (In re Jasmine D. (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 1339, 1350.)
A beneficial relationship is one that “promotes the well-being of the child to such a degree as to outweigh the well-being the child would gain in a permanent home with new, adoptive parents.” (In re Autumn H. (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 567, 575.) “In other words, the court balances the strength and quality of the natural parent/child relationship in a tenuous placement against the security and the sense of belonging a new family would confer. If severing the natural parent/child relationship would deprive the child of a substantial, positive emotional attachment such that the child would be greatly harmed, the preference for adoption is overcome and the natural parent’s rights are not terminated.” (Ibid.) The existence of the relationship is determined by “[t]he age of the child, the portion of the child’s life spent in the parent’s custody, the ‘positive’ or ‘negative’ effect of interaction between parent and child, and the child’s particular needs . . . .” (Id. at p. 576.) “[A] parent may not claim entitlement to the exception provided by subdivision (c)(1)(A) simply by demonstrating some benefit to the child from a continued relationship with the parent, or some detriment from termination of parental rights.” (In re Jasmine D., supra, 78 Cal.App.4th at p. 1349.)
The juvenile court’s ruling declining to find an exception to termination of parental rights must be affirmed if it is supported by substantial evidence. (In re Autumn H., supra, 27 Cal.App.4th at p. 576; In re Zachary G. (1999) 77 Cal.App.4th 799, 809; In re Derek W. (1999) 73 Cal.App.4th 823, 827; cf. In re Jasmine D., supra, 78 Cal.App.4th at p. 1342 [applying abuse of discretion standard].) “On review of the sufficiency of the evidence, we presume in favor of the order, considering the evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party, giving the prevailing party the benefit of every reasonable inference and resolving all conflicts in support of the order.” (In re Autumn H., supra, 27 Cal.App.4th at p. 576.)
Here, the juvenile court rejected the parental relationship exception, concluding the parents had not shown a compelling reason to avoid the legislative preference for adoption. While there is evidence that R.B. had a positive relationship with mother, the juvenile court was required to weigh this against the benefits R.B. would gain in a permanent adoptive home. The court engaged in this process, acknowledging that R.B. had a “relatively strong” relationship with mother, but concluding that “any transient symptoms of acute psychological distress” he would experience if contact was terminated did not outweigh the benefits of adoption, including the advantages to be gained “from remaining in his aunt and uncle’s home where his safety needs and welfare are given priority and provided for on a consistent basis . . . .” Substantial evidence supports that determination.
On appeal, the parties argue the beneficial parental relationship exception as to R.B. only.
Mother argues loss of the relationship with her would cause R.B. substantial detriment because R.B. spent most of his life with her before being removed, during which time he formed “a strong and a positive emotional attachment to [mother] as his mother . . . .” She argues the bond between them is evidenced by the fact that he wanted to continue living with her, even while in foster care, and often talked about her; he told his attorney he wanted his mother to be given more time to make use of reunification services; he wanted to maintain contact with her; and, in the event parental rights were terminated, he wanted an agreement for a post adoption contact. She notes further that R.B. expressed that he missed her, wished he could see her every day and “would prefer to be returned to her care.” Those facts, she argues, are evidence of a beneficial, “parental” bond with R.B.
While this is evidence of a bond with the mother, the court could find, in weighing the evidence, that the bond was outweighed by the minor’s need for a permanent and stable home. The fact that R.B. often vacillated with regard to where he wanted to live is further support for the court’s determination that permanence and stability in his life is of paramount concern.
Mother also contends that R.B. has particular needs which weigh in favor of maintaining the parental relationship, i.e., that he is vulnerable due to the loss of his father. However, she presented no evidence in the juvenile court that contact with her would alleviate any of his feelings of loss. On the contrary, the record shows the issues R.B. is struggling with are being adequately addressed both in the foster home and in therapy, where he “is doing well.”
Mother also argues the maternal relatives “were not well-suited to being able to help him with [his] emotional needs” and “actually would increase his anxieties about losing the relationships that were important to him,” and speculates that it is “questionable” whether the maternal relatives will continue to foster R.B.’s relationship with his paternal relatives without a court order. Again, to the extent any of these arguments were raised at the section 366.26 hearing, if at all, they were not supported by evidence then and are little more than speculation now.
Mother claims the bond assessment upon which the juvenile court “relied completely” included irrelevant and incompetent opinion evidence regarding the benefit to the minor of continuing the relationship with the parent, and the court’s ruling is therefore not supported by substantial evidence. Neither parent objected to any portion of the bonding assessment at the hearing, thus forfeiting any claim in that regard on appeal. (In re S.B. (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1287, 1293, fn. 2; In re Dakota S. (2000) 85 Cal.App.4th 494, 501-502; In re Daniel K. (1998) 61 Cal.App.4th 661, 667.)
II
The parents claim that, assuming mother is successful in arguing error with respect to denial of the beneficial parental relationship exception as to R.B., the judgment terminating parental rights must be reversed not only as to R.B., but also as to C.D. based on the sibling bond between them. Having rejected mother’s first contention, we need not address the argument.
DISPOSITION
The orders of the juvenile court are affirmed.
We concur: NICHOLSON, J., BUTZ, J.