Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County No. CK59930, Jan G. Levine, Judge.
Judy Weissberg-Ortiz, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Appellant.
Raymond G. Fortner, Jr., County Counsel, James M. Owens, Assistant County Counsel, Jacklyn K. Louie, Senior Deputy County Counsel, for Respondent.
MOSK, J.
INTRODUCTION
G.O. (mother) appeals an order of the juvenile court terminating her parental rights over her children, Carolina S., Peter R. and Cruz R. (collectively, the children) pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26. Mother argues that she was denied her constitutional right to due process because the Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS), due to mother’s mental illness, improperly deprived her of her court-ordered visitation rights, after the juvenile court had terminated reunification services. Mother contends she was thus deprived of a meaningful opportunity to establish the statutory exception to termination of parental rights set forth in section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(B)(i) (the parental-relationship exception). The record does not support mother’s contention. We therefore affirm.
Mother refers to Cruz as Ernesto.
All statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless otherwise stated.
BACKGROUND
1. Detention—Carolina and Peter
In July 2005, Carolina was five years old, Peter was nine months old, and Cruz had not yet been conceived. On July 11, DCFS received a report that mother, who reportedly suffered from hallucinations, had physically abused Peter by throwing him on a bed, thinking he was the devil. Mother had also attempted to stab her 10-year old brother. A social worker found mother sitting on a couch and crying, stating that she needed help with her mental illness. Maternal grandfather told DCFS that mother had been hospitalized for her mental illness three times, but her treatment had been unsuccessful. Mother also was a drug user, and admitted to using drugs while pregnant with Peter. Maternal grandfather reported that the family locked mother in her bedroom at night because they were afraid she might hurt them or would leave the home. Mother signed an affidavit that she was willing to accept help from DCFS and giving maternal grandparents temporary custody of the children. DCFS detained the children and placed them with maternal grandparents. On July 13, 2005, mother was hospitalized due to her mental illness.
On July 14, 2005, DCFS filed a petition pursuant to section 300 with respect to Carolina and Peter. The petition alleged, among other things, that mother had physically abused Peter, had physically assaulted the children’s maternal uncle, and that mother suffered from mental and emotional problems that put the children in danger and limited mother’s ability to parent them. The juvenile court appointed counsel to represent mother, and at counsel’s request, appointed a guardian ad litem for mother. The juvenile court ordered the children detained. The juvenile court also ordered that mother receive reunification services once she was released from the hospital, to include referrals for mental health services and parenting classes. The juvenile court ordered that mother receive monitored visits in the DCFS office, giving DCFS discretion to liberalize visitation. The juvenile court also ordered a psychological evaluation of mother pursuant to Evidence Code section 730.
2. Jurisdiction and Disposition—Carolina and Peter
On August 4, 2005, the juvenile court held a jurisdictional hearing but continued the matter for mediation. Counsel for the children informed the juvenile court that mother had not had any visits with children. The juvenile court ordered DCFS to set up weekly visits at the same time and location and to provide a supplemental report regarding mother’s visitation.
On August 23, 2005, Dr. Suzie Dupée submitted a psychiatric evaluation of mother. Dr. Dupée reported that it was unclear how many times mother had been hospitalized, although it appeared that mother had two psychiatric hospitalizations, one following a suicide attempt when mother was 18 and one following the children’s detention a month prior. Mother had also been in a drug treatment facility in May or June of 2005, but she denied taking illicit drugs. Dr. Dupée concluded that mother suffered acute and severe symptoms of psychosis, and that mother most likely suffered from schizophrenia. Mother’s desire to reunify with the children seemed genuine, but Dr. Dupée thought mother was not stable enough to engage in family reunification services.
DCFS reported that, between August 4 and 24, 2005, mother had two monitored visits with the children. Mother had scheduled visits every Tuesday, Wednesday and Sunday, but mother stated she had been unable to attend visits because she was too busy attending counseling programs and did not feel well enough to take the bus. The visitation monitor reported that mother visited for approximately 40 minutes before becoming tired and sleepy and wanting to return home, and that mother was able to engage with the children for only 20 minutes per visit. The visits were relocated to a park near mother’s residence to help with mother’s transportation issues.
Mother and DCFS reached a mediation agreement with respect to the petition. Based on the mediation agreement, the juvenile court sustained the allegation in the petition that mother suffered from mental and emotional problems that posed a danger to the children and limited her ability to parent them. The juvenile court ordered DCFS to explore methods to finance mother’s medication, and set the matter for a disposition hearing.
Prior to the disposition hearing, DCFS recommended that mother be denied reunification services based on Dr. Dupée’s conclusion that reunification did not seem possible at that time. The juvenile court rejected that recommendation, and ordered that mother be provided reunification services. Mother was to continue in therapy, take her medication, and sign a release permitting DCFS to obtain progress reports from her psychiatrist. Mother also was to take parenting classes. Mother was to receive at least two monitored visits per week. The juvenile court ordered another psychiatric evaluation to be completed by the six-month review hearing.
3. Six-month Review Hearing—Carolina and Peter
Prior to the six-month review hearing, DCFS reported that mother was receiving individual counseling and parenting classes. Mother’s therapist informed DCFS that he was concerned about mother being alone with the children, and that mother might be depressed. He reported, however, that mother was lucid and oriented, and her major delusional symptoms seemed to be significantly reduced. Mother had reported some “questionable thoughts” and had stated that she believed she was psychic. Mother’s therapist recommended that she not be permitted unmonitored visits because of the possibility that she might have a delusional or psychotic episode or “poor reality testing.”
Mother was also receiving psychiatric assistance for her medication. Mother’s psychiatric case manager reported that mother had been diagnosed as suffering from psychotic disorder, not otherwise specified (NOS), and had consistently taken her psychotropic medication.
Mother had been participating in monitored visits on Saturdays and Sundays at maternal grandparents’ house. The visits were going well. Mother was visiting consistently and on time. Maternal grandfather felt that mother was not ready to care for the children, however, because she appeared to be distracted and pensive during visits.
DCFS stated that mother was in compliance with her case plan, but she did not have a stable permanent home and mother’s therapist was concerned about permitting mother unmonitored visits with the children. DCFS therefore recommended that the children remain with maternal grandparents, that mother not receive unmonitored visits, and that reunification services be continued for another six months.
Dr. Dupée submitted a follow-up psychiatric evaluation of mother. Dr. Dupée reported that mother seemed to be doing well and had been compliant with her treatment and medications. She no longer suffered from the acute psychotic symptoms present during mother’s first evaluation. Dr. Dupée did not believe that mother posed a direct risk to the children, and recommended that mother be permitted unmonitored visits.
At the six-month review hearing, the juvenile court ordered that mother was permitted to reside in the home of maternal grandparents with the children, and that DCFS continue to provide mother with reunification services. Mother’s visitation was to remain monitored for another month, but would then be unmonitored provided she stayed on her medication and continued her therapy.
4. Section 385 Petition—Carolina and Peter
On June 9, 2006, DCFS filed an ex parte application pursuant to section 385 for a modification of the juvenile court’s orders. DCFS had received information that mother had failed to show up for a session with her psychiatrist and had not been taking her medication. When a social worker visited mother, mother stated that she had missed her therapy appointment because God had told her that she was the chosen and that she was concentrating on saving the world. Mother stated that she did not need her medication, that only God knew what kind of medication she needed, and that the world depended on her. DCFS requested an order that mother not be permitted to reside with the children and that all her visits with the children be monitored. The juvenile court denied the petition and permitted mother to stay in the home, but ordered that all of mother’s contact with the children was to be monitored. Shortly thereafter, mother was again hospitalized.
5. Twelve-Month Review Hearing—Carolina and Peter
Prior to the twelve-month review hearing, mother moved out of maternal grandparents’ home. She moved in first with a friend and then with Peter’s father, who previously had assaulted her and against whom mother had a restraining order. Mother informed DCFS that she wanted to “become a family again” with Peter’s father and that she no longer needed to attend therapy because her therapist had terminated her treatment.
The juvenile court previously had terminated family reunification services for Peter’s father.
Mother’s therapist reported to DCFS that mother had attended 26 one-hour counseling sessions. Mother had told the therapist that she had been diagnosed with schizophrenia. Given that diagnosis and mother’s history of psychotic episodes, the therapist concluded that he could not support mother regaining custody of the children because doing so could place them in “serious danger.” Mother’s psychiatric case manager told DCFS that mother’s diagnosis remained psychotic disorder NOS, but mother’s psychiatrist refused to speak to DCFS directly.
Maternal grandparents informed DCFS that after mother moved out of the home and before she reunited with Peter’s father, she had been visiting the children consistently on weekends. Mother had been interacting well with the children, but maternal grandfather was concerned that mother had been talking about “‘great ideas’” all the time and was not stable enough to care for the children.
DCFS concluded that the children’s safety could not be assured if returned to mother given her history of psychotic episodes. Moreover, mother’s desire to reunify with Peter’s father, who was physically abusive, showed poor judgment and an inability to protect herself and the children. DCFS recommended that reunification services for mother be terminated, and that the children be placed permanently with their maternal grandparents. Mother contested DCFS’s recommendation, and the matter was set for a contested hearing in September 2006.
Prior to the September hearing, DCFS reported that mother was continuing her psychiatric care. Mother’s psychiatric case manager, Rosalie Casillas, wrote a letter to DCFS regarding mother’s treatment, in which she indicated that she would be providing counseling services for mother. When asked by DCFS if she, rather than a licensed psychiatrist, was providing psychiatric care, Ms. Casillas responded that she did not do psychotherapy but did “cognitive counseling” to assist mother in making sound decisions. The letter from Ms. Casillas also stated that mother had received counseling services treatment from her prior psychiatric case manager, Toni Perez. When questioned by DCFS regarding Mr. Perez’s role, Ms. Casillas admitted she had “not ‘looked’ at the chart” but thought Mr. Perez had been providing counseling services to mother. When asked if she would testify to that effect, Ms. Casillas said she could not because she had merely assumed that Mr. Perez had provided counseling services to mother. Mr. Perez previously had told DCFS that he was only providing case management services for mother.
DCFS also reported that Peter’s father had been arrested and was in jail for striking mother in the face with his fist. DCFS reiterated its recommendation to terminate mother’s family reunification services.
At the September hearing, counsel for DCFS reported that he was not ready to proceed with the contest and the matter was continued to October 2006. The court asked if mother was “getting her visitation”; mother responded that she was. Mother also informed the juvenile court that she was pregnant again by Peter’s father.
Prior to the October hearing, DCFS reported its conclusion that mother had not made progress sufficient to indicate that it would be safe to return the children to mother within the next six months. Mother had become delusional and had been hospitalized as recently as May 2006, after nine months of court-supervised therapy and psychotropic medication. Mother had also resumed her relationship with Peter’s father, who recently had abused her yet again. DCFS reiterated its prior recommendation to terminate reunification services.
The matter was continued again to November 2006. Prior to that hearing, mother’s original therapist reiterated his statement that given mother’s diagnosis of schizophrenia, he could not endorse mother gaining custody of the children.
At the November hearing, mother testified that she was seeing a new therapist named Jaime. She had seen him once. Jaime was not a licensed therapist, but mother believed that he was supervised by a licensed therapist. She previously had seen two other therapists, including Tony (referring to her prior psychiatric case manager, Toni Perez). Tony had retired, and her original therapist no longer wanted to treat her. Mother had been looking for another licensed therapist, but there was a one- to two-month waiting list. On cross-examination, mother testified that she had gone to Salinas to see Peter’s father for one week, but had not told her social worker that she was going. She was taking Cypresa for her schizophrenia. On August 25, Peter’s father had hit her in front of a policeman because he was drunk. She did not seek a restraining order.
Counsel for DCFS argued that mother was not in compliance with her case plan and asked that family reunification services be terminated. Counsel for the children agreed, stating that mother had tried, but her mental health was preventing her from completing her program. Given mother’s recent psychiatric hospitalization, counsel believed it would be a “huge risk” to return the children to her.
Counsel for mother argued that mother had done her best. She had attended 26 counseling sessions with her original therapist and had found a new therapist on her own. Mother’s case plan did not call for domestic violence counseling or require her to stay away from Peter’s father. Although mother was not ready to take custody of the children, there was nothing to support the conclusion that she could not be ready in another six months. Mother did not argue that she had not been provided reasonable reunification services or that she had been denied adequate visitation.
The juvenile court terminated mother’s reunification services. The juvenile court noted that mother had a history of psychotic episodes, and she was not able to care for the children during those episodes. Mother also had shown poor judgment in resuming a relationship with Peter’s father, who was physically abusive. In such a relationship, mother would not be in a position to care for or protect the children; and it would not be good for the children to see mother getting hurt. The juvenile court found that DCFS had provided mother with reasonable reunification services, that mother was only in partial compliance with her case plan, and that there was no substantial probability that the children would be returned to her by the end of the 18-month reunification period. A permanency planning hearing was scheduled for March 2007. Mother did not seek appellate review of the order terminating her reunification services or setting the permanency planning hearing.
6. Permanency Planning—Carolina and Peter
In March 2007, DCFS reported that the children were adoptable and that maternal grandparents wanted to adopt them, but the adoption home study had not been completed. With respect to visitation, DCFS reported that mother’s visitation schedule had not been changed, but that contact with mother had been sporadic. Maternal grandmother told DCFS that mother’s behavior was deteriorating because she was no longer taking her medication. At a hearing on March 8, 2007, mother’s attorney informed the juvenile court that mother’s visits with children generally were “going fine,” although she asked the juvenile court to remind maternal grandparents to ensure that the children were available on the visitation dates. Mother complained that her telephone calls to the social worker were not being returned.
7. Detention—Cruz
Mother’s third child, Cruz, was born in early May 2007. On May 8, DCFS filed a section 300 petition with respect to Cruz, alleging, in essence, that his and Peter’s father physically abused mother and that mother had a history of mental and emotional problems which rendered her unable to care for Cruz. Mother told DCFS that she had not taken her psychotropic medication while pregnant and did not intend to do so as long as she was breast feeding Cruz. Mother’s sister and maternal grandmother told DCFS that two weeks before Cruz was born, mother had become aggressive toward maternal grandmother; the police had been called; and mother had been hospitalized. The juvenile court ordered Cruz detained with maternal grandmother and ordered that mother receive monitored visitation.
8. Permanency Planning—Carolina and Peter
With respect to Carolina and Peter, DCFS reported in May 2007 that mother had not taken her medication due to her pregnancy and that her visits with the children had been sporadic. Maternal grandfather said that mother had been speaking erratically and at times believed that “they” wanted to poison her. During one visit before Cruz was born, maternal grandparents had to call a “‘Mental Health Cris[i]s Team’” because mother’s odd behavior caused them to fear for the safety of mother’s fetus. Mother had been hospitalized but later left the hospital. During another visit, mother locked herself in Carolina’s room. The grandparents had to ask mother several times to leave their home because they feared for the children’s safety. Carolina (then aged seven) told DCFS that mother sometimes cried during her visits, and that she was sometimes scared of mother when mother was sick.
At a hearing in May 2007, the juvenile court relieved mother’s guardian ad litem because mother appeared lucid and capable of assisting counsel in representing her. Mother complained that she wanted unsupervised visits; the juvenile court refused, but gave DCFS discretion to allow unmonitored visits once mother was back on her medication and had stabilized. Mother did not contend that she had been denied visitation.
9. Jurisdiction—Cruz
In May 2007, mother was again hospitalized at a mental health facility. DCFS could not obtain more detailed information from the hospital because mother had not signed a release permitting the hospital to disclose information. DCFS recommended that Cruz be declared a dependent of the juvenile court; that no reunification services be provided to mother; and that mother not receive visits until her mental health was stable.
At the jurisdictional hearing in June 2007, mother’s attorney complained that mother had not been permitted to visit Cruz because “they” were concerned about mother’s mental state. The juvenile court modified the visitation order to allow mother to visit not less than three times per week. The jurisdictional hearing was continued to July 2007.
Prior to the hearing in July, DCFS reported that mother had provided progress reports from her therapists, but the reports were dated in early May, prior to mother’s most recent psychiatric hospitalization. A check of mother’s medications indicated that mother was not taking the full prescribed dose of at least one of her medications. Mother’s psychiatric case manager, Ms. Casillas, stated that she had not seen mother for “a while” and was not aware that mother had been hospitalized in May. Mother’s psychiatrist submitted a letter to DCFS stating that mother had missed scheduled appointments and sometimes appeared without one; she frequently was disheveled and unbathed, and seemed unable to care for herself. The psychiatrist concluded that mother should not be reunited with the children.
In addition, Carolina’s therapist informed DCFS that mother had been calling his agency to demand that they provide her with domestic violence counseling. He stated that his agency was “not capable to deal with someone that is psychotic.” Mother had interrupted Carolina’s therapy sessions and had been observed pounding on a window and the door of the facility.
With respect to visitation, DCFS reported that it had met with mother and maternal grandmother and arranged a visitation schedule for Monday mornings, Tuesday afternoons and Sunday mornings. Mother admitted to DCFS that she had no stable housing or employment.
At the continued jurisdictional hearing, mother testified that she did not believe she had a history of mental problems, and that her mother had locked her up against her will when she was pregnant. The juvenile court nevertheless sustained the petition, finding that mother continued to be plagued with mental health issues. Counsel for mother requested that visitation be changed to a neutral setting, and that maternal grandmother not be the monitor. Mother explained that her family was “nosey” and would accuse her of things she had not done. The juvenile court granted mother’s request, and ordered monitored visits at the DCFS office. Mother did not assert that she had been denied visitation.
10. Permanency Planning—Carolina and Peter; Disposition—Cruz
In July 2007, DCFS reported that the adoption home study for maternal grandparents still had not been completed, in part because Cruz required special care and medical attention. The permanency planning hearing with respect to Carolina and Peter was therefore continued.
With respect to Cruz’s disposition, DCFS requested that mother be denied reunification services on the ground that the juvenile court had previously terminated reunification services with respect to Carolina and Peter. (§ 361.5, subd. (b)(10).) At the disposition hearing, mother testified that she had attended counseling for seven months, but the social worker “never accepted it.” She also testified that she had taken her medication since the juvenile court had terminated reunification services with respect to Carolina and Peter. Mother testified that she had only stopped taking medication during her pregnancy because one of her doctors had not assured her that the medication would not affect the baby. Mother testified that she had also attended individual counseling and parenting classes after reunification services had been terminated with respect to Carolina and Peter.
On cross-examination, mother clarified that the therapy her social worker had not “accepted” was her therapy with Tony (Toni Perez, her former psychiatric case manager). She also clarified that, in fact, she had not taken any parenting classes after reunification services were terminated. The parenting classes were those she had taken before reunification services had been terminated.
Maria Rincon, the social worker, called by mother’s counsel, testified that she recommended against reunification services with respect to Cruz because mother had failed to reunify with her other children and because she had professional opinions from a licensed clinical social worker and a psychiatrist that mother was not fit to care for the children. Mother also had been hospitalized recently due to her mental illness. Moreover, mother’s psychiatrist and psychiatric case manager had reported that mother had not been consistent with her mental health treatment. The social worker confirmed that mother’s psychiatrist had advised mother to go off her medication while she was pregnant, but that same psychiatrist also had recommended against mother’s reunification with the children after seeing mother.
Counsel for DCFS argued that mother had not shown efforts subsequent to the termination of reunification services with Carolina and Peter such that she should be afforded reunification services with respect to Cruz. This was evidenced particularly by her recent psychiatric hospitalization. Counsel for the children agreed. Counsel for mother argued that mother had only gone off her medication on her doctor’s recommendation, and had started her medication again as soon as she was cleared by her doctor to do so. Mother did not claim she had been denied visitation.
The juvenile court concluded that, even if mother had attempted to address her mental health issues to the best of her limited ability, her attempt did not rise to the level of a reasonable effort, and that reunification services would not be in Cruz’s best interest. The juvenile court denied mother reunification services with respect to Cruz and set a permanency planning hearing pursuant to section 366.26. Mother did not seek appellate review of those orders.
11. Permancy Planning—All Children
A hearing was held in September 2007, but the adoption home study of maternal grandparents was not yet complete. Mother did not raise any issue about visitation at the hearing.
In November 2007, DCFS reported that the children were doing well and that the maternal grandparents wanted to finalize the adoption. The home study had been approved in late October.
Mother’s visitation schedule was for monitored visits. In August, maternal grandmother told DCFS that mother was sleeping in a car with Peter’s father, and feared that Peter’s father was abusing her. In September, the social worker saw mother standing in front of the children’s residence. Her face was bruised, and she was getting wet from the sprinklers. She appeared delusional and told the social worker that people were going in and out of the children’s apartment complex who wanted to kill the children. Mother said that black cars were going in and out of the building, and everyone wanted to take the children away. Mother refused to leave. When the social worker went inside, maternal grandmother informed her that mother had been calling all night and had stood in front of Carolina’s school yelling that God is great, scaring the other children. Maternal grandmother believed mother was on the verge of a psychotic break. The social worker called police, who refused to detain mother pursuant to section 5150. Police instructed mother to leave the apartment building. Mother told police that she was three months pregnant. Mother had not thereafter scheduled any visits with the children, but called sporadically to check on them.
Section 5150 provides, in relevant part, “When any person, as a result of mental disorder, is a danger to others, or to himself or herself, or gravely disabled, a peace officer, member of the attending staff . . . of an evaluation facility designated by the county, designated members of a mobile crisis team . . ., or other professional person designated by the county may, upon probable cause, take, or cause to be taken, the person into custody and place him or her in a facility designated by the county and approved by the State Department of Mental Health as a facility for 72-hour treatment and evaluation.”
A hearing was held on November 7, 2007, at which the juvenile court set the section 366.26 hearing with respect to Cruz for December 12, 2007, to coincide with the hearing with respect to Carolina and Peter. Counsel for mother complained that the social worker would not let mother visit the children. The juvenile court responded that the social worker had reported a recent incident concerning mother, and that mother should call the social worker to arrange monitored visits.
In December 2007, DCFS reported that mother had not visited the children during the reporting period. Maternal grandmother told DCFS that mother had not contacted her to schedule a visit, and called only sporadically to inquire of the children’s well-being. At a hearing on December 17, mother requested that the juvenile court appoint a new attorney for her. Among mother’s complaints regarding her attorney was that mother had not had visitation for three months because she could not “find a person to supervise for me.”
In January 2008, DCFS reported that mother had been taken into custody for a mental health evaluation pursuant to section 5150. The social worker met with mother at the Ingleside Psychiatric Hospital. Mother reported having no stable housing or income.
The juvenile court held a contested section 366.26 hearing with respect to all three children on January 24, 2008. Mother testified that she had not visited the children much recently, but had visited them three weeks prior to the hearing at maternal grandmother’s home. On cross-examination, mother testified that, other than her recent visit, she had not visited the children since she had asked the juvenile court for a monitor other than maternal grandmother. Mother then testified that her last visit actually had not been three weeks ago, but had been the previous Saturday. On redirect, mother testified that the social worker had told her that she could not visit the children. Mother testified that her visits had stopped because she had been unable to find a monitor other than her mother.
Counsel for DCFS argued that mother’s visits were placed on hold until an appropriate monitor was found, but mother had never been told that she could not have visits; to the contrary, DCFS contended that mother had not visited the children enough. Counsel for the children agreed. Counsel for the children also argued that mother recently had a psychotic break and had been placed on a section 5150 hold. Carolina had expressed embarrassment at her mother’ s behavior and had told DCFS that she was sometimes afraid of her mother. Furthermore, when mother visited, her visits were monitored and were only one to two hours per week.
Counsel for mother argued that mother had satisfied the parental-relationship exception of section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(B)(i). Mother had testified that the social worker told her she could not visit the children even though the juvenile court had not ordered that visits be stopped. If DCFS stopped the visits, that should not be held against mother.
The juvenile court found that the children were adoptable and that it would be detrimental to return them to their parents. The juvenile court terminated mother’s parental rights. Mother timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
A. Standard of Review and Applicable Principles
“‘It is axiomatic that due process guarantees apply to dependency proceedings.’ [Citations.] ‘A parent’s interest in the companionship, care, custody and management of his or her children is a fundamental civil right.’ [Citation.] Statutory procedures used for termination of parental rights satisfy due process requirements only because of the demanding requirements and multiple safeguards built into the dependency scheme at the early stages of the process. [Citations.] ‘If a parent is denied those safeguards through no fault of her own, her due process rights are compromised.’ [Citation.]” (In re Valerie A. (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 987, 1006.)
If a juvenile court determines at a permanency planning hearing that a child is likely to be adopted, it “shall terminate parental rights and order the child placed for adoption” (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)) unless the juvenile court finds that a statutory exception applies. (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B).) One such exception is the parental-relationship exception. To invoke that exception, a parent must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that he or she “maintained regular visitation and contact with the child and the child would benefit from continuing the relationship.” (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i).) To satisfy this standard, “[t]he parent must do more than demonstrate ‘frequent and loving contact[,]’ [citation] an emotional bond with the child, or that parent and child find their visits pleasant. [Citation.] Instead, the parent must show that he or she occupies a ‘parental role’ in the child’s life. [Citations.]” (In re Derek W. (1999) 73 Cal.App.4th 823, 827; accord, In re Mary G. (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 184, 207.) “Obviously, the only way a parent has any hope of satisfying this statutory exception is if she maintains regular contact with her child.” (In re Hunter S. (2006) 142 Cal.App.4th 1497, 1505.) A parent wrongfully deprived of visitation with his or her child does not have a meaningful opportunity to establish the applicability of the parental-relationship exception. (In re Valerie A., supra, 152 Cal.App.4th at p. 1007.) “Thus, the erroneous denial of parent-child visitation compromises a parent’s due process rights to litigate and establish the section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)[(B)(i)] exception. [Citation.]” (Ibid.) A parent is entitled to visitation even after reunification services have been terminated unless the juvenile court finds that “visitation would be detrimental to the child.” (§ 366.21, subd. (h).)
We review for substantial evidence a juvenile court’s determination that the parental-relationship exception does not apply. (In re Mary G. (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 184, 206; In re Autumn H. (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 567, 576.) “‘[W]e presume in favor of the order, considering the evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party, giving the prevailing party the benefit of every reasonable inference and resolving all conflicts in support of the order.’” (In re Mary G., supra, 151 Cal.App.4th at p. 206 .) We will affirm if there is any substantial evidence—that is, evidence which is reasonable, credible and of solid value—to support the juvenile court’s conclusion. (In re Henry V. (2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 522, 529; Francisco G. v. Superior Court (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 586, 600; In re Jasmine C. (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 71, 75.) “The appellant has the burden of showing there is no evidence of a sufficiently substantial nature to support the finding or order.” (In re Dakota H. (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 212, 228.) We independently review issues raising pure questions of law. (In re Clarissa H. (2003) 105 Cal.App.4th 120, 125.)
Some courts have applied an abuse of discretion standard in these circumstances. (E.g., In re Aaliyah R. (2006) 136 Cal.App.4th 437, 449; In re Jasmine D. (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 1339, 1351.) However, “[t]he practical differences between the two standards of review are not significant.” (In re Jasmine D., supra, 78 Cal.App.4th at p. 1351.) We would conclude under either standard of review that the juvenile court did not err.
B. The Record Does Not Support Mother’s Claim of a Due Process Violation
Mother argues that, during the post-reunification stage of the proceedings, DCFS “deliberately and discriminatorily impeded her visitation and contact with [the children], solely on the basis of Mother’s mental illness disability, to prevent Mother and children from maintaining their parent-child relationship.” As a result, mother contends, she was denied a meaningful opportunity to establish the parental-relationship exception, in violation of her right to due process. The record does not support mother’s contention.
Mother did not argue in the trial court and does not contend on appeal that DCFS provided inadequate services during the reunification period, nor did mother seek writ review of the juvenile court’s orders terminating (with respect to Carolina and Peter) or denying (with respect to Cruz) reunification services and setting the section 366.26 hearings. Mother has therefore forfeited any contention regarding the adequacy of her reunification services. (§ 366.26, subd. (l)(1) & (2); Calif. Rules of Ct., rule 5.715(d)(3)(C).)
The only affirmative evidence that DCFS “deliberately . . . impeded” mother’s visitation was mother’s testimony at the section 366.26 hearing that the social worker had told mother she could not visit the children. Mother also testified, however, that the reason she could not visit the children was because she had not found anyone to monitor her visits. Mother has never contended that the juvenile court abused its discretion in requiring monitored visits, nor has mother argued or cited evidence that DCFS refused any request by mother to assist her in finding an appropriate monitor. To the contrary, it appears that maternal grandparents were willing and available to monitor mother’s visits throughout the proceedings, as evidenced by the fact that mother was able to visit the children shortly before the permanency planning hearing, with maternal grandparents as monitors. Throughout most of the post-reunification period, however, mother refused to accept maternal grandparents as monitors. Mother even obtained an order from the juvenile court for visits at a neutral location with a neutral monitor. The record thus establishes that visitation was available to mother, but mother failed to take advantage of it.
There is no evidence in the record that having obtained an order for a neutral monitor, mother actually made any effort to find one. DCFS consistently reported throughout the post-reunification period that mother had made no attempt to arrange visitation, and had called maternal grandparents only sporadically to check on the children’s well-being. There is no evidence that mother proposed anyone other than her parents to monitor her visits, or that DCFS refused to approve anyone nominated by mother, or that a DCFS social worker was ever requested by mother and refused to act as monitor. The record therefore does not support mother’s contention that DCFS “deliberately . . . impeded” her visitation with children.
Mother argues that DCFS should have taken the “initiative to develop a creative approach(s) [sic] to assist Mother with the aspects of her illness that impeded her visits . . . .” Mother never raised this issue in the juvenile court, however, and therefore forfeited any such contention. (See In re S.B. (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1287, 1293.) Even if we were to consider mother’s argument, it does not prevail. Mother suggests that DCFS should have developed a “methodology to ensure Mother took her medication,” but offers no suggestion what such a “methodology” might be. DCFS regularly monitored and reported on what medications mother had been prescribed and, to the best of its ability, whether mother was taking them, at one point going so far as counting the pills in mother’s prescription bottles. Mother suggests that DCFS should have maintained “closer contact with Mother’s counselors and other mental health service providers,” but mother does not supply sufficient evidence as to how DCFS was deficient in liaising with mother’s mental health service providers, or how such “closer contact” would have benefited mother with respect to her visitation—especially given that mother’s therapist and psychiatrist both recommended against mother’s reunification with the children. Mother also suggests that DCFS should have held “regular, intensive meetings with Mother,” but fails to explain adequately what such meetings might have accomplished or how such meetings would have benefited mother with respect to her visitation. Moreover, it appears that for much of the post-reunification period, mother was living in a car with the father of Peter and Cruz; it therefore appears doubtful whether DCFS could have implemented any of the “creative approach[es]” mother now suggests were required.
Furthermore, it is significant that mother’s complaints relate only to the period after reunification services were terminated or denied. Before the termination of reunification services, the state has an affirmative obligation to facilitate family reunification. (In re Julie M. (1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 41, 49.) Reunification services must include visitation between parent and child “as frequent as possible, consistent with the well-being of the child.” (§ 362.1, subd. (a)(1)(A).) Accordingly, during the reunification period, “[v]isitation between a dependent child and his or her parents is an essential component of a reunification plan.” (In re Mark L. (2001) 94 Cal.App.4th 573, 580.)
In contrast, “[a]fter the termination of reunification services, the parents’ interest in the care, custody and companionship of the child are no longer paramount. Rather, at this point ‘the focus shifts to the needs of the child for permanency and stability’ [citation] . . . .” (In re Stephanie M. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 295, 317; accord, In re Marilyn H. (1993) 5 Cal.4th 295, 309.) Post reunification, the juvenile court does not need to consider the possibility of family reunification unless the parent affirmatively demonstrates changed circumstances sufficient to revive the issue. (In re Marilyn H., supra, 5 Cal.4th at p. 309.) After reunification services are terminated, the juvenile court must “permit the parent . . . to visit the child” unless visitation would be detrimental to the children (§ 366.21, subd. (h), italics added) so that the parent has a meaningful opportunity to demonstrate changed circumstances in support of a petition pursuant to section 388 (In re Marilyn H., supra, 5 Cal.4th at p. 309), or to establish the parental-relationship exception of section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(B)(i). (See In re Hunter S., supra, 142 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1504-1505.) But nothing in section 366.21, subdivision (h) imposes a mandatory duty on the juvenile court or DCFS to facilitate post-reunification visitation to the extent required during the reunification period.
Mother relies on In re Elizabeth R. (1995) 35 Cal.App.4th 1774 for the proposition that a parent suffering from mental illness is entitled to reunification services that are responsive to his or her particular circumstances. (Id. at p. 1790.) To the extent that case is arguably relevant here, however, it concerned the adequacy of visitation services provided during the reunification period. (Id. at p. 1789.) As noted above, DCFS does not have the same obligation to provide visitation services after the reunification period has been terminated. Moreover, In re Elizabeth R. involved a child welfare agency that had “rebuffed” a mother’s “persistent attempts to increase her visitation,” and which “belittled” and “demeaned” the mother because of her manic-depressive illness. (Id. at p. 1791.) The mother in that case had been hospitalized “for most of the reunification period” (id. at p. 1787), yet the Court of Appeal noted that there was “little in the record about the department’s efforts to facilitate visitation during [the mother’s] hospitalizations.” (Id. at p. 1791.) That is not the situation in this case. Here, as noted above, visitation was available to mother during throughout the post-reunification period, with the possible exception of mother’s brief hospitalization on a section 5150 hold in January 2008. Mother has failed to establish a violation of her right to due process.
DISPOSITION
The order is affirmed.
We concur: TURNER, P. J., KRIEGLER, J.