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In re Cameron A.

California Court of Appeals, First District, Fifth Division
Apr 30, 2009
No. A121882 (Cal. Ct. App. Apr. 30, 2009)

Opinion


In re CAMERON A., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. CAMERON A., Defendant and Appellant. A121882 California Court of Appeal, First District, Fifth Division April 30, 2009

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

Del Norte County Super. Ct. No. JD-SQ-08-0006067

SIMONS, J.

An April 2, 2008 juvenile wardship petition (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 602, subd. (a)) alleged that on or about April 1, 15-year-old Cameron A. (appellant) committed second degree robbery (Pen. Code, § 211) and received stolen property (Pen. Code, § 496, subd. (a)). Following an April 9 contested jurisdictional hearing, the court sustained the allegations of the petition. On June 12, appellant was declared a ward of the court and placed on probation subject to various conditions. On appeal, he contends the court abused its discretion in imposing several conditions of probation.

All undesignated section references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.

BACKGROUND

In the late afternoon on April 1, 2008, the 15-year-old victim was walking to a Wal Mart store near his home to purchase some items for his mother. She had given him two $20 bills and he had $10 of his own money. After realizing he forgot his shopping list, the victim began walking back to his house. En route three males approached the victim. One of the males, later identified as Jody Bingham, was older and showed the victim a gun he had under his shirt. Another had a Mohawk haircut and held a pocket knife with an open blade, and a third “kid,” Brendon, had blue tinted hair and held a stick. At the jurisdictional hearing, the victim identified appellant as the person holding the knife.

Three or four days earlier, while fishing, the victim had met Bingham who was with appellant and Brendon. The victim told Bingham he lived near Wal-Mart. Later that night Bingham and three others, including appellant, came to the victim’s house. Bingham asked to see the victim’s raccoons, the victim complied, after which Bingham and the others left.

Bingham and appellant then said to the victim, “You better empty all your pockets or else it’s gonna get ugly.” The victim pulled a knife from his pocket in order to defend himself and told the men to stay away from him. Appellant then took the knife away from the victim and the three men started yelling and demanding the victim’s money. The victim complied, took the money out of his pocket, and appellant grabbed it. Appellant then said, “We’re with the Aryan Nation and if you snitch on us we’ll burn your house down and gut all your raccoons and animals.” The three men then fled. The victim ran home and told a neighbor he had just been robbed at gunpoint. The neighbor and the victim’s mother called the police.

The victim raised chickens and goats and had four pet raccoons.

Thereafter, Police Officer Burke met with the victim who gave a description of the robbers. Del Norte County Deputy Sheriff Griffin was dispatched to the robbery scene and received a description of the robbery suspects. As Griffin neared the area, he saw people matching the description of the suspects. When Griffin ordered them to stop, only one, Brendon, complied and was detained; the other two fled. Brendon told Griffin he had been with appellant, and Brendon and appellant lived at the same address. That evening, Burke drove the victim and his mother to Brendon’s address and the victim identified appellant and Brendon as his robbers. Appellant was then taken into custody. At another location the victim identified Bingham as the third robber.

After waiving his Miranda rights (Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436), appellant admitted his involvement in the robbery. Appellant told Griffin the following: Appellant, Bingham, and Brendon went to the victim’s residence the night before the robbery and the victim bragged about having a large amount of money and a nine-millimeter gun on his person. Thereafter, Bingham tried to coerce appellant to do a home invasion robbery at the victim’s home that night, but appellant talked Bingham out of it. The next day appellant, Bingham, and Brendon went to the victim’s residence and “coaxed” him to come out to go on a walk with them. During the walk Bingham confronted the victim, demanded money, and became “very aggressive” with him. Appellant was “kind of taken back” by Bingham’s aggressiveness, so he encouraged the victim to turn over the money so the victim would not get hurt. Following the incident, appellant, Bingham, and Brendon split the robbery proceeds. Appellant wanted to go back to his residence to change his clothes and say goodbye to his girlfriend because he knew he was going to jail. Appellant said his share of the robbery proceeds was in his jacket underneath his bed. Griffin retrieved a $20 bill and two $1 bills from the jacket.

Miranda D., the mother of appellant’s pregnant girlfriend, said appellant resided with Miranda and her daughter at Miranda’s residence at the time of the incident. When the police arrived on the night of the robbery, Miranda found appellant hiding underneath a bed and Miranda encouraged him to turn himself in, which he did. Miranda found appellant’s jacket and the money. She did not find a knife and was unaware of appellant ever possessing a knife.

DISCUSSION

Appellant contends the court erred in imposing three conditions of his probation.

Section 730, subdivision (b), provides in part: “... The court may impose and require any and all reasonable conditions that it may determine fitting and proper to the end that justice may be done and the reformation and rehabilitation of the ward enhanced.” Moreover, “A condition of probation will not be held invalid unless it ‘(1) has no relationship to the crime of which the offender was convicted, (2) relates to conduct which is not in itself criminal, and (3) requires or forbids conduct which is not reasonably related to future criminality....’ [Citation.]” (People v. Lent (1975) 15 Cal.3d 481, 486, fn. omitted.) “The juvenile court has wide discretion to select appropriate conditions and may impose ‘ “any reasonable condition that is ‘fitting and proper to the end that justice may be done and the reformation and rehabilitation of the ward enhanced.’ ” ’ [Citations.] In distinguishing between the permissible exercise of discretion in probationary sentencing by the juvenile court and that allowed in ‘adult’ court, we have advised that, ‘[a]lthough the goal of both types of probation is the rehabilitation of the offender, “[j]uvenile probation is not, as with an adult, an act of leniency in lieu of statutory punishment....” [¶] In light of this difference, a condition of probation that would be unconstitutional or otherwise improper for an adult probationer may be permissible for a minor under the supervision of the juvenile court.... [¶]... [N]o choice is given to the youthful offender [to accept probation]. By contrast, an adult offender “has the right to refuse probation, for its conditions may appear to [the] defendant more onerous than the sentence which might be imposed.” [Citations.]’ [Citations.]” (In re Sheena K. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 875, 889-890.) We review the juvenile court’s imposition of a probation condition for abuse of discretion. (People v. Carbajal (1995) 10 Cal.4th 1114, 1121.)

I. Condition Requiring Blood, Breath or Urine Testing

Appellant contends the court erred in imposing the probation condition that he “shall submit to a blood, breath or urine test or a field sobriety test on the demand of any peace officer. Any scheduled test that is diluted will be regarded as a probation violation.” He contends the condition that he submit to drug and alcohol testing does not relate to behavior that is itself criminal and the condition is not reasonably related to the crimes which he was found to have committed. He also contends the condition violates his state constitutional right to privacy.

Appellant is correct that the probation department’s May 2008 dispositional report did not mention any drug or alcohol use or abuse by appellant. However, at the dispositional hearing the probation officer testified that the drug and alcohol condition was recommended because appellant had “admitted to having issues with drugs in the past. He’s been clean now for quite some time. But the probation department wants this as a tool to [e]nsure he’s going to remain clean.” Appellant contends this “rather vague statement” by the probation officer is not “persuasive evidence that appellant ever actually abused alcohol or drugs as opposed to typical teen experimentation.” Moreover, he argues that given his current nonuse of drugs, the condition is unrelated to his possible future criminality. He acknowledges that section 729.3 gave the court discretion to impose urine testing, but argues the circumstances of the case do not justify the exercise of that discretion.

Section 729.3 provides, “If a minor is found to be a person described in Section 601 or 602 and the court does not remove the minor from the physical custody of his or her parent or guardian, the court, as a condition of probation, may require the minor to submit to urine testing upon the request of a peace officer or probation officer for the purpose of determining the presence of alcohol or drugs.”

In imposing probation conditions the juvenile court must consider the circumstances of the offense as well as the minor’s entire social history. (In re Tyrell J. (1994) 8 Cal.4th 68, 81, overruled on other grounds in In re Jaime P. (2006) 40 Cal.4th 128, 130, 139.) The court should address the problem of juvenile delinquency at its inception, when minors are more amenable to rehabilitation, and intervene when the minor shows early signs of delinquency such as drug and alcohol abuse. (In re Kacy S. (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 704, 711.)

We conclude the drug and alcohol testing condition imposed on appellant was a proper exercise of the court’s discretion. Drug and alcohol use by a minor is unlawful. (In re Kacy S., supra, 68 Cal.App.4th at p. 710.) The probation officer’s testimony that appellant had admitted to having issues with drugs in the past provides substantial evidence that appellant had early signs of delinquency regarding drug abuse. The Legislature has determined that drug and alcohol use is a precursor to delinquency. (Stats. 1989, ch. 1117, § 1, subd. (a)(2), p. 4113.) The drug and alcohol testing condition was designed in part to detect and deter appellant’s use of drugs and alcohol, in the hopes of deterring appellant’s future criminality.

In his reply brief appellant asserts that the probation officer’s statement that appellant had past “issues” with drugs does not establish past drug use or abuse. The court could reasonably interpret appellant’s past “issues” with drugs to mean past drug use or abuse.

While court-ordered drug testing of minors implicates their right to privacy, conditions infringing on constitutional rights may not be invalid if they are specifically tailored to fit the needs of the juvenile. (In re Carmen M. (2006) 141 Cal.App.4th 478, 494; In re Christopher M. (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 684, 693.) In light of appellant’s prior drug use, the infringement on his privacy is not invalid, especially since the drug and alcohol testing is not random; it is only to be performed on the request of a peace officer.

II. Condition Prohibiting Drug And Alcohol Paraphernalia

Appellant also challenges the probation condition that he “not possess any paraphernalia, pictures, clothing or other miscellaneous items that promote drug or alcohol use.” In recommending this condition the probation officer said, “I don’t think young people should be walking around promoting drug or alcohol use.” Appellant argues that in light of his social history, there is no connection between this probation condition and either the crime he committed or his possible future criminality.

Once again, based on the evidence of appellant’s past issues with drugs, the court could reasonably impose this condition on appellant in an effort to deter his future drug and alcohol use and criminality.

III. Condition Prohibiting Weapons Possession

Finally, appellant contends the court improperly imposed the probation condition that he “not possess any weapons.” The probation officer recommended this probation condition because “this was a serious -- it was a felony offense. And it was by... force or fear.” Appellant contends the condition is unconstitutionally vague and overbroad because the meaning of the term “weapons” is uncertain. He argues that because many objects that are not inherently dangerous have been found to be deadly weapons, such as stones, bottles or screwdrivers, the weapons condition does not notify him of what is required of him.

For the first time in his reply brief, appellant conclusorily argues that the condition is improper because a gun and knife were not used in the robbery. Assuming the claim is not waived, the argument fails on the merits. In demanding the victim’s money, appellant told him to empty his pockets or it would “get ugly.” After taking the victim’s money, appellant threatened to burn down the victim’s house and “gut” his animals. Such threats of violence clearly justify a condition prohibiting weapons.

Appellant asserts that the term “dangerous or deadly weapon” is not constitutionally vague, while the term “any weapons” is vague. In order to withstand a vagueness challenge, a probation condition “ ‘must be sufficiently precise for the probationer to know what is required of him, and for the court to determine whether the condition has been violated.’ ” (In re Sheena K, supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 890.) A probation condition that limits constitutional rights will be deemed “constitutionally overbroad when it substantially limits a person’s rights and those limitations are not closely tailored to the purpose of the condition.” (People v. Harrisson (2005) 134 Cal.App.4th 637, 641.)

We conclude the probation condition prohibiting appellant’s possession of “any weapons” is vague and overbroad since it fails to adequately identify or reasonably regulate the objects that may be encompassed within the prohibition. Because the condition potentially precludes items beyond those recognized and identified as dangerous and deadly weapons, it fails to provide a comprehensible reference as to what is prohibited. The condition also fails to provide both appellant and those who are responsible for enforcing it with reasonable notice of its parameters. By prohibiting appellant’s possession of “any weapons,” the condition potentially includes within its scope objects that may look like a weapon, or could be used as a weapon, regardless of the objects’ function or use, and regardless of appellant’s intent. Because innocuous objects used in every day life could be construed as prohibited under the probation condition, the condition is vague and overbroad.

The People assert that a probation condition prohibiting appellant’s possession of a “deadly or dangerous weapon” would pass constitutional muster. We agree. The meaning of the phrase “deadly and dangerous weapon” has been explained clearly in case law. In People v. Henderson (1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 453, the court stated: “In... People v. Simons (1996) 42 Cal.App.4th 1100, the court was asked to decide whether a screwdriver could be a deadly weapon under [Penal Code] section 417.8. [Citation.] The Simons court... recit[ed] the long-standing distinction between weapons that are inherently deadly or dangerous and those that are deadly or dangerous based only on the facts of the particular case: ‘ “ ‘There are, first, those instrumentalities which are weapons in the strict sense of the word, and, second, those instrumentalities which are not weapons in the strict sense of the word, but which may be used as such. The instrumentalities falling in the first class, such as guns, dirks and blackjacks, which are weapons in the strict sense of the word and are “dangerous or deadly” to others in the ordinary use for which they are designed, may be said as a matter of law to be “dangerous or deadly weapons.” This is true as the ordinary use for which they are designed establishes their character as such. The instrumentalities falling into the second class, such as ordinary razors, pocket-knives, hatpins, canes, hammers, hatchets and other sharp or heavy objects, which are not weapons in the strict sense of the word and are not “dangerous or deadly” [to] others in the ordinary use for which they are designed, may not be said as a matter of law to be “dangerous or deadly weapons.” When it appears, however, that an instrumentality other than one falling within the first class is capable of being used in a “dangerous or deadly” manner, and it may be fairly inferred from the evidence that its possessor intended on a particular occasion to use it as a weapon should the circumstances require, we believe that its character as a “dangerous or deadly weapon” may be thus established, at least for the purposes of that occasion.” ’ [Citations.] ” (Id. at pp. 467-468.) We thus remand the matter to the juvenile court with directions to modify the weapons condition to state that appellant “shall not possess any deadly or dangerous weapons.”

DISPOSITION

The matter is remanded to the trial court to modify the weapons probation condition in accordance with the views expressed herein. In all other respects the order is affirmed.

We concur. JONES, P.J., BRUINIERS, J.

Judge of the Contra Costa Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.


Summaries of

In re Cameron A.

California Court of Appeals, First District, Fifth Division
Apr 30, 2009
No. A121882 (Cal. Ct. App. Apr. 30, 2009)
Case details for

In re Cameron A.

Case Details

Full title:In re CAMERON A., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. THE…

Court:California Court of Appeals, First District, Fifth Division

Date published: Apr 30, 2009

Citations

No. A121882 (Cal. Ct. App. Apr. 30, 2009)